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The thesis addresses how effectively or otherwise litigation and NHS complaints 
procedures redress ‘harm’ suffered by patients through treatment under the NHS. I 
argue that patients’ entitlement to redress within the NHS is founded on corrective 
justice principles, requiring one who harms another without justification to indemnify 
the individual harmed. Entitlement is finite because the NHS is a communal enterprise 
with limited resources explicitly expected to be shared throughout the population. 
Accordingly, distributive justice must apply to monetary compensation. For my 
purposes, harm includes significant adverse events, even where the requirements for 
actionable negligence necessary to mount successful legal action are not met. The 
emphasis is on patients’ access to justice, with account also taken of the toll on doctors 
under the present system. 
 
I explore what patients seek from redress and the possible forms compensation may 
take. Litigation, curtailed by withdrawal of public funding, can only offer damages for 
loss. Complaints procedures theoretically offer, inter alia, explanations, apologies and 
undertakings to repair. Careful consideration of both systems reveals that in their 
present unconnected form, insufficient congruence obtains between what aggrieved 
patients with complex needs require and what they receive. 
 
Lack of open disclosure of adverse events perpetuates power differentials between 
parties and adversely affects patients’ abilities to seek appropriate redress. Analysis of 
constraints on disclosure highlights the nuanced communication that is necessary and 
the fears of legal ramifications which apologies engender. After discussing apology-
protection legislation in other common law countries, I argue for the role that full 
apologies can play in explanation, communication and undertakings to repair, 
particularly in addressing intangible loss. I also argue that in a universal health service, 
non-pecuniary losses should not be monetarily compensated because they are 
uncommodifiable and because of distributive justice demands. The thesis concludes 







If no man is an island, then no doctoral candidate can reach this point in their studies 
without the help of an unseen army of supporters. Dedications and acknowledgements 
have been referred to as ‘making the private public’ and everyone mentioned below has 
assisted me in ways that words alone cannot convey. 
 
My philosophical, legal and ethical viewpoint comes shaped by inspirational Professor, 
Jonathan Glover, and the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King’s College, London. 
Professor Ben Bowling’s Research Seminars were an excellent introduction to the 
discipline of studying for a doctorate. I am particularly obliged to Professor Prue Vines, 
University of New South Wales Law School, for generously making available to me her 
creative and humane writings regarding apologies in the context of clinical negligence. 
My first supervisor, Associate Professor Mr Mark Lunney, introduced me to the 
doctoral process, while my second supervisor, Professor Maria Lee, saw me through the 
transition from MPhil to PhD. Professor Rosamund Scott, my final supervisor, manages 
to combine immense scholarship with grace and unflagging support and humour. I am 
grateful to Ms Annette Lee, learning and teaching officer, for her guidance and common 
sense, and to Brigitte Shade and Madeline Cohen who always managed to make best 
copy from my jottings. 
 
Although the subject matter of the thesis is about when medical matters go awry, this is 
not a reflection of my experience. It has been my good fortune to have learned from 
exemplary doctors. For many years I worked with Dr Dora Black, Consultant 
Psychiatrist (Child and Adolescent), who set the standard for excellent practice. 
Professors John Studd and Margaret Johnson, Dr Clive Malcolm Tonks, Dr Kevin 
Zilkha and the late Dr Isaac Kashi all combine compassion, humour and understanding 
with the highest professional standards. In this they represent the highest traditions of 
the original NHS. 
 
If the adage “by his friends shall ye know him” holds true, I would be proud to be 
counted as one of the Tuesday Stitching Group. The indomitable four ladies buoyed me 
up when I was flagging and offered education, information, practical help and pleasant 





mysteries of Intellectual Property law with clarity and humour and Sandra, his very 
special wife, took up where George left off to see me through to the final thesis. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my husband, Berny, for his enormous generosity of spirit, 
love, and his practical skills with computers and language, translating Americanisms 
into English. My dear cheerleading children, sons-in-law and grandchildren provided 
the encouragement, laughter and fun throughout the whole project. Finally, I wish to 
honour the memory of my parents and my wonderful cousin Regina who would be 








TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................................5 
CASES .........................................................................................................................11 
STATUTES..................................................................................................................16 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................16 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................21 
PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE THESIS..................................................................21 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................21 
II. ARGUMENTS AND THEMES .....................................................................22 
A. The Problem ................................................................................................22 
B. Claimants and Complainants: Both Short-changed?...................................23 
C. Implicit Assumptions ..................................................................................24 
D. Civil Litigation and the NHS Complaints Procedure: 
The Patient’s Dilemma: Which or Both?....................................................26 
E. The Import of Redress: Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Losses ...................26 
F. Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies ..............................................27 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ..........................................................28 
PART I INTRODUCTION..............................................................................29 
Chapter 1: Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress within the NHS.....29 
Chapter 2 Redress for Iatrogenic Harm: What Patients Seek: 
Claimants and Complainants ......................................................................29 
PART II MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION ......................................31 
Chapter 3: Funding Litigation..........................................................................32 
Chapter 4 Proving Clinical Negligence, Duty of Care and Breach of Duty ....33 
Chapter 5 Causation .........................................................................................34 
Chapter 6 Damages ..........................................................................................35 
PART III REDRESS WITHIN THE NHS.......................................................37 
Chapter 7 History of NHS Processes – A Curate’s Egg? ................................37 
Chapter 8 NHS Redress Act 2006 – A Lost Opportunity ................................38 
Chapter 9 Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies..................................39 
IV. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................39 
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................41 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND ..................................................................................41 
ENTITLEMENT TO REDRESS WITHIN THE NHS................................................41 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................42 
A. From Recipients to Citizens ........................................................................43 
II. ENTITLEMENT TO REDRESS: COMPETING THEORIES OF JUSTICE..45 
A. The Role of Fault ........................................................................................47 
B. Concepts of Justice ......................................................................................49 
1. Claimants and Defendants: Their Relationship........................................51 
2. Corrective Justice .....................................................................................53 
3. Distributive Justice...................................................................................56 
C. Corrective or Distributive Justice as a Basis for Recovery .........................58 
 In Clinical Negligence Cases ......................................................................58 
1. The Hillsborough Cases: The Police, the Public and the Bereaved 
    Relatives...................................................................................................59 
2. Wrongful Pregnancy Cases: Who Pays for Baby?...................................62 
a) McFarlane and the ‘Healthy Child’..................................................62 





ii. ‘The parents’ claim’.........................................................................64 
b) Parkinson – the ‘Disabled Child’ and Rees - the ‘Disabled Parent’ ...66 
c) Rees: the ‘Disabled Parent’ .............................................................68 
D. Corrective and Distributive Justice: Damages and the NHS.......................69 
III. CONCLUSION: FORMS OF REDRESS......................................................71 
A. Civil Litigation and the NHS Complaints Procedure..................................72 
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................73 
WHAT DO PATIENTS SEEK FROM REDRESS? ...................................................73 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................74 
II. PATIENTS’ COMPLEX DESIRES ...............................................................75 
A. Restoration: How Far Can Money Take Us? ..............................................76 
1. Claimants .................................................................................................77 
2. Complainants ...........................................................................................78 
B. Communication: Can You Hear Me? ..........................................................79 
1. The Patient’s Perspective .........................................................................80 
2. The Physician’s Perspective.....................................................................81 
3. Government Initiatives.............................................................................81 
III. OPEN DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
      DISCLOSURE TO PATIENTS.....................................................................83 
IV. WHAT PATIENTS SEEK FROM REDRESS: CONCLUSIONS................86 
PART II........................................................................................................................89 
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION .................................................................89 
CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................90 
FUNDING LITIGATION............................................................................................90 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................91 
A. Clinical Negligence: A Special Case?.........................................................92 
B. Funding Legal Actions ................................................................................94 
II. LEGAL AID....................................................................................................94 
A. Legal Aid in the Past: Whither the Welfare State? .....................................94 
B. Reform of Civil Procedure ..........................................................................95 
C. The Legal Aid System: Effect on Litigation ...............................................96 
D. Modern Times: Legal Aid in Action at Present ..........................................97 
1. The Legal Framework for Funding Legal Aid.........................................97 
a) The Legal Framework: Access to Justice Act 1999.........................97 
E. The Future: Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid....................................99 
F. The Claimant’s Rights: Challenges to Refusals of Legal Aid ...................100 
1. Challenges to Funding Decisions before the Administrative Court.......100 
a) Multiparty Actions .........................................................................100 
b) Procedural Challenges....................................................................102 
2. The Human Rights Act 1998 and Funding Civil Justice .......................103 
G. Goodbye Legal Aid: Hello CFAs..............................................................105 
III. CFAs: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD ..........................................................105 
A. CFAs: Statutory Requirements .................................................................107 
1. The Success Fee .....................................................................................107 
2. ATE Insurance and Disbursements........................................................109 
3. Recoverability of the Success Fee ‘Uplift’ and the ATE Insurance 
Premiums from the Losing Defendants......................................................110 
4. Costs-Only Proceedings: Civil Procedure Rule (hereinafter ‘CPR’) 
    44.12A....................................................................................................112 
B. An Alternative to CFAs: Private Funding of Personal Injury Claims.......112 





V. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: HOW WIDE ARE THE GATES? ........................113 
CHAPTER 4 ..............................................................................................................116 
PROVING CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE....................................................................116 
DUTY OF CARE.......................................................................................................116 
BREACH OF DUTY AND THE STANDARD OF CARE ......................................116 
Bolam, Bolitho, the Experts and the Claimant ...........................................................116 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................117 
II. PROVING LIABILITY: DUTY OF CARE .................................................119 
A. Conceptual Framework .............................................................................119 
B. Establishing a Duty of Care.......................................................................120 
C. When a Duty of Care Arises......................................................................121 
1. General Practitioners: Issues of Liability...............................................121 
2. Hospitals: Issues of Liability – Vicarious Liability and Non- 
    Delegable Duty ......................................................................................122 
D. Health Workers and Non-Patients: Can a Duty of Care Arise? ................124 
III. THE HRA 1998: DOCTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES – PATIENTS’ 
      RIGHTS .......................................................................................................125 
IV. BREACH OF DUTY AND STANDARD OF CARE.................................128 
A. Introduction ...............................................................................................128 
B. Not Yet Bye-Bye Bolam: Factors Triggering the Bolitho ‘Gloss’............129 
1. Introduction and Context .......................................................................129 
2. The ‘Bolam Test’....................................................................................131 
3. Bolitho: from the Descriptive to the Normative.....................................134 
a) Bolitho in Action................................................................................135 
4. Bolam, Bolitho and Access to Justice ....................................................136 
C. Setting the Standard...................................................................................137 
A Responsible Body of Medical Opinion: Experts........................................137 
1. Experts ...................................................................................................137 
a) The Expert’s Duty..............................................................................138 
b) Expert Witness Immunity: Jones v Kaney.........................................139 
2. Experts’ Immunity: The Public Policy Aspect and Reluctance 
    to Testify ................................................................................................140 
3. Vexatious Claims ...................................................................................141 
4. Access to Justice ....................................................................................142 
C. The Expert Witness: The Role of Protocols and Guidelines.....................143 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE CLAIMANT’S BURDEN – DUTY and BREACH ..144 
CHAPTER 5 ..............................................................................................................146 
PROVING LIABILITY .............................................................................................146 
CAUSATION.............................................................................................................146 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................147 
II. SPECIAL FEATURES OF CLAIMS FOR CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE.....148 
A. Medicine as an Art ....................................................................................148 
B. Difficulties of Proof of Causation in Medical Cases.................................149 





III. THE CAUSATION ELEMENT ..................................................................154 
A. The ‘But-For’ Test ....................................................................................155 
B. Uncertain Causation: Who gets the Benefit of the Doubt? .......................159 
1. Material Contribution to the Damage: A Response to Causal  
    Uncertainty? ...........................................................................................161 
2. Material Contribution to the Risk of Harm ............................................164 
3. A Case of Alternative Causes: Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority.....170 
4. The Fairchild Approach to Causation ...................................................175 
5. Clinical Negligence Cases: Does Fairchild Apply? ..............................180 
6. Modifying the Strict Rules: Chester v Afshar ........................................182 
a) Chester v Afshar: The Case ...............................................................183 
i. The House of Lords’ Solution.........................................................184 
b) Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence?........................184 
c) Negligence, Causation and Informed Consent...................................185 
i. The Problem....................................................................................185 
d) Chester and Damages.........................................................................187 
e) Tort After Chester ..............................................................................188 
IV. LOSS OF CHANCE ....................................................................................189 
A. Historical Loss of Chance Case: Hotson...................................................191 
B. Loss of Chance: Gregg v Scott..................................................................193 
1. Gregg v Scott in the Court of Appeal.....................................................194 
2. Loss of Chance in the House of Lords ...................................................196 
a) The Claimant’s Arguments: The Quantification Argument ..............196 
b) The Loss of Chance Argument ..........................................................197 
C. Discussion of Loss of Chance ...................................................................199 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CAUSATION .........................................202 
VI. CONCLUSIONS ON PROVING LIABILITY ...........................................205 
CHAPTER 6 ..............................................................................................................206 
DAMAGES................................................................................................................206 
‘WHEN SORRY DOESN’T CUT THE MUSTARD’ ..............................................206 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................207 
II. SETTING THE SCENE: THEORIES AND PRACTICALITIES OF 
    COMPENSATION ........................................................................................209 
A. Theoretical Constructs in Non-Pecuniary Loss.........................................210 
B. Conceptual Difficulties..............................................................................212 
C. Putting a Price on Pain and Suffering: Theoretical Issues of 
Quantification............................................................................................215 
D. Practical Issues of Quantification of Redress for Non-Pecuniary Loss ....218 
1. Principles of Assessment: Pain and Suffering .......................................219 
2. Loss of Amenity.....................................................................................220 
3. Evidence.................................................................................................222 
E. Non-Pecuniary Loss: The View from Abroad...........................................222 
III. DAMAGES IN RESPECT OF DEATH......................................................224 
A. The Survival Action ..................................................................................224 
B. The Dependency Action ............................................................................225 
1. Calculating the Dependency ..................................................................228 
2. Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in Respect of Bereavement: Who 





IV. PECUNIARY LOSS ASPECT OF CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ...232 
A. Lump Sum or Periodical Payment?...........................................................233 
B. Potential Problems in the Calculation of Pecuniary Loss: Medical Costs .....234 
C. Conclusion: Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Loss ......................................235 
V. PSYCHIATRIC HARM IN THE CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE SPHERE....237 
A. Mental and Emotional Harm: Problems of Classification ........................237 
B. Medical Classification ...............................................................................239 
C. Legal Classification ...................................................................................240 
D. Liability for Psychiatric Harm: ‘Beyond the Mainstream’ – The Current 
Position......................................................................................................242 
E. The View from Afar: Australia..................................................................244 
VI. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE: PECUNIARY AND NON-
      PECUNIARY LOSS ....................................................................................245 
VII. CONCLUSION: DAMAGES AS REDRESS FOR IATROGENIC HARM: 
PECUNIARY AND NON-PECUNIARY LOSS ..............................................248 
PART III ....................................................................................................................251 
REDRESS WITHIN THE NHS.................................................................................251 
CHAPTER 7 HISTORY OF THE NHS COMPLAINTS PROCESSES 
                      ‘A CURATE’S EGG’?.........................................................................252 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................253 
A. Medical Error in Context ..........................................................................256 
1. Historical Backdrop: ‘The Times They Are a-Changin’........................256 
2. Medical Error Defined ...........................................................................258 
B. Regulation and Investigation.....................................................................261 
1. Regulation: Doctors and Hospitals ........................................................262 
a) The General Medical Council: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? .......262 
b) Clinical Governance ..........................................................................262 
2. Investigation...........................................................................................264 
a) Inquests ..............................................................................................264 
b) Public Inquiries ..................................................................................265 
c) Conclusion: Regulation and Investigation .........................................267 
II. THE WORLD OF COMPLAINTS...............................................................268 
A. Introduction ...............................................................................................268 
B. Complaints Procedures: A Troubled History ............................................270 
C. The Extant Complaints Procedure.............................................................272 
1. From Three Stages to Two.....................................................................272 
2. Access to Justice via the Complaints Process ........................................273 
D. The Health Service Ombudsman ..............................................................274 
1. The Remit...............................................................................................274 
2. The Challenges.......................................................................................275 
E. Nobody Knows the Trouble I’ve Seen: How to Fix It ..............................276 
1. The Problems .........................................................................................276 
2. Access to the Complaints Process..........................................................277 
3. Disclosure...............................................................................................277 
4. Learning from Adverse Events ..............................................................278 





CHAPTER 8 ..............................................................................................................281 
THE NHS REDRESS ACT 2006 – A LOST OPPORTUNITY?..............................281 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................282 
A. The Historical Context: The Dreams ........................................................284 
II. ANTICIPATED PROVISIONS: THE REALITIES.....................................286 
A. Tort Based Eligibiliy Scheme: Access to Justice ......................................286 
B. Independence: Perception and Reality ......................................................288 
1. Appeals...................................................................................................289 
C. Redress ......................................................................................................289 
1. Financial Compensation.........................................................................290 
2. Explanations...........................................................................................291 
3. Future Remedial Care ............................................................................291 
D. Lost in Transit ...........................................................................................292 
E. Cost ............................................................................................................293 
III. OVER THE RAINBOW: WALES and SCOTLAND.................................294 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NHS REDRESS ACT 2006 ....................................295 
CHAPTER 9 ..............................................................................................................296 
EFFECTIVE REDRESS AND THE ROLE OF APOLOGIES.................................296 
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................297 
II. TAKING STOCK: REDRESS FOR IATROGENIC HARM.......................297 
A. Redress: The Moral Imperative Claimants and Defendants......................297 
B. Litigation and Complaints Claimant or Complainant?..............................301 
1. An Integrated System? ...........................................................................301 
2. Medical Negligence Litigation: Access to Justice? ...............................302 
3. Redress within the NHS: Just Redress as it Stands? ..............................303 
C. The Role of Apology in Addressing Non-Pecuniary Loss........................304 
III. FACILITATING EFFECTIVE REDRESS: APOLOGIES AND NON-
      PECUNIARY LOSS ....................................................................................305 
A. Setting the Scene: Trust ............................................................................305 
B. Apologies: Timing and Definition ............................................................306 
1. Timing ....................................................................................................307 
2. Full Apologies, Partial Apologies and Forgiveness: What Do We    
    Mean?.....................................................................................................307 
3. The Consequences of Offering Partial or Insincere Apologies..............308 
C. Apology-Protecting Legislation: Apologies, Insurance and Liability.......309 
1. Why Sorry is the Hardest Word .............................................................309 
2. The Effect of Apologies on Litigation ...................................................311 
D. The Other Side of the Coin: How Medical Apology Programs Harm 
Patients ......................................................................................................312 
IV. EFFECTIVE REDRESS..............................................................................314 
A. Can Complaints Programmes Become a Way to Build Trust? .................314 












AB v Tameside and Glossop Health Authority [1997] 8 Med LR 91 
Aerts v Belgium (Application No 25357/94) (1998) Reports 1998-V. 
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police: [1992] 1 AC 310 
Allin v City and Hackney Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 167 
Ann Marriot v Greggs PLC Leeds County Court Case No 757514. 
Appleton v Garrett (1995) 34 BMLR. 
Bailey v MOD and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 2913 (QB) 
Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 883. 
Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493. 
Barker v Corus UK Ltd (PLC) [2006] UKHL 20. 
Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572. 
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
Bateman v Hydro Agri (UK) LTD. (1995) unreported. 
Batt v Highgate Private Hospital [2004] EWHC 707, ch D (Patents). 
Begum v Barnett and Chase Farm Hospital Trust [2005] EWHC 3383 (QB). 
Benarr v. Kettering Health Authority [1988] N.L.J. 179 
Betney v Rowland and Mallard [1955] 2 All ER 166. 
Blake v Midland Railway Co. (1852) 18 QB 93. 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 381. 
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151, HL at 1160. 
Bolitho v City and Hackney HA (1997) 39 BMLR 1 (HL). 
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, (HL) 
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 
Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 
Callery v Gray [2001] 1 WLR 2112 and 2142 
Campbell v MGN [2005] UKHL 61 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 1 All ER 568. 
Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 
Chappel v Hart [1999] 2 LRC 341. 





Chester v Afshar [2002] EWCA Civ 724; [2003] QB 356; [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 
AC 134 (HL). 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease Litigation Group B Plaintiffs v Medical Research Council 
[2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 161 QB 
Cook v JL Kier & Co [1970] 1 WLR. 
D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151 
Dale v Bloomsbury AHA [1983] 2 All ER 522, [1983] 1 WLR 1098, per Jupp J. 
Danns v Department of Health [1998] PIQR P226 
De Freitas v O’Brien [1993] 4 Med L R 281 
Derrick Barr & Ors v Biffaste Services LTD & QBE Insurance (Europe) Ltd [2009] 
EWHC 1033 QBD (TCC). 
Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] QB 162 
Dixon (R on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2003] EWHC 325 
Admin. 
Doleman v Deakin (1990) Times, 30 January, CA. 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004. 
Emeh v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] QB 1012, 
[1984] 3 All ER 1044, CA. 
English v Emery Rheinbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409. 
Every v Miles (1964) unreported, Court of Appeal. 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305. 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22. 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1052. 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 89 
Farrell v Avon Health Authority [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458. 
Fawcett Old Ltd v Hibberd [2008] EWHC 90102 (Cost) upheld on appeal at [2008] 
EWCA Civ 1375. 
Fitzgerald v Lane [1987] All ER 455. 
Franklin v South Eastern Railway Co. (1858) 3 H & N 211 at 214. 
Freeman v Home Office [1984] 2 WLR 130. 
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1997] 3 WLR 1194 (CA) 
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1998] 3WLR 1509, [1999] 2 AC 
455. 
Garcia v St Mary’s NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2314 (QBD) 
Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All ER 161. 





Gregg v Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471. 
Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2. 
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176. 
Gregg v Scott [2005] 82 BMLR 52. 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 
Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272. 
Herskovits v Group Health Co-operative of Puget Sound 664 P. 2d 474 (1983) 
(Washington SC). 
Hicks and another v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 2 All ER 65, 
8 BMLR. 
Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 All ER 65, HL 
Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd. [2002] 3 All ER. 421. 
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 1 All ER 210 (CA). 
Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] 2 All ER 909 
Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] AC 750 
Humberstone, R (on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 
760 (Admin) (13 April 2010) 
Hunter v Hanley [1955] SLT 213 
Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718. 
Ichard v Frangoulis [1977] 2 All ER 461. 
Jaensch v Coffey, (1984) 155 CLR 549. 
JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23 
Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, [2011] All ER (D) 346 (Mar). 
Kent v Griffiths (N03) [2001] QB 36. 
Ku v Liverpool City Council [2005] EWCA Civ 475. 
Laferriere v Lawson (1991) 78 DLR (4th) 609 (SCC). 
Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174. 
Livngstone v Rawyards Coal Co. [1880] 5 AC 25. 
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990)169 Cambridge Law Review 638. 
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634. 
McCarthy v Essex Rivers Healthcare Trust [November 2009]. High Court, 
HQ06X03686 
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 





MacFarlane v Tayside [2002] 2 AC 59. Note that this variant spelling of the surname 
seems to be used only in the AC case of 2002. 
McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008 
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 
McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410 
Melchior v Cattanach 2000 SC1 (HL); [2000] AC 59. 
Melchior v Cattanach [2003] HCA 38, at [121-122]. 
Millett v McMonagle [1070] AC 166 (HL). 
Moriaty v McCarthy [1978] 1 WLR 155. 
Murray v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority, unreported, 
1981, CA 
Nationwide Organ Retention Group Litigation Order No. 9. 
Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269. 
Newell and Newell v Goldenberg [1995] 6 Med LR 371 
Oliver (executor of the Estate of John Oliver, Deceased) v (1) Whipps Cross University 
Hospital NHS Trust (2) Waltham Forest Primary Care Trust) [2009] EWHC 1104 
(QB). 
Osman v UK (1998) 29 EHRR 245. 
Osman and Keenan v UK [2001] 33 EHRR 913. 
Overton v Horder [2008] EWHC 90109 
Padfield v MAFF [1968] AC 977 
Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 
Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351CA 
Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co. [1928] 162 N.E. 99 at 100 (NYCA) 
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 
530; [2001] 3 All ER 97 
Parkinson v St James NHS Trust (CA) [2002] QB paras 56-57 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1999) 48 BMLR 118. 
Penney, Palmer and Cannon v East Kent Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 
41, 46, CA. 
Perotti v Collyer-Bristow [2003] EWCA Civ 1521 
Peters v East Midlands SHA [2009] 3 WLR 737 
Pickett v British Rail [1980] AC 136 





Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health [1965] AC 512 
Pukis v Brumby [2008] EWHC 90095 (Costs) 
R v Camden & Islington HA, ex p K (2001) 
R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Wagstaff (2001) 1 WLR 292 
R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Associated Newspapers Ltd The Times, 31 
August 2000 (QBD) 
R (On the application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v Secretary of State for Health) 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1129. 
R (on application of G) v Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 276 (Admin). 
Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 88, [2003] 4 All 
ER 987, [2004] AC 309, [2003] UKHL 52. 
Rees v Darlington Memorial NHS Trust [2003] 4 All ER 987. 
Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309. 
Rich v Pierpoint (1862) 176 ER 16 
Robert Alan Odes v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 552 (Admin.). 
Rogers v Whitaker [1992] ALJR 47 at 52. 
Rufo v Hosking [2004] NSWCA 391 (1 November 2004). 
S v Lothian Health Board (2009) SLT 689. 
Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust House of Lords, 10/12/08. 
Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74 
Sawar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2002] 1 WLR 125. 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1984] QB 493. 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital [1985] AC 871 at 881. 
Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) 
Sion v Hampstead HA [1994] 5 Med LR 170 (CA). 
Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 285. 
Smith v Salford Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 321. 
Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 334. 
Stanton v Callaghan [1999] 2 WLR 745. 
Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
Tan v East London and City Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 389. 





The Surgeon’s Case (or Morton’s Case) (1374) 48 EDW 11. 
Transco Plc v Griggs’ [2003] EWCA Civ 564. 
Udale v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1983] 2 All ER 531 
W (R on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 564 (Admin). 
Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2002] Lloyd’s Rep Med 227. 
Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273 at 299-300 
Wells v Wells [1998] 3 All ER 481. 
West H & Sons Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326 at 354. 
West v Shepherd [1964] AC 326, 344-353. 
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 1All ER1. 
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] AC 455 in the House of 
Lords 
Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 
Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER. 
Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801. 
Wilsher v Essex AHA [1987] QB 730 
Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074. 
Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] 1 All ER 883. 
Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638. 
Wright v British Railways Board [1983] 2 AC 773 
X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 
X v United Kingdom [1984] 6 EHRR136 
YM v Gloucester Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and the Secretary of State for Health 
[2006] EWHC 820, [2006] PIQR P27. 
STATUTES 
Access to Justice Act 1999 
British Colombia Apology Act RSBC 2006, Bill 16 
Civil Law Wrongs Act 2002 (ACT) 
Civil Liability (Personal Responsibility) Amendment Act 2002. 
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 28-30. 





Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 30. 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW) s 32. 
Civil Procedure Rules (1999) 
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules (2000) 
Compensation (Fatal Injuries Act (NT), s 10(f). 
Compensation Act 2006 s. 2: Apologies, Offers of Treatment or Redress. 
Compensation Act 2006 s. 3 
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995, SI 1995/1675 
Coroners Act 1988 
Coroners Rules 1984 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58A (6) and (7), as amended by AJA 1999, 
s 27(1). 
Damages (Government and Health Service Bodies) Order 2005, SI 2005/474. 
Damages (Variation of Periodical Payments) Order 2005, SI 2005/841. 
Damages Act 1996, ss 2-2B (as substituted by the (Courts Act 2003) 
Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 2002, 
SI2002/644. 
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (ENG), s 1A (bereavement). 
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982. 
Fatal Accidents Act 1976. 
The General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) (Amendment in relation to standard 
of proof) Rules Order of Council 2008, SI 2008/1256 
The General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) (Amendment) Rules Order of 
Council 2009, SI 2009/1913. 
The General Medical Council (License to Practise) Regulations Order of Council 2009, 
SI 2009/2739. 
Health & Social Care Act 2001 
Health & Social Care (Community Health & Standards) Act 2003 
Health & Social Care Bill 2011 
Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 
Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 as amended by the Health Service 





Human Rights Act 1998 Article 6 ‘right to a fair trial’. 
Inquiries Act 2005 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s 1(1A). 
Legal Aid Board’s Funding Code 1 April 2000 
Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 1997 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010-12 
Limitation Act 1980, s 38(1) 
Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) 
Regulations 2009. 
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 
Massachusetts General Laws TiT II Ch 333, s 23D. 
Medical Act 1983 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 
National Health Service Act 1977, s2 
National Health Service Act 2006 
NHS (Clinical Negligence Scheme) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/251 made under 
National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, s 21. 
National Health Service (Complaints) Regulations 2004 SI 2004/1768. 
The National Health Service (Complaints) Amendment Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2084. 
NHS Redress Bill Explanatory Note available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/137/en/06137x--.htm. 
NHS Redress Act 2006 
Ombudsman Case W 241/79-80, HC 51 (1982-83) 
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
The Redress Act 2006 
Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 69(3). 
Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injury and Death) Act (No. 2) 2004 (Cth). 
UK Compensation Act 2006 
Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) 





TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AC  Appeals Court 
AHA  Area Health Authority 
AJA  Access to Justice Act 1999 
ATE  After The Event (Insurance) 
AVMA Action for Victims of Medical Accidents 
BMA  British Medical Association 
BSB  Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein article Valuing Life and Limb 
CDS  Criminal Defence Service 
CFA  Conditional Fee Agreements 
CHRE  Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 
CLAF  Contingent Legal Aid Fund 
CLS  Community Legal Service 
CMO  Chief Medical Officer (The Ombudsman) 
CNST  Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts 
CPR  Civil Procedure Rule 
CQC  Care Quality Commission 
ECHR  European Convention of Human Rights 
ECT  Electroconvulsive Therapy (Electric Shock Treatment) 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
FRC  Funding Review Committee 
GLO  Group Litigation Order 
GMC  General Medical Council 
HA  Health Authority 
ICAS  Independent Complaints Advisory Service 
LJ  Lord Justice 
LSC  Legal Services Commission 
MMR  Measles Mumps and Rubella 
MOD  Ministry of Defence 
MRSA  Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
NHS  National Health Service 
NHSLA National Health Service Litigation Authority 
NICE  National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence  
NPSA  National Patient Safety Agency 
NT  Northern Territory (Australia) 
PALS  Patient Advice and Liaison Service 
PI  Personal Injury 
PIBA  Professional Insurance Brokers Association 
PPO  Periodical Payments Order 
PTSD  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
QC  Queen’s Counsel 
RLF  Retrolental Fibroplasia (Retinopathy of Prematurity) 
SA  (in legal citations) South Africa 
SC  (in legal citations) Supreme Court 










PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE THESIS 
 
The Library at Night argues that the hankering for a flawless system remains a 




At this time of political coalition and severe financial constraint,2 it is particularly 
challenging to consider the vexed question of meaningful redress for patients injured in 
the course of medical treatment within the National Health Service.3 In the euphoria of 
the inception of the NHS, little thought was given to who would be sued in case of 
medical negligence when things go wrong. I will argue that there is entitlement to 
redress within the NHS premised upon a theory of corrective justice which requires that 
somebody who has harmed another, albeit unintentionally but without justification, 
indemnify the other. However, the entitlement is finite. Because the NHS is a communal 
enterprise and there is an explicit expectation that the ‘goods’ (limited resources) will be 
shared throughout the population, distributive justice arguments serve to limit monetary 
compensation. 
 
The thesis addresses how effectively or otherwise the civil justice system through 
litigation, and/or the NHS complaints procedures, provides redress for patients suffering 
iatrogenic harm in the course of treatment received under the aegis of the NHS. 
 
The thesis begins with an exploration of the philosophical platform upon which 
entitlement to redress for iatrogenic harm rests. My argument will be that entitlement to 
redress is founded upon corrective justice principles. However, because I am looking 
exclusively at harm within a universal health service, principles of distributive justice 
are engaged in relation to financial settlement. 
 
I continue by considering what patients seek from redress and what motivates them to 
choose between litigation and complaint. This is followed by an analysis of medical 
                                             
1 A Manguel, The Library at Night (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008) quoted in The Independent, 
25 April, 2008. 
2 ‘Austerity Britain’ 2012. 





negligence litigation, which considers whether the requirement for successful litigation 
(including the issue of funding and the requirement for proving medical negligence) 
assists or hinders access to justice in law. The redress available through litigation is 
damages. I make a twofold argument that damages should only be available for 
pecuniary loss. This is because of the non-fungible nature of intangible loss and because 
of distributive necessity in a welfare medical system. I then turn to a critical overview of 
redress within the NHS. Here, I first consider the history of the NHS complaint 
processes and then analyse to what extent the current system addresses complainants’ 
needs. I conclude that both the civil justice system and the NHS complaints processes, 
for different reasons, fall short of providing just redress for iatrogenic harm. 
 
I conclude the thesis with consideration of how a more effective redress scheme could 
be achieved.4 There are two proposals for fast-track low-value clinical negligence 
schemes: Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals that the abandoned NHS Redress Act 2006 
be resurrected;5 and Lord Young’s proposal that the Road Traffic Act fast-track scheme 
be extended to clinical negligence claims.6 However, in the final chapter I concentrate 
most upon the role of apologies in the medical situation. Lack of disclosure of adverse 
events is a major stumbling block for iatrogenically harmed patients in both the 
litigation and complaints systems. I discuss factors that impede candour and I consider 
innovative programmes in common law countries which have apology laws and 
apology-protection laws in the medical context. It is to be hoped that more of the 
humane recommendations in Making Amends7 will come to fruition.8 
 
II. ARGUMENTS AND THEMES 
A. The Problem 
 
Modern healthcare is delivered in a highly complex, pressurised environment, often 
involving the care of seriously ill patients. More than in any other industry in which 
                                             
4 E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) 27 Professional Negligence 3, 138-157 at 139. 
5 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Final Report, (London, 
The Stationery Office, December 2009) ch 23, paras 7 and 8. 
6 HM Government, Lord Young, ‘Common Sense, Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of 
Graffham to the Prime Minister following a Whitehall‑wide review of the operation of health and safety 
laws and the growth of the compensation culture’ (London, The Stationery Office, October 2010), 23. 
7Chief Medical Officer, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for Reforming the 
Approach to Clinical Negligence in the NHS (Crown Copyright, Department of Health, 2003) (hereinafter 
CMO, Making Amends).  





risks occur, healthcare is reliant on people, more often than on machines, to make 
decisions, exercise judgement, and execute the techniques which will determine the 
outcome for a patient.9 In such circumstances, things can and do go wrong. Sometimes 
unintentional harm comes to patients as a result of a clinical decision or clinical 
procedure. The consequences may be very serious for the patient, his family and 
carers.10 There are said to be about a million adverse clinical events each year, but only 
a few thousand clinical negligence claims, of which only a modest proportion show a 
sustainable cause of action resulting in an award or settlement.11 Even accepting that an 
adverse event is not necessarily a breach of duty causing injury, the figures suggest that 
much negligence is not compensated and most cases of alleged negligence are not 
legally sustainable. There appears to be a mismatch between incidents of actual 
negligence and cases of alleged negligence.12 
 
B. Claimants and Complainants: Both Short-changed? 
 
In the Parliamentary debates involved with the passage of the NHS Redress Act 2006,13 
there was recognition of the problems of litigation: delay, limited access to justice, 
procedural complexity, low success rate and disproportionate legal cost.14 It was also 
clear from the debates in both Houses that most patients who have suffered adverse 
events want an explanation, an apology where appropriate, and some mechanism to 
ensure that lessons are learnt and mistakes avoided in the future.15 The reports of the 
Health Ombudsman and of the House of Commons Health Committee16 emphasised the 
failings of the current NHS complaints procedures and the need for better 
communication and more effective redress for complainants.17 
 
                                             
9 CMO Making Amends (n 7), 58. 
10 Ibid. 
11 MJ Powers, NH Harris and A Barton, Clinical Negligence, 4th edn, (Haywards Heath, Tottel 
Publishing Limited, 2008), Foreword.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Chapter 8 ‘NHS Redress Act 2006’ below. 
14 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation: Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’: Chapter 4 ‘Proving Clinical 
Negligence’ Chapter 5 ‘Causation’ below. 
15 NHS Redress Bill Explanatory Note available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/137/en/06137x--.htm. See Chapter 2 ‘What 
Do Patients Seek From Redress?’ below. 
16 A Abraham, Listening and Learning: the Ombudsman’s Review of Complaint Handling by the NHS in 
England 2010-1; House of Commons Health Committee, ‘Complaints and Litigation’ Sixth Report of 
Session 2010-12, Printed 22 June 2011. 





Overall, I argue that there is an implicit ethos that patients who are harmed should be 
compensated but that there are inadequate mechanisms in place to facilitate this. My 
thesis concerns itself with how to achieve, as near as possible, full redress for iatrogenic 
harm. I will consider redress not simply by means of financial compensation18 but in 
particular, I focus upon innovative redress for non-pecuniary harm by means of, inter 
alia, full apologies, relying on recent initiatives in Australia, Canada and the USA.19 I 
place special emphasis on the real difficulties of the communication of bad news and 
analyse the constraints on candour in the absence of a legal duty of candour and even 
where apology-protection legislation exists. I will also argue that, particularly in the 
context of a universal health service, monetary compensation is not appropriate to 
redress non-pecuniary, uncommodifiable, loss. My argument is both philosophical and 
practical. Redress for iatrogenic harm needs to be broader than financial compensation 
and should also include the possibility of acknowledgement apology, correction and 
sanction. Most importantly, in all the studies cited, aggrieved patients and relatives 
wanted assurance that ‘lessons would be learned’ and adverse events would not be 
repeated.20 Unfortunately, this is as yet an unrealised goal and systems for reporting 
adverse events in order to learn from them remain inadequate. 
 
C. Implicit Assumptions 
 
I have taken a broad definition of harm to include patients who have suffered a 
significant adverse event even if this falls short of the requirement of actionable 
negligence necessary to mount a successful legal action. The main emphasis is on 
patients and their access to justice, although account is taken of the toll on doctors under 
the present system. 
 
The parameters of the debate in this thesis are constrained by several underlying 
assumptions. First, there is a presumption of an idealised model of a welfare state 
National Health Service. This assumes that de facto ‘every penny spent on 
compensation is money that could otherwise be spent providing healthcare’.21 This 
model throws into stark relief the problem of NHS resources being used to compensate 
                                             
18 Chapter 6 ‘Damages’ below. 
19 Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies’ below. 
20 Chapter 2 ‘What Do Patients Seek From Redress?’ below. 





for non-pecuniary loss.22 Second, it will be argued that non-pecuniary loss is 
uncommodifiable23 and needs addressing, apart from financial compensation.24 Third, 
there is a preference towards the model of corrective justice, to be understood as the 
view based on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that individual moral rights are the 
foundation on which negligence law is based.25 Corrective justice theory focuses on the 
connection between law and morality by arguing that there is a specific obligation 
resting on the individual who causes harm to correct that harm in some way.26 Fault is 
central to negligence law because of its connection to moral responsibility27 and, in 
particular, to personal responsibility. There is an emphasis on the transactional nature of 
the relationship between victim and wrongdoer.28 Thus, although negligence law is 
outcome-responsibility based29 the fault principle (based on the act itself) is what 
operates to determine who should compensate.30 I find the corrective justice model so 
compelling because essentially the paradigm of clinical negligence concerns interaction 
between two individuals, the doctor and the patient.31 Corrective justice theory equates 
best to the moral hinterland of apologies. The moral account of apology focuses 
centrally on what was done, being the moral wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s action, 
while tort law focuses on outcome-responsibility. One of the reasons I will argue against 
a distributive justice model, which more easily accepts the idea of no-fault schemes, is 
on the basis that it neglects the necessary moral recognition of responsibility.32 
 
                                             
22 This model also puts to one side the real world where NHS funding gets diverted, eg ‘Accenture, the 
leading management and technology consulting firm, announced a provision for a further £450 million of 
losses against its contract to deploy IT systems on behalf of the English NHS.’ The Guardian 29 March 
2006. 
23 See M Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996). 
24 See Chapter 6 ‘Damages’ for discussion of the role of damages for non-pecuniary loss.  
25 P Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal Of Law And Social Justice 1, 13. Note: corrective justice as 
opposed to distributive justice. See Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress within the 
NHS’ below. 
26S Perry, ‘The Moral Foundation of Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449 and E Weinrib, ‘The 
Special Morality of Tort Law’ (1989) 34 McGill LJ 403 for accounts of corrective justice theory. 
27 See Vines (n 25), 14 fn 63 for further accounts of corrective justice theory. 
28 E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995), 57. 
29 This represents the view that the wrongdoer must be responsible for the outcome of his actions rather 
than the actions themselves. 
30 Perry (n 26), 497. 
31 Admittedly the paradigm may be deceptive. One of the dyad may turn out to be a large corporation/ 
hospital. 





D. Civil Litigation and the NHS Complaints Procedure: 
The Patient’s Dilemma: Which or Both? 
 
The legal and the Health Service routes to justice are quite different. The former offers 
damages, the latter explanations, apologies where appropriate, and undertakings to 
repair. Damages operate as compensation, as a marker of wrongdoing and as 
acknowledgement that redress is needed. Damages also address needs and this might be 
regarded as their most significant aspect. Explanations and apologies act as different 
types of reparation. They address the emotional and moral pain suffered by the victim 
and his family. However, as will be shown, access to either system presents 
difficulties.33 Patients and their families may have to endure repeated hearings in their 
efforts to obtain information and justice.34 Until recently, the two systems have been 
mutually exclusive in that recourse to the law barred one from using the NHS 
complaints procedure. The NHS Redress Act 2006, intended to provide a framework for 
the resolution of clinical negligence disputes by combining features of the legal and 
healthcare mechanisms, is not yet fully functioning but is under consideration.35 I will 
argue that both the legal and the NHS systems, while offering some remedies, have their 
drawbacks. This is especially true for those seeking clarification of the adverse event. 
Here again, my arguments for facilitating full apologies become relevant. 
 
E. The Import of Redress: Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Losses 
 
Apposite redress for harm incurred through clinical negligence should accord with the 
particular harm incurred, namely, pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. The legal route to 
redress is quintessentially about obtaining damages;36 clearly, for pecuniary losses 
sustained, receiving payment is essential and congruent. As to who should pay, this is 
addressed when we consider notions of corrective justice. Some claims can only be put 
right by the harm-doer, as when an apology is claimed. In other circumstances, such as 
where the claim is for money, this can be satisfied by someone else, such as the 
                                             
33 Chapter 3, ‘Funding Litigation’ and Chapter 7, ‘History of NHS Complaints Processes – A ‘Curate’s 
Egg’? herein. 
34 Chapter 7, ‘History of NHS Complaints Processes – A ‘Curate’s Egg’? herein. 
35 Chapter 8, ‘NHS Redress Act 2006 – A Lost Opportunity’ herein. Note: although in Making Amends (n 
7), it was mooted that a duty of candour might be imposed in the forthcoming NHS Redress Act 2006, 
this did not materialise. M Brazier, and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011), 270. 
36 Although claimants may indicate other motives, the redress available at the end of the day is financial. 





insurer.37 However, just as patients can experience diverse avoidable outcomes of 
care,38 so the effects of a serious adverse and unexpected outcome of care go beyond the 
physical injury itself. The psychological and social impact of an adverse event can 
include anxiety, depression, and fear of future treatment, disruption to work and family 
life and, in the worst case, bereavement. This leads us to the question of redress for non-
pecuniary or intangible losses, which are, by definition, non-fungible. If, in tort law, 
damages are paid to try ‘as far as money can’ to put the victim of harm back to his ‘pre-
tortious state’,39 what happens when there is no congruence between the desired relief 
by the claimant and the compensation available? 
 
F. Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies 
 
Medico-legal disputes are costly to both doctors and patients, not only in terms of 
money, but, more significantly, in the emotional toll on all parties. I argue that the 
current civil justice system and the NHS complaints processes are failing the very 
people they are designed to assist. With the withdrawal of legal aid for clinical 
negligence cases,40 access to justice through litigation will be severely curtailed and 
there will be increasing pressure on achieving less costly litigation, perhaps through a 
form of fast-track scheme for low-value clinical negligence cases.41 There will also be 
more pressure on the NHS procedures. In the final chapter in this thesis,42 I address the 
issue of how to achieve an effective, streamlined redress system. Looking to the future, 
it will be instructive to monitor how well the redress scheme in Wales and the possible 
no-fault system in Scotland serve iatrogenically harmed patients. I start with a small but 
significant first step advocating a full apology system which would empower patients 
through knowledge to make informed decisions on how to achieve just redress. This 
thesis takes into account developments in the law up to the end of July 2012. 
Throughout this thesis, all emphasis is mine unless explicitly mentioned otherwise. 
                                             
37 See Vines (n 25), quoting A Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law’ in D Owen, Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), 79. 
38 For example, as a result of: a sudden catastrophic event; being treated by a service performing sub-
optimally; suffering a recognised complication of care; or failing to gain access to a service using 
evidence-based best practice. 
39 S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 951. 
40 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010-2012 Part 2 received Royal Assent on 
1 May 2012. See also Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ below. 
41 Cave (n 4), 154. 






III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The title The Day After reflects my interest in the consequences for all parties after a 
patient suffers iatrogenic harm in the course of treatment within the NHS. The fact that 
the treatment occurs under the aegis of a universal healthcare setting is significant, 
because the demands of the general population as well as the treated patients must be 
taken into account. In the sphere of clinical negligence, the stakes are high for both 
doctors and patients. Doctors have been found to have intense negative emotional 
responses such as stress, anxiety and anger, as well as guilt and shame, after receiving 
complaints.43 Patients have to live with the consequences of the adverse event and 
realistically cannot be restored to their pre-tortious state. The thesis addresses the moral 
imperative of redress for the harm, the mechanisms currently in place in the civil justice 
and NHS systems for compensation in its broadest sense and the possibility of 
improvement of both systems in order to achieve a more positive outcome where 
learning from mistakes can occur. 
 
The thesis consists of three parts: Part I, Introduction, the philosophical basis of redress 
for injured patients; Part II, Medical Negligence Litigation – with chapters on Funding 
Litigation, Proving Clinical Negligence, Causation and Damages – addresses the issue 
of what hinders access to redress in law; and Part III, Redress within the NHS, analyses 
the redress available though the NHS complaints procedures and includes chapters on 
the History of NHS Complaints Processes – A Curate’s Egg?, the NHS Redress Act 
2006 – A Lost Opportunity, and a final chapter covering the constituents of a system 
offering Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies. The thesis ends with a concluding 
summation of the key arguments. 
 
                                             
43 W Cunningham, S Dovey, ‘The Effect on Medical Practice of Disciplinary Complaints: Potentially 





PART I INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress Within the NHS 
 
In this opening chapter, I discuss the legal and philosophical basis for patients’ 
entitlement to redress within the NHS. This is framed in the language of patients with 
rights rather than as passive beneficiaries. Liability for iatrogenic harm is derived from 
the concept of fault.44 After consideration of the importance of the idea of fault, I 
discuss the philosophical basis of the imperative to make good by reference to theories 
of corrective and distributive justice, using the case of MacFarlane v Tayside45 as an 
example. My argument is that while corrective justice underpins the necessity of full 
compensation for pecuniary loss, when it comes to damages for non-pecuniary loss, 
other factors come into play. These include the NHS’s responsibility to the wider 
community based on notions of distributive justice and the non-fungible nature of 
intangible losses. The discussion is limited to the special circumstances inherent in a 
national health service with a mandate to treat the citizenry within the limits of a 
constrained budget. The chapter concludes with thoughts about alternative redress for 
non-pecuniary loss. This includes exploring what is available through the NHS 
complaints processes and full apologies, and this search is a constant theme throughout 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 Redress for Iatrogenic Harm: What Patients Seek: 
Claimants and Complainants 
 
The question of what iatrogenically injured patients and their families might seek from 
redress is a complicated one. There is no solution offering restitutio in integrum; 
therefore most forms of redress are rendered second best from the start. Historically four 
themes have been mooted: restoration, including financial compensation or another 
intervention to ‘make the patient whole again’; correction, such as a system change or 
competence review to protect future patients; communication, which may include an 
explanation, expression of responsibility, or apology; and sanction, including 
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professional discipline or another form of punitive action.46 More recently these notions 
have been considered in more nuanced ways.47 
 
Due to the increasing sophistication of medical law and the Human Rights Act 
(hereinafter ‘HRA’) 1998, there are now a myriad of initiatives designed to address the 
‘tangle of motives behind a patient’s or family’s decision to take legal action following 
medical injury, money only representing one of them’.48 
 
In this chapter, I address what is known about the motivations of patients who suffer an 
adverse event, why some become complainants and others claimants49 and why some 
choose not to sue. 
 
A major stumbling block for patients and families who suspect iatrogenic harm is the 
lack of honest information about adverse events. I analyse the lack of open disclosure, 
apologies and communication and consider the impediments to open disclosure from the 
medical providers. I discuss recent initiatives in England aimed at facilitating open 
disclosure, legal duty of candour and incidence reporting. I set out what patients might 
wish for redress. In the final chapter of the thesis,50 I evaluate the expectations gap 
between what complainants/claimants want and what they in fact get out of the redress 
processes.51 
 
Unfortunately, except for low-value claims,52 there is as yet no integrated response 
system to address the wishes of claimants, both financial and otherwise. This chapter 
lays the foundation for the rest of the thesis,53 which analyses redress available to 
victims both through the English legal system and the extralegal methods of pursuing 
                                             
46 M Bismark and E Dauer, ‘Motivations for Medico-Legal Action – Lessons From New Zealand’ (2006) 
27 The Journal of Legal Medicine 55. Issues regarding professional sanctions and discipline will be 
addressed in Part III Redress within the NHS below. 
47 M Bismark, MJ Spittal, AJ Gogos, RL Gruen, DM Studdert, ‘Remedies Sought and Obtained in 
Healthcare Complaints’ (2011) 20 British Medical Journal Quality and Safety 806-810 and EA Dauer, 
‘Medical Injury, Patients’ Claims and the Effects of Government Responses in Anglo-American Legal 
Systems’ (2011) 20 British Medical Journal Quality and Safety 735-737. 
48 Bismark and Dauer (n 46). 
49 Bismark et al (n 47). 
50 Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress’ below. 
51 Bismark et al (n 47). 
52 Clinical negligence claim worth less than £1,000 small claims track should not result in proceedings. 
Brazier and Cave (n 35), 228. 





complaints through the English NHS structures.54 I will argue that apart from pecuniary 
loss, restoration through monetary means is illusory. Therefore within the strictures of a 
universal health service, both the needs of patients and their families and the demands 
of distributive justice are better served by improved extralegal initiatives. 
 
PART II MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION 
 
This part of the thesis addresses the legal route to justice.55 I begin with the critical issue 
of the constraint on access to justice for iatrogenically harmed patients, now that clinical 
negligence cases have been removed from the scope of legal aid.56 The funding for this 
litigation now depends upon the use of conditional fee agreements, and I analyse their 
operation. I then turn to the burden upon the claimant of proving clinical negligence; 
first duty and breach and then causation. While proving duty of care is not a problem in 
most instances, proving breach of duty is more difficult. I discuss the Bolam test and the 
extent to which Bolitho has given the courts more leeway in critical analysis of the 
reasonableness of the medical standards. In addition, I consider the role and function of 
expert witnesses. 
 
The next chapter is concerned with the major hurdle of proving causation. I include 
discussion of Chester v Afshar,57 a failure to warn case, framed in causation in order to 
effect justice and protect patients’ autonomy and rights. 
 
This part concludes with a chapter on damages – the sole redress available through 
litigation. I consider the symbolic meaning of damages as compensation for pecuniary 
loss and as inappropriate redress for non-pecuniary loss. I also address psychiatric harm 
and the courts’ unease with the concept of pure psychiatric harm and the restrictive rules 
limiting the class of claimants. 
 
In considering damage arising from iatrogenic harm I contrast the approaches of the 
English and Australian courts58 to the question of whether or not compensation should 
                                             
54 Where applicable, references will be made to initiatives in other common law jurisdictions. 
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57 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [2004] UKHL 41 Hereinafter Chester. Full analysis of medical law 





be paid for the maintenance of a healthy child who was born as the result of negligent 
advice following a sterilisation operation.59 
 
Chapter 3: Funding Litigation 
 
In this chapter, I consider whether the arrangements, both extant and projected, for 
funding clinical negligence actions assist or adversely affect access to justice. At 
present,60 clinical negligence actions may be funded by legal aid, conditional fee 
agreements (CFAs) and several other arrangements. For present purposes, I will be 
focusing on funding through legal aid, conditional fee (‘no win, no fee’) agreements, 
insurance and costs. Reform of legal aid is on the Government’s agenda with the 
publication of the consultation documents: Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in 
England and Wales61 and Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in 
England and Wales: Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations.62 It is 
proposed that ‘all clinical negligence cases be excluded from civil legal aid because 
there is a viable alternative source of funding in CFAs’.63 However, recognising that 
some individual cases will continue to require public funding even once they are 
removed from its scope, it is proposed that a power to grant legal aid in certain 
circumstances be retained.64 I analyse the Government’s rationale and justification for 
the use of legal aid and the cases meriting exception. At the conclusion of the chapter, I 
present arguments challenging the assumption that access to justice would not be 
adversely affected by this change. Access to justice has two aspects: the availability of 
legal representation in the civil justice system; and access to redress through extralegal 
routes. The challenge of widening access to justice is to address both these aspects in a 
financially viable way.65 
 
                                                                                                                                  
58 JK Mason, ‘A Turn-Up Down Under: McFarlane in the Light of Cattanach’ (2004) 1 Scripted 1. The 
High Court rejected the House of Lords decision in McFarlane.  
59 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. See Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement 
to Redress within the NHS’ for discussion of McFarlane and distributive justice arguments against 
recovery for the maintenance of a healthy child after negligent advice. 
60 Written just before the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (n 40) received Royal 
Assent in May 2012. Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ includes discussion of recent legal aid available for 
clinical negligence cases.  
61 Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales. www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/legal-
aid-reform-151110.htm. Any changes to legal aid are unlikely to be implemented before 2012 at 4.8. 
62 See:http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/Jackson-review-151110.htm. 
63 Proposals (n 61) at 4.166. 
64 Ibid. at 1.11. 





Chapter 4 Proving Clinical Negligence, Duty of Care and Breach of Duty 
 
This part of the thesis focuses on the response of the civil justice system to actions for 
clinical negligence.66 Having considered the funding difficulties faced by would-be 
claimants and the negative effect financial constraints have on access to justice,67 in this 
and the next chapters I concentrate on the legal rules and requirements governing proof 
of clinical negligence. In particular, I consider whether the requirement for the claimant 
to prove the elements of any successful negligence claim acts as a hindrance to 
obtaining redress. I consider cases associated with medical treatment in one form or 
another. There has been a parallel series of cases of alleged negligence arising before 
treatment started. These cases are based on the right of the patient to make an informed 
choice regarding treatment. Although the principles underlying the tort of negligence 
are similar in both situations, the latter have developed a jurisprudence of their own 
which is outwith the remit of this chapter, and the chapter therefore confines itself to 
discussion of medical misadventure. 
 
Clinical negligence is the principal action by which patients seek compensation for 
injuries caused within the NHS. The only other action which features to any extent is 
battery.68 Claims for damages generally arise out of treatment or care to which the 
patient has consented, but which went wrong or did not produce the desired or expected 
outcome. The essence of the patient’s claim is that the doctor was negligent in that he 
breached his duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in diagnosing, advising or 
treating the patient. Medical negligence is a specific form of negligence liability in the 
professional context.69 A patient may have an action for breach of contract, in the tort of 
negligence70 or for misrepresentation.71 
 
I briefly explore problems regarding establishing the existence of a duty of care, where 
liability falls and the question of how far that duty extends. I then turn to the question of 
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68 See I Kennedy, A Grubb, J Laing, and J McHale, Principles of Medical Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010), ch 8. 
69 See Powell, J and Stewart, R (eds), Jackson and Powell on Professional Negligence 6th edn, (Andover, 
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70 See Kennedy et al (n 68), 135 fn 19. Other actions may include false imprisonment or battery.  
71 Ibid, 135 fn 20. Under the common principle in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] 
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proving that there has been a breach of that duty. I consider the issues arising from the 
use of the Bolam72 standard and the impact of the Bolitho73 ‘gloss’74 on the assessment 
of medical breach. Discussion then focuses on the role of expert medical opinion in 
defining the appropriate standard of care. I touch upon the complexity of the role of the 
expert witness and note the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney75 
overturning the long-standing rule that expert witnesses are immune from liability for 
damages to parties that have engaged them and to whom they owe a duty of care. I 
briefly delineate the role guidelines play in setting the requisite standard and raise the 
vexed question of the relevance of resources in framing NHS institutional liability.76 I 
conclude by considering how the rules for establishing medical negligence, in particular 
the rules about establishing breach of duty, affect a claimant’s access to justice via the 
civil litigation system. 
 
Chapter 5 Causation 
 
The true battleground in many clinical negligence cases is not breach of duty at all but 
causation.77 Clinical negligence cases usually involve claimants who, by definition, 
were ill or injured before the treatment was given or sought and, by the very nature of 
their complaint, are ill or injured at the end of the process. Demonstrating the causation 
of the particular injury or illness complained of to the requisite legal standard can be of 
the utmost medical and legal complexity.78 Having addressed the issues of when a duty 
of care arises and whether there has been a breach of that duty, I come to the most 
problematic aspect of a patient’s claim. He must show that his injury, his worsened or 
unimproved condition, was caused by the doctor’s negligence. Clinical negligence 
claims have special difficulties not only because of the vagaries inherent in illness and 
treatment but also the differences between scientific and legal approaches to the 
problem of causation. 
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In order to put the problems in proving causation into context, I start this chapter with a 
brief comparison between the scientific and legal approaches to evidence of causation. I 
then present the legal approach to determining causation. Causation of primary injury at 
the liability stage may take a number of forms: classical causation, other forms of causal 
connection which do not depend on a comparison, such as ‘material contribution’ and 
causation in the rare claims where the analysis of the causation of damage departs from 
a strict approach which would leave the claimant unable to prove damage.79 These 
approaches address the question of whether the patient can convince the court that it 
was the relevant negligence which caused his injury, rather than the progress of his 
original disease or condition. Here, the court, in determining what did happen, is dealing 
with past fact and decides on the balance of probabilities.80 
 
There is another class of cases that addresses a different question. How should courts 
proceed when the essence of a claim is not that clinical negligence caused any fresh or 
additional injury to the patient, but that negligence deprived him of the chance of full 
recovery from his original disease or condition? These cases, known as loss of chance 
cases, are about future events.81 The patient must advance evidence showing that it is 
more likely than not that the defendant’s negligence caused the injury of which he 
complains. 
 
Having concluded discussion of proving liability, I turn to the question of damages. 
 
Chapter 6 Damages 
 
This is the concluding chapter of the section of the thesis concerned with medical 
negligence litigation. This chapter on damages82 is the cornerstone of a thesis concerned 
with redress for negligently inflicted personal injury in clinical negligence suits. Redress 
via the civil litigation route is then contrasted with the possibilities of redress offered 
through the National Health Service schemes, which will inform the second part of the 
thesis. 
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Selective subjects have been chosen which resonate with issues pertinent to the Health 
Service. The chapter begins with a discussion of theories of compensation, 
consideration of what damages are for and what they represent. The choice of model of 
corrective or distributive justice, deterrence, or retribution determines notions of 
entitlement to financial redress. This becomes particularly challenging when looking at 
the heads of claim pertaining to non-pecuniary loss and the use of monetary 
compensation for intangible losses. I concentrate on the theoretical and practical 
difficulties that claims for non-pecuniary loss represent. I discuss claims for wrongful 
death which encompass bereavement payments83 and I touch upon relevant aspects of 
pecuniary loss. There follows a discussion of claims for psychiatric harm and/or injury 
which encompass both non-pecuniary and pecuniary losses. 
 
I argue that in accepting corrective justice as my preferred model, I have no quarrel 
regarding patients’ entitlement to full compensation for both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss. However, mindful that there are compelling competing calls on the NHS 
budget for treatment from other patients and members of the public I would limit 
compensatory damages to pecuniary loss. This is because the NHS is, by its nature, a 
communal enterprise and the arguments for distributive justice which focus on the just 
distribution of goods across the population are also legitimate. In addition to this 
pragmatic argument there is the theoretical one. Because, by its very nature, non-
pecuniary loss is non-fungible, after reviewing academic and judicial attempts to place 
financial value on these losses in this chapter, I suggest alternative models for redress 
for this aspect of claims in the final part of the thesis.84 
 
The issue of redress for pecuniary loss is less theoretically challenging but of immense 
importance to claimants. In the larger picture, a serious crisis looms from the very 
challenge of tort law, exemplified by clinical negligence claims, as a suitable method of 
compensating accident victims85 in the modern welfare state.86 There have been 
perceived medical indemnity insurance crises in Australia, New Zealand, the USA and 
England. I conclude with a brief review of their legislative responses to this. 
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PART III REDRESS WITHIN THE NHS 
 
Here I analyse the redress available though the NHS complaints procedures namely: the 
History of NHS Complaints Processes – A Curate’s Egg?, the NHS Redress Act 2006 – 
A Lost Opportunity, and a final chapter, Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies, 
which summarises the necessary elements for a just system that includes apologies. 
 
Chapter 7 History of NHS Processes – A Curate’s Egg? 
 
The prior section of the thesis87 was concerned with claimants obtaining financial 
recompense through litigation. This section is about redress within the NHS and focuses 
on non-litigious and non-financial remedies for alleged clinical negligence, in particular, 
the increasingly important NHS complaints procedures. Where financial compensation 
is barred by virtue of limitations on legal aid and civil law reform,88 more pressure will 
be placed upon the complaints system and professional regulation to deliver appropriate 
sanction, communication and correction.89 I argue that a well-functioning complaints 
system would offer a significant alternative route to access to justice for iatrogenically 
harmed patients. In the interests of integration, it could be envisioned that some 
appropriate financial compensation could be included in this system. 
 
After preliminary discussion of the context within which medical errors occur, I touch 
upon the regulatory processes and investigative recourse available. This is followed by a 
detailed analysis of the history and working of the NHS complaints processes and the 
role of the Health Ombudsman.90 
 
I show that in its present form and operation the complaints system falls far short of 
these aspirations. Ideally, the NHS complaints system was envisaged not as a fall-back 
when litigation was not possible but as an avenue to address different problems such as 
explanations of the adverse event and plans to avoid recurrence. I measure the current 
complaints system against the Ombudsman’s essential elements for a just system of 
redress. I conclude with discussion of the recommendations of the House of Commons 
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Health Committee91 for the future shape of the complaints process and the redress for 
iatrogenic harm it may offer complainants. 
 
Chapter 8 NHS Redress Act 2006 – A Lost Opportunity 
 
The NHS Redress Act 200692 is the only statute entirely concerned with clinical 
negligence,93 and is important because it potentially affects NHS hospital patients, with 
the intention to extend its operation to primary care. The underlying policy of the 
NHSRA 2006 was to provide a genuine alternative to litigation for low-value claims.94 
The Act, wholly concerned with the process of compensation, proposes a redress 
package where there has been clinical negligence in hospital. The redress scheme would 
be run by the NHS Litigation Authority (hereinafter ‘NHSLA’).95 In addition, the Act 
was to provide a more integrated system of complaints and compensation.96 I will argue 
that in not providing this integrated system, the major lost opportunity occurred. 
 
Indeed, the lost opportunity regarding the Act is twofold: the failure to draft 
regulations, leaving in doubt whether the NHS Redress Scheme would be developed in 
England at all; and in the actual proposed provisions which ‘failed by a large margin to 
live up to the aspirations for a radically different way of compensating patients’.97 As 
regards the failure to enact the scheme, the previous Government98 did not capitalise on 
the unique consensus in all of the Parliamentary debates that an alternative to litigation 
had to be found. The provisions of the Act did at least offer some alternative, though 
modest, improvement.99 Most significantly, the Act would have offered a preferable 
procedural route when compared with litigation and could potentially combine 
compensation with apologies, explanations and system change, but the Act has not as 
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yet been implemented.100 I offer, for comparison, the new Welsh alternative 
compensation systems for low-value clinical negligence claims, namely the Welsh 
Redress Scheme and the Welsh Speedy Resolution Scheme, which will both co-exist 
with the litigation route for the foreseeable future.101 
 
Chapter 9 Effective Redress and the Role of Apologies 
 
This concluding chapter is concerned with what an effective redress system would 
contain. I have already addressed this issue when considering the complaints 
procedure102 and in this chapter I look more broadly at the problem of redress for the 
more intangible aspects, focusing on redress for non-pecuniary loss. The chapter starts, 
in Section II, with a review of the central problems in the current system(s). I then turn 
in Section III to consider what an effective redress system would look like. In this 
regard, because knowledge and acknowledgement of the adverse event is crucial both to 
litigation and complaints, I have chosen to focus on the role of apologies in facilitating 
effective redress and have considered the purported effect or otherwise of apologies on 
litigation. I conclude that without a system for full apologies, as defined in the chapter, 
there cannot be effective redress. However, to achieve the aims of corrective justice, 
redress would have to include forms of reparation and compensation. The nearest model 
for effective redress for iatrogenic harm in the UK is in its embryonic form in Wales.103 
Looking to the future, it will be instructive to monitor how well the redress scheme in 




An adverse event is a tragedy for the patient, the latter’s family and the physician. Many 
doctors consider their vocation the essence of their being and are understandably 
mortified and anxious when their judgement or practice is questioned. In clinical 
negligence cases, the damage involves intangibles as well as pecuniary loss, and thus it 
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is usually impossible to restore the victim to his former whole self. However, in a just 
society, the tortfeasor bears the onus of offering compensation. Because ‘the shopping 
list of the clinical negligence claimant is varied’,104 this thesis has considered the 
different types of redress presently and potentially available. The current situation offers 
inadequate redress, for there are difficulties with eligibility for both the litigation and 
the NHS schemes, difficulties with funding litigation, problems with obtaining 
information about adverse events and of obtaining apologies, if appropriate. I suggest 
one new initiative in order to extend the range of redress, namely, full apologies. 
Because the NHS is a communal and valued enterprise, deliberation regarding the 
conflicting demands on its budget is difficult. Nevertheless, justice in the form of 
redress for iatrogenic harm must be an integral part of a national health service. 
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It is possible to view the case simply from the perspective of corrective justice. It 
requires someone who has harmed another without justification to indemnify the 
other…But one may also approach the case from the vantage point of distributive 
justice. It requires a focus on the just distribution of burdens and losses among members 
of a society.1 
                                             







With the National Health Service in England fast approaching its sixty-fifth year of 
existence, now is an opportune time to consider the vexed question of meaningful 
redress for patients injured in the course of their medical treatment. The founding of the 
National Health Service was an historic post-war enterprise. Understandably, in the 
euphoria of its inception, attention was rightly focused on treatment delivery rather than 
on adverse events. Little thought was given, when the NHS began (and doctors became 
employees of the new State-run service), as to who would be sued in case of medical 
negligence.2 However, risk is an inherent part of treatment and things can and do go 
wrong. 
 
In this, my opening chapter, I will discuss the legal and philosophical basis for patients’ 
entitlement to redress within the NHS. This is addressed in the context of the changing 
perception of patients initially as passive recipients of care and latterly as active citizens 
with rights. Liability for iatrogenic harm is derived from the concept of fault.3 After 
consideration of the importance of the idea of fault, I will discuss the philosophical 
basis of the imperative to make good by reference to theories of corrective and 
distributive justice, using the case of MacFarlane v Tayside4 as an example. My 
argument will be that while corrective justice underpins the necessity of full 
compensation for pecuniary loss, in the case of damages for non-pecuniary loss, other 
factors come into play. These include the responsibility of the NHS to the wider 
community based on notions of distributive justice and the uncommodifiablity of these 
losses. The discussion is limited to the special circumstances inherent in a national 
health service with a mandate to treat the citizenry within the limits of a constrained 
budget. The chapter concludes with thoughts about alternative redress for non-pecuniary 
loss. 
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A. From Recipients to Citizens 
 
Current developments in healthcare provision prompt a number of questions about the 
nature of medical relationships and the legal principles which govern them. Until 
recently, there was relatively little opposition to the traditional medical view of patients 
as passive recipients of medical care. It was widely accepted that doctors might decide 
unilaterally what treatment should be provided and presume how much a patient wanted 
or needed to know. Such paternalistic attitudes and practices were entrenched features 
of medicine, conveniently justified as serving the patient’s welfare.5 However, with the 
publication of Ian Kennedy’s persuasive Reith Lectures attacking the dominance and 
paternalism of the medical profession, the climate began to change.6 The language of the 
argument changed to one based on the concept of patients’ rights. The patient’s voice 
having been insufficiently heard, the assertion of ‘patients’ rights’ is now presented as a 
natural antithesis to medical paternalism, proclaiming the moral agency of the 
individual and the intrinsic value of respect for the patient as a person.7 As regards the 
law, the number of actions for malpractice against doctors, once virtually unknown in 
England, has grown substantially.8 Patients find the English legal system obstructive 
and cripplingly expensive. Nor are their grievances limited to lack of provision for 
compensation for medical mishap. Increasingly, patients demand a greater say in their 
treatment. The extent to which it is right for patients to have their own say becomes 
ultimately a question for the law.9 At the core of this thesis, then, is the need of 
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autonomous patients10 to be cared for and their right to redress when things go wrong. A 
sub-theme concerns the needs of the medical practitioner for sufficient autonomy and 
legal protection to practise his profession,11 mindful of the best interests of the particular 
patient. The issue of redress is contingent upon access to justice and to legal 
representation for all parties. All this occurs within the constraints of a hard-pressed 
National Health Service still fighting for the ethos of medical help free at the point of 
delivery. 
 
One of the most powerful criticisms of the tort system is that it is inefficient in 
delivering compensation to an injured person. From the patient’s point of view, the 
difficulties of establishing causation and negligence make it hard to make a successful 
claim. Even if a causally significant breach of the standard of care is established, the 
slow and expensive nature of the legal process absorbs a significant portion of the total 
cost of the system, resulting in the injured party’s receiving in damages only a small 
part of the overall cost.12 
 
A similar criticism may be made with regard to the overall social efficiency of the tort 
system. Compensation for medical injury may come from a variety of sources. In a 
system of state-financed medical care, it is ultimately the state that will pay for such 
compensation.13 As will be discussed in the section on medical negligence litigation,14 
for the majority of claimants, stressful and expensive litigation will end in 
disappointment. Research appears to indicate that even where claimants are awarded 
damages, many remain dissatisfied because they have not been given an explanation, an 
apology, or reassurance that the same thing will not happen again.15 Therefore, in 
addressing the issue of entitlement to redress, the latter is not confined to damages. 
                                             
10 Their autonomy and rights strengthened by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
11 See Part III Redress Within the NHS, below. 
12 A Merry and A McCall Smith, Error, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001) 212. Until the introduction of NHS indemnity in January 1990, the cost of any compensation award 
against a hospital doctor was shared between the NHS and the doctor’s medical defence union. Then and 
until 1995, when the clinical negligence scheme for trusts was introduced, hospitals effectively insured 
themselves against claims. Now, all hospital negligence claims are paid for by the NHS, thereby reducing 
the amount available for all other health expenditure.  
13 The NHS Litigation Authority handles negligence claims and works to improve risk management 
practices in the NHS. For statistics on number of claims handled in recent years see n 8. 
14 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation, below. 
15 L Mulcahy, Disputing Doctors: The Socio-Legal Dynamics of Complaints about Medical Care 
(Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2003) 96 and E Jackson, Medical Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 149. See also below ch 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’ and Part III Redress 





II. ENTITLEMENT TO REDRESS: COMPETING THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
 
Entitlement to redress for iatrogenic harm sustained within the NHS rests upon legal 
and moral precepts. Legal entitlement may be based on actions for breach of contract, 
possible if a patient has paid for his medical treatment,16 but more usually tort actions 
based upon an actionable claim for personal injury, which the Limitation Act 198017 
defines as: ‘...any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental 
condition... .’ 
 
Briefly, in order to succeed in an action for negligence, the claimant must establish: 
a. that the healthcare professional owed the complainant a duty of care – ie a legal 
duty, which is a matter for the courts to decide; 
b. that there was a breach of duty to the extent that the standard of care provided 
fell below the standard required by the law – thus, although by definition this is 
a legal concern, the courts must, and do, defer to professional standards; 
c. that because of that breach, the patient suffered a legally recognisable harm – the 
problem of causation.18 In the context of clinical negligence cases, assessment of 
the extent of the ‘impairment of condition’ is often more complex than in other 
types of personal injury because of the claimant’s pre-existing condition. In 
many cases, the claimant would have had a level of ongoing injury but for the 
negligence. This impacts significantly on the value of these claims and makes 
the process of valuation generally more difficult.19 
 
Legal entitlement to redress is itself informed by the idea of corrective justice which 
requires that those who have, without justification, harmed others by their conduct put 
the matter right.20 Clinical negligence claims usually involve one party, the patient or 
his family, seeking damages from another party, the doctor and/or his employing health 
facility, on the basis that the latter is responsible for the former’s injuries. Responsibility 
                                             
16 No contract exists between doctor and patient within the NHS: Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health 
[1965] AC 512. However, see L Hoyano, ‘Misconceptions and Wrongful Conceptions’ (2002) 65 Modern 
Law Review 883, 904 ‘The legal status of claims of patients who can afford private healthcare and so sue 
in contract remains unclear’. 
17 Limitation Act 1980, s 38(1). 
18 See Part II Medical Negligence Litigation below. 
19 P Balen, Clinical Negligence (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2008) 471. 
20A Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law –Questions and Answers’ in D Owen Philosophical Foundations 





for personal injuries in tort law rests on the notion of fault.21 In this chapter, after a brief 
discussion of the role of fault, I will introduce relevant aspects of corrective and 
distributive or communitarian22 justice theories. I will then argue that patients who are 
harmed in the course of their treatment should be compensated in full for their 
pecuniary losses because corrective justice demands this. However, I will also argue 
that within the special context of a welfare national health service, their entitlement to 
redress for loss is finite. Therefore, while I would look to the principles of corrective 
justice when expecting the harm-doer to be responsible for the repair of the harmed, I 
would look to the principles of distributive justice when considering financial redress 
for non-pecuniary losses. Non-pecuniary loss is usually defined as a claim for ‘general 
damages’ which incorporates losses where valuation is imprecise and subjective, 
namely, pain, suffering and loss of amenity and, inter alia, loss of enjoyment and leisure 
time, loss of congenial employment, and marital breakdown. As Emily Jackson has 
noted, almost every medical dilemma could be framed in terms of a tension between 
two or more basic principles.23 I will argue that patients should not receive damages for 
these non-pecuniary losses, not only for practical reasons such as NHS budgetary 
restraints, but because the uncommodifiability of these losses indicates the futility of so 
doing.24 I will be considering alternative responses for redressing these losses in the 
final chapters of the thesis. 
 
After discussion of the theories of justice underpinning the need or otherwise for redress 
for iatrogenic harm, I will consider the seminal case of McFarlane v Tayside Health 
Board.25 In that case, although negligence was admitted as regards wrongful conception 
and recovery for the mother’s claim was allowed, the cost of bringing up the healthy 
child was disallowed on public policy grounds which included, inter alia, references to 
the potential burden on NHS resources that could be a consequence of such claims. In 
the last section of this chapter, I will introduce the succeeding parts of the thesis 
regarding medical negligence litigation and redress within the NHS. 
 
                                             
21 Cane, n 3, 421. 
22 JK Mason and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics 7th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 6. 
23Jackson, n 15, 17. 
24 See Part II Chapter 6 Damages below for fuller discussion of non-pecuniary loss. 





A. The Role of Fault 
 
Fault is the basic cement of the clinical negligence action. Fault permeates the structure 
of tort law doctrine, providing both definition and justification for the great majority of 
rules governing private responsibility for causing harm. What fault is, therefore, and 
how in moral theory it may claim to dominate this area of law, are questions of 
fundamental importance to an understanding of tort law. ‘Fault’ is often addressed in 
terms of ‘blame’ or ‘wrong’: faulty conduct is ‘blameworthy’ or ‘wrongful conduct’ and 
the challenge is to determine, in actions for iatrogenic harm, whether a particular 
person’s harmful behaviour was blameworthy or wrongful, ie whether the person was at 
fault.26 
 
The question of when one can hold an actor responsible for his actions permeates the 
philosophical literature.27 ‘What is required in the medical context is a clear-eyed, 
properly informed examination of the grounds for blame, and a firm fixing of these 
grounds to criteria which are both morally defensible and pragmatically productive.’28 
Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith have argued that many errors are not the 
product of failures or shortcomings of a culpable nature. Rather, certain types of errors 
are inextricably linked to those human strengths (such as distractibility and creativity) 
which differentiate us from machines and which have contributed to our success as a 
species.29 Their analysis reveals that to attribute blame for an error is to misunderstand 
the very nature of what is happening when an error is made. Slips or lapses, for 
example, will be made by the most conscientious of people and do not, of themselves, 
demonstrate any culpable failing sufficient to justify the attribution of blame. The same 
is generally true of rule-based and deliberate errors. Errors are not the product of choice. 
 
I would, however, ask ‘Why should such errors not be culpable?’ If one believes that 
moral culpability depends on the making of a free choice, then any human action which 
is not the result of such a choice cannot involve blame. This is not a novel position in 
moral philosophy; indeed, the place occupied by freedom in theories of moral 
responsibility finds its roots in Aristotle and has been central to theories of 
                                             
26 See Part II Medical Negligence Litigation below. Also DG Owen ‘Philosophical Foundations of Fault 
in Tort Law’ in D Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, n 20, 201. 
27 Ibid, 202–206. A full discussion is outwith the remit of this chapter. 






responsibility since then.30 It is on the basis of the absence of a free choice of course of 
action that those who act under coercion are exculpated; similarly, those who act in 
ignorance are not usually held to be culpable, on the grounds that their actions do not 
represent an informed choice of the resulting harm.31 In practice, however, the making 
of an error will often be construed as negligence. In the medical context, errors can have 
grave consequences: 
 
The power inevitably held by the doctor in our society is matched by the human cost of 
any error he may make. When an overstretched accountant makes a mistake, she will 
probably get a chance to put it right the next day. The junior doctor who has been 
working continuously for over thirty-six hours may get no second chance. Nor is there a 
second chance for the patient. The accountant or the solicitor may cause her client to 
lose money or property. Monetary compensation paid for out of the professional’s 
insurance cover will go some way to placate the client. For the patient whose doctor’s 
mistake resulted in disability or death, money is poor compensation. Finding out why 
things went wrong may be more important to the patient and the family. The difficulties 
in finding out ‘why’ may explain the bitterness that attends many claims against the 
medical profession.32 
 
Nevertheless, Merry and McCall Smith have argued that, in the case of errors, the only 
failure is a failure defined in terms of the normative standard of what should have been 
done. There is a tendency to confuse the reasonable person with the error-free person. 
In other words, the test has shifted from what could reasonably have been expected to 
what ought to have been done. Even though the courts have repeatedly said that the 
reasonable person test is anchored in realistic expectations of people, the reasonable 
person test has progressively failed to take account of the inherent human limitations of 
actual reasonable people.33 
 
My contention is that the inescapable tension in the law of torts between the principle of 
compensation for loss caused by another, on the one hand, and the principle that only 
those who deserve to pay compensation should be required to do so, on the other hand, 
has not been resolved satisfactorily. It remains the case that negligence liability in the 
common law system is founded on fault and this notion of fault is not one which is 
                                             
30 R Wright, ‘Right, Justice and Tort Law’ in D Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, n 20, 159. 
31 Ibid, 169. 
32 Although the current M Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
2011) expresses the same idea, the actual quotation is from the third edition of that work, page 6. 
33See Merry and McCall Smith, n 12, their final chapter ‘Conclusions’ and their Chapter 5 ‘Negligence, 
Recklessness and Blame’ for alternative formulations of classifications of blame. (Emphasis added by 





entirely amoral in nature. The transfer of loss from the person who has suffered it to the 
person who has caused it depends on the latter having fallen below a standard which it 
is thought he should have reasonably met.34 This is unobjectionable, even if it means 
that those who were not subjectively negligent will be held liable. Merry and McCall 
Smith make the point that the reasonable person’s expected level of performance must 
take into account the fact that the reasonable person is a human being with the normal 
limitations of even the most conscientious human being. If the standard ceases to 
represent the level that can in reality be expected of the reasonable person, then it could 
be argued that the moral underpinning of negligence liability has been lost. If the 
standard becomes too high, it will be a disincentive for people to engage in high-risk 
activities such as medicine. The psychological cost of civil litigation on doctors and 
patients is high and stressful for all, even if it is technically not about moral opprobrium. 
Linda Mulcahy makes a plea for the interests of both the patient for redress and the 
doctor, who can have a long-lasting emotional reaction to a complaint, to be taken into 
account.35 
 
I think, given what is at stake, that it is illusory to imagine a pain-free process of 
resolution of claims for compensation for iatrogenic harm. Nevertheless, in my final 
chapter, I will be considering what processes, in addition to damages, might make for 
more effective redress; apologies being a case in point.36 Of course, how people view 
compensation or redress depends critically on their conception of justice. It is to this 
that I now turn. 
 
B. Concepts of Justice 
 
When injured people clamour for recourse against their injurers, their concern is not just 
with compensation, but with justice. If many victims of wrongs do not get redress, the 
problem is not just one of undercompensation, but of injustice. If compensation is 
extracted from someone who is not responsible for an injury, the problem is again one 
of injustice, not just expense. When money, power and the personal sympathies of 
                                             
34 See Part II Medical Negligence Litigation below. 
35 L Mulcahy, n 15, 147. 





judges speak too loudly, it is the voice of justice that they silence. But the 
disappointments reveal the force of the animating idea of justice between persons.37 
 
A good starting point to the elucidation of the tensions between applying ideas of 
corrective or distributive justice in matters of redress for personal injury within a 
national health service is to be found in academic writing.38 One might ask the 
following questions: ‘What is the rationale for an individual’s “right” to recover for his 
losses? What are the criteria for justly singling out some people and making them, and 
not their neighbours, bear the costs of accidents?’ In short, what underpins the moral 
imperative to offer redress to victims of iatrogenic harm? John Harris has argued that 
there is a fundamental unfairness in paying awards to the victims of medical injury even 
when fault has been established, given that there are other pressing demands being made 
on the same funds. Harris suggests that, although victims of negligence may have a 
claim, this claim should not have priority over the needs of those whose claim is for a 
non-injury related medical condition.39 He states his case very effectively: 
 
When judgment is delivered by the courts, payment becomes due immediately and 
hospitals have to pay the compensation awarded against them. Thus, successful litigants 
get immediate and absolute priority in the deployment of public resources allocated for 
health. This guarantee of access to health resources for successful litigants highlights an 
important ambiguity when allocation decisions are based on scarcity...40 
 
Harris is also concerned that judges are not made aware of the effect on healthcare 
resources when ordering compensation payments in medical litigation.41 
 
While Harris concentrates on the relationship between the victims of clinical negligence 
and the general patient pool, my emphasis is on the nexus between the victims and the 
defendant health facility. I believe that a mature universal health service must be 
accountable and incorporate a comprehensive compensation scheme available when 
there has been iatrogenic harm. I am mindful of the calls on NHS budgets and the 
                                             
37 A Ripstein, ‘Some Recent Obituaries of Tort Law’ (1998) 48 University of Toronto Law Journal 4, 
561. 
38 G Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 535, 538. 
39 J Harris, ‘The Injustice of Compensation for Victims of Medical Accidents’ (1997) 314 British Medical 
Journal 1821. 
40 Ibid. 






principles of distributive justice. However, I am arguing for the withholding of payment 
for non-pecuniary loss not solely on public policy grounds,42 but rather on the grounds 
of the futility of money for these losses. 
 
Additionally, it is noteworthy that there is a perceived inequality between people injured 
by accident who can make a claim for damages and those people with serious illness 
and disability who will not receive damages at all. Only those who can establish 
iatrogenic harm will receive generous financial assistance with the costs of their care. 
Whether or not a social security system or a welfare state which allocates resources 
according to need might be fairer than the tort of negligence is beyond the remit of this 
thesis. For present purposes the discussion will concentrate on the extant tort system.43 
 
1. Claimants and Defendants: Their Relationship 
 
There are several ways of defining the relationship between claimants and defendants. 
How one defines this relationship is key in determining one’s conception of justice 
between the parties. On one view there is the ‘paradigm of reciprocity’;44 on another the 
‘indispensable nexus between the parties’45 and finally, there is the ‘language of 
responsibility’.46 These will be discussed in turn. 
 
In the first instance there are two distinct issues: whether the victim is entitled to receive 
and whether the defendant ought to pay. The relationship between victim and defendant 
is seen as an example of the ‘paradigm of reciprocity’. This paradigm of reciprocity 
looks only to the activity of the victim and the risk-creator. The distinct question under 
this paradigm is whether the risk was non-reciprocal and unexcused, namely: was the 
risk unreasonable? The reasonableness (liability) of the risk thus determines both 
whether the victim is entitled to compensation and whether the defendant should be held 
liable. It becomes a question of balancing costs and benefits.47 The function of George 
Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity and liability is to distinguish between those risks 
                                             
42 ‘Relying on the principles of distributive justice I am persuaded that our tort law does not permit 
parents of a healthy unwanted child to claim the costs of bringing up the child from a health authority or a 
doctor…’. See Lord Steyn in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board n 25. 
43 For further discussion see ch 18 in Cane, n 3. 
44 Fletcher, n 38 at 538.  
45 E Weinrib, ‘Towards a Moral Theory of Negligence Law’ (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 37, 38. 
46 A Honoré, ‘Responsibility and Luck’, (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 530–553. 





which represent a violation of individual interests and those which are the background 
risks that must be borne as part of group living.48 
 
An alternative view, however, points to the ‘indispensable nexus between the parties’.49 
It is asserted that tort law embodies corrective, rather than distributive justice, and the 
requirement of factual causation establishes an indispensable link between the victim 
and the tortfeasor by relating their rights to a transaction in which one has directly 
impinged upon the other. Ernest Weinrib asserts that tort law, while not concerned with 
abstract ideas of wrongful conduct, is concerned with the right of recovery against a 
specific tortfeasor, who must respond to the harmed individual for the damage which he 
has caused. 
 
A more elegant approach speaks in the language of ‘responsibility’50. Assuming that the 
actor (defendant) possesses a general capacity for decision and action, he is responsible 
for what he does and its outcome is ‘inseparable from his status as a person’. Tony 
Honoré considers that the main role of legal liability is to reinforce our basic outcome-
responsibility with formal sanctions, such as compensation or punishment.51 The idea of 
‘responsibility’ covers a wide spectrum. It does not necessarily import legal liability or 
moral blame, although it is a condition of both. Honoré points out that human 
responsibility may relate to (a) our own conduct, (b) the responsibility that we choose to 
take on for other people, things and events; and (c) the responsibility that society thrusts 
upon us. Honoré’s three aspects of responsibility remind us that liability may stem from 
omissions as well as acts, including the acts or omissions of a third party. They also 
show the fallacy of limiting duty of care to ‘assumption’ of an obligation to control a 
person or a situation.52 
 
                                             
48 Fletcher, n 38 at 538. Fletcher then describes non-reciprocal risk and issues of fault at 539. 
49 E Weinrib, n 45. 
50 A Honoré, n 46. 
51 Ibid, 531. Honoré then discusses the requirements in a negligence action, namely fault as a failure to 
reach the objective standard of competence and the assumption that the actor ‘could have done otherwise’ 
which is an implicit factor. 
52 See Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 125 and K Mason ‘Fault, 
Causation and Responsibility: Is Tort Law Just An Instrument of Corrective Justice?’ (2000) 19 
Australian Bar Review 201. Also refer to Part III Redress Within the NHS below for discussion of the 
principle of medical responsibility for an act itself and/or responsibility only for the consequences and 





All three definitions can be applied to clinical negligence situations: the ‘paradigm of 
reciprocity’53 related to the standard of care; the ‘indispensable nexus between the 
parties’54 describing the doctor-patient relationship; while the ‘language of 
responsibility’55 places clinical negligence in context. I now turn to the framework 
within which one considers the appropriate balance of responsibilities when treatment 
goes amiss. 
 
2. Corrective Justice 
 
Despite semantic differences,56 all of these definitions of the relationship between the 
injured party and the tortfeasor conform to Weinrib’s account of the Aristotelian 
definition of corrective justice: 
 
Corrective justice is the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person 
on another. This idea received its classic formulation in Aristotle’s treatment of justice 
in Nicomachean Ethics, Book V.57 
 
Weinrib asserts58 that Aristotle presents corrective and distributive justice as two 
contrasting forms of justice. Corrective justice, which deals with voluntary and 
involuntary transactions (contracts and torts) focuses on whether one party has 
committed and the other has suffered a transactional injustice. Distributive justice, 
discussed below, deals with the distribution of whatever is divisible (honours and 
goods) among the participants in a political community. For Aristotle, justice in both 
these forms relates one person to another according to a conception of equality or 
fairness. Injustice arises in the absence of equality, when one person has too much or 
too little relative to another. 
 
The two forms of justice differ, however, in the way they construe equality. Distributive 
justice divides a benefit or burden in accordance with some criterion that compares the 
relative merits of the participants. Distributive justice, therefore, embodies a 
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54 Weinrib, n 45. 
55 Honoré, n 46. 
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individuals on a one-to-one basis’ quoted in A Ripstein n 37, 561. 
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proportional equality, in which all participants in the distribution receive their shares 
according to their respective merits under the criterion in question.59 
 
Corrective justice, in contrast, features the maintenance and restoration of the notional 
equality with which the parties enter the transaction. This equality consists in persons 
having what lawfully belongs to them. Injustice occurs when, relative to this baseline, 
one party realises a gain and the other a corresponding loss. The law corrects this 
injustice when it re-establishes the initial equality by depriving one party of the gain and 
restoring it to the other party. Of course, in the field of clinical negligence one is not 
referring to gains and losses, but rather to ‘rights and correlative duties’.60 
 
One answer to the question posed above, namely, ‘Why is this claimant entitled to 
recover from this particular defendant?’ is that, in sophisticated systems of private law, 
the overarching justificatory categories expressive of correlativity are those of the 
claimant’s right and the defendant’s corresponding duty not to interfere with that right. 
Right and duty are correlated when the claimant’s right is the basis of the defendant’s 
duty and, conversely, when the scope of that duty includes avoiding the kind of right-
infringement that the plaintiff suffered. Under those circumstances the reasons that 
justify the protection of the claimant’s rights are the same reasons that justify the 
existence of the defendant’s duty61. 
 
Negligence law provides a paradigmatic example of the operation of such correlativity 
in the common law. For the defendant to be held liable, it is not sufficient that the 
defendant’s negligent act resulted in harm to the claimant. The harm has to be to an 
interest that has the status of a right and the defendant’s action has to be wrongful with 
respect to that right. As Justice Cardozo stated in Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co.62 
a leading judgment explaining the notion of tortious wrong, ‘What the plaintiff must 
show is a ‘wrong’ to herself; ie, a violation of her right and not merely a wrong to 
someone else, nor conduct ‘wrongful’ because unsocial but not ‘a wrong’ to anyone.’ 
Under the condition stated by Cardozo J, freedom from the injury of which the claimant 
is complaining is both the content of the claimant’s right and the object of the 
                                             
59 For relevance to the NHS and compensation see discussion of the work of John Harris below. 
60 Weinrib, n 57. Most tort cases of accidental harm feature a loss by the claimant from which the 
defendant realises no corresponding gain. 
61 Ibid. 





defendant’s duty. In claims for personal injury the specific rights and interests of the 
claimant are those pertaining to the rights to the integrity of one’s body. The existence 
of these rights and interests gives rise to correlative duties of non-interference.63 
 
Correlativity then obtains because the parties are the doer and the sufferer of the same 
injustice, and the reason for the claimant’s entitlement to win the negligence action 
would be the same reason for the defendant’s liability to lose it. In the context of 
corrective justice, therefore, liability consists in a legal relationship between the two 
parties, each of whose position is intelligible only in the light of the other. In holding 
the defendant liable to the claimant, the court is making not two separate judgments 
(one that awards something to the claimant and the other that coincidentally takes the 
same from the defendant), but a single judgment that embraces both parties in their 
interrelationship. Corrective justice, then, is the theoretical construct that highlights the 
role of correlativity as the organising idea implicit in the relationship between the 
claimant and the defendant.64 
 
It is submitted that corrective justice as a basis for clinical negligence actions can be 
seen as psychologically satisfying65 and biblically justified.66 This is particularly so, if 
one considers that liability is predicated upon fault.67 Justifications of tort-based 
compensation may also be made on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. The 
theoretical justification of the tort system is that considerations of justice require fault-
based compensation to be sought from the person who is causally responsible for a loss 
or injury. Looked at in this way, the denial to an injured party of the right to bring a 
legal action amounts to the condoning of a wrong.68 Particularly in clinical negligence 
cases, the process of suing a defendant is more than an attempt to recover a loss or to 
seek monetary compensation for pain and suffering: it may well represent the desire to 
                                             
63 Weinrib, n 57, who links these ideas with Kantian principles. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Making psychological sense, fitting in with one’s intuitive world view and therefore ‘ego syntonic’. 
66 ‘An eye for an eye’ Exodus xxxi, 24. 
67 See Owen n 26, 201. 
68 The denial of a chance to sue refers to some no-fault systems. This could be challenged on 
constitutional or human rights grounds, eg a challenge based on The Human Rights Act 1998 Article 6 





seek an explanation of what happened69 and, indeed, may also be an attempt to secure 
some form of retribution.70 
 
However, Merry and McCall Smith have argued that in the context of medical 
misadventures, singling out an individual may sometimes obscure the real systemic 
nature of the responsibility for the incident.71 The counter-productiveness of the role of 
‘blaming behaviour’ in the context of non-deliberate actions is also addressed by the 
authors. Nevertheless, I believe that a merit of the current clinical negligence action is 
that it allows a defendant to mount a vigorous defence with a view to establishing that 
an injury is not due to incompetence (falling below the requisite standard) but instead 
reflects no more than an inevitable concomitant of an inherently risky procedure. 
 
There are, however, caveats to accepting corrective justice as the only philosophical 
basis for tort actions in cases of alleged clinical negligence within the context of a 
welfare national health service, in particular, the vexed question of the cost of both 
litigation and damages. This latter issue is the driving force behind support for 
distributive justice as the model for damages or compensation: 
 
If damages become payable, then that means that there is a correspondingly 
reduced amount available for the maintenance of wards and equipment, the 
purchase of drugs or the provision of treatment. A medium sized award, 
therefore, may be crudely translated into ten fewer hip replacements.72 
 
3. Distributive Justice 
 
While it is clear that corrective justice links the claimant’s claim to the defendant’s 
wrong and one person’s right is always a function of another person’s duty,73 the 
definition of distributive justice is more elusive. The two forms of justice both concern 
the allocation of resources; but they differ in that under distributive justice, individuals’ 
                                             
69 This is precisely what independent reviews of medical care by the Healthcare Commission were meant 
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70 FA Sloan, K Whetten-Goldstein, SS Entman, ED Kulas and EM Stout, ‘The Road From Medical Injury 
to Claims Resolution; How No-Fault and Tort Differ’ (1997) 60 Law and Contemporary Problems 35–70. 
Also ch 8 ‘Responding to the Needs of the Injured’ in Merry and McCall Smith, n 12. 
71 Final chapter ‘Conclusions’ in Merry and McCall Smith, ibid, 242–3. Also see J Harrington, ‘Elective 
Affinities: the Art of Medicine and the Common Law’ 55 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 259. 
72Merry and McCall Smith, n 12, 212. 
73 P Cane, ‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal 





entitlements are not correlative to other individuals’ obligations. Loss spreading may be 
seen as a principle of distribution, not of correction.74 Peter Cane, discussing Weinrib,75 
continues: ‘a judgment that a situation is distributively just cannot be made without 
reference to some extrinsic principle of distribution; and such a principle is political’.76 
The notion of distributive justice has no principle of just distribution built into it, in 
contrast to the notion of corrective justice77 which encompasses what is just and unjust 
without reference to any external criterion. 
 
In discussing Bolton v Stone78 Weinrib79 makes the point that in this case, the choice 
between the two outcomes was ultimately a question of distributive justice: should the 
cricket Club have an entitlement to injure or should the passer-by have an entitlement to 
be free of injury? The likeness with clinical negligence cases takes us back to the point 
made by Harris that victims of medical negligence should compete for scarce NHS 
funds according to the same rationing that exists throughout the NHS, rather than, as 
happens now, being given absolute priority. My position is less harsh on victims of 
iatrogenic harm. I will argue that because non-pecuniary losses are intangible and ill-
fitted to monetary redress and because the context is one of budgetary constraint within 
a communal NHS, damages should not be paid for them. It is not to say that there is no 
entitlement for non-pecuniary loss, rather that an alternative to financial redress is 
desired by victims of iatrogenic harm and what form this might take is addressed in the 
final chapter.80 
 
Before turning to the case law and judicial discussion of corrective and distributive 
justice, I turn to the idea of communitarianism, an extension of distributive justice, 
which helps shed light on decisions of entitlement to redress in the medical setting.81 
 
In contrast to the ideal of personal autonomy as the cornerstone of medical ethics and 
medical law, the communitarian ethos visualises the community as the integral unit in 
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which autonomy is expressed.82 Communitarianism is seen as a state that is modified by 
a sharing of values with those of the group in which the individual operates. Put in 
practical terms, the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness 
or badness of its effect, not on an individual per se but on persons as interdependent 
units of society. A community is therefore defined as a group of people who are 
significantly affected by an action or a decision. Autonomy must then be qualified by 
the legitimate interests and expectations of others, as well as by economic constraints. 
In the medical context, the claims of autonomy, defined here as the right to redress, 
must be moderated so as to accommodate the sensitivities of others, including those of 
the doctor – who is also an autonomous agent. Personal autonomy must be measured 
against the needs of the society as a whole. For example, in an ideal world, a sick person 
should be able to demand the treatment of his choice. It is acknowledged that this is an 
impossible goal. Society itself demands a just distribution of resources and that cannot 
be realised in an ambience of unrestricted ‘rights’: we can only realise our autonomy 
within the framework provided by society. 
 
C. Corrective or Distributive Justice as a Basis for Recovery 
in Clinical Negligence Cases 
 
Tort law is a mosaic in which the principles of corrective justice and distributive 
justice are interwoven.83 
 
At one extreme one could opt for a social security system which allocates resources 
according to need and would not give priority to victims of iatrogenic harm.84 Many 
corrective justice proponents reject the idea of no-fault schemes on the basis that they 
neglect the necessary moral recognition of responsibility. Moreover, public (or 
psychological) vindication is not provided at all by compensation systems such as 
personal insurance and social security, in which entitlement to compensation does not 
depend on establishing legal wrongdoing where the compensation is sought from and 
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paid by persons in no way responsible for the loss suffered and where entitlement to 
compensation is determined by an administrative process conducted in private.85 
 
Putting no-fault schemes to one side, I argue that despite the theoretical conflict, I 
would opt for a model of corrective justice as regards liability for the damage incurred 
and payment of damages for pecuniary loss, but look to distributive justice principles, 
which focus on the just distribution of burdens and losses amongst members of a society 
dependent on an NHS, when considering the merits of compensation for non-pecuniary 
loss. It is clear that there has been judicial concern regarding which principle of justice 
should prevail. Before considering McFarlane, the decision that parents of an 
unplanned but healthy child were no longer entitled to recover damages reflecting the 
costs of its maintenance, I will note the line of judicial argument in Frost v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police and the other cases arising from the Hillsborough 
disaster.86 
 
1. The Hillsborough Cases: The Police, the Public and the Bereaved Relatives 
 
Judges are increasingly prepared to discuss wider policy issues.87 The House of Lords 
has given explicit recognition to distributive justice principles as reasons for limiting 
tort liability. Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire88 involved claims by police 
officers with respect to psychiatric injury suffered after helping victims at the 
Hillsborough disaster, where 96 spectators were crushed to death at a soccer match. The 
negligence of the officers’ employers was held insufficient to ground recovery for pure 
psychiatric injury. Their Lordships expressed concern about the impact of a litigation 
explosion in the area of an employer’s duties. There was also concern about the burden 
of damages and the impact upon crowded court lists. If the employer’s duty were 
enlarged in this way the new principle would be available in many different situations, 
eg doctors and hospital workers who are exposed to the sight of grievous injuries and 
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suffering. This particular image of potentially far-reaching liability illustrates how 
heavily the floodgates argument weighed with Lord Steyn.89 
 
It is also clear that their Lordships recognised that based on the rule of recovery it would 
be difficult to justify how it would be fair to award compensation to police officers90 
when it had already been refused to family members of those who had been killed or 
maimed at the disaster. Lord Hoffmann said that corrective justice ‘...has been 
abandoned in favour of a cautious pragmatism.’91 
 
Lord Hoffmann put the dilemma of choosing between corrective and distributive justice 
as a basis for recovery for personal injury succinctly in Alcock v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police:92 
 
If one starts from the proposition that in principle the law of torts is there to give 
legal force to an Aristotelian system of corrective justice, then there is obviously no 
valid distinction to be drawn between physical and psychiatric injury....On the other 
hand, if one starts from the imperfect reality of the way the law of torts actually 
works, in which the vast majority of cases of injury and disability, both physical and 
psychiatric, go uncompensated because the persons (if any) who caused the damage 
were not negligent (a question which often involves very fine distinctions), or 
because the plaintiff lacks the evidence or the resources to prove to a court that they 
were negligent, or because the potential defendants happen to have no money, then 
questions of distributive justice tend to intrude themselves. Why should X receive 
generous compensation for his injury when Y receives nothing? Is the administration 
of so arbitrary and imperfect a system of compensation worth the very considerable 
cost? 
 
The underlying issue in these cases was an attempt to limit the class of persons who 
could recover damages on the basis of pure psychiatric injury not linked to physical 
injury. The ‘solution’ was a convoluted and medically unsound division of victims as 
primary and secondary and the conditions that each class must show in order to qualify 
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for relief.93 In the end we are left with a sense of ‘weary resignation’94 that pervades the 
majority speeches in White. Lord Hoffmann characterised the underlying concern in 
White as one of fairness between citizens. Was liability in negligence essentially about 
corrective justice – a principled ‘righting of wrongs’ by the wrongdoer within 
established legal rules – or should broader considerations of policy and social justice be 
allowed to influence or determine outcomes? Though historically the pursuit of 
corrective justice held sway and is still often portrayed as the dominant function,95 
considerations of what is sometimes described as ‘distributive justice’ increasingly 
intrude.96 Harvey Teff has argued, rightly I think, that in negligence which has its 
primary roots in the principle of corrective justice, the principles of distributive justice 
are effectively built into the formulation of the duty of care, via the ‘fair, just and 
reasonable’ requirement.97 
 
For Lord Steyn, ‘reasons of distributive justice were decisive’.98 I would take issue with 
the somewhat grandiose use of the term ‘distributive justice’ as a rationale for the 
decision. As a concept, distributive justice is most appropriately understood in systemic 
terms as a model for achieving greater fairness in the overall pattern of resource 
allocation. By contrast, the primary/secondary victims classification in White merely 
limits the class of those who can obtain a remedy within the framework of a system 
rooted in corrective justice. As Lord Steyn observes: 
 
In an ideal world all those who have suffered as a result of the negligence ought to be 
compensated. But we do not live in Utopia: we live in a practical world where the tort 
system imposes limits to the classes of claims that rank for consideration as well as to 
the heads of recoverable damages. This results, of course, in imperfect justice but it is 
by and large the best that the common law can do.99 
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The reality seems to be that there is an irresolvable tension between the merits of both 
philosophical paradigms when it comes to compensating victims of medical accidents. 
In clinical negligence and psychiatric injury cases, victims (and their relatives and 
friends) are frequently angry and resentful. It is difficult for them to accept judgments 
rooted not in clear corrective justice terms but rather in considerations of distributive 
justice that are frequently veiled. 
 
2. Wrongful Pregnancy Cases: Who Pays for Baby? 
 
The stories of parents bringing wrongful conception and birth suits against health 
authorities raise familiar scenarios – clinical mishaps in family planning techniques 
including negligently performed sterilisations and, in the case of wrongful birth, 
negligent failures in genetic counselling, whether actual diagnosis or information 
provision. Claiming that in the absence of such negligent treatment the ‘unwanted child’ 
would not have been born,100 parents have sought damages under two heads: firstly, for 
the pain and suffering attendant on the ‘personal injury’ of pregnancy and birth and 
secondly, for the costs of child maintenance. While for over a decade parents were able 
to seek both heads of damages from courts where clinical negligence resulted in the 
birth of a healthy or disabled child, in 1999, the adjudication by the House of Lords in 
McFarlane brought one dimension of this trend to a close.101 
 
a) McFarlane and the ‘Healthy Child’ 
 
Fortunately or unfortunately, she gave birth to a normal, healthy boy…The phrase 
‘fortunately or unfortunately’ encapsulates the most part of the legal argument which 
has surrounded the plaintiff’s claim for damages.102 
 
In McFarlane the pursuers claimed compensation for the costs arising from the 
gestation and birth of an unwanted healthy child conceived as a consequence of the 
defender’s negligence. The House of Lords held that the McFarlanes could recover 
general damages for the pain, discomfort and inconvenience as well as the costs arising 
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out of the pregnancy.103 However, although not taking issue with the mother’s claim 
(Lord Millett dissenting on this point), their Lordships utilised a wide variety of legal 
techniques in order to unanimously deny the more substantial claim for child 
maintenance in the case of the healthy child. The House of Lords, in McFarlane, 
overturned what had been thought to be settled law since the Court of Appeal judgment 
in Emeh v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority.104 While the 
judgment is less than straightforward since their Lordships gave different reasons for 
their decisions, the general thrust of McFarlane was this: if parents had suffered any 
loss, then this was pure economic loss which was not recoverable.105 
 
The significance of McFarlane for present purposes concerns the question of whether 
damages, paid from a straitened NHS budget, should be available for the birth and 
upbringing of a healthy child. The case addresses in sharp relief the tension between the 
demands of corrective and distributive justice. The argument for corrective justice and 
legal principle is that the couple had an initially unwanted child due to the negligent 
advice provided by someone who owed them a duty of care; their reasons for avoiding a 
further parentage were largely economic and to return them to the position in which 
they would have been in the absence of negligence involved reparation of the costs of 
maintaining that child. When it comes to consideration of distributive justice, arguments 
of a moral nature intrude, namely, whether the birth of a healthy child should not be 
considered an injury on the grounds of public policy, whether it is wrong to compensate 
people for an event many other couples have been seeking unsuccessfully and whether 
it is undesirable for a child to grow up to discover it was so unwanted that its parents did 
not pay for its upkeep.106 
 
What losses can be compensated in the circumstances the McFarlanes were in? As 
noted above, the action in negligence raised against the Health Board was in two parts – 
the ‘mother’s claim’ in respect of pain and suffering due to pregnancy and childbirth 
and the ‘parents’ claim’ for the upkeep of the child until the age of majority. 
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i. ‘The mother’s claim’ 
 
Mrs McFarlane claimed a sum of £10,000 in respect of pain, suffering and distress 
resulting from the unwanted pregnancy. Lord Steyn’s reasons for allowing this aspect of 
the claim allude to issues of corrective and distributive justice: 
 
The claim for solatium simply alleges that Mrs McFarlane became pregnant and had 
to undergo a pregnancy and confinement and the pain and distress of giving birth to 
the …child. It will be recalled that I have already rejected the argument that Mrs 
McFarlane suffered no personal injury. The constituent elements of a claim in delict 
are present. The considerations of distributive justice which militated against the 
claim for the cost of bringing up Catherine do not apply to the claim for a solatium.107 
 
A majority of the House of Lords allowed Mrs McFarlane’s claim for the pain and 
suffering associated with pregnancy and childbirth and for consequential financial 
losses, such as clothing and loss of earnings. Lord Millet’s minority view on this point 
was that the two claims were dependent upon each other and both claims should be 
denied if one was unacceptable.108 
 
ii. ‘The parents’ claim’ 
 
In McFarlane, the House of Lords confirmed that pregnancy and childbirth could 
qualify as personal injuries for the purposes of an action in negligence. The maintenance 
costs of a healthy child, however, while foreseeable, were not recoverable. Although the 
Law Lords’ reasons differed, I argue that underpinning them all was a concern that: 
 
To award potentially very large sums of damages to the parents of a normal and 
healthy child against a National Health Service always in need of funds to meet 
pressing demands would rightly offend the community’s sense of how public 
resources should be allocated.109 
 
Lord Slynn, when considering the extent of the duty of care and of liability for 
economic loss, applied the Caparo110 standard: ‘I consider that it is not fair, just or 
reasonable to impose on the doctor or his employer liability for the consequential 
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responsibilities imposed on or accepted by the parents to bring up a child’. Lord Slynn 
suggests that a line must be drawn before such losses are recoverable – but how fair, 
just or reasonable does it seem to the parents?111 
 
Lord Steyn’s judgment more directly addresses the issue of corrective and distributive 
justice. While stating that from the perspective of corrective justice the parents’ claim 
for the cost of bringing up Catherine should succeed, when focusing on the ‘just 
distribution of burdens and losses among members of society’, Lord Steyn decided that 
the parents of an unwanted but healthy child should not be able to sue the doctor or 
hospital for compensation equivalent to the cost of bringing up a child for the years of 
her minority. Lord Steyn relied on the reasoning in Frost v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police112 that it would be morally unacceptable if the law denied a remedy to 
bereaved relatives but granted it to police officers who were on duty. I find Lord Steyn’s 
appeal to public opinion113 unconvincing because he saw this as a ‘moral’ rather than 
‘legal’ argument and accepted that within tort law rules the claim would not satisfy the 
requirements of being fair, just and reasonable.114 
 
Lord Hope thought that, since the benefits associated with a healthy child were 
incalculable, it was illogical to attempt an assessment of the net economic loss sustained 
by the child’s parents. One reason was the difficulty of offsetting financial costs with 
emotional benefits.115 Lord Clyde was struck by the disproportion between the 
surgeon’s culpability and the level of damages that would be required for the full costs 
of the child’s upbringing. He considered the extent of liability that the defenders could 
reasonably have anticipated and opined that the cost of the child’s upbringing would be 
‘way beyond this’. Lord Millett objected to this ‘proportionality argument’ on the 
grounds that damages in tort are not based on the ‘gravity’ of fault but rather, are 
intended to put the claimant in the pre-tortious position. Lord Millett returned to the 
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reasoning in the index English case116 in holding that the law must accept the birth of a 
healthy baby as a blessing.117 
 
While accepting the mother’s claim, the costs of the child’s upbringing were, according 
to the majority of the House of Lords, pure economic loss and subject to the special 
rules of recovery, namely the ‘Caparo test’ of foreseeability, proximity and that it 
should be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in these circumstances. A 
majority of the House of Lords rejected the McFarlanes’ claim on the third limb of the 
test, namely that imposing liability on the Health Authority for the costs of their healthy 
child’s upbringing would not be fair, just and reasonable. 
 
The rejection by the Lords of the McFarlane claim is predicated on a concern that scarce 
NHS resources should not be diverted from their primary purpose of healthcare. 
However, the courts are not the forum where resources are allocated. In order to come 
to an equitable result, their Lordships have distorted traditional tort principles. The 
‘mother’s claim’ was for a ‘limited recovery’ and therefore unproblematic. However, 
the upbringing costs of a healthy child, which in other cases have included the costs of 
private education,118 were clearly seen as a step too far. Lord Millett’s suggestion of a 
‘conventional sum’ of £5,000 to compensate for the wrongful interference with their 
freedom to limit the size of the family,119 could be seen as an honest marker that a 
wrong was done and might have been a more elegant and honest solution.120 
 
b) Parkinson – the ‘Disabled Child’ and Rees - the ‘Disabled Parent’ 
 
The decision in McFarlane is unsatisfactory, a significant problem being the lack of 
clarity about legal policy and principle. McFarlane does not straightforwardly apply to 
cases where either the child or the parent is disabled and the House in McFarlane 
deliberately left open the possibility of recompense for the upkeep of an unexpected 
‘disabled’ child. 
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In Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust121 an attempt to 
entrench the possible exception for disabled children firmly within the law was 
successful. In this case a woman gave birth to a disabled child following an admittedly 
negligent sterilisation operation. Although it was in fact agreed that the child’s disability 
was not attributable to a breach of duty on the defendant’s part, the Court of Appeal 
made an exception and agreed to an entitlement to the extra costs over and above the 
expenses associated with bringing up a healthy child. The exception has been seen as a 
‘tug of sympathy’ for the claimants rather than a principled exception.122 However, 
Brooke LJ pointed out that parents in a similar position had been able to recover 
damages for some 15 years following Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster 
Area Health Authority123 and that both the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ test and the 
principles of distributive justice would be satisfied if the award was limited to the 
special costs associated with the disability. He was supported in a powerful speech by 
Hale LJ who started from the premise that to cause a woman to become pregnant 
against her will was an invasion of her bodily integrity. Hale LJ could find nothing 
unusual or contrary to legal principle in awarding damages in such a case on the 
grounds that the caring role persists throughout childhood. Admitting damages limited 
to the restitution of costs beyond those involved in bringing up a normal child gave no 
offence to those with disability and simply acknowledged that the costs in the event of 
disability were greater than in the case of normality – put another way, the ‘deemed 
equilibrium’ between the benefits derived from and the costs of maintaining an 
uncovenanted healthy child that underpins the McFarlane decision is distorted to an 
extent that is determined by the degree of disability in an unhealthy child.124 Although I 
welcome the more generous outcome in Parkinson, I agree with Mason and Laurie125 
that there remains a logical inconsistency between the outcomes of the two cases. Hale 
LJ’s arguments regarding bodily invasion can be equally applied to the birth of a 
‘healthy’ uncovenanted child; additionally, in most cases, the fact that the disability was 
not caused by the breach dilutes the moral imperative for compensation.126 
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c) Rees: the ‘Disabled Parent’ 
 
The House of Lords revisited the issues again in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust,127 a case concerning a disabled parent and a healthy child. In this case, as a 
result of a negligently performed sterilisation operation, a healthy child was born to a 
woman who was severely visually handicapped. The mother claimed damages not only 
for the pain and discomfort of pregnancy and childbirth ‘the mother’s claim’, but also 
for the additional costs incurred as a result of her disability. The Court of Appeal by a 2 
to 1 majority allowed recovery on the grounds that the claimant’s case could be 
distinguished from McFarlane because McFarlane only applied to healthy parents. 
Waller LJ in a powerful dissenting judgment argued that whether the birth of an 
unwanted child is a ‘disaster’ will often depend more upon the resources and support 
available to the mother than on whether she happens to be disabled.128 On appeal, the 
House of Lords reconsidered its judgment in McFarlane. Despite trenchant criticism of 
McFarlane in a similar case heard in the High Court of Australia,129 the seven Law 
Lords unanimously declined to revisit the judgment in McFarlane largely on the basis 
of consistency of the law. In considering whether an exception should be made where 
the mother was disabled, the House of Lords was divided. By a 4 to 3 majority it held 
that Rees could not be distinguished: the child was healthy so McFarlane applied. 
Therefore there was no recovery for any of the costs associated with the child’s 
upbringing. In contrast, the dissenting judges would have allowed Karina Rees to 
recover for the extra costs associated with her disability. Nevertheless, the majority 
added a ‘significant gloss’. Lord Bingham explicitly questioned ‘the fairness of a rule 
which denies the victim of a legal wrong any recompense at all beyond an award 
immediately related to the unwanted pregnancy and birth…’. He then suggested a 
conventional sum of £15,000 ‘which would not be and would not be intended to be 
compensatory…It would afford some measure of recognition of the wrong done.’130 
Arguably, this decision shows the tension between adhering to the ordinary rules of tort 
law based on corrective justice principles and the requirement of distributive justice, 
namely: that giving the claimant full compensation for all her losses would undermine 
the capacity of the NHS to provide adequate healthcare to the rest of the population. 
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Would a conventional sum which recognised that a wrong had been done to them but 
does not attempt to provide full compensation be a good compromise? I can see this as a 
reasonable solution to the problems of a stretched healthcare budget but Mark Lunney 
has significant reservations: 
 
It is risky because it may end up pleasing no one, except perhaps the NHS. Given 
the potential costs involved in raising a child, the parents of a healthy child may 
still feel hard done by. Disabled parents may feel aggrieved because the 
comparatively small award is unlikely to meet the additional costs incurred 
because of their disability. Those in favour of a full award in line with corrective 
justice principles may feel that the solution fails to do justice and those who 
believe McFarlane was a wholly just decision may feel that the judgment has 
been undermined.131 
 
In the context of claims for clinical negligence, the various ‘solutions’ adopted in both 
McFarlane and Rees are undoubtedly anomalous. Creating a partial immunity to the 
NHS against liability for wrongful conception and birth suits must now raise difficult 
questions for all clinical negligence claims, particularly those with a large element of 
‘pure economic loss’, as to which are the most deserving of compensation and which 
are not. If one considers that such judgements are better left for Parliament than the 
judiciary, then the reproductive torts now require a serious rethink.132 
 
D. Corrective and Distributive Justice: Damages and the NHS 
 
The conundrum is the question of the relevance and application of distributive justice in 
tort law, which is primarily a system of corrective justice. It is arguable that a system of 
corrective justice in the sphere of clinical negligence is predicated on distributive justice 
principles applied to outcome-responsibility.133 Outcome-responsibility for harm to 
another does not by itself create a duty to compensate. However, it serves as a basis on 
which the law can erect a duty to compensate if there is a reason to treat the harm 
suffered as the infringement of a right. The form that our responsibility for an outcome 
takes remains an open question; an apology will often be enough. In other cases the 
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state may impose tort liability to make good the loss, provided that to do so is not 
inconsistent with maintaining competing crucial principles.134 
Any limitation on liability is analysable in terms of distributive justice. The ‘fair, just or 
reasonable’ criterion, which has become an accepted part of English negligence law, is 
now being acknowledged as expressing distributive justice.135 In Rees, Lord Steyn 
characterised the ratio of McFarlane as reliant on the impossibility of weighing the 
benefits and detriments of the birth of a healthy child and Lord Millett opined that it 
would be ‘morally offensive’ for society ‘to regard a normal healthy child as more 
trouble and expense than it is worth’. When coupled with the principle of distributive 
justice, or the ‘fair, just or reasonable’ test – which is arguably just distributive justice 
by another name – the result was that the maintenance costs of a healthy child could not 
be recovered.136 It is impossible from this to determine the exact end point by which a 
fair distribution should be measured. However, it is noted that the subsequent Court of 
Appeal hearings of Parkinson and Rees were determined on the basis of need.137 This 
reliance on a needs-based distributive justice argument has been undermined by the 
majority’s decision in Rees, which applies in all cases where the child is healthy. If that 
point is considered in conjunction with the previous argument about the lack of balance 
to be tipped by the extra costs arising from a disability, it is arguable that in order to be 
consistent, parents should no longer be able to recover where the child is disabled.138 
There remains a problem with determining the optimum distribution of losses and 
burdens within society.139 Honoré argues that the two theories meet because corrective 
justice depends on distributive justice, corrective justice being a genuine form of justice 
only because the just distribution of risks distributes throughout society the risks of 
harm attributable to human conduct.140 This just distribution of risks requires people to 
bear the risk of harming others by their conduct even when they are not at fault in doing 
so. In the end, the justification of tort liability both against the harm-doer personally and 
                                             
134 Ibid, in particular the necessity of distributive justice in the case of the NHS.  
135A Maclean, ‘An Alexandrian Approach to The Knotty Problem of Wrongful Pregnancy: Rees v 
Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust in the House of Lords’ [2004] 3 Web JCLI, 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2004/issue3/maclean3.html> This is not true in Australian law, which has rejected 
the Caparo test: Melchior v Cattanach [2003] HCA 38, at [121–122] per Kirby J. 
136 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309, 325 [28–29]. 
137 Hale LJ’s argument in, Rees n 128 [22]. 
138 MacLean, n 134. 
139 Ibid. 





against secondary defendants, such as health authorities held to be vicariously liable, 
rests on both corrective and distributive justice. 
 
The question of the extent of entitlement to financial redress is particularly acute when 
the defendant is the communal NHS. I accept Tony Honoré’s construction that clinical 
negligence law is a system of corrective justice predicated on distributive justice 
principles applied to outcome-responsibility. Hence, in the particular context of the 
NHS, entitlement to redress for loss is perhaps justifiably finite. I will argue that non-
pecuniary loss can be redressed in ways alternative to damages. My argument is not 
solely based on the practical issue of the NHS finances, although that weighs heavily, 
but on the point that these intangible, uncommodifiable losses require a different 
approach. In the following chapter141 I will address the issue of what victims of 
iatrogenic harm seek from redress for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. In a later 
chapter142 I will consider the question of the extent to which damages can compensate 
for pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: FORMS OF REDRESS 
 
What would an adequate, fair, rational and just system of compensation for iatrogenic 
harm within the confines of a national health service look like?143 In corrective justice 
terms it is incumbent upon the NHS to compensate victims of iatrogenic harm. In 
pragmatic terms today it is the NHS Litigation Authority (hereinafter ‘NHSLA’), a 
public body answerable to HM Treasury, which provides the damages. Whereas this 
may compensate for pecuniary losses, I would argue that this payment is not sufficient 
in offering succour for the emotional need to know what happened and for an 
acknowledgement from the negligent party, albeit that the injury was unintentional. The 
tensions between the theories of corrective and distributive justice have been explored. 
The roles of fault and cost have been addressed with respect to how they influence both 
the theory and practice of the law pertaining to clinical negligence. In essence I argue 
that the principle of corrective justice fulfils the moral imperative of redress for 
iatrogenic harm to a specific patient but that the principles of distributive justice are 
                                             
141 Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’, below. 
142 Part II Chapter 6 ‘Damages’, below. 
143 ‘…maintaining the welfare state compromise of 1945’. J Harrington, ‘Law’s Faith in Medicine: Utopia 
and Its Discontents’, Paper presented at Modern Law Review Seminar on Health, Law, Faiths and Beliefs: 





called upon when analysing limitations of liability within the Health Service. After a 
complementary chapter looking at patients’ wishes from redress,144 the thesis is divided 
into two parts, one looking at medical negligence litigation, the second at redress within 
the NHS. 
 
A. Civil Litigation and the NHS Complaints Procedure 
 
The legal and the Health Service routes to justice are quite different. The former offers 
damages, the latter explanations, apologies where appropriate and undertakings to 
repair. Damages operate as compensation, as a marker of wrongdoing and as 
acknowledgement that redress is needed. Damages also address needs and this might be 
regarded as the most significant aspect of damages. Explanations and apologies act as 
different types of reparation. They address the emotional and moral pain suffered by the 
victim and his family. However, as will be shown, access to either system presents 
difficulties.145 Patients and their families may have to endure repeated hearings in their 
efforts to obtain information and justice.146 Until recently, the two systems have been 
mutually exclusive in that recourse to the law barred one from using the NHS 
complaints procedure. The NHS Redress Act 2006 intended to provide a framework for 
the resolution of clinical negligence disputes by combining features of the legal and 
healthcare mechanisms is not yet fully functioning but will be considered in a 
subsequent chapter.147 I will argue that both the legal and the NHS systems, while 
offering some remedies, have their drawbacks. This is especially true for those seeking 
clarification of the adverse event. I will argue that it might be helpful to consider 
initiatives in Australia which offer open disclosure and what is referred to as full 
apologies.148 These are not easy options but if they offer effective redress they will 
prove to be options worth exploring. 
                                             
144 Chapter 2 below. 
145 Part II Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ and Part III Redress Within the NHS Chapter 7 ‘History of the 
NHS Complaints Process’, below. 
146Ibid. 
147 Part III Chapter 8 ‘NHS Redress Act 2006’. Note: although in Making Amends it was mooted that a 
duty of candour might be imposed in the forthcoming NHS Redress Act 2006, this did not materialise. 
See M Brazier & E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2007), 270 
on the NHS Redress Act 2006. 
148 RAM Iedema, ‘The National Open Disclosure Pilot: Evaluation of a Policy Implementation Initiative’ 
(2008) 188 Medical Journal of Australia 7, 397–400 and P Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, 
Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal of 

























Studies of patients and families considering or involved in litigation suggest the 
importance of explanation and apology, but findings from such studies are suggestive 




Should we continue with fault as a basis of compensation? Or is the link between fault 
and payment forged by deeply felt but …dysfunctional drives for accountability and, 
let’s use the word, revenge? It is difficult to explain the persistence of the Anglo-
American fault-based tort system as anything other than its having been built on an 
atavistic foundation of retributive, rather than distributive justice.2 
                                             
1 KM Mazor, SR Simon, JH and JH Gurwitz, ‘Communicating with Patients about Medical Errors: A 
Review of the Literature’ (2004) 164 Archives of Internal Medicine 1690–1697. 
2 EA Dauer, ‘Medical Injury, Patients’ Claims and the Effects of Government Responses in 







The question of what iatrogenically injured patients and their families might seek from 
redress is a complicated one. There is no solution offering restitutio in integrum; 
therefore most forms of redress are rendered second best from the start. Historically, 
four themes have been mooted: restoration, including financial compensation or another 
intervention to ‘make the patient whole again’; correction, such as a system change or 
competence review to protect future patients; communication, which may include an 
explanation, expression of responsibility, or apology; and sanction, including 
professional discipline or another form of punitive action.3 More recently, these notions 
have been considered in more nuanced ways.4 
 
Due to the increasing sophistication of medical law and the Human Rights Act 
(hereinafter ‘HRA’) 1998, there are now a myriad of initiatives designed to address the 
‘tangle of motives behind a patient’s or family’s decision to take legal action following 
medical injury, money only representing one of them’.5 
 
In chapter 1,6 I argued that on the basis of corrective justice principles, iatrogenically 
injured patients have an entitlement to redress and compensation against the tortfeasor. 
In this chapter, I will address what is known about the motivations of patients who 
suffer an adverse event, why some become complainants and others claimants7 and why 
some choose not to sue. I then turn to the issues of open disclosure, apologies and 
communication, seemingly self-evident requirements for satisfactory redress and yet 
rarely forthcoming. I will consider the impediments to the straightforward solution of 
openness from the medical providers. In addition, consideration will be given to recent 
initiatives in England aimed at facilitating open disclosure, legal duty of candour and 
incidence reporting. In conclusion, this chapter sets out what patients might wish from 
redress. In the final chapter of the thesis,8 I will evaluate the ‘expectations gap’: the 
                                             
3 M Bismark and E Dauer, ‘Motivations for Medico-Legal Action – Lessons From New Zealand’ (2006) 
27 The Journal of Legal Medicine 55. Issues regarding professional sanctions and discipline will be 
addressed in Part III Redress within the NHS below. 
4 M Bismark, MJ Spittal, AJ Gogos, RL Gruen and DM Studdert, ‘Remedies Sought and Obtained in 
Healthcare Complaints’ (2011) 20 British Medical Journal Quality and Safety 806–810 and Dauer (n 2). 
5 Bismark and Dauer (n 3). 
6 Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress Within the NHS’ above. 
7 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4). 





discrepancy between what complainants/claimants want and what they in fact get out of 
the redress processes.9 Unfortunately, except for low-value claims,10 there is as yet no 
integrated response system to address the wishes of claimants, both financial and 
otherwise. This chapter lays the foundation for the rest of the thesis,11 which analyses 
redress available to victims both through the English legal system and the extralegal 
methods of pursuing complaints through the English NHS structures.12 I will argue that, 
apart from pecuniary loss, restoration through monetary means is illusory. Therefore, 
within the strictures of a universal health service, both the needs of patients and their 
families and the demands of distributive justice are better served by improved extralegal 
initiatives.13 
 
II. PATIENTS’ COMPLEX DESIRES 
 
In a landmark paper, four aspects of redress issues for iatrogenically injured patients 
were put forward, namely: restoration, correction, communication and sanction.14 
Although these will be discussed discretely, patients and families often seek an 
amalgam of all four. 
 
A more sophisticated view would show that there is little that is intrinsic or inevitable 
about people’s needs and expectations following an injurious event. What people want 
and expect is as much a function of environmental variables as it is of objective injury, 
loss or pain.15 Sally Lloyd-Bostock,16 writing from the perspective of the psychology of 
legal decision-making and the social psychology of legal disputes, developed what she 
termed ‘attribution theory’ to link injury with behaviour, specifically ‘claiming 
behaviour’. An individual’s journey from the fact of an injury to the making (or not 
making) of a claim is an untidy psychological process. In outline, it can be described as 
                                             
9 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4). 
10 Clinical negligence claim worth less than £1,000 small claims track should not result in proceedings. 
Brazier, M and Cave, E Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011), 228. 
11 Themes addressed in this chapter will be expanded upon throughout the thesis. 
12 Where applicable, references will be made to initiatives in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
13 ‘If damages become payable, then that means there is a correspondingly reduced amount available for 
the maintenance of wards and equipment, the purchase of drugs or the provision of treatment. A medium 
sized award therefore may be crudely translated into ten fewer hip replacements.’ A Merry and A McCall 
Smith, Errors, Medicine and The Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 212. 
14 Bismark and Dauer (n 3). 
15 S Lloyd-Bostock ‘The Ordinary Man and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and Responsibility’ 






a cascade of perceptions and decisions: first, recognising the fact that one has been 
injured; second, realising that the injury was caused by someone else; third, assessing 
that cause as a matter of fault or wrongdoing on the tortfeasor’s part; next, concluding 
that some sort of accountability is called for; and from there sorting through all of the 
permutations of seeking satisfaction by selecting a remedy, the latter dependant on the 
remedial pathways known to be available. 
 
The discussion below is to be seen in the context of these complexities and in the 
framework of dispute resolution choices people make in response to unsatisfactory 
medical experiences.17 
 
A. Restoration: How Far Can Money Take Us? 
 
Restoration is concerned with the attempt to restore the injured person to ‘wholeness’ 
and focuses on the needs of the victim rather than the impact on the tortfeasor. In this 
context, restoration typically involves monetary compensation. To the extent that 
damages represent pecuniary loss, restoration is possible. For the intangible losses, 
damages represent means replacing compensation or ends replacing compensation.18 
For present purposes these can be defined as substitute but incomplete compensation. 
Traditional litigation provides only money, infrequently, slowly and at considerable 
emotional and psychological expense.19 Injured patients, however, report the need for 
other things, as noted: restoration (more broadly than cash); sanction (accountability for 
erring providers); communication (disclosure, explanation, apology); and, perhaps most 
significantly, correction (steps taken to assure the error is not repeated).20 Money is a 
poor substitute for these other concerns and the legal system is used for a variety of 
                                             
17 ML May and DB Stengel, (1990) “Who sues their doctors? How patients handle medical grievances” 
Law and Society Review, 24, 103 at 106. ‘Patients may lump it; exit by changing doctors; make a claim by 
confronting doctor with a complaint; engage in disputing taking the grievance to a non-legal forum; 
and/or engage in disputing involving a lawyer and then decide to sue or not sue’. 
18 Chapter 6 ‘Damages’ below. 
19 See Part II ‘Medical Negligence Litigation’ below for analysis of the difficulties claimants face in 
pursuing litigation. Outcome of claims for medical negligence 2001–2011 NHSLA  Factsheet August 
2011: 37.69% abandoned by claimant; 45% settled out of court; 3.16% damages approved and set by 
court; yet to settle 14.14%. For the majority of claimants stressful and expensive litigation ends in 
disappointment. Research indicates that even where claimants are awarded damages, many remain 
dissatisfied, lacking an explanation, apology or assurance that the same thing will not be repeated. L 
Mulcahy, Disputing Doctors: The Socio-Legal Dynamics of Complaints about Medical Care 
(Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2003), 96. 





reasons, some of which it is not intended to serve.21 However, the other systems of 
recourse, complaints,22 referral to the Ombudsman or Commissioner, offer only non-
monetary remedies.23 Confining ourselves for the moment to requests for restoration in 
monetary terms, the most recent study of remedies sought and obtained in healthcare 
complaints24 noted that the vast majority (87 per cent) of conciliated complaints 
included a request for restoration. This finding, consistent with similar research, 
identified this as an important outcome for many patients and families, particularly 
those who have suffered serious financial consequences as a result of medical injury.25 
Compensation is usually a determining factor for those suing on behalf of a relative 
(often a dependent child), but it is less important to the bereaved – who in any case 
receive small damages. Compensation is crucial for actual losses or to provide care in 
the future for an injured person, especially in jurisdictions which cannot assure future 




Because patients have such complex needs for redress, it is difficult to distinguish 
precise motivations which determine whether a patient takes the path of complaint 
and/or litigation. One study from New Zealand, where there are two well-established 
medico-legal paths, one leading to monetary compensation and the other to non-
monetary forms of accountability, compared the form of accountability sought by 
patients and their families following an adverse event.27 They noted that the odds that 
patients would seek compensation were significantly increased if they were in their 
prime working years or had a permanent disability as a result of their injury. Lost 
wages, serious injury and financial necessities, particularly if there are dependents, were 
also significant factors. It appears that there is a threshold with respect to bearable 
monetary losses due to injury. Beyond the threshold, the need for monetary 
                                             
21 Bismark and Dauer (n 3). 
22 Australia, New Zealand and England have responded to the need for redress apart from money by 
creating health complaint commissions empowered to deliver a broader and more responsive array of 
remedies. However, patient dissatisfaction is still significant. Dauer (n 2). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4), 808. 
25M Bismark, E Dauer, R Paterson, et al ‘Accountability Sought by Patients Following Adverse Events 
from Medical Care: The New Zealand Experience’ (2006) 175 Canadian Medical Association Journal 
889–94. 
26 C Vincent, A Phillips and M Young, (1994) ‘Why do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and 
Relatives Taking Legal Action’ 343 The Lancet, 1609. 





compensation may become more pressing, whatever concerns the patient may have. As 
important as corrective action and improved communication may be, they cannot pay 
the bills. Another consideration for claimants is that medico-legal systems based on 
malpractice litigation allow few outlets for achieving non-monetary goals such as 
clinical review and finding out what occurred.28 In these cases, money serves as a 
proxy.29 
 
 In conclusion, I fully support financial redress as compensation for pecuniary loss and 
argue that corrective justice principles require this even from a universal health service, 
which has to be held to the same account as the private or voluntary health sectors. 
Although restoration was included as a request for the majority of conciliated cases, it 
stood alone as a remedy sought in only 25 per cent of the complaints in this study of 
Anglo-American legal systems.30 Litigation, ostensibly for compensation, may also be 
motivated by anger, perceptions of poor physician-patient communication and 
encouragement by families.31 I argue that these other significant aspects of harm 
following adverse outcomes should be compensated by non-monetary remedies which 




The issues raised by complainants in a further study, conducted in England, are 
remarkably consistent with the wishes expressed in studies in other commonwealth 
countries.32 The most commonly sought form of non-monetary accountability, raised by 
50 per cent of complainants, was the desire for corrective measures to address the 
causes of harm. That aspiration by patients and relatives to prevent future incidents can 
be seen both as a genuine desire to safeguard others and as an attempt to find some way 
of coping with their own pain or loss.33 Another form of accountability frequently 
                                             
28 In the civil system through an independent expert witness instructed by their solicitor, the patient would 
gain access to the clinical reports. This would not be available through the complaints procedures. 
Vincent, Phillips and Young (n 26). 
29 Bismark, Dauer, Paterson, et al (n 25). 
30 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4), 808. This resonates with research from New Zealand, the UK, the USA and 
the Netherlands. 
31 G Hickson, E Clayton, P Gitnens,  and F Sloan, (1992) ‘Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical 
Malpractice Claims following Perinatal Injuries’ 267 Journal of the American Medical Association 16, 
1359–63. 






sought was the wish to secure information and greater transparency about what had 
happened. Such clarification was particularly important in families of infants and 
children who had been harmed by medical care. This was the only subgroup of patients 
for whom a desire for communication was mentioned more frequently than a desire for 
correction.34 Other wishes for redress included apologies and assurances that someone 
accepted responsibility. Patients who sought non-monetary relief also desired 
restoration and sanction, but these were less prevalent issues. A growing emphasis on 
the need to disclose adverse outcomes of care was noted.35 
 
I now turn to the issues around openness: explanation and the taking of responsibility 
and apology where appropriate. In order for these to constitute effective redress, 
satisfactory communication is required. 
 
B. Communication: Can You Hear Me? 
 
Although open disclosure is lauded as a ‘good’ it is a more complicated concept than it 
first appears. Information is power and initially, in clinical negligence cases, 
information resides with the defendants. I would place the need for explanation as the 
first priority for iatrogenically harmed patients because there is a ‘need to know’ before 
any coming to terms with or grieving for a loss can occur.36 As Beverly Raphael 
explains:37 
 
Sudden, unexpected and unanticipated deaths, especially deaths of the young, 
that are perceived as untimely, are more likely to be associated with pathological 
outcomes…Often much psychic energy goes into trying to make meaning of the 
death, finding out why it happened, who is to blame, perhaps because the 
bereaved hopes to prevent such shock in the future or to undo what has 
happened. This may be further complicated by a failure to see the body of the 
dead, adding to the problem of accepting the finality of the loss.38 
                                             
34 Ibid. 
35 Bismark, Dauer, Paterson, et al (n 25). 
36 CM Parkes, Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult Life, 4th edn. (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2010). 
The recent Hillsborough report (see page 59 herein, n 86) also highlighted the need for people to have 
correct information before they can come to terms. 
37 Beverley Raphael, The Anatomy of Bereavement: Handbook for the Caring Professions (London, 
Routledge, 1985), 222–223. 





There is the complex issue of the content of what is to be disclosed;39 the receptiveness 
of the hearer and the ability and willingness of the physicians to tell. These are some of 
the features which inhibit successful communication even when there is good faith on 
both sides. It is noteworthy that these conversations often take place in an emotionally 
charged situation. 
 
1. The Patient’s Perspective 
 
In a thoughtful study40 it was found that the desire for information, perception of being 
misled, anger with the medical profession, desire to prevent injuries to others, 
recognition of long term sequelae and advice from knowledgeable acquaintances, as 
well as the need for money, appeared to contribute to families’ decisions to file 
malpractice claims. Patients identified two general types of communication problems. 
They believed that some physicians had misled them and that others would simply not 
listen or answer their questions. Some families who believe they were misled may have 
come to that conclusion when what they remembered hearing about their children’s 
prognosis differed from actual outcomes.41 
 
The sources of such discrepancies vary. Families may be correct when they complain 
that their providers did not tell them the full story. Few physicians are eager to share 
bad news. Physicians may feel that they are trying to preserve some hope for the family 
by withholding the full details of an infant’s grim prognosis, while others may fear 
being sued. The responses of the families also contribute to misunderstandings about 
expected outcomes. They may not understand medical terminology or may fail to raise 
their most deep-seated concerns or seek clarification of points about which they are 
confused, either because they have been acculturated not to ask or because they are 
intimidated or made anxious by discussions with physicians. Other families may 
experience denial as a part of grieving; some who are given bad news later deny that 
they were ever given the information. To point out these sources of misunderstanding is 
not to say that families somehow ‘ought to understand better’. Rather it is to suggest 
                                             
39 ‘…negligent adverse events are a subset of preventable adverse events. In practice, there is likely to be 
considerable uncertainty as to causality and preventability…such uncertainty complicates the disclosure 
decision. Premature disclosure may cause unnecessary distress, but waiting for an investigation to be 
completed may increase patient anger and frustration, especially when causality is obscure to the patient 
and family.’ Mazor, Simon and Gurwitz, (n 1).  






that physicians should be aware that some families have trouble understanding or 
remembering what they hear so that an attempt can be made to overcome these barriers 
to communication.42 
 
2. The Physician’s Perspective 
 
Physicians’ difficulties in sharing information and families’ problems in hearing what 
has been said may also have contributed to the perception of some families that they 
could not find out what happened. Several studies suggest that physicians and patients 
have different ideas about the amount and type of information that can and should be 
transmitted; physicians also struggle with what to do in the face of requests for 
unattainable information and much hinges on the prior and current relationship between 
the physician and the patient.43 Working under a threat of litigation creates a climate of 
fear, which cannot be conducive to the best use of human resources within the medical 
system.44 The toll that the blame and fault-based litigation system takes on doctors is 
high and counter-productive.45 
 
3. Government Initiatives 
 
I now turn to the question of the need for there to be open disclosure of adverse events. 
This relates to the issue of apologies which will be discussed fully in a later chapter.46 In 
brief, a ‘protected apology’ is one where even a full admission of fault cannot be used 
as evidence against the doctor in a subsequent malpractice action. In recent years in the 
United States, six States47 have enacted laws excluding expressions of sympathy after 
accidents as proof of liability. Such laws however do not remove all barriers to 
disclosure of medical errors. The law excludes from evidence statements made to the 
                                             
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See Merry and McCall Smith (n 13) at 217; Mulcahy (n 19) and J R Cohen, (2004) ‘Toward Candor 
after Medical Error: the First Apology Law’ 5 Harvard Health Policy Review 21–24.  
45 For a moving account of the toll on doctors see AW Wu, ‘Medical Error: The Second Victim: The 
Doctor Who Makes the Mistake Needs Help Too’ (2000) 320 (7237) British Medical Journal, 726−727. 
See also Chapter 7 ‘History of the Complaints Process – a ‘Curate’s Egg?’ below for initiatives in training 
doctors to deal with adverse events. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Cohen (n 44) for an example of a legal initiative in Colorado, USA. Ibid. Also for the laws of the 
six states referred to: Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 233, 23D; Tex Civ Prac and Rem Code Ann 18.061; Cal 





patient, but not statements made, for example, to one’s colleagues.48 While the case for 
open disclosure to patients is strong from the viewpoint of medical ethics, the reality in 
practice is different.49 Yet it is precisely failure to admit a mistake and apologise for it 
that can prompt a lawsuit.50 
 
There are three important aspects to highlight. The first is in regard to the right to 
information. If the medical provider does not offer that information, some patients or 
their families will sue to get it.51 Second is the issue of betrayed trust. To be effective, 
the physician-patient relationship must be rooted in trust. And finally, there is the matter 
of dignity. Failure to apologise after injury can itself be a form of injury.52 By removing 
the spectre of liability from the physician-patient dialogue, a law creating an apology 
exception can help maintain the physician-patient relationship after an error occurs. 
Even with protected apologies, however, compensation may still be required. In 
particular, where medical errors have been severe, the critical issue is not whether an 
apology will prevent all legal recourse, but rather how it will influence the character of 
that recourse. The hope is that compensation will then be achieved by a relatively 
cooperative and speedy settlement process rather than more lengthy, costly and 
unpredictable litigation.53 
 
One caveat must be included. Although ethical and professional guidelines, with public 
support, recommend disclosure of medical errors to patients, there has been insufficient 
empirical evidence to support conclusions about the disclosure process or its 
consequences. Additional research is needed to understand how disclosure decisions are 
made, to provide guidance to physicians on the process and to help all involved 
anticipate the consequences of disclosure.54 
 




51 Ibid, footnote 14 therein. S Gilbert, Wrongful Death: A Medical Tragedy (New York, WW Norton & 
Co., 1997). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, footnote 26 therein. DN Frenkel and CB Liebman, ‘Words that Heal’ (2004) 140 Annals of 
Internal Medicine 6, 482–3. 





III. OPEN DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
DISCLOSURE TO PATIENTS 
 
In Making Amends,55 Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer, discussed the 
aims of redress in his proposals to reform clinical negligence in the NHS. In the context 
of the need for open disclosure, it was to be hoped that the ‘risks of care are reduced and 
patient safety improved because medical errors and near misses are readily reported, 
successfully analysed and effective corrective action takes place and is sustained.’56 A 
number of initiatives ensued, briefly mentioned herewith. However, as Emma Cave 
says, ‘evidence suggests that defensiveness amongst the medical profession remains a 
persistent problem, though the associated costs are difficult to quantify.’57 A duty of 
candour was called for by the Chief Medical Officer (hereinafter ‘CMO’) in Making 
Amends58 and, in 2009, the House of Commons called for such a duty to be 
reconsidered.59 As Emma Cave observes, 
 
The Department of Health has responded cautiously and disjointedly. It 
promised a culture of openness in High Quality Care for All.60 Section 2 of the 
Compensation Act 2006 reassured healthcare professionals that: ‘An apology, 
offer of treatment or other redress shall not of itself amount to an admission of 
negligence or breach of statutory duty’. According to the National Patient Safety 
Agency,61 ‘[s]aying sorry is not an admission of liability and is the right thing to 
do... Patients have a right to expect openness in their healthcare’.62 This is a 
stance enforced by the Care Quality Commission (hereinafter ‘CQC’),63 the NHS 
Litigation Authority (hereinafter ‘NHSLA’),64 and the General Medical Council 
(hereinafter ‘GMC’).65 In April 2010, a statutory duty to report incidents was 
introduced.66 The NPSA will pass on details of incidents to the CQC which can 
impose fines and registration penalties if the guidelines are not strictly 
                                             
55 Chief Medical Officer Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for Reforming the 
Approach to Clinical Negligence in the NHS (Crown Copyright, Department of Health, 2003) hereafter 
CMO Making Amends. 
56 Ibid, 13. 
57 E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) 27 Professional Negligence 3, 138–157 offers a comprehensive 
summary of initiatives towards redress and open disclosure at 145. 
58 CMO Making Amends (n 55) at 18 and 125. 
59 Cave (n 57), footnote 56 therein: House of Commons Health Committee Sixth Report (2009), para 91. 
60 Department of Health, High Quality Care for All Cm 7432 (2008), ch 5, paras 21-25. 
61 hereafter NPSA. 
62 NPSA, Being Open: Communicating Safety Incidents with patients, Their Families and Carers 
NPSA/2009/PSA003, (London: DH, 2009), 6. 
63 Care Quality Commission, A Quality Service, A Quality Experience (London: CQC, 2009). 
64 National Health Service Litigation Authority, Apologies and Explanations: Letter to Chief Executives 
and Finance Directors (London, 2009); See J Wright, G Opperman, ‘The Disclosure of Medical Errors: 
A Catalyst for Litigation or the Way Forward for Better Patient Management?’ (2008) 14 Clinical Risk 
193. 
65 GMC, Good Medical Practice (London, GMC, 2006), para 30.  





followed.67 A more comprehensive approach was promised in the Department of 
Health’s White Paper Liberating the NHS, where the Government undertook ‘to 
require hospitals to be open about mistakes and always tell patients if something 
went wrong’.68,69  
 
There is, however, no need to restrict the duty to hospitals. Primary carers could also be 
required to be candid. Early day motions in 201070 proposed that the duty be put on a 
statutory footing but ministers are still prevaricating about whether such a duty will be 
brought in.71 
 
I concur with Emma Cave72 who concludes that requiring openness is only part of the 
solution. It is also necessary to create an environment whereby doctors are willing to 
admit their errors or mistakes and to report those of others,73 while maintaining 
individual and institutional sanctions by which they can be held to account.74 The 
current clinical negligence system acts as a disincentive to openness.75 The CMO 
recommended that a statutory duty of candour be accompanied by an exemption from 
disciplinary action, where no crime had been committed and it remains safe for the 
doctor to practise.76 In addition, documents identifying adverse events would be 
protected from disclosure in court, as is the case in parts of Canada, Australia and the 
United States.77 This does not seem to form part of the Government’s plans, yet without 
                                             
67 The Care Quality Commission regulations introduce a statutory duty for healthcare providers to report iatrogenic 
adverse events to the NPSA but the Government excluded any duty to inform the injured patient or their next of kin. 
See AvMA Campaign www.avma.org.uk/pages/legal_duty_of_candour_- robbies_law.html 21/10/2010. 
Updated January 2011. 
68 White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS Cm 7881 (2010), 3. For critique, see V 
Shekar, M Singh, K Shekar and P Brennan, 'Clinical Negligence and Duty of Candour' (2010) 49 British 
Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery 8, 593-596. 
69 Entire passage quoted from Cave (n 57), 145; fns 61 and 67 are mine; fn 68 has been updated by me. 
70 T Brake, Campaign for Statutory Duty of Candour in Healthcare EDM 1163, 23 March 2010; T Brake 
Duty of Candour in Healthcare EDM 486, 13 July 2010. 
71 See AvMA Campaign (n 67). 
72 Cave (n 57) at 146. Emphasis added by Cave. 
73 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 protects workers who ‘blow the whistle’ about wrongdoing. 
74 For an alternative system see P Vines, ‘Apologies and Civil Liability in England, Wales and Scotland: 
The View from Elsewhere’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 2, 200. 
75The Final Report of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry began as a public inquiry into the abnormally 
high death rate for paediatric heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary, but it culminated in some damning 
conclusions about the NHS’s response to adverse events and argued that clinical negligence should be 
abolished. It found that clinical negligence litigation did not represent a systemic approach to 
accountability or proper analysis of error. The view was ultimately taken that it would not be possible to 
achieve an environment of open reporting within the NHS when, outside it there exists a litigation system 
the incentives of which press in the opposite direction. The way forward must be a new approach to 
compensating those patients harmed through adverse events. 
76 CMO Making Amends (n 55) at 18 and recommendation 12 at 125. 





it, the incentive for openness and honesty remains limited.78 I agree with Cave that 
despite aspirational publications, Government initiatives have delivered neither a 
statutory duty of candour79 nor an appropriate legal context for encouraging significant 
apologies.80 However, I would argue that even if everything were in place, there is an 
inherent mismatch between patients’ desires and expectations in these difficult 
circumstances and what any explanation and apology can assuage.81 I also emphasise 
the communication disconnect discussed above which also is a limiting factor. 
Nevertheless, at the very least, patients and their families are owed honest explanations 
of iatrogenic adverse events. 
 
                                             
78 Cave (n 57) at 146. 
79 See AvMA Campaign (n 67) emphasising the need for a statutory duty of candour in healthcare.  
80 Vines (n 74). This approach will be discussed in Part III Redress within the NHS below. 
81 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4) at 806 discusses the ‘expectations gap’ discordance between what patients 





IV. WHAT PATIENTS SEEK FROM REDRESS: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter began by addressing four aspects of redress for iatrogenically injured 
patients, namely: restoration, correction, communication and sanction.82 The question of 
providing redress for such victims was examined within the context of corrective justice 
principles. These supply the moral imperative for the tortfeasor to compensate the 
victim even when the harm was unintentionally occasioned. Both because the financial 
aspect of redress made a call on the scarce resources of a universal health service and 
thereby engaged distributive justice principles,83 and because non-pecuniary loss is by 
its very nature uncommodifiable, I have argued that outside of compensation for 
pecuniary loss, more imaginative methods of redress were called for. I have discussed 
the desire of patients for restoration, in Marie Bismark’s terms84 money. It was clear 
from the literature that although financial compensation was a necessity and desire from 
some patients, usually the wish for damages was accompanied by the need for 
explanation, communication, correction and sanction. I have also discussed the subtle 
and nuanced communication difficulties between patients and physicians which provide 
a barrier to resolution.85 
 
In their earlier paper Bismark86 et al were hopeful that the New Zealand no-fault system 
would offer patients more satisfaction than the traditional adversarial approach of the 
Anglo-American system. However, in a more recent paper,87 dissatisfaction with the 
redress process was particularly notable. This dissatisfaction flowed from a ‘gap 
between demand and response.’88 The authors offer two solutions for narrowing the gap. 
One is to correct expectations with ‘reality mediation’. The other is to design the 
systems to offer more of what complainants seek. I would argue that satisfaction for 
                                             
82 Bismark and Dauer (n 3). This chapter lays the foundation for fuller discussion of redress in the body of 
the thesis. Part II Medical Negligence Litigation and Part III Redress Within the NHS below. 
83 Regarding distribution of assets. 
84 Bismark and Dauer (n 3). 
85 The issue of professional sanction and discipline will be addressed in Part III ‘Redress within the NHS’ 
below. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Bismark, Spittal et al (n 4). 
88 Ibid. The ‘expectations gap’ discordance between what patients want and what they get from the New 





redress in clinical negligence is always doomed to be partial due to the nature of the 
loss.89 
 
In a reply to this article, Edward Dauer90 suggests a different formulation of the 
question with which I concur. ‘The question could, however, be approached from a 
different starting point. What objectives, exactly, should a legal system seek to achieve 
in the aftermath of an adverse medical event? Is satisfaction with remedial outcomes 
one of them?’ I agree with Dauer that one’s aspirations for ‘making good’ or restoration 
need to be more limited in order to be realistic. The principal objectives should be three: 
restoration of the patient to a pre-event condition as nearly as may be; accountability for 
individual and institutional providers when they err; and learning – using today’s 
adverse outcome to help prevent tomorrow’s. Each of these has two components to be 
measured: the subjective expectations of the patient and the objective measures in the 
medico-legal system. His main emphasis is on quality and safety, both ‘goods’ patients 
wanted. Paradoxically, having more limited but possible aims could lead to greater 
satisfaction for patients. 
 
The context within which redress for iatrogenic harm operates is the fault-based liability 
system in operation in England.91 The current adversarial system fits in with corrective 
justice principles where the tortfeasor is responsible to his victim. However, it is clear 
that the system of redress is imperfect, leaving iatrogenically harmed patients at a 
disadvantage when attempting to establish liability92 and damage. What patients want is 
to be made whole again and what physicians want is for the unintended adverse event 
never to have happened. Given that these are impossible goals, one looks at the art of 
the possible. I would argue that the aim of redress in these circumstances should not be 
measured by the amount of litigation which does or does not ensue but by what is a just 
result. If a patient is iatrogenically harmed he deserves to be given the necessary 
information to make an informed choice of how to go about seeking redress: financial 
for pecuniary loss and extralegal measures for non-pecuniary loss. As the redress 
available is constrained by the limitations of the budget of a universal healthcare 
system, I would still not offer damages for non-pecuniary loss. The most glaring 
                                             
89 See discussion in last paragraph of previous section. 
90 Dauer (n 2). 
91 Discussion of a no-fault system is outwith the remit of the thesis but see E Jackson, Medical Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2010), 161. 





vacuum in the redress landscape remains the fact that the complaints and claims systems 
operate independently.93 
 
I now turn to the second part of the thesis concentrating on medical negligence 
litigation, funding litigation, proving liability and damages as redress. This will be 
followed by the third part of the thesis, analysing extant and future redress within the 
NHS. 
                                             














































Blind Plaintiff, lame Defendant, share 
The friendly Laws impartial care, 
A Shell for him, a Shell for thee 
The Middle is the Lawyer’s Fee 
 
 
Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanac, 1733, in 








This part of the thesis addresses the legal route to justice.1 In this chapter, I will consider 
whether the arrangements, both extant and projected, for funding clinical negligence 
actions assist or adversely affect access to justice. At present,2 clinical negligence 
actions may be funded by legal aid; conditional fee agreements (hereinafter ‘CFAs’); 
private claimant funding; third-party funding; speculative fee agreement; pro bono; 
contingency fee arrangements; before the event insurance; after the event (hereinafter 
‘ATE’) insurance; own legal costs and opponents’ legal costs; litigation funding 
agreement and contingent legal aid fund (hereinafter ‘CLAF’).3 For present purposes, I 
will be focusing on funding through legal aid, conditional fee (‘no win, no fee’) 
agreements, insurance and the issue of costs. Nevertheless, it is clear that reform of 
legal aid is on the Government’s agenda with the publication of consultation documents: 
Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales4 and Proposals for Reform 
of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales: Implementation of Lord 
Justice Jackson’s Recommendations.5 It is proposed that ‘all clinical negligence cases 
be excluded from civil legal aid because there is a viable alternative source of funding 
in CFAs’.6 However, recognising that some individual cases will continue to require 
public funding even once they are removed from scope, it is proposed that a power to 
grant legal aid in certain circumstances be retained.7 I will consider the Government’s 
rationale and justification for the use of legal aid and the cases meriting exception. At 
the conclusion of the chapter I will briefly present arguments challenging the 
assumption that access to justice would not be adversely affected by this change. Access 
to justice has two aspects: the availability of legal representation in the civil justice 
system; and access to redress through extralegal routes such as the NHS complaints 
                                             
1 The subsequent Part III will address Redress within the NHS. 
2 January 2011. 
3 M Powers, N Harris and A Barton, Clinical Negligence 4th edn (Haywards Heath, Tottel Publishing, 
2008) ch 11 ‘Funding Clinical Negligence Claims’ at 249. 
4 Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/legal-
aid-reform-151110.htm at 4.8. Any changes to legal aid are unlikely to be implemented before 2012. 
5 Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales: Implementation of 
Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations, http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/Jackson-review-
151110.htm. 
6 Proposals… (n 4) at 4.166. 





system. The challenge of widening access to justice is to address both these aspects in a 
way that is financially viable.8 
 
A. Clinical Negligence: A Special Case? 
 
Clinical negligence actions are a category of personal injury claims. Most claims in 
respect of medical injury are brought in tort, that is, on the basis of a non-contractual 
civil wrong. Due to the complexity and unpredictability of these claims, which can 
require inter alia high disbursement costs, funding arrangements differ from the general 
personal injury claims9 and presently legal aid remains available for clinical negligence 
litigation. 
 
The imperative necessity of ‘access to justice’ in clinical negligence cases may be found 
in the judgment of Hale LJ in Parkinson v St James NHS Trust (CA):10 
 
The right to bodily integrity is the first and most important of the interests protected by 
the law of tort, listed in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 18th edn (2000) paragraphs 1–25. 
‘The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is 
inviolate’ see Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177. Included within that right 
are two others. One is the right to physical autonomy to make one’s own choices about 
what will happen to one’s own body. Another is the right not to be subjected to bodily 
injury or harm. These interests are regarded as so important that redress is given against 
both intentional and negligent interference with them. 
 
In Lord Woolf’s Final Report on Access to Justice,11 medical negligence (clinical 
negligence) claims were singled out for special consideration because the ‘civil 
justice system was failing most conspicuously to meet the needs of litigants in a 
number of respects’. These included the disproportion between costs and damages in 
these cases,12 the unacceptable delay in resolving claims and the lower success rate 
than in other personal injury litigation. Lord Woolf expressed concern that ‘in the 
vast majority of clinical negligence cases both sides were funded from the public 
                                             
8 Powers et al, n3, Introduction at 249. 
9 Nevertheless requirements to show duty, breach and causation remain the same. 
10 Parkinson v St James NHS Trust (CA) [2002] QB paras 56–57. This was suggested by Allan Gore QC, 
President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers at a Journal of Personal Injury Law Conference 
on 4 November 2005. 
11 H Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England 
and Wales, (London, Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1996). online at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm. 





purse and the amount of money spent by NHS Trusts and other defendants on legal 
costs was money which would be much better devoted to compensating victims, or 
better still, to improving standards of care so that future mistakes are avoided.’ 
 
Lord Woolf’s concern was paralleled by Sir Ian Kennedy in the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry13: 
 
The crucial difference, apart from any structural differences between the law and 
practice in England as compared with the various states in the USA, may lie in the 
source of the funds for compensation. In the USA, the hospital claims from its insurer, 
which passes on the cost in increased premiums for healthcare insurance, which the 
hospitals in turn pass on to the patients in increased healthcare costs. In the UK, it is the 
service provider, the NHS, which pays the cost and, short of increasing taxes, or taking 
the funds from elsewhere in the public sector, money spent on meeting claims is money 
not spent on care. 
 
It is precisely because clinical negligence claims are funded from the NHS budget that 
the problem becomes acute. 
 
The Government recognised the inherent difficulties of funding clinical negligence 
litigation by CFAs and retained legal aid for these cases after it was withdrawn from 
other personal injury work in April 2000. At present, for clinical negligence claims 
there is still the possibility of public funding through legal aid if certain conditions are 
met. If found ineligible for legal aid, a claimant may proceed on a CFA with his 
lawyers, or a last recourse would be private funding, but this could prove prohibitively 
expensive. However, if the Government’s changes to the legal aid system are accepted 
in their current form,14 claimants will need to rely on before the event insurance or on 
claimants’ solicitors offering them CFAs to be able to fund a claim. Nonetheless, as 
noted, within the details of the Government’s proposals there may be a reprieve for 
some claimants.15 
 
                                             
13 The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry led by Sir Ian Kennedy, July 2001, ch 26, p 370, para 45, s 2. 
14 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010–12 incorporating Lord Justice 
Jackson’s reforms received Royal Assent on 1 May 2012. 
15 Ibid. ‘Some cases will continue to require public funding…and there is a proposal retaining a power to 
grant legal aid in some circumstances.’ Section 6(8) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 empowers the Lord 
Chancellor to issue instructions to bring certain services back into scope either on a general basis or in 
respect of an individual, notwithstanding their inclusion in schedule 2 which removes certain matters 





B. Funding Legal Actions 
 
The underlying question behind this discussion of funding clinical negligence claims is 
whether the system in place and projected impedes or aids access to justice through the 
legal route to redress. In the introduction to the consultation document,16 the 
Government maintains its commitment to access to justice as ‘a hallmark of a civilised 
society’ and its aim to ensure that legal aid is targeted to those who need it the most. 
Nevertheless, the Government is explicit that against a background of considerable 
financial pressure on the legal aid fund, the proposals have been developed with the aim 
of delivering savings of £350 million in 2014–15 on legal aid by the final year of the 
spending review period.17 After briefly considering the legal aid scheme in its historical 
context, I will be focusing on the issues inherent in funding litigation through legal aid. 
The final form of Government funding is still open for consultation, as Sir Rupert 
Jackson has proposed to introduce a supplementary legal aid scheme and this is also 
under consideration.18 
 
II. LEGAL AID 
 
A. Legal Aid in the Past: Whither the Welfare State? 
 
According to Michael Zander QC ‘the phrase “Access to Justice” has become a term of 
art signifying the arrangements made by the state to ensure that the public at large, 
especially those who are indigent, can obtain the benefits available through the use of 
the law and the legal system.’19 The legal aid system was principally established by the 
Attlee government by means of the Legal Aid Act 1949 which gave an entry to justice 
for citizens. This Act, setting up the civil legal aid scheme, was an historic stage in the 
story of legal services for the poor. The legal aid scheme enabled a person to have all or 
part of the costs connected with legal proceedings (including solicitors’ and barristers’ 
fees) paid from public funds. For legal advice and assistance, other than proceedings, a 
separate arrangement, known as the ‘green-form scheme’ was available.20 If a citizen 
                                             
16 Proposals... (n 4), ch 2 at 2.2. 
17 Ibid ch 2 at 2.3. 
18 Ibid ch 4 at 4.167–9. 
19 M Zander, The State of Justice, The Hamlyn Lectures Fifty First Series, (Andover, Sweet & Maxwell 
Ltd., 2000). See below for current criteria for accessing legal aid in clinical negligence cases. 





with a legal problem could establish that he qualified for legal aid under the means test 
and the merits test, he had an entitlement to legal aid.21 Fifty years later, the Access to 
Justice Act 1999 (hereinafter ‘AJA’ 1999) restricted this entry. The ‘New Jerusalem’ 
envisaged by Beveridge and enacted by Aneurin Bevan had simply become too 
expensive to maintain and all parts, including the legal area, were now subject to 
restriction.22 
 
B. Reform of Civil Procedure 
 
Lord Woolf’s reports23 presented a vision that those who sought to bring cases to court 
should be able to do so efficiently and at a cost proportionate to the amount in dispute.24 
 
The late 1990s saw the Government undertake a fundamental review of both the civil 
justice system and the means by which legal services could be provided and financed. 
The Lord Chancellor’s Department issued a consultation paper entitled Access to Justice 
with Conditional Fees: A Consultation Paper, in March 1998.25 The rationale of 
criticism of the legal aid system was: 
 
The present civil justice system falls woefully short of the ideal that there should be 
justice for all of us when we need it. The system is too complex, takes too long to deal 
with cases and is too costly. The number of people entitled to legal aid has gone down. 
A huge swathe of ordinary people on modest incomes are deterred from starting a legal 
action by the potential costs of litigation – their own costs and the risk of ending up 
paying the costs of the other side...The current system does not encourage lawyers...to 
weed out weak cases...at the same time the cost of the Legal Aid Fund goes up and up. 
Net expenditure in 1990–91 was £682 million. Only six years later, expenditure had 
more than doubled to £1,477 million. This is an increase of 115%... 
                                             
21 To determine whether an applicant is financially eligible for legal aid, the Legal Aid Office will 
undertake a means test to determine whether the applicant’s finances are within the required limits for 
legal aid under the Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 1997. The merits test enquires whether 
or not the proceedings have legal merit. This point will be dealt with between the Advocate and the Legal 
Aid Certifying Officer. See below for questions of evaluation of success rates now required for access to 
legal aid. 
22 C Barnett, The Lost Victory, British Dreams, British Realities 1945–1950, (London, Pan Books, 1995, 
Reprint 2001). For historical background see the Department of Constitutional Affairs ‘A Fairer Deal for 
Legal Aid’ Cm 6591 (July 2005) signed by Charley Falconer, Lord Falconer of Thornton, Secretary of 
State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor. 
23 There were two reports, both entitled Access to Justice. The Interim Report was published in 1995; the 
Final Report in 1996. Both were published directly by the Lord Chancellor’s Department. 
24 For details of the proposals see M Partington ‘Access to Justice: Reforming the Civil Justice System of 
England and Wales’ (2001) 30 Common Law World Review 115. Proposals include changes to Civil 
Procedure Rules (1999) and support for Alternative Dispute Resolutions. 
25 Lord Chancellor’s Department: Access to Justice with Conditional Fees: A Consultation Paper, 





When Legal Aid was set up 50 years ago, it was a great step forward. It brought the 
opportunity of access to justice within the reach of the majority of the population. Now 
it is failing the very people it was supposed to help...26 
 
Subsequently, there have been a number of changes to the operation of the legal aid 
schemes, in particular, the 1999 Access to Justice Act which inter alia established the 
Legal Services Commission (hereinafter ‘LSC’) to administer the schemes. The 1999 
Act also introduced limitations on the scope of legal aid, removing most personal injury 
cases. The LSC was empowered to set standards for service provision so that legal aid 
services could only be supplied by franchised legal firms. Additionally, the Funding 
Code,27 which introduced a more stringent merits test for civil and family cases, was 
established.28 Since 2006, there have been over 30 separate consultation exercises on 
legal aid and, as noted, at present the Government has undertaken a new review of legal 
aid in England and Wales wherein it is proposed to exclude legal aid from civil legal aid 
funding.29 The Government’s hypothesis is that CFAs will provide a viable alternative 
source of funding for these actions. I will address this issue in the conclusion of the 
chapter following discussion of CFAs. 
 
C. The Legal Aid System: Effect on Litigation 
 
An interesting consequence of litigation when legal aid funds an action was noted in the 
Law Society Research Study No 38, concerned with ‘Access to Legal Services.’30 The 
study showed that ‘the way in which a personal injury case is funded has a major impact 
on the way that it is pursued’. Effects on the litigants were outlined thus: 
 
A salient feature of the legal aid system was that legal aid protected victims from the 
fear of costs should the case proceed to court. This report remarked that: ‘this isolates 
claimants from some of the pressure to settle and allows them to pursue the case for 
longer. 
 
                                             
26 Ibid. 
27 http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/civil/guidance/funding_code.asp. 
28 For further details of historical changes see Proposals… (n 4), ch 3 Background. 
29 Ibid Ministerial Foreword. 
30 T Goriely and A Paterson, Access to Legal Services: A European Comparison A Review of the 






Additionally, it has been found that, where the plaintiff was legally aided, personal 
injury cases took longer and cost more. Defendant insurance companies were more 
likely to offer larger settlements if they knew the victim could go to court and that the 
insurer would not be awarded its costs if it won. 31 
 
D. Modern Times: Legal Aid in Action at Present 
 
1. The Legal Framework for Funding Legal Aid 
 
The AJA 1999, which came into effect in 2000, abolished the legal aid scheme and 
introduced in its place a new body – the LSC charged with running two new services: 
the Community Legal Service (hereinafter ‘CLS’) and the Criminal Defence Service 
(hereinafter ‘CDS’).32 When considering the possibility of legal aid being removed from 
clinical negligence actions, it is important to note that this sphere of governmental 
activity is subject to the scrutiny of the Administrative Court. Decisions of the LSC and 
those of the Funding Review Committee (hereinafter ‘FRC’) have been challenged by 
way of judicial review. After a short description of the legal framework within which 
legal aid operates, I will consider past challenges to funding decisions before the 
Administrative Court.33 
 
a) The Legal Framework: Access to Justice Act 1999 
 
Section 4(2) of the AJA sets out in general terms the types of services which the LSC 
may fund. This power is qualified by section 6, which removes certain matters from 
scope, listing these in schedule 2, and which also empowers the LSC to prioritise and 
hence decide upon services it wishes to fund. Section 6(8) empowers the Lord 
Chancellor to issue directions so as to bring certain services back into scope either on a 
general basis or in respect of an individual, notwithstanding their removal from the 
scope under schedule 2. 
 
                                             
31 H Genn, Survey of Litigation Costs: Research conducted for Lord Woolf’s Inquiry into Access to 
Justice (London, Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1996). 
32 Partington (n 24). The latter will not be considered here. For more detail on CLS than will be provided 
here see the full article. 
33 C Haley, ‘Civil Legal Aid – The Challenges’ (2004), published online by the Legal Action Group, The 





Section 8 requires the LSC to prepare a Code setting out (1) the general criteria it is to 
apply to individuals seeking funding and (2) the procedures it will use to determine such 
applications. The Code on procedures provides that the LSC decision makers should 
have regard to guidance issued by the Lord Chancellor (under section 23 of the Act) and 
to that issued by the LSC itself and also contains the rights of appeal to the FRC. 
 
Funding for the Community Legal Service is provided by Government and distributed 
by the Commission under the terms of a Funding Code which sets out the detailed 
framework within which legal services will be delivered. The Funding Code offers two 
levels of service to be funded by the CLS for clinical negligence cases. Legal Help – 
advice and assistance; and Legal Representation which is licensed work only to be 
undertaken by franchised firms. Legal Representation can be Investigative Help – 
available when a case needs substantial investigation before its prospects of success can 
be determined; and Full Representation available only for strong cases. The General 
Funding Code sets out the criteria for clinical negligence cases.34 
 
Whereas the old legal aid system was ‘demand-led’ so that any case which could fulfil 
the merits test for a client who was financially eligible would be funded, the intention of 
the new regime was to introduce stricter budgetary controls. In theory at least, 
‘affordability’ is now a key feature. The merits test has also been refined, replacing the 
old ‘private client’ test with stricter imposition of cost/benefit criteria. Costs payable by 
the LSC have been strictly curtailed. Solicitors able to act for legally-aided clients must 
be approved by the LSC and only firms who hold such a franchise can act.35 
 
Briefly, only services for individuals may be funded under the scheme. In addition, 
certain types of legal service are excluded from the scheme altogether, which includes 
personal injury cases but not clinical negligence cases. The broad exclusion of funding 
services for representation before coroners’ courts and tribunals is retained.36 However, 
as noted, the Lord Chancellor has discretion to fund exceptional cases before tribunals 
or the coroner’s court where strict criteria are met (bringing an exception back into 
                                             
34 See CJ Lewis, Clinical Negligence, 6th edn (Haywards Heath, Tottel, 2006) 36 for details of funding 
code. 
35 P Balen, Clinical Negligence (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2008) 64. 
36 See R (On the application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v Secretary of State for Health) [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1129. In complex cases Article 2 requires that the family of the deceased have legal representation at 






scope).37 As alternative funding sources develop, such as conditional fee arrangements 
and legal expenses insurance,38 then categories of work publicly funded may be 
removed from the scope of the CLS. In addition, where the proceedings are designed to 
obtain an award of damages or other financial provision, any award of damages is 
subject to a ‘charge’ in favour of the CLS Fund. 
 
Thus, account must be taken of whether proceedings would be cost-effective.39 There 
must be an assessment of the prospects of success.40 Cost-benefit ratios are to be 
determined by relating the likely costs to the percentage prospect of success.41 Funding 
will be refused in cases where a CFA should be obtained. Special arrangements 
continue to apply to multiparty actions, where a large number of claimants are claiming 
loss from a single event or cause. 
 
E. The Future: Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid 
 
The changes proposed by Kenneth Clarke’s review of the legal aid system42 have been 
presaged in the AJA 1999 whose purpose was to target the limited resource of legal aid 
so as to widen access to justice. The underlying policy of the 1999 Act was to widen 
access to justice and to promote the replacement of civil legal aid by the conditional fee 
system.43 The Government’s current position44 is that the legal aid scheme in its current 
form is no longer sustainable financially and difficult decisions need to be made about 
where to target scarce resources. The factors to be taken into account to justify legal aid 
are: the importance of the issue; the litigant’s ability to present their own case (including 
the venue before which the case is heard); the likely vulnerability of the litigant and the 
complexity of the law; the availability of alternative sources of funding; and the 
                                             
37 Section 6(8) AJA 1999. 
38 Discussed below. These sources are also important in funding clinical negligence cases which do not 
meet the strict means and merits criteria of the CLS. 
39 In framing the Funding Code’s provisions on these matters, the Legal Services Commission is required 
to take into account the statutory factors, which are set out in s. 8(2) of the Act. 
40 This criterion will not apply in cases with a wider public interest. The Legal Services Commission will 
be advised on the public interest by a Public Interest Advisory Panel 2. 
41 For example, where the prospects of success are 80% or better, the likely damages must exceed the 
likely costs; where the prospects of success are 60–80%, the likely damages must exceed likely costs by 
2:1 and where prospects of success are between 50–60%, the likely damages must exceed likely costs by 
4:1.2. 
42 Proposals … (n 4). 
43 Powers et al (n 3). 





availability of alternative routes to resolving the issue. Account is also taken of the 
Government’s domestic, European and international legal obligations.45 
 
F. The Claimant’s Rights: Challenges to Refusals of Legal Aid 
 
1. Challenges to Funding Decisions Before the Administrative Court 
 
Institutions which provide publicly funded services may be subject to liability through 
the mechanisms of public law by means of judicial review of administrative action. A 
successful challenge in judicial review normally does not give rise to an award of 
damages and the judgment of the court merely obliges the institution to retake its 
decision in accordance with the law as articulated.46 In the Proposals for the Reform of 
Legal Aid47 it is acknowledged that ‘proceedings where the litigant seeks to hold the 
state to account by judicial review are important because they are the means by which 
the citizen can seek to ensure that state power is exercised responsibly’. The issues at 
stake in public law challenges are deemed to be of high importance and, where 
alternative forms of dispute resolution, such as complaints procedures or referral to an 
ombudsman, have not succeeded, legal aid will remain available for public law 
challenges.48 It is proposed that claims against public authorities should continue to 
receive legal aid where they concern abuse of position of power; and/or significant 
breach of human rights; and/or negligent acts or omissions falling very far below the 
required standard of care.49 I will now consider the court’s general approach to several 
challenges of refusals of legal aid. 
 
a)  Multiparty Actions 
The rules of the Supreme Court and the legal aid system were essentially designed to 
deal with individual cases. Because defective medical products and devices can cause 
injury on a large scale, they are liable to generate multiparty actions. These cases can 
pose intractable problems of procedure and case management and can involve 
                                             
45 Ibid ch 4 at 4163–169 for full details. 
46 I Kennedy, A Grubb, J Laing and J McHale, Principles of Medical Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 
at 417 and see their footnote 152. 
47 Proposals… (n 4), ch 4 at 4.96 
48 Ibid. 





protracted and costly hearings and the imbalance in financial resources and expertise 
between multinational corporations and claimants continues to pose formidable 
problems in funding large-scale group actions.50 In W (R on the application of) v Legal 
Services Commission51 the MMR (Measles Mumps and Rubella) vaccine case, the 
Applicants’ funding from the LSC had been withdrawn and the decision upheld by the 
FRC, Davies J opined that the decision of the FRC was proportionate, rational and took 
into account the relevant considerations; it was sufficiently reasoned and there had been 
no procedural unfairness. We see then that in any claim for judicial review, the 
Administrative Court considers the actions of the LSC and FRC against the benchmark 
of common law principles. However, this decision is one of a number where the LSC 
has refused to fund certain group actions (such as that brought by the survivors and 
families of the Potter’s Bar rail crash) and there have been calls for a different approach 
to be taken by the LSC in such cases. One such approach would be to give greater 
weight to public interest considerations rather than to financial ones.52 However, the 
recent decision to withdraw legal aid funding from a case aimed at compensating 
children born with disabilities after mothers took an anti-epilepsy drug Epilim is an 
indication that the LSC’s thinking about such cases remains constant.53 The civil 
procedure reforms, at the turn of the century,54 introduced the more elaborate 
mechanism of Group Litigation Orders (hereinafter ‘GLOs’) which require that 
claimants need only have ‘common or related’ issues.55 The introduction of the GLOs 
would seem to offer a preferable, more flexible approach. However, claimants may still 
find it difficult to persuade the court that the cost-benefit ratio justifies the exercise of 
its discretion to grant a GLO.56 
 
                                             
50 Kennedy et al (n 46) at ch 18: 1007. 
51 W (R on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 564 (Admin). 
52 See Haley (n 33) for details of further challenges to legal aid refusals. M Day and J Kelleher ‘Lessons 
from MMR and the Future of Group Litigation Funding’ (2005) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Litigation 
98. 
53 ‘But the government’s LSC, which is believed to have provided more than £3m to help families prepare 
for the action, decided to end its financial support three weeks before the hearings were due to begin in 
the high court in London’. The Guardian, 8 November 2010. ‘Ministers introduced a £3m cap on all 
major multiparty cases a year as a result of what the Legal Services Commission has called its “bitter 
experiences” such as the benzo fiasco…  such a limit was a major hurdle when drug companies “will 
spend tens, if not hundreds, of millions in research and development alone”. One of the American lawyers 
on Vioxx once told me that individual expert reports alone were running into “tens and 20s of thousands 
of dollars”. Epilim joins a dismal roll call: the 2002 oral contraception pill litigation; the MMR litigation; 
the notorious benzodiazepine tranquilliser cases; and Vioxx.’ The Guardian 1 February 2011. 
54 The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules (2000). 
55 As distinct from the ‘same interest’ required in a representative action.  





b) Procedural Challenges 
 
In Dixon (R on the application of) v Legal Services Commission57 public funding was 
sought for a claim against the claimant’s former solicitors in negligence. As a result of 
disputed Counsel’s Advice LSC funding was withdrawn and an FRC hearing provided 
only a short explanation. A ‘reasons point’ was then taken against the FRC. The 
relevance to the present discussion is that the court found that the FRC hearing had 
provided insufficient explanation for their conclusions. Although the FRC need not 
provide a judgment to court standards, it is obliged to provide sufficient reasoning of its 
decisions so as to enable the applicant to understand why his appeal was lost. If no 
reasons can be offered for a decision, the court may conclude that there had been no 
good reasons for it and, in turn, that the body has acted irrationally.58 
 
In R (on application of G) v Legal Services Commission59 guidance was given as to the 
relevant criteria to be considered to determine whether a public authority had been 
culpable of serious wrongdoing by act or omission which justified the public funding of 
a negligence claim against it. G’s application for funding was granted as the 
Commission had erred in its conclusion that to constitute serious wrongdoing the 
conduct had to be deliberate, malicious or dishonest. The correct approach should have 
concerned considerations of the duty of care owed to the family. 
 
We have now seen that decisions to refuse legal aid funding may be challenged in 
public law on procedural grounds and that the LSC will be expected to give full and 
transparent reasons for its refusal. The other way the refusals may be challenged is to 
question whether the manner in which the Lord Chancellor exercises his section 
6(8) (b)60 discretion is compliant with the European Convention of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ‘ECHR’). Claims have been based upon Article 6 and also upon the 
procedural protection contained in Article 2. 
 
                                             
57 Dixon (R on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2003] EWHC 325 Admin. 
58 Padfield v MAFF [1968] AC 977. See Haley (n 33) for more case law. 
59 R (on application of G) v Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 276 (Admin). 





2. The Human Rights Act 1998 and Funding Civil Justice61 
 
A significant barrier to access in the English civil justice system is the cost of 
litigation.62 Political commitment to the provision of public funding to enable access for 
all is limited by financial resource constraints and, as we have seen above, the provision 
of publicly funded legal services is thus subject to qualification.63 
 
There is no absolute right to litigate in the civil justice system under the terms of the 
HRA 1998 Article 6 (1).64 Under the AJA 1999,65 the Lord Chancellor is able to 
authorise the provision of legal aid for those proceedings generally excluded from legal 
aid provision.66 The Lord Chancellor, however, has made it clear that approval will be 
given only in exceptional circumstances. He has indicated that the benchmark will be 
those cases where the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’) has 
indicated that the right of access to court has been effectively denied due to lack of 
public funding. The issue as to when the court will find that there has been a violation of 
Article 6 (1) due to a refusal of legal aid is not straightforward. The final decision as to 
whether funding will be awarded under the AJA 1999, section 6 (8) (b), rests with the 
Minister for Legal Aid at the Department of Constitutional Affairs. If such an 
application reaches the ECtHR on the grounds that the Minister has refused such an 
application, the court may not approve of the fact that the final decision is made by a 
Government Minister.67 
 
On the whole, human rights challenges of refusals of legal aid in medical cases are not 
successful.68 In Perotti v Collyer-Bristow69 the Court of Appeal said the court had no 
power in civil proceedings to grant a right to representation. The decision whether or 
                                             
61 This discussion relies heavily on S Shipman, ‘Case Comment: Steel & Morris v United Kingdom Legal 
Aid in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) Civil Justice Quarterly 25 January, which was a case 
regarding the European Court of Human Rights decision in Steel v UK (68416/01, which held that the 
failure to provide legal aid to the defendants in the McDonald’s Restaurant libel case violated their right 
to a fair trial under the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 Article 6 (1). 
62 AAS Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003), 862. 
63 Zuckerman, Ibid, 949. 
64 Right to a fair hearing. 
65 S 6 (8) (b) (‘AJA 1999’). 
66 The difficulties facing applicants seeking his consent have been outlined in a previous case note on 
legal aid and defamation proceedings: Shipman, S, ‘Defamation and Legal Aid in the European Court of 
Human Rights’, (2005) 24 Civil Justice Quarterly 23, 28–32. 
67 Aerts v Belgium (Application No 25357/94) (1998) Reports 1998–V. 
68 Lewis (n 34), 50. 





not to fund legal services in civil proceedings was a matter for the LSC and it was not 
for the court to direct the Commission to exercise its discretion to provide funding. The 
state’s obligation to provide legal aid arose if the fact of presenting his own case could 
prevent the litigant from having effective access to the court. The test under Article 6(1) 
of the Convention was whether the court was put into a position where it really could 
not do justice in the case because it had no confidence in its ability to grasp the facts and 
principles of the matter on which it had to rule.70 
 
There have, however, been successful challenges under Article 2(1) of the ECHR 
concerning the ‘right to life’ in cases where funding has been refused for bereaved 
families’ participation in inquest proceedings. In Humberstone, R (on the application of) 
v Legal Services Commission71 refusal to grant legal aid to a mother for the inquest into 
her son’s death was deemed unlawful ‘because the state had a duty, in some 
circumstances to investigate a death and if necessary, provide funding so that the 
investigation, including an inquest, functions properly’.72 Hickinbottom J then provided 
five points of guidance for determining when the funding of representation is necessary 
for the purposes of an inquest. These included taking account of the view of the 
presiding coroner and noting that ‘one factor that will not be relevant is the absence of 
(or restrictions on) available public funds’. He particularly emphasised that if the state is 
required to fund a party at an inquest to avoid a breach of the state’s obligations under 
Article 2, it is no answer to say that money is short’. 
 
In conclusion, it appears that although there are public law mechanisms to challenge 
refusals of funding for legal aid, the bar to winning is set very high.73 
 
                                             
70 See Lewis (n 34), 50 and Haley (n 33) for further case law. 
71 Humberstone, R (on the application of) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 760 (Admin) (13 
April 2010) 
72 Para 51. See R (On the application of Mohammed Farooq Khan) v Secretary of State for Health) [2003] 
EWCA Civ 1129. In complex cases Article 2 requires that the family of the deceased have legal 
representation at the inquest. Also Part III Redress within the NHS; section on inquests and coroner’s 
court and legal representation below. 
73 The relevant dictum is set out in X v United Kingdom [1984] 6 EHRR136. ‘Only in exceptional 
circumstances, namely where the withholding of legal aid would make the assertion of a civil claim 
practically impossible, or where it would lead to an obvious unfairness of the proceedings, can such a 





G. Goodbye Legal Aid: Hello CFAs 
 
As noted, the original idea of legal aid, introduced in 1949, was to assist people who 
were too poor to pay for legal representation if they were injured and sought to recover 
damages. Over time, the scope and range of situations where legal aid has been applied 
has burgeoned, often with small restraint on its mounting costs for the taxpayer and 
unfairness to those at the other end of disputes who were not protected by insulation 
against costs that legal aid usually gives its clients. It is unsurprising that governments 
are not enthusiastic about using taxpayers’ money to fund litigation against institutions 
that are paid for by the taxpayer – for example, granting legal aid to people so that they 
can sue the NHS.74 If the Government’s consultation documents are accepted,75 legal 
aid will no longer be routinely available for clinical negligence cases.76 Instead it is 
proposed that there is a viable alternative source of funding in CFAs, to which I now 
turn. At the end of the chapter, having reviewed both legal aid and CFAs as funding 
sources in clinical negligence cases, I will discuss their impact on access to justice and 
access to the courts. 
 
III. CFAs: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 
 
CFAs are defined in section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act (hereinafter 
‘CLSA’) 1990, as amended by section 27(1) of the AJA 1999.77 The importance of 
CFAs has significantly increased, since it is now a principle that public funding of 
litigation through the CLS should not be provided in cases where alternative funding 
(including CFAs) is available. As has been seen, legal aid has become unavailable for 
personal injury cases,78 but is still available for clinical negligence cases. However, due 
to the means and merits thresholds discussed above, it is clear that many claimants fall 
                                             
74 D Brahams, ‘Cutting Legal Aid Down to Size’ (2010) 78 Medico-Legal Journal 4, 113. 
75  Proposals… (n 4) and Proposals… (n 5). See also, Sir Ian Magee, ‘Review of Legal Aid Delivery and 
Governance’ 3 March 2010, a critique of the workings of the LSC online at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/legal-aid-delivery.pdf. 
76 Excepting for a few very complex cases, eg involving a disabled client. However, note that Jackson  
LJ, although not making any recommendation on legal aid, commented that it is vital that legal aid  
remains for clinical negligence and fees should be at an appropriate level. See also C Stutt, ‘Who Ate All 
The P.I.s?’ (2007) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Law, 81–85 who argues that any savings to the Legal Aid 
Fund or gains to the NHS through recovering costs in successful cases would be outweighed by additional 
liabilities in uplifts and premiums in successful cases. 
77 A Conditional Fee Agreement is ‘an agreement…which provides for…fees and expenses, or any part of 
them, to be payable only in specified circumstances’. Refer to Partington (n 24). 
78 Legal aid for most personal injury claims has been withdrawn, in accordance with the Access to Justice 





outside of the ambit of legal aid and need to find other ways of funding their cases.79 
CFAs are the other main alternative to legal aid.80 
 
I begin with a description of CFAs and how they operate in practice. This is not an 
exhaustive explanation but I will highlight specific problematic areas: namely, Success 
Fees (Uplifts), ATE Insurance and Costs. These issues will be addressed including 
references to case law and intimations of the suggested reforms as outlined in Proposals 
for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales81 and Proposals for Reform of Civil 
Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales: Implementation of Lord Justice 
Jackson’s Recommendations.82 
 
I will address the ethical uncertainties the CFA may represent for the legal profession 
because of its financial stake in the outcome of cases, as well as whether the proposed 
‘no win–no fee’ system of funding clinical negligence cases will indeed achieve the 
Lord Chancellor’s aspiration of ‘[p]romoting access to justice for the majority of the 
population in England and Wales’.83 Unsurprisingly, this change of ethos, from a 
system of legal aid in which, for well over 30 years, Government-funded legal aid has 
played a primary role in the provision of legal services in civil litigation for those 
unable to pay for such services, to ‘a system premised on the commercial judgement of 
insurers and the financial self-interest of the professions’,84 provoked consternation 
amongst both legal academics and practitioners.85 
 
                                             
79 Civil legal aid is available only if the claimant qualifies for it based on their income (less than £25,000 
per annum gross household income) disposable capital less than £8,000 and the case satisfies the LSC’s 
‘affordability’ criteria. See S Dunn, ‘Paying for Personal Injury Claims – What Are the Options for 
Clients and Their Representatives?’ (2009) 3 Journal of Personal Injury Law 218–223. 
80 See Partington (n 24) for discussion of additional initiatives for funding and resolving cases such as 
alternative dispute resolution and other speculative agreements. Also M Harvey, ‘Funding Personal Injury 
Litigation’ (2003) 3 Journal of Personal Injury Law 03 for more detail. 
81 Proposals… (The Clarke Reforms) (n 4). 
82 Proposals… (The Jackson Reforms) (n 5). 
83 Access to Justice with Conditional Fees (n 25). 
84 ‘The Ethics of Conditional Fee Arrangements’ (January 2001) The Society for Advanced Legal Studies, 
Ethics and Lawyer Fee Arrangements Working Group, 5. 





A. CFAs: Statutory Requirements 
 
For many years, public policy, expressed through the offences of champerty and 
maintenance and enforced through court decisions and practice rules, had prevented 
lawyers from having an interest in the outcome of a case. Although the crime was 
abolished in the 1960s, any such agreement remained unenforceable at law.86 
Nowadays, CFAs entered into by solicitors are rescued from being champertous by s.58 
of the CLSA 1990.87 Fears about an ever-reducing access to justice due to restrictions 
on the legal aid budget88 led to a fundamental change of view. The means by which this 
policy change was implemented was a very ‘English’ compromise. Parliament did not 
want to introduce a US-style of contingency fees for fear of creating a ‘compensation 
culture’. Instead, in a CFA, the ‘loser pays’ cost rule was maintained. 
 
1. The Success Fee 
 
Parliament enacted that a lawyer could charge a percentage increase on his normal fee 
with a maximum success fee of 100 per cent. Section 58 of the CLSA 1990 was brought 
into force in 1995.89 The AJA 1999 provided that, subject to rules of court, success fees 
(and any premiums for ATE insurance) should be paid by the loser in litigation along 
with other legal costs.90 The legality of the CFA regime for all clients, not just the 
impecunious, was upheld by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN91 (although not 
without some regret and not without criticism of some of the effects of Parliament’s 
decision).92 
 
Under a CFA, the solicitor agrees to provide legal services on the basis that, unless the 
claim is successful, the client will pay nothing for his services. The success fee is a 
                                             
86 Balen (n 35), 75. 
87 See V Williams, ‘A Species of Speccing’ (2010) 2 Journal of Personal Injury Law 119–130 for history 
and case law. 
88 It has been reported that a decade ago, 52 per cent of the population was financially eligible for legal 
aid and this has now dwindled to under one-third. E Booth ‘Beyond the Public Purse’ (2009) 295 New 
Law Journal 1328. 
89 Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995, SI 1995/1675. 
90 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58A (6) and (7), as amended by AJA 1999, s 27(1). 
91 Campbell v MGN [2005] UKHL 61. 





proportion of the solicitor’s normal costs and not a proportion of the compensation 
recovered.93 
 
Litigation regarding success fees has centred on the reasonableness of the level of 
percentage to be charged and/or the timing of such decisions.94 For example, there have 
been a number of clinical negligence cases before the courts which have involved a firm 
that claims a success fee of 100 per cent in all CFAs that are entered into at an early 
stage and where the merits are uncertain. In May 2009, an appeal in Oliver (executor of 
the Estate of John Oliver, Deceased) v (1) Whipps Cross University Hospital NHS Trust 
(2) Waltham Forest Primary Care Trust)95 came before Justice Jack following a 
reduction by the costs judge of the success fee from 100 per cent to 67 per cent (which 
represented a 60 per cent chance of success) in a claim on behalf of the deceased who 
had died of septicaemia in hospital as a result of MRSA. The costs judge had reduced 
the success fee on the basis that the solicitors must have thought there was more than a 
50 per cent chance of success otherwise the claim would not have been pursued on a 
CFA basis. On appeal in Oliver, Jack J disagreed with the reduction to 67 per cent and 
reinstated the success fee of 100 per cent. Jack J ruled that a firm of solicitors was 
entitled to assess a claim for clinical negligence that was accepted under a CFA as 
having a 50 per cent chance of success, which allowed it to charge a 100 per cent 
success fee. The claim was of a kind that had uncertain prospects and, based on what the 
solicitor knew when the fee agreement was made, the claim could easily have been 
assessed as having chances of success lower than 50 per cent. Therefore a CFA could be 
entered into at an early stage and that even where a solicitor has experience of clinical 
negligence his ‘ignorance is relative’. 
 
This case may be contrasted with the advice in Ku v Liverpool City Council96 that a 
staged success fee, which claims a lower success fee if the case settles at an early stage, 
should be applied when the merits are uncertain. Six months after Oliver, in another 
                                             
93 Despite this linkage with damages, it should be stressed that CFAs are related only to the professional 
fees charged, not damages. See Callery v Gray [2001] 1 WLR 2112 and 2142, the first guidance as to 
how risk should be assessed and success fees set. The House of Lords indicated that the Court of Appeal 
should be the final arbiter of judicial policy making in the new funding regime. 
94 See E Rawson, ‘Funding Update’ (2010) 16 Clinical Risk 143–148 for cases and details. 
95 Oliver (executor of the Estate of John Oliver, Deceased) v (1) Whipps Cross University Hospital NHS 
Trust (2) Waltham Forest Primary Care Trust) [2009] EWHC 1104 (QB). 





clinical negligence case, McCarthy v Essex Rivers Healthcare Trust97 the costs judge 
had reduced the success fee from the usual 100 per cent to 80 per cent. On appeal, Mr 
Justice Mackay upheld the reduction. Mackay J, in McCarthy, recognised that in a 
typical clinical negligence claim a meaningful assessment of the risk is often not 
possible until the medical notes and a provisional opinion have been obtained and that 
thereafter a claim might be ‘transformed in terms of the risk presented’. Significantly, 
Mackay J distinguished Oliver and felt that the decision in Oliver had understated the 
importance of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Ku. 
 
There are now two High Court decisions giving different interpretations of Ku. In 
Oliver, the interpretation of Jack J was that ‘it might be harder for a solicitor to justify a 
high fee if he has not in an appropriate case entered a two-stage agreement’, whereas in 
McCarthy, Mackay J gives a more robust interpretation that, in those cases, ‘it would 
not be possible to justify so high a success fee’. At present, there is no further guidance 
from the Court of Appeal, leaving scope for continuing arguments over success fees.98 
 
2. ATE Insurance99 and Disbursements 
 
The introduction of CFAs in 1995 still left the litigant at risk of having to pay the other 
side’s costs. Until 1 April 2000, the loser paid the basic costs in the normal way but the 
claimant paid his own lawyer the success fee and the ATE insurance premium. Under 
the AJA 1999, from 1 April 2000, the loser pays the success fee and the ATE insurance 
premium as well as the basic costs.100 The Law Society’s original scheme covered only 
the costs of the other side, but now there are forms of ATE insurance which provide 
cover against other risks.101 Clinical negligence cases that are proceeding under a CFA 
                                             
97McCarthy v Essex Rivers Healthcare Trust [November 2009]. High Court, HQ06X03686 
98See Rawson (n 94) for further cases regarding different aspects of success fee litigation. Also Rowley, J, 
‘Is It Too Soon to Consider Prematurity?’(Or Would the Court of Appeal Decide Callery v Gray the 
Same If the Case Was Heard Today?) (2009) Journal of Personal Injury Law 4, 276–283 Rowley, J, ‘Is It 
Too Soon to Consider Prematurity?’ Part II (Or Would the Court of Appeal Decide Callery v Gray the 
Same If the Case Was Heard Today?) (2010) Journal of Personal Injury Law 1, 39−51. 
99 Before-the-event insurance is insurance already in place at the time of the clinical negligence, usually 
an add-on to another insurance policy such as housing or motor policy. There is often unawareness of its 
existence but enquiries should be made.  
100 Ss 27 and 29 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and The Conditional Fee Regulations 2000. 
101 After the Event Cover for ‘both sides’ costs which would include cover for the claimant’s liabilities to 
his own solicitor, disbursements and counsel’s fee. After the Event Cover for individual claimants or in 
standard form by solicitors under delegated authority. For full discussion of insurance and CFAs see 





are usually backed by ATE insurance to cover the claimant’s potential liability for the 
defendant’s costs and own disbursements if the case fails. 
 
The majority of patients bringing clinical negligence claims cannot afford to pay for 
disbursements, the vast majority of which are experts’ fees, throughout the litigation. 
There are various ways of paying these depending on the type of funding in place, but if 
the claimant does not have legal aid or insurance to pay the experts on an ongoing basis, 
market pressures will make it increasingly difficult for law firms to resist paying for 
disbursements. This will increase pressure on the firms to only litigate cases which 
appear strong on their merits. 
 
There have been several cases which deal with the question of whether a solicitor who 
entered into a CFA breached the duty102 to disclose to the client any interest which the 
solicitor had in recommending a specific policy of ATE costs insurance.103 In Ann 
Marriot v Greggs PLC104 it was held that the solicitor had materially breached the 
regulations, as the CFA stated erroneously that the solicitor did not have an interest in 
recommending a specific policy. In Derrick Barr & Ors v Biffaste Services LTD & QBE 
Insurance (Europe) Ltd105 it was decided that ATE policies were disclosable. 
 
3. Recoverability of the Success Fee ‘Uplift’ and the ATE Insurance Premiums 
from the Losing Defendants 
 
The Labour Government’s106 plans to restructure legal aid included the abolition of 
legal aid for most types of personal injury action save for small exceptions, including 
clinical negligence, multiparty actions and cases involving matters of public interest and 
non-negligent injury, such as battery. To replace legal aid, the Government decided to 
reinforce CFAs with the concept of ‘recoverability’,107 introduced by section 29 of the 
Access to Justice Act 1999. In essence, this enabled the successful claimant’s solicitor 
to recover both the success fee and the ATE insurance premium from the defendants. 
                                             
102 In its form under the former Conditional Fee Agreement Regulations 2000. 
103 See Pukis v Brumby [2008] EWHC 90095 (Costs); Fawcett Old Ltd v Hibberd [2008] EWHC 90102 
(Cost) upheld on appeal at [2008] EWCA Civ 1375; and Overton v Horder [2008] EWHC 90109 in 
Williams (n 87). 
104 Ann Marriot v Greggs PLC Leeds County Court Case No 757514. 
105 Derrick Barr & Ors v Biffaste Services LTD & QBE Insurance (Europe) Ltd [2009] EWHC 1033 
QBD (TCC). 
106 The Labour Government was in office from 1997–2010. 





Jackson LJ108 supports CFAs in principle, but states that these have ‘been the major 
contributor to disproportionate costs’. He makes a case for non-recoverability of the 
success fee and the ATE premium. His recommendations include preserving conditional 
fees, but with a cap on success fees of 25 per cent of damages109 which will be paid by 
the claimant (ie not recoverable from the defendant). He then suggests that general 
damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity (non-pecuniary losses) be increased by 
10 per cent to offset this payment. 
 
I would argue that the proposal to increase general damages by 10 per cent in order to 
compensate having to pay an up to 25 per cent success fee will not in fact compensate 
claimants in most cases because compensation for general damages is so low. It also 
undermines any meaningful significance of general damages and lends credence to my 
argument that payment for non-pecuniary loss within the confines of the NHS budget is 
futile. One argument against non-recoverability of the success fee maintains that the 
defendant wrongdoer should bear the costs. In addition, the low success fee will 
encourage solicitors to cherry-pick only the strongest cases. 
 
Jackson LJ is particularly concerned about the defendant’s liability to pay ATE 
insurance premiums. He found that the one-way costs shifting, that is whereby 
defendants bear their own costs in every case, win or lose, would be substantially 
cheaper. He quotes Action against Medical Accidents’ (hereinafter ‘AvMA’)110 
comments in the final report: 
 
AvMA supports the idea of one way costs shifting which has been a familiar 
mechanism in clinical negligence where cases are funded by legal aid. AvMA does 
not support an unnecessary burden on the public purse of recoverability of large 
ATE premiums if other costs mechanism could apply. 
 
There remains the question of non-equality of arms between defendant insurers and 
personal claimants. 
                                             
108 (The Jackson Reforms) (n 5). 
109 Excluding any damages referable to future care or losses. 





4. Costs-Only Proceedings: Civil Procedure Rule (Hereinafter ‘CPR’) 44.12A 
 
Another important aspect of the regime for CFAs is the introduction of costs-only 
proceedings. CPR 44.12A makes provision for a new procedure for costs to be assessed 
where the parties have settled the substantive dispute without proceedings but are 
unable to agree costs. The claim is to be brought under CPR part 8, but the court must 
dismiss the claim if the procedure, ie CPR part 8, is opposed. Therefore, the court can 
only act as an arbiter if both sides agree. This means that a lawyer will need to secure 
the opponent’s consent to this procedure before concluding the settlement of the 
substantive claim.111 
 
B. An Alternative to CFAs: Private Funding of Personal Injury Claims 
 
“If you can find a client who will pay your costs from start to finish, treasure him.”112 
 
The importance of consideration of alternative funding arrangements was emphasised in 
Sawar v Alam.113 This case demonstrated that if, at the end of the case, it can be shown 
that the claimant/client had satisfactory means of funding the case other than with a 
CFA (involving uplifts and ATE insurance premiums) and these options had not been 
sufficiently explored, it would be unlikely that the firm representing him would be able 
to recover its success fee or ATE insurance premium. There have been technical 
challenges to CFAs.114 Nonetheless, the reality is that private self-funding of most 
clinical negligence actions is prohibitive. 
 
IV. IN SUMMATION: FUNDING CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 
 
So far in this chapter, I have considered and described the arrangements, both in place 
and projected, for funding clinical negligence actions. I have concentrated on the major 
sources of funding at present, namely, legal aid and CFAs. I have indicated that there 
                                             
111 For fuller discussion of costs-only proceedings please refer to F Bawdon, M Napier and G Wignall 
(eds) ‘Conditional Fees: A Survival Guide’ 2nd edn (London, The Law Society, 2001) 38 and Harvey (n 
101), ch 10. 
112 Harvey (n 101), 21. 
113 Sawar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2002] 1 WLR 125. 
114 Harvey (n 80), 137. Please Refer to Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718 regarding the 
enforceability of CFAs which do not comply with statute. This article also discusses recent refinements of 





are major changes anticipated following the publication of both the Clarke Report and 
the Jackson Report. I now turn to the question of the effect the planned changes might 
have on access to justice for claimants suffering iatrogenic harm. 
 
V. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: HOW WIDE ARE THE GATES? 
 
It is trite to say that funding is essential, but its importance cannot be overstated. If 
funding cannot be put in place, then a patient’s claim cannot be investigated. 
Medical practices will be beyond accountability and deserving victims of medical 
accidents will not be compensated…It is equally important that remuneration, the 
other side of the funding coin, is sufficient to enable lawyers to be paid in 
accordance with their skill and expertise, and to ensure that clinical negligence 
work remains commercially viable.115 
 
In the Introduction to this chapter I made the point that access to justice had two 
aspects: the availability of legal representation in the civil justice system and access to 
redress through extralegal routes such as the NHS complaints system. 
 
As regards legal representation in the civil justice system, the future looks bleak for 
victims of medical accidents. If the proposals in the Clarke Report are accepted, clinical 
negligence cases will be removed from the scope of legal aid excepting special 
individual cases. These will depend on: the importance of the issue; the claimant’s 
ability to present his own case, depending upon the context within which it shall be 
heard; the likely vulnerability of the claimant; the complexity of the law; the availability 
of alternative sources of funding; and the availability of alternative routes to resolving 
the issue. Account is also to be taken of the Government’s domestic, European and 
international legal obligations.116 As noted, challenges of the refusal of legal aid have 
not met with success, excepting representation at inquests where human rights 
legislation holds sway. The assumption in the Clarke Report that CFAs provide a viable 
alternative source of funding clinical negligence actions is only true up to a point. In 
order for law firms to remain financially viable, it behoves them to concentrate on cases 
with a more than 50 per cent chance of success. This will be even more acutely so if the 
Jackson Report’s suggestion that success fees be reduced to 25 per cent is taken up. 
Again, I would emphasise that clinical negligence cases are more complex than most 
personal injury cases and success or failure harder to gauge at the outset. 
                                             
115 Rawson (n 94), 143. 





The outlook for important class actions such as the Epilim case, which might have 
resulted in one of the UK’s most significant medical compensation packages, is equally 
bleak. This would have been a meretricious landmark case as it is thought to be the first 
made against a pharmaceutical company under the 1987 Consumer Act, governing 
companies’ responsibility for the safety of their products. 
 
As regards the recommendation in the Jackson Report for non-recovery of the success 
fee, offset by an increase in general damages of 10 per cent, this could leave a claimant 
with serious injuries without anything like sufficient funds.117 There are additional 
issues arising from the recommendations. Firstly, adjustments to the level of general 
damages have usually been regarded as a judicial matter for the courts rather than the 
Government. In addition, the central purpose of an award of civil damages is to 
compensate the claimant for the loss or injury that he has suffered and this principle is 
only departed from where clear authority has been established for doing so.118 An 
increase in the level of damages which is expressly made for the purpose of assisting 
claimants to meet their costs liabilities, rather than to compensate them for the injury 
suffered, would represent a fundamental change in the nature of the general damages 
award and would create a precedent for calls to depart from the compensatory principle 
in other circumstances.119 
 
In conclusion, having argued for the entitlement to redress for victims of iatrogenic 
harm in my first chapter, it would seem to be a breach of citizens’ legal rights to a fair 
trial120 for them to have no practical access to representation in the civil justice system. 
Having exempted the more ‘certain cases’ which can attract CFA funding and those 
which may be taken into scope, the withdrawal of legal aid for clinical negligence cases 
represents a clear restriction of access to justice through the courts. 
 
Whether there is a compensating extralegal route to redress is a moot point at present. 
The LSC in its thinking relied on the fact that victims would have recourse to the 
                                             
117 The law firm Stewarts Law have a breakdown of figures in Lord Justice Jackson’s Review of Civil 
Litigation Costs: Final Report A response by Stewarts Law, Page 1 of 6.  Point 6, downloadable as a pdf 
from http://www.stewartslaw.com/stewarts-laws-response-to-final-report-by-lj-jackson.aspx. 
118 For example, in the specific circumstances in which exemplary damages have been held to be 
available under the common law. 
119 Refer to ch 6 Damages below. 






advantages set out in the Redress Act 2006.121 The Redress Act 2006 introduces a 
scheme proposed by the CMO to provide victims of NHS negligence with a variety of 
remedies, including financial compensation, without resort to the legal process.122 The 
NHS Redress Act 2006 received Royal Assent in November 2006 and was to have been 
implemented in April 2008.123 Implementation has, however, been put on hold pending 
further consultation and likely reform of the NHS complaints procedure.124 The NHS 
Redress Act 2006 is an enabling Act and much of the detail will be contained in 
secondary legislation. At the time of writing, July 2012, the secondary legislation has 
not been forthcoming. The NHS complaints system, also due for reform, has been 
heavily criticised in a report ‘Care and Compassion?’ written by the Health 
Ombudsman, Ann Abraham.125 I can only conclude that at present access to justice 
through extralegal channels has also been diminished. 
 
Having examined the issues related to the funding of clinical negligence actions, I now 
turn to the necessary components of proving clinical negligence: duty; breach126 and 
causation.127 
                                             
121 See Chapter 8 The Redress Act 2006 below. 
122 Ibid.  
123 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2007) 
270. 
124 This is due to the widely held belief that the principles of the Act are closely related to the live 
consultation paper entitled Making Experiences Count regarding NHS Complaints Procedure Reform. 
125 A Abraham, Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, ‘Care and Compassion?’ Report of the 
Health Service Ombudsman on ten investigations into NHS care of older people. Presented on January 
24, 2011 and printed on February 11, 2011. See Chapter 7 History of NHS Complaints below. 
126 Chapter 4 Proving Clinical Negligence below. 














PROVING CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE 





Historically, the legal obligations of a doctor were derived from his status and 





His Lordship reiterated that ultimately the courts, and only the courts, are the 






BREACH OF DUTY AND THE STANDARD OF CARE 





Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by the courts, but they are 
taken over from the facts of life.3 
                                             
1 The first reported cases against a doctor is The Surgeon’s Case (or Morton’s Case) (1374) 48 EDW 11. 
2 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, (HL). 







The overall thesis examines how effectively or otherwise the civil justice system and the 
National Health Service4 complaints systems address redress for patients suffering 
iatrogenic harm. This part of the thesis focuses on the response of the civil justice 
system.5 Having considered the funding difficulties faced by would-be claimants and 
the negative effect financial constraints have on access to justice,6 in this and the next 
chapters I concentrate on the legal rules and requirements governing proof of clinical 
negligence. In particular, I consider whether the requirement for the claimant to prove 
the elements of any successful negligence claim, namely duty, breach, causation and 
damage, acts as a hindrance to obtaining redress. The cases which give rise to these 
questions are those where there has been either a technical failure or misadventure 
(acts), or where there has been a failure to treat (omissions). In other words, these are 
cases which are associated with medical treatment in one form or another. There has 
been a parallel series of cases of alleged negligence arising before treatment started. 
These cases are based on the right of the patient to make an informed choice regarding 
his or her treatment. Although the principles underlying the tort of negligence are 
similar in both situations, the latter have developed a jurisprudence of their own which 
is outwith the remit of this chapter. Hence this chapter will confine itself to discussion 
of medical misadventure. 
 
Most litigation against doctors concerns actions for clinical negligence. It is the 
principal action by which patients seek compensation for injuries caused within the 
NHS. The only other action which features to any extent is battery.7 Actions in battery 
are rare, not least because they require the patient to prove that the doctor acted without 
their consent, which is not usually the case. Claims for damages generally arise out of 
treatment or care to which the patient has consented, but which went wrong or did not 
produce the desired or expected outcome. The essence of the patient’s claim is that the 
doctor was negligent in that he breached his duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
diagnosing, advising or treating the patient. 
 
                                             
4 Referred to as ‘the NHS’ hereafter. 
5 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation. 
6 Chapter 3 Funding Litigation, above. 






Clinical negligence is, in reality, no more than an application of the tort of negligence to 
professionals such as doctors, nurses and others involved in the provision of healthcare 
services. Hence, the law of negligence is applicable to the medical context and medical 
negligence is a specific form of negligence liability in the professional context.8 There 
are, however, particular factual and legal problems thrown up in the medical context 
which necessitate a separate account from the general principles of negligence and 
professional liability. A patient may have an action for breach of contract in the tort of 
negligence9 or for misrepresentation.10 
 
In this chapter, I will initially briefly explore problems regarding establishing: the 
existence of a duty of care; where liability falls; and the question of how far that duty 
extends. I will then turn to the question of proving that there has been a breach of that 
duty. I will consider the issues arising from the use of the Bolam11 standard and the 
impact of the Bolitho12 ‘gloss’13 on the assessment of medical breach. Discussion will 
then focus on the role of expert medical opinion in delineating the appropriate standard 
of care. I will touch upon the complexity of the role of the expert witness, and note the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney14 overturning the long-standing rule 
that expert witnesses are immune from liability for damages to parties that have 
engaged them and to which they owe a duty of care. I will briefly touch upon the role 
that guidelines play in setting the requisite standard and will raise the vexed question of 
the relevance of resources in framing NHS institutional liability.15 I will conclude by 
considering how the rules for establishing medical negligence, in particular the rules 
about establishing breach of duty, affect a claimant’s access to justice via the civil 
litigation system. 
 
                                             
8 J Powell and R Stewart (eds), Jackson and Powell on Professional Negligence 6th edn, (Andover, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2007, with cumulative supplements). 
9 Kennedy et al (n 7) at 135 their footnote 19. Other actions may include false imprisonment or battery.  
10 Ibid at 135 footnote 20. Under the common principle in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 
Ltd [1964] AC 465, or under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, where the patient has been induced to enter 
into a contract for the provision of medical services. 
11 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
12 Bolitho (Deceased) v Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
13 R Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s Gloss’ (2010) 69 Cambridge 
Law Journal 3, 609–638. 
14 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, [2011] All ER (D) 346 (Mar). 
15 J Beswick, ‘A First Class Service? Setting the Standard of Care for the Contemporary NHS’ 





On the whole, establishing the existence of a duty of care in the medical setting is not 
problematic. It will be obvious and accepted that a duty was owed to the claimant who 
was the doctor’s patient. The real issues in the case will normally revolve around, for 
example, breach and causation. Nevertheless, there are some circumstances regarding 
the existence of a duty of care which briefly merit mention. These include problems 
where the doctor-patient relationship has not been fully forged or at all, for example: 
where the doctor is employed by another such as an insurance company or a prospective 
employer to examine the claimant; or where there is a third party who suffers injury as a 
result of the doctor’s negligence.16 Also, legal problems arise where the injury suffered 
by the patient (or another) is not personal injury but rather financial loss or psychiatric 
harm.17 
 
II. PROVING LIABILITY: DUTY OF CARE 
 
A. Conceptual Framework 
 
Although no formula for testing whether in a given situation a duty of care arises has 
proved satisfactory, there are guidelines, of which the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ of 
harm is the most important, for it indicates a prima facie duty of care. However, that 
duty may be negated by any number of considerations, prime among which is the 
general consideration of policy as it appears to the tribunal trying the case.18 The ambit 
of the duty of care is continually being extended gradually by ad hoc judicial decisions. 
In that way, the scope of recovery for, inter alia, nervous shock, economic loss, 
negligent misstatement, injury suffered by a rescuer and, more recently, undiagnosed 
dyslexia and stress-related psychiatric injury at work has been widened.19 Some injuries 
are caused by circumstances where there will be no compensation – they are just bad 
luck.20 Nevertheless, the claimant who has suffered personal injury21 as a result of 
                                             
16 For example, a total stranger injured by the patient or a relative of the patient. 
17 For detailed analysis of these issues see Kennedy et al (n 7) Chapter 3 Duties in Contract and Tort. See 
also below Chapter 6 ‘Damages’ for a discussion of claims for psychiatric harm. 
18 C Lewis, Clinical Negligence, 6th edn. (Haywards Heath, Tottel Publishing Ltd, 2006) page 175. 
19 Ibid. 
20 PS Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) for a discussion of the unfairness of 
this very point. 





someone else’s fault has a good chance of finding that compensation is available, and it 
is mainly in the area of pure economic losses that restrictions on tort liability arise.22 
 
The picture for success in clinical negligence claims is different. It is a major difficulty 
for any claimant to discharge the burden which falls upon him to prove that the 
defendant’s negligence caused his injury. The current system for compensating those 
sustaining injury has come under attack from all sides.23 Patients, it is argued, have 
great difficulty seeking compensation for negligently inflicted medical injury and may 
face daunting hurdles in the process of suing the doctor. Under the NHS Litigation 
Authority (hereinafter ‘NHSLA’)24 regime less than 4 per cent of cases now go to court, 
although this might not be a bad thing given that 76 per cent who do so fail.25 It is 
noteworthy that, in clinical negligence cases, payment is made in some 30–40% of 
actions as compared with 86% in the general run of personal injury cases.26 
 
B. Establishing a Duty of Care 
 
A doctor owes you a duty of care because he is your doctor. That is, an automatic legal 
duty of care arises if a health professional has accepted to treat you, or a general 
practitioner has accepted you on his list.27 A duty will also arise in the case of a private 
patient by virtue of his contractual relationship with his doctor (or the hospital) and, 
within a public national health system, the duty arises when the patient presents for 
treatment and is admitted.28 
 
Duties in law can be assumed or imposed. The paradigm example of an assumed 
obligation of care is that of contract, where parties voluntarily agree to be bound to each 
other. As has been noted, this is not the legal basis for the operation of the NHS; rather, 
                                             
22 This optimistic assessment of the claimant’s position is from P Barrie, Compensation for Personal 
Injuries (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) page 15 and refers to general claims for personal injury 
in the general run of personal injury cases. A 2nd edition of this book was published in March 2005. 
However, pages refer to the 2002 edition. 
23 Not least from the senior judiciary: Lord Woolf ‘Clinical Negligence: What is the Solution? How can 
we provide justice for doctors and patients?’ (2000) 4 Med. L Internat. 133. 
24 The NHSLA was established in 1995 to indemnify English NHS bodies against claims for medical 
negligence. 
25See NHSLA Report and Accounts 2009, p 15 and JK Mason and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, 
8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), at 123. 
26 Mason and Laurie (n 25), at 113. 






tort law dictates if and when a duty of care arises. The overarching legal and policy 
consideration in respect of all duties of care in tort is to ask whether it would be fair, 
just and reasonable to impose such a duty in the given circumstances.29 Furthermore, the 
relationship between the claimant and the defendant must be sufficiently ‘proximate’30 
that harm following the defendant’s acts/omissions was ‘reasonably foreseeable’.31 
This, in essence, is a question of how directly a claimant might be affected by the 
behaviour of another. The more direct the likelihood of harm, the more likely it will be 
that a duty of care will be imposed. This is always, however, subject to the fairness and 
reasonableness of creating that duty. This can be particularly problematic for relatives 
who claim they have been harmed as a result of negligent care of a loved one.32 It would 
seem unquestionable that a public health service owes duties of care to the patients it 
accepts for treatment; on any analysis it is a fair and reasonable legal position.33 
 
C. When a Duty of Care Arises 
 
1. General Practitioners: Issues of Liability 
 
A medical injury may have been caused to the claimant by any one or more of the 
healthcare personnel who have treated him. Locating negligence may be simple in some 
cases but, in others, the patient may have to choose the responsible party from a fairly 
large group, which may include a general practitioner, a hospital consultant or other 
hospital doctors and the nursing staff. Locating the specific act of alleged negligence 
which caused the injury may also involve a degree of disentanglement. 
 
As noted, the existence of the doctor-patient relationship is usually obvious. However, 
there could be times of uncertainty about whether an individual was in fact the doctor’s 
patient at the relevant time. Because a doctor is under no obligation to treat a ‘stranger’ 
it is important to know when the transition from ‘stranger’ to ‘patient’ takes place. The 
common law position is that a duty of care is imposed upon the doctor once he has 
                                             
29 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Kent v Griffiths (N03) [2001] QB 36 and Rees v 
Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309. 
30 Danns v Department of Health [1998] PIQR P226 relationship not considered proximate. 
31 Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All ER 161. 
32 The issue of how far a duty of care may be extended will be addressed below. 
33 See Mason and Laurie (n 25), at 135 for circumstances where patients may be redirected to other 
services. It is noted that ‘it is no part of the general law in the United Kingdom that a doctor must respond 





assumed responsibility for the patient’s care. Crown immunity has been extended to 
NHS hospital doctors, dentists and community physicians since January 1990 and, as a 
result, the entire costs of negligence litigation are now borne by the Health Service 
itself, though there is nothing to stop a claimant suing an individual doctor.34 
 
2. Hospitals: Issues of Liability – Vicarious Liability and Non-Delegable Duty 
 
The position is different if the alleged negligence occurs after the general practitioner 
has referred the patient for further treatment within the NHS. In hospital, the duty may 
arise as soon as the patient presents himself for treatment, before he is actually seen by a 
doctor.35 If the negligent act is committed by a Health Service employee, the patient 
then has the choice of proceedings, either against the individual he thinks has been 
negligent, or against the Health Authority or Trust, or against both in a joint action. In 
practice, many actions are brought against the Health Authority or the Trust on grounds 
of convenience. The liability of the Authority or Trust may be based on either of two 
grounds: (1) the duty of a hospital to care for patients or (2) the vicarious liability of a 
Health Authority for the negligence of its employees.36 Since the entire costs of 
negligence litigation of the NHS are now borne by the Health Service itself, this means 
that compensation for the injured produces limitations in treatment facilities for other 
patients.37 The load is now spread in that all Trusts are encouraged to make use of the 
mutual insurance offered by the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts operated by the 
NHSLA.38 Nonetheless, litigation impacts directly upon the financial resources 
available to the NHS. For example, in 2009/10, the NHSLA reported a 10 per cent 
increase in claims over 2008/9, already an 11 per cent increase over 2007/8.39 Legal 
costs are high. The costs claimed by claimant lawyers are significantly higher than those 
incurred by NHSLA’s panel defence solicitors. The availability of CFAs40 and the 
                                             
34 Mason and Laurie (n 25) at 129. 
35 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
36 Mason and Laurie (n 25) at 130. 
37 Ibid at 131.  
38 NHS (Clinical Negligence Scheme) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/251 made under National Health 
Service and Community Care Act 1990, s 21. 
39 NHSLA (website), Key Facts About Our Work, ‘£769 million was paid in connection with clinical 
negligence claims during 2008/09, up from £633 million in 2007/08’ accessible at 
http://www.nhsla.com/home.htm. See also E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) Professional Negligence 
27(3), 138–157 at 141. 
40 See Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ above. The Government, in Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2010–2012, eliminated legal aid for clinical negligence cases, which will 





increase in their use by claimants in clinical claims has meant that claimants’ costs are 
significantly disproportionate to the amount of damages paid, especially in low cost 
claims.41 
 
Notwithstanding the attempts made by the Authority to avoid formal litigation, there 
remains a concern that the assumption of financial responsibility for legal liability by 
health institutions serves to divert resources away from the provision of patient care.42 
This provides a compelling reason to find creative non-financial redress for iatrogenic 
harm where appropriate. I argue that reparation for non-pecuniary loss (not amounting 
to psychiatric injury) falls into this category. 
 
An outstanding question remains as to the extent that a hospital owes a non-delegable 
duty to use skill and care in treating its patients.43 In S v Lothian Health Board,44 the 
court allowed proof before answer on the issue of such a duty on the premise that what 
is relevant is whether the hospital assumes responsibility for contracted-out services that 
lead to negligent harm, not whether it had a degree of control over the work done.45 This 
latter question of hospitals having a primary duty to provide adequate treatment 
becomes more significant when, as is increasingly common, a patient’s NHS treatment 
has been contracted out to a private hospital. The NHS Trust will continue to be liable 
for a failure to arrange adequate care, even though it is not the doctor’s employer. The 
NHS will normally have made an arrangement with the private hospital to indemnify it 
against liability, but the patient will be able to sue the NHS Trust.46 Although detailed 
consideration of institutional liability is outside my remit, I would emphasise that there 
is a central public policy problem in the modern delivery of healthcare: the scarcity of 
resources to meet demand for services and treatment. Publicly funded health systems 
worldwide have come under growing pressure and the NHS is no exception to this 
general trend. In response, attempts have been made to utilise resources in a more 
                                             
41 NHSLA Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 (London, 2010), at 14. Also see Cave (n 39) at 141, 
footnote 30 therein. 
42 Kennedy et al (n 7) at 396. 
43See Garcia v St Mary’s NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2314 (QBD). An NHS Trust, in addition to being 
vicariously liable for its employees, may be liable for a breach of duty owed directly to its patients. See 
Beswick (n 15).  
44 S v Lothian Health Board (2009) SLT 689.  
45See E Jackson, Medical Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) at 105 for further 
discussion and case law on this point. 





systematic and rational manner and difficult questions arise when an NHS body 
commissions care in the private sector, or refers a patient for treatment abroad.47 
 
D. Health Workers and Non-Patients: Can a Duty of Care Arise? 
 
Usually, the only person who suffers iatrogenic harm is the patient himself. However, 
there are various situations where a third party may be owed a duty of care by the health 
worker. These situations include wrongful pregnancy,48 failure to prevent the patient 
from causing harm,49 medical examinations50 and psychiatric injury.51 Claims for 
psychiatric injury are an area of special complexity which will be addressed when 
considering damages.52 There have been cases regarding negligent communication of 
bad news53 and fear for the future54 where the question of duty of care was raised, but 
for present purposes I will be concentrating on claims by patients and/or relatives 
claiming for psychiatric injury occasioned by iatrogenic harm. 
 
We have seen that the doctor’s duty arises because he has undertaken or assumed 
responsibility for the patient.55 What follows is a brief synopsis of the development of 
                                             
47 Kennedy et al (n 7) at 406. 
48 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1. Patient’s wife considered within the doctor’s 
contemplation; Goodwill v BPAS [1996] 1 WLR 1397. No duty owed by doctor to future unknown 
partners. 
49 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351CA. On the facts insufficient proximity 
found between the health authority and the victim for it to be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of 
care on the defendants. 
50 D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151. Doctor examining a child 
in a question of suspected abuse owed the child himself a duty of care. However in JD v East Berkshire 
Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23 the House of Lords decided that in these situations the 
duty did not extend to the child’s parents because this could create a conflict of interests. But see also 
Kennedy et al (n 7) at 189 regarding the scope of a doctor’s duty to an examinee including US judgments. 
51 Ibid 108 and Lewis (n 18) at 101. 
52 Chapter 6 ‘Damages’ below. 
53 Allin v City and Hackney Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 167 (mother told incorrectly that her baby 
had died. The existence of a duty of care in respect of the provision of information was conceded and the 
defendant held liable for its breach) and AB v Tameside and Glossop Health Authority [1997] 8 Med LR 
91 (Health worker diagnosed with HIV and past patients were informed. Accepted on issue of duty of 
care but lost on issue of breach) P Balen Clinical Negligence Jordan Publishing Limited (2008) pages 
175–6. 
54 The Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease Litigation Group B Plaintiffs v Medical Research Council [2000] 
Lloyd’s Rep Med. 161 QB ‘The claimants were not defined as primary or secondary victims but rather as 
having a relationship to the defendants “akin to that of doctor and patient, one of close proximity”,’ H 
Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Legal Liability (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2009), ch 4, p 102, fn 43 and pp 109–110. 
55 Teff, Ibid, at 126–127. ‘There are distinct signs of judicial readiness to invoke “assumption of 
responsibility”, broadly construed when finding public authorities liable.’ In a sense, one can trace the 
ethos informing the Human Rights Act 1998 back to the historical development of the concept of trespass 





the law in relation to the impact that human rights legislation might have on delineating 
medical responsibility and patients’ rights. I will also consider what extra dimension the 
Human Rights Act (hereinafter ‘HRA’) 1998 requires of public bodies, namely 
hospitals. 
 
III. THE HRA 1998: DOCTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES – PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 
 
Following the entry into force in October 2000 of the Human Rights Act 1998,…a 
huge tranche of legal aid money has been taken away from victims of injury and 
placed at the disposal of those lawyers and clients who can find some human rights 
basis for a claim…No lawyer dealing with any issue now is worth his salt if he 
cannot tag on to his claim a human rights plea. Almost every issue one can think of 
will have some sort of connection with one or more of the hugely comprehensive, 
fundamental and protean human rights recognised by the Convention, whether 
family, life, freedom, access to courts, fair trial or whatever.56 
 
The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECHR’) 
into domestic law through the HRA 199857 has had some, though limited, impact on the 
way in which the courts deal with claims for medical negligence.58 The relevance of the 
HRA 1998 to medicine is that medical law is concerned with the fundamental nature of 
the relationship between doctors and patients. Medical law encompasses patients’ rights 
to make their own decisions about how they live their lives and how they die. Patients’ 
interests in privacy and family life, in having or not having children, are central to their 
dealings with healthcare professionals and the HRA 1998 makes implicit rights explicit. 
The HRA 1998 renders the ECHR enforceable against public authorities. However, the 
ECHR59 addresses only a limited range of rights. Noteworthy is that there is no positive 
right to healthcare. There is no equivalent to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. For the most part, what the Convention confers are negative rights – 
prohibitions against certain kinds of infringements of basic freedoms.60 The area where 
human rights litigation best flourishes concerns the liberty of the subject.61 The 
significant areas for concern are where what is at stake is a failure by the NHS to 
                                             
56 Lewis (n 18) at 444. 
57 To be referred to as HRA 1998. 
58 See M Jones Medical Negligence 4th edn (Andover, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 59–68 for detailed case 
material. 
59 The Convention to which the 1998 Act gives domestic effect. 
60 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011) 
chapter 2 for a full discussion of the HRA 1998 and domestic medical law. 
61 For example in issues surrounding the detention of mental patients, R v Camden & Islington HA, ex p K 





provide certain sorts of care, or concerns about allowing insurers to demand medical 
details. The utility of the Act still needs to be tested.62 
 
Article 2 of the ECHR provides that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by 
law’.63 Article 2 imposes on the State a positive obligation to intervene to protect people 
whose lives are at real and immediate risk.64 In terms of hospital care, Article 2 is likely 
to be engaged in cases where death has or may have been caused by a lack of adequate 
systems to protect the lives of patients and the patient is detained, either as a prisoner or 
as a patient sectioned under the Mental Health Act. 
 
A recent and useful example of the court’s approach to the application of Article 2, the 
right to life, may be found in Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation 
Trust.65 In brief, Mrs Savage had been detained under section 3 of the Mental Health 
Act 1983. She suffered from schizophrenia, but it was not considered necessary for her 
to be in a locked ward. She walked out of the hospital, proceeded to a railway station, 
jumped in front of a train and suffered fatal injuries. Her daughter brought a claim 
alleging breach of Article 2. There was no claim in negligence. The Trust applied for 
determination of the proper test to establish a breach of Article 2.66 
 
It was established that the State’s obligation to protect life under Article 2 imposed three 
different duties upon the State: (1) a negative duty to refrain from taking life, (2) an 
implied positive duty properly and openly to investigate deaths for which the State 
might bear some responsibility and (3) a duty to take positive steps to protect the lives 
of those within the State’s jurisdiction. This case was about the third duty. The principal 
component of the duty to protect life was an effective system of criminal law to deter 
people from taking other people’s lives and to punish those who did. However, the duty 
goes further than that. In certain well-defined circumstances, there is a positive 
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63 Brazier and Cave (n 60), at 39. 
64 Osman v UK (1998) 29 EHRR 245. 
65 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust House of Lords, 10/12/08. Analysis from J 
Mead, ‘Application of Article 2 to patient suicides: Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation 
Trust’ (2009) Clinical Risk 15, 85–88. 
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obligation on public authorities to take preventative measures to protect an individual 
whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.67 
The question at issue was what would trigger the obligation in a clinical setting. The 
Trust cited Powell v UK68 where the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
‘ECtHR’) had ruled that, where a State made adequate provision for securing high 
professional standards among medical practitioners, negligence by doctors did not, of 
itself, constitute a breach of Article 2. However, the court applied the test in the rulings 
in Osman and Keenan v UK,69 namely: 
 
Whether the authorities knew, or ought to have known, that the deceased posed a 
real and immediate risk of suicide and, if so, whether they did all that could 
reasonably be expected of them to prevent that risk.70 
 
The trigger of ‘real and immediate risk to life’ had rarely been demonstrated in the 
reported cases. Competing values in the Convention had to be considered by public 
authorities. For example, keeping a patient absolutely safe from physical harm by 
secluding or restraining her, or even by keeping her in a locked ward, may do more 
harm to the patient’s mental health. The court’s ruling included a comment that this 
approach should not persuade professionals to behave any more cautiously or 
defensively than they are already persuaded to do by the ordinary laws of negligence. 
However, it remains unclear where this ruling leaves the NHS. John Mead’s view is that 
it is likely to persuade Trusts to take a ‘safety first’ approach, which may mean a more 
restrictive regime for patients.71 He concludes that, as with many leading decisions, the 
true significance of this one will only become clear once following cases have been 
before the courts. The NHS can expect to see an increase in Article 2 challenges.72 
 
I have included this discussion of the HRA 1998 because the Act has the potential to 
transform medical law and offer a clearer articulation of patients’ rights.73 One example 
of this would be regarding provision of care. As the pressure for scarce NHS resources 
becomes ever more acute, decisions regarding allocation will be framed in the language 
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of competing rights. How restrictively, or otherwise, the courts interpret the scope of the 
duty of care owed by public healthcare providers will be determinative in these cases.74 
One positive impact of the HRA 1998 has been to encourage the judges to scrutinise 
public authorities’ decisions more vigorously, particularly where life is at stake.75 
 




The common law, it can be argued, progresses, not just over the longue durée from 
time immemorial to the present, but also from case to case.76 
 
There are a number of difficulties a claimant faces in proving negligence. They include 
the problem of ascertaining exactly what was done in the course of treatment, of 
securing expert evidence which will allege and substantiate a want of due care, of 
proving a causative link between the treatment and the injury and of overcoming any 
possible pro-doctor prejudice in the mind of the judge and, if matters go further, the 
appeal court.77 In this section of the chapter, I shall be concentrating on the necessary 
elements a claimant must prove to show that there has been a breach of duty. Where, as 
seen, claimants on the whole will find little difficulty in showing that a duty of care is 
owed by the doctor to his patient, the issue of the standard of care and whether the 
defendant has failed to meet that standard is a central issue in an action for medical 
negligence.78 The action will only succeed if the defendant/doctor has not attained the 
requisite standard of care and the claimant proves this. 
 
                                             
74 For discussion of the obligation to provide medical care see Kennedy et al (n 7) at 259. See the 
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opinion. 
75 Brazier and Cave (n 60) at 59. 
76 JA Harrington, ‘Progress Through Pluralism: Towards an Epistemology of Medical Negligence Law’ 
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2002/12, p 16. 
77 See Lewis (n 18), chapter 22 regarding difficulties for the claimant in finding medical experts and the 
issue of judicial bias towards doctors. 
78 See above regarding ‘duty of care’. The claimant will usually not have any difficulty showing that he 
was owed a duty of care by health professionals, usually in tort/and or contract. In order to restrict the 
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I will first consider the Bolam79 and Bolitho80 tests. The traditional test the English 
courts have adopted to define the standard of care is known as the ‘Bolam test’.81 This 
test, perceived as ‘making doctors judges in their own case’,82 has come under 
increasing criticism83 in the current less deferential and more iconoclastic age. This 
section will first set out the extent of the ‘Bolam test’ and will then discuss the more 
recent ‘Bolitho’84 decision, wherein the court will be seen to have taken a more active 
role (vis-à-vis the medical profession) in the evaluation of what the standard of care 
should be in specific instances. 
 
I will then discuss the significance of expert opinion and guidelines in setting out the 
requisite standard of care. Once the standard of care is set, the second stage of 
deliberation requires a decision about whether, on the facts of the case (as determined 
from the evidence), the defendant’s conduct fell below the appropriate standard. This is 
a question of fact. Although these two stages are logically discrete, in practice it may be 
difficult to separate findings of ‘fact’ and value judgements about the defendant’s 
conduct. It is because the question of standards, guidelines and medical expert opinion 
is pivotal in both the legal and NHS investigations of medical misadventure that I am 
addressing the problem. 
 
B. Not Yet Bye-Bye Bolam: Factors Triggering the Bolitho ‘Gloss’ 
 
1. Introduction and Context 
 
One of the crucial issues before us is the extent to which accepted professional practice 
dictates the standard of care in medical negligence. Until well into the twentieth 
century, the standard, as commonly formulated in the cases and mediated through the 
jury, provided considerable scope for external evaluation.85 Consistent with general 
negligence principles, liability was said to depend on failure to exercise reasonable care 
and skill in the circumstances. Decisions ultimately rested on how juries interpreted the 
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requirements of reasonable medical practice as articulated by the judge. To that extent, 
liability could be described as rooted in community standards.86 Expert evidence on the 
expectations and customary practice of the medical profession played an important part 
but was not seen as dispositive. The primacy of the jury’s evaluative role was a 
distinctive feature of judicial directions in the leading nineteenth and early twentieth 
century cases.87 From the 1950s onwards, a different picture emerges. The civil jury had 
all but disappeared and judicial evaluation of medical conduct was to be constrained by 
the direction in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee88or more precisely, by 
the interpretation of certain passages in McNair J’s summing up. Most important of 
these was the assertion which has become known as the ‘Bolam test’: that a doctor is 
‘not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art… merely 
because there is a body of opinion who would hold a contrary view’.89 The test, as 
normally applied, precluded a finding of negligence if one or more medical experts 
satisfied the court that such a responsible body existed.90 In Lord Scarman’s words, 
‘…the standard of care is a matter of medical judgement.’91 
 
Endorsement by the House of Lords of the ‘accepted medical practice’ defence was to 
prove wide-ranging. It embraced, but went well beyond, diagnosis92 and treatment,93 the 
…heartland of the skilled medical practitioner,’94 substantially enlarging the role of the 
doctor as moral arbiter in the process.95 
 
                                             
86 This approach is described as ‘normative’ by J Miola and would have allowed the court to say ‘what 
ought to have been done in the circumstances’ following Hunter v Hanley [1955] SLT 213. See Miola 
Ibid at 11. 
87 See summing up in Rich v Pierpoint (1862) 176 ER 16 at 18–19, per CJ Erle: ‘...it was an action 
charging (the defendant) with a breach of his legal duty, by reason of inattention and negligence and want 
of proper skill and care; and if the jury were of the opinion that there had been a culpable want of 
attention and care, he would be liable…’ quoted in H Teff, ‘The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence 
– Moving on from Bolam’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3, 473 at 473–4. 
88 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (Bolam). 
89 Ibid at 587. 
90 Today one would look to the standards and guidelines of the relevant Royal College. 
91 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1AC 
871 at 881. 
92 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634. 
93 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 
94 Rogers v Whitaker [1992] ALJR 47 at 52. 
95 For further examples refer to H Teff (n 87) at 473–4. In J Miola’s terms ‘a descriptive approach to 





On the whole, the courts have been loath to take issue with clinical judgement that has 
been endorsed by expert testimony. However, in the last decade, they have been 
increasingly prepared to question medical conduct, test the reasoning behind clinical 
decisions and non-disclosure of risks and even, on occasion, override expert medical 
evidence.96 As Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in Bolitho, referring to clinical 
judgement: 
 
‘…if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not 
capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the 
body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible’.97 
 
Below, I will consider the extent to which current judicial attitudes towards clinical 
judgement mean that the courts make their own risk-benefit analysis and exercise the 
traditional role of a tribunal of fact: to decide whether or not the defendant’s conduct 
was reasonable — in short, the impact of Bolitho on the application of the Bolam test.98 
 
2. The ‘Bolam Test’99 
 
John Hector Bolam was very depressed before he began his medical negligence 
claim. This was why he was given the Electric Shock Treatment (ECT) which 
resulted in the injuries which caused him to sue. I am certain he was even more 
depressed at the end of his case, not only because he lost it, but because he found that 
he had unwittingly given his name to the legal principle which caused him to lose 
it.100 
 
At the trial of his negligence claim against the hospital, the diagnosis of depression was 
not in question, nor was the decision to use ECT. What was in dispute was whether, 
prior to the administration of the shocks, Mr Bolam should have been given muscle 
relaxants and/or restrained on the table. At that time, professional practice varied widely 
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about the use of drugs and physical restraint and in relation to whether patients should 
be warned of the risk of fracture. Experts disagreed. The case was heard before a jury, 
as was usual with personal injury claims in England at the time. The trial judge, Mr 
Justice McNair, had to give directions to the jury on the law to apply when deciding 
whether the omission of restraints was negligent. Faced with the conflicting medical 
views on the matter, he directed the jury as follows: 
 
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to 
have that special skill. He need not possess the highest expert skill at the risk of 
being found negligent. It is well established that it is sufficient if he exercises the 
ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.101 
 
This first part of the judgment is unremarkable and not far removed from the 
‘reasonable man’ test which applies in other spheres of life. The defendant need not 
attain the ‘highest expert skill’ but must have achieved the ordinary level of competence 
expected of a person in his profession practising the same speciality. The next part of 
the judgment is more problematic: 
 
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in a particular 
art...Putting it the other way round, a doctor is not negligent if he is acting in 
accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion that 
takes a contrary view.102 
 
The difficulty this part of the judgment presents is that the core dispute in professional 
negligence cases which are defended often centres on just what does constitute ‘proper 
practice’ or ‘ordinary competence’ in relation to the procedure in dispute. If the 
profession itself cannot agree whether or not a particular practice amounts to adequate 
care of the patient’s or client’s interests, judges have been reluctant to intervene to 
second-guess the opinion held, reasonably, by one body of opinion within a profession. 
Margaret Brazier and José Miola103 and James Badenoch104 argue that, although the 
same considerations apply to all professions, what distinguished medical litigation from 
other areas of professional liability, at least before Bolitho, is, in part, that a series of 
judgments gave rise to a perception that all Bolam requires is that the defendant fields 
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experts from his medical speciality prepared to testify that they would have followed the 
same course of management of the patient as did the defendant.105 Brazier and Miola 
contend that, Before Bolitho, assuming the expert opinion had genuine probative value, 
neither the expert nor the defendant would be asked to justify their practice; the judge 
would play no role in evaluating the expert opinion.106 The extent to which the Bolam 
rule regarding differing practices obtains in professional contexts other than medicine is 
unclear. Judicial lack of challenges in medical cases has been compared unfavourably 
with its handling of other professions.107 
 
The Bolam test of breach, with its genesis being a defendant’s reliance upon a body of 
responsible peer professional opinion, is the ‘universal test’108 of professional 
negligence. It is qualified, however, by the ‘gloss’ that was applied, courtesy of the 
House of Lords’ 1997 decision in Bolitho.109 By virtue of that decision, peer 
professional opinion which purportedly represents evidence of responsible medical 
practice can be departed from if that opinion is determined by the court to be ‘not 
capable of withstanding logical analysis’ or is otherwise ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘irresponsible’. In a case analysed according to Bolitho principles, the court, not the 
medical profession, becomes the final arbiter of medical breach. The issue addressed 
below concerns what features particularly characterise a peer professional opinion as 
one that is ‘illogical’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘indefensible’ — in other words, what 
situations trigger a Bolitho ‘gloss’.110 
 
                                             
105 See Lord Scarman’s judgment in Maynard (n 92) (HL): “It is not enough to show that there is a body 
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3. Bolitho: from the Descriptive to the Normative 
 
The medical malpractice claim brought on behalf of Patrick Bolitho which culminated 
in the judgment of the House of Lords in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority111 
was an unlikely candidate to become a landmark case regarding the standard of care 
because the central question in dispute was a problem of causation rather than breach of 
duty. Nonetheless, in Bolitho, the House of Lords adopted a more robust and potentially 
less deferential version of the Bolam test. Patrick Bolitho, who was two years old, had 
been admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. His condition deteriorated 
and he suffered a cardiac arrest, leading to brain damage and subsequently to his 
death. The on-duty paediatric registrar did not see him, but even if she had, she said that 
she would not have intubated him. Intubation was the only procedure which could 
have prevented respiratory failure, but it was not without risks. The expert witnesses 
for each side expressed diametrically opposed views about whether a failure to intubate 
would have been reasonable. On the facts, the House of Lords held that the registrar 
had not breached her duty of care, but the case is important for Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s comments on the circumstances in which the court would decide that there 
had been negligence, despite experts agreeing with the defendant’s course of action.112 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that this plurality of views did not automatically decide 
the issue in favour of the defendants. He acknowledged that it will be a ‘rare’ or 
‘exceptional’ case where judicial intervention will be justified: ‘it will seldom be right 
for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical 
expert are unreasonable’.113 Nevertheless, ‘the law has been put back on its proper 
course: clinical judgements will, in all probability, remain untouched by the court’s 
reviewing eye, as Bolitho shows, but they will be subject to it and that is a very 
important reaffirmation of the court’s role’.114 In Bolitho, then, the House held that the 
descriptive interpretation was no longer to be used and that the test would be normative 
instead. In order to qualify as a responsible or reasonable body of opinion, expert 
evidence had to be logically defensible.115 
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a) Bolitho in Action 
 
The Bolitho test has had a tangible impact on medical jurisprudence but the unexpressed 
or non-explicit instances of its application unfortunately conceal the effect of the ‘brake’ 
which it is applying to Bolam. Although originally regarded as a ‘rare occurrence’, the 
Bolitho test, while not commonly trumping Bolam, has changed the outcome of medical 
negligence lawsuits in more cases than the label of ‘rarity’ would suggest.116 The 
number of cases in which Bolitho’s gloss has been invoked,117 is not so low as to be 
labelled ‘rare’; and the scenarios in which the courts have considered Bolam evidence to 
be lacking logical analysis are repetitive enough to comprise recognisable categories, 
yet reasons varied as well. The categorisation of Bolitho factors covers a range of 
scenarios in which the expert evidence was not defensible. Some factors pertain to 
credibility; others require a close examination of why experts advocated certain medical 
diagnosis or treatment for that patient which have nothing to do with credibility but 
speak to the comparative weighing of risks and benefits. Close analysis of the standard 
obtained in the case by the defendant is necessary to retain cogency and clarity and, I 
would argue, fairness to both parties in litigation. 
 
In totality, Rachael Mulheron118 notes the following seven factors which have emerged 
post-Bolitho, by which to test whether Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s labels – ‘illogical’ and 
‘irrational’ – can be made out, so as to override approved medical practice under the 
Bolam test. The court must consider whether the doctor’s expert testimony: 
• took account of a clear and simple precaution which was not followed but which, more 
probably than not, would have avoided the adverse outcome; 
• considered conflicts of duties among patients and resource limitations governing the 
medical practice;119 
• weighed the comparative risks/benefits of the medical practice, as opposed to other 
course(s) of conduct; 
• took account of public/community expectations of acceptable medical practice;120 
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118 Ibid at 637. 
119 See Garcia v St Mary’s (n 43) discussed above regarding resource allocation. 
120 See Nationwide Organ Retention Group Litigation Order No. 9. The jointly-agreed expert evidence 





• was correct in light of the factual context as a whole; 
• was internally consistent; and 
• adhered to the correct legal test governing the requisite standard of care. 
 
4. Bolam, Bolitho and Access to Justice 
 
Adhering to the Bolam test, a doctor who is accused of negligence need only present 
expert opinion to the effect that he has ‘acted in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of his professional peers’ and he will be absolved of 
negligence. The doctor’s expert’s evidence thus becomes conclusive of the question of 
breach of duty.121 The test has been seen as being ‘over-protective and deferential’ 
towards doctors leading to the perception that the medical profession was ‘above the 
law’.122 The Bolam test was also seen to deprive the courts of the opportunity of 
‘precipitating changes where required in professional standards’ and being ‘dictated to’ 
rather than exercising their own judgement. Additionally, there was the view that Bolam 
did not necessarily protect the community against unsafe medical practices and that 
more judicial safeguards for the public were required. It was also contrary to the 
increasingly ‘rights-based society’ to dismiss patients’ concerns as obviously as the 
Bolam test countenanced. The overarching criticism of Bolam was that the medical 
profession was seen to set its own standards irrespective of whether the practices 
adopted by the profession provide an adequate protection for patients.123 While Bolitho 
may herald a new dawn in the proclamation of judicial authority over medical practice, 
cases since decided have sent mixed messages.124 However, the new ethos should be 
seen in the context of other developments in the manner in which medical practice is 
regulated and audited, which place limits on unfettered clinical autonomy,125 thereby 
theoretically extending access to redress for victims of iatrogenic harm. 
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C. Setting the Standard 
A Responsible Body of Medical Opinion: Experts 
 
The classic exposition of the duties of expert witnesses was laid down by 
Cresswell in Natural Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. The 
Ikarian Reefer [1995] 2 LI Rep 68. The key features are that the expert must be 
independent; never assume the role of an advocate; never ignore or omit relevant 
material; inform the court if his view changes; and tell the court if something is 




In the context of medical negligence litigation, expert evidence on both liability and 
causation will normally be crucial to the outcome of the case. Cases can be won or lost 
on the quality of expert evidence. The technical legal issues of privilege, confidentiality, 
disclosure, conflicts of interest, single or more experts to keep equality of arms and the 
Protocol for the Instruction of Experts to give Evidence in Civil Claims127 are outwith 
the remit of the thesis and are extensively covered elsewhere.128 There are, however, 
concerns about the dynamics of providing expert evidence for the purposes of 
adversarial litigation. Expert witnesses wield considerable power and influence in both 
civil and criminal cases. Obtaining an expert has historically proved challenging for the 
claimant, but providing expert opinion can also be fraught. 
 
It is common knowledge that it has, in the past, been extremely difficult to prove that a 
doctor has been negligent. One of the reasons given for this is that it was difficult to find 
an expert willing to accuse a colleague. This has been referred to as the ‘closing ranks’ 
syndrome, contributing to patients’ difficulties, particularly where the speciality 
concerned is a narrow one. Greater expertise in choosing experts means that presently it 
is easier to get a fair assessment of a patient’s treatment.129 Nevertheless, judicial 
deference to the medical profession still leaves an echo and that, coupled with judicial 
inexperience whereby complex claims are often heard by a judge with no background in 
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medical matters, may leave the claimant at a disadvantage.130 Many, if not most, 
medical negligence trials are decided by the judge’s preference for the evidence of one 
expert rather than another.131 In English v Emery Rheinbold & Strick,132 a personal 
injury claim, the Court of Appeal gave guidelines on how and when to appeal on the 
grounds that the trial judge’s reasons for his decision were inadequate. It was also clear 
inter alia that it was the judge’s duty to produce a judgment that gave a clear 
explanation for his order.133 Therefore, the quality of the expert evidence and the 
manner in which it is given is so important that judicial comments on experts in all 
medical negligence cases are now collected on the Database of Medical Litigation.134 
 
a) The Expert’s Duty 
 
Aspiring medical expert witnesses would do well to bear this case in mind – an 
expert witness can win or lose a case.135 
 
In medical cases, any course of action (ceasing/continuing treatment) typically entails 
certain risks and the question is always whether the physician balanced those risks 
properly. In a negligence action, the expert will be called upon to establish that the 
doctor did not act as a reasonable doctor136 skilled in the particular speciality would 
have done.137 The expert has a duty both to the court and to those from whom he has 
received instructions, the former being the more crucial. The Civil Procedure Rules 
(hereinafter ‘CPR’) at part 35.3, provide that it is the duty of an expert to help the court 
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137 The court is the trier of fact decided by the judge. Expert evidence is opinion evidence which is a 
significant exception to the general inadmissibility of statements of opinion. Merry and McCall Smith 





on matters within his expertise and that that duty overrides any obligation to the person 
from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid.138 
 
The Court… needs and depends upon the help it receives from experts. The 
expert advises, but the judge decides – on the evidence. If there is nothing 
before the Court which throws doubt upon the expert evidence then the court 
must accept it. The Court relies upon the medical expert witness to be up to 
date, to be honest and to be familiar with the relevant medical literature. 
Agreeing to act as a medical expert witness is not a decision to be taken 
lightly.139 
 
In Jones v Kaney,140 the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether expert 
witnesses should remain immune from negligence actions in respect of their court work. 
The Supreme Court, in its wide-ranging judgment, took the opportunity to consider the 
broader issue of whether public policy ‘justifies conferring on an expert witness any 
immunity from liability in negligence in relation to the performing of his duties in that 
capacity’.141 The issues canvassed include the current state of the law, the reasons for 
the immunity, comparison with the position of barristers, and discussion of the 
foreseeable consequences of removing the immunity of expert witnesses. After noting 
the court’s decision, I will highlight and discuss some of the court’s concerns and how 
access to justice might be affected. 
 
b) Expert Witness Immunity: Jones v Kaney142 
 
In this professional negligence action, the defendant psychologist, Mrs Kaney, raised 
the defence of witness immunity, relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Stanton v 
Callaghan.143 She applied to strike out the claim. Handing down judgment on 21 
January 2010, Blake J held that Stanton v Callaghan was still good authority, was 
binding on him and he was required to strike out the claim. However, because he 
considered that a policy of blanket immunity for all witnesses was too broad, the case 
was certified as being suitable for a leap-frog appeal to the Supreme Court under section 
                                             
138 CPR Part 35.3; but note an expert is defined as ‘one who has been instructed to give or prepare 
evidence for the purpose of court proceedings r 35.2. See also Lewis (n 18) at 123 ‘What the Court 
Expects of the Expert’ and at 126 ‘What the Lawyer Expects of the Expert’. 
139 Ibid at 1. 
140 Jones v Kaney (n 14). 
141 Jones v Kaney (n 14) per Lord Phillips at para 2. 
142 Jones v Kaney (n 14). 
143 Stanton v Callaghan [1999] 2 WLR 745. The leading case on immunity conferred in respect of a claim 





12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969.144 The Supreme Court, by a majority of 
five to two (Lord Hope and Lady Hale dissenting), allowed the appeal.145 The question 
remained whether the principle that ‘Where there is a wrong there must be a remedy’ 
was more pressing than countervailing factors, such as a fear of deterring potential 
expert witnesses from agreeing to act or the additional insurance costs. This final point, 
to which I shall return, speaks directly to the question of access to justice and redress for 
a wrong. 
 
2. Experts’ Immunity: The Public Policy Aspect and Reluctance to Testify 
 
Expert’s immunity is a long-standing principle of English law with roots as far back as 
1585. The justification for immunity has traditionally centred on public policy issues, 
including the need to ensure that witnesses are able to give their evidence freely and in 
accordance with their duties to the court. The immunity exists, then, not for the benefit 
of the expert as such, but for the public policy requirement that all witnesses, including 
expert witnesses, should not be inhibited from giving frank and fearless evidence. So far 
as the expert witness is concerned, this avoids the tension between a desire to assist the 
court and the fear of the consequences of a departure from advice previously given to 
the client. The limits to this protection are based around the fact that its foundation is 
the need to protect the integrity of the court process and the witness’s role in it.146 
 
Lord Phillips, giving the leading judgment, addressed this issue and challenged the 
justification for experts to be immune on the assumption that experts would be reluctant 
to testify through fear of being sued. When considering if experts would still give full 
and frank disclosure to the court in accordance with their overriding duty as set out in 
the CPRs at part 35.3, Lord Phillips compared expert witnesses to advocates whose 
immunity was abolished in 2000.147 He noted that in his experience, the removal of 
                                             
144 See C Passmore, ‘Expert Witness Immunity: The End of the Road?’ (2011) 17 Clinical Risk 8–11 at 
10 for Blake J’s reasoning for expediting the case to the Supreme Court. This included concern that ‘an 
overbroad immunity from suit to apparently privileged parties raises questions of right of access to a court 
under Article 6’. 
145 Ben Hardiman, Mills & Reeve LL.P. ‘Experts’ immunity from suit’ Insurance Briefing Jones v Kaney, 
at www.mills-reeve.com/insurance-briefing-Jones-v-Kaney-03-30-2011. 
146 Passmore (n 144) at 8. Note: the expert was not immune at the advisory stage including preparation of 
advisory report. 
147Arthur JS Hall and Co. v. Simons [2000] 3 WLR 543. At 552–553, Lord Steyn considered whether 
removal of an advocate’s immunity would undermine his overriding duty to the court and concluded that 





immunity from advocates had not resulted in any diminution of the advocate’s readiness 
to perform that duty. Lord Phillips denied that an expert would be torn between his dual 
responsibilities to the court and to his clients.148 
 
There are two issues here: the quality of experts’ evidence if immunity is removed and 
the ‘chill factor’ as regards the availability of willing experts. I would argue that most 
expert witnesses, being conscientious professionals, would feel themselves unlikely to 
be found negligent and would nonetheless carry indemnity insurance. In fact, existing 
professional disciplinary risks would be seen as a greater concern.149 As regards the 
availability of experts, this is a more complex calculation. The analogy between expert 
witnesses and advocates ignores the fundamental differences between their roles. An 
advocate faced with the removal of immunity is less likely to leave legal practice, or be 
put off by the threat of being sued, than will a surveyor or paediatrician to abandon 
forensic work.150 Experts have busy professional lives away from the legal system and 
can choose not to take on forensic work, while advocates have no such easy choice. 
There is concern that this decision might lead to a professional class of expert witness 
who would create fewer procedural problems but would lose the freshness and 
challenge to dogma that comes with diversity.151 
 
3. Vexatious Claims 
 
The minority (Lady Hale and Lord Hope) were concerned about the understandable but 
usually unjustifiable desire of a disappointed litigant to blame someone else for his lack 
of success in court. Given the lack of reliable evidence about what the effects of the 
abolition of the immunity might be, they preferred to leave any reform, if needed, to 
Parliament. As Lord Hope expressed it: 
 
[T]he lack of a secure and principled basis for removing the immunity from 
expert witnesses, the lack of a clear dividing line between what is to be affected 
by the removal and what is not, the uncertainties that this would cause and the 
                                             
148 For a critique of Lord Phillips’ judgment see C Pamplin, ‘Supreme Court Experts?’ (2011) 161 New 
Law Journal 488. 
149 This was highlighted by Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin). 
150 Following the Meadow (Ibid.) litigation, obtaining expert witness evidence from paediatricians in child 
abuse cases has become problematic. Karen-Paz (n 130), endnote 50. 





lack of reliable evidence to indicate what the effects may be suggest that the 
wiser course would be to leave matters as they stand.152 
 
The issue of potential satellite litigation remains an open one. Nevertheless, with this 
judgment, the Supreme Court has abolished an expert’s immunity from suit concerning 
breaches of duty, whether in contract or tort, in connection with their participation in 
legal proceedings. An expert can now be sued for negligence concerning pre-trial work 
intimately connected with the case, his oral evidence in court, the contents of a report 
adopted in evidence and concessions made in experts’ meeting or a joint statement. 
 
4. Access to Justice 
 
Immunity is a very unforgiving defence. It leaves the victim of even the most 
serious negligence without any remedy. Why should the expert who provides 
advice to a client, and receives payment for that service, be free from claims if 
their view is negligent? After all, they are doing no more than a solicitor or 
barrister advising as to the merits of the case.153 
 
I would argue that the most compelling argument for abolishing the immunity from suit 
of expert witnesses is the general rule that ‘where there is a wrong there should be a 
remedy’ which is a cornerstone of any system of justice. In fact, to deny a remedy to the 
victim of a wrong, therefore, should always be regarded as exceptional.154 In the end, 
the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that this principle trumped the pragmatic 
issues of the need for insurance, rising costs, competing duties, potential availability of 
expert witnesses and the threat of satellite litigation. Access to justice for litigants who 
have a claim against a negligent expert has now been assured. However, on a final 
dispiriting note, the abolition of legal aid for clinical negligence cases155 means that, 
except for ‘cherry-picked cases’, it will be difficult for claimants to afford expert 
witness advice, which is the linchpin of clinical negligence cases. The use of expert 
evidence is one way that the court defines the requisite standard of care owed to the 
patient. Another, or additional method, is by the use of guidelines. 
 
                                             
152 Jones v Kaney (n 14) at 173. 
153 Hardiman (n 145). 
154 Lord Dyson at 113. 
155 Part 1 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010–2012. The Government has 





C. The Expert Witness: The Role of Protocols and Guidelines 
 
Several cumulative pressures have fuelled the need for transparent accountability of 
clinical judgement. The finding of the Bristol Inquiry shook public confidence and 
called into question standards within the NHS.156 The fifth report of the Shipman 
Inquiry highlighted that it is not sufficient for guidance to be implicit in the context and 
circumstances of clinical practice.157 The lack of explicit standards can result in 
inconsistent and widely varying decisions, as well as tragic consequences for patients 
and their families. In recent years, there has emerged the concept of evidence-based 
medicine and the development of clinical practice guidelines which reflect this 
evidence.158 Among the tools that inform the expert’s base of knowledge are the 
guidelines of the medical colleges, teachers, textbooks, refereed journal articles and 
personal experience.159 
 
Guidelines are consensus statements developed to assist clinicians in making decisions 
about treatment for specific conditions. They are developed systematically on the basis 
of evidence and aim to promote effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare delivery. In 
England, the NHSLA operates a Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (hereinafter 
‘CNST’), which sets its own approved risk management standards, against which 
healthcare providers are assessed. The CNST operates as a quasi-insurance system for 
NHS Trusts, so there are obvious economic incentives for Trusts to ensure compliance 
with the NHSLA risk management standards. In addition, the Royal Colleges of 
Medicine routinely issue best practice guidance and the National Institute of Health and 
Clinical Excellence (hereinafter ‘NICE’) has developed cost-effective treatment 
protocols for a number of conditions. Although beyond the scope of the thesis, I would 
raise the question of how far financial constraints affecting resources in the NHS should 
dictate the court-accepted appropriate institutional standard of care.160 Given the wealth 
                                             
156 Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary 1984–95 (Cmnd. 5207 2001). 
157 Safeguarding Patients: Lessons Learned from Past – Proposals for the Future, 5th Report (Cmnd. 
6394 2004). 
158 R Rosen and S Dewar, ‘On Being a Doctor. Redefining Medical Professionalism for Better Patient 
Care’ King’s Fund (2004). S 46 of Health & Social Care (Community Health & Standards) Act 2003 sets 
out the legislative basis for health and care standards. See generally A Samanta ‘The Role of Clinical 
Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from The Bolam Standard?’ (2006) 14 Medical Law 
Review 321 and Brazier and Cave (n 62) p 167, fn 62 therein. 
159 Merry and McCall Smith (n 121) at 185. 





of evidence of best practice which now exists, courts increasingly rely on professional 
guidance when determining the standard of care.161 The considered judgement of NICE, 
or the profession itself, will be evidence of what constitutes responsible practice but 
need not be dispositive. Where departure from the guidelines can be justified in the 
interests of the patient, the doctor discharges his duty of care.162 In the previous 
discussion regarding the Bolam and Bolitho tests of the standard of care, the former 
relies on the medical interpretation of a reasonable standard of practice, while the latter 
sanctions the courts to challenge medical evidence where appropriate. Explicit 
guidelines assist the court in so doing.163 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: 
THE CLAIMANT’S BURDEN – DUTY and BREACH 
 
While the scope of the duty of care reflects the boundaries of liability, the standard of 
care determines the level of care a patient may reasonably expect. I have noted my 
reflections on how access to justice is affected by the legal rules pertaining to the 
existence of a duty of care. I have discussed how the courts use the Bolam and Bolitho 
tests for establishing when there has been a breach of that duty and how the requisite 
standard of care is identified by expert witnesses using inter alia professional and 
Government guidelines. I analysed how the historic Bolam test could be construed as 
doctors, through their expert witnesses’ testimony, being judge in their own case. 
Bolitho heralded a new dawn for claimants, giving courts the ability to analyse medical 
practice and make sure it stood up to logical examination. However, we have also seen 
that, post-Bolitho, judges are not empowered to decide themselves what constitutes 
good medical practice but may require expert witnesses to justify and explain the basis 
of their judgements. Although the Bolitho criteria are not frequently triggered, their 
existence assists claimants in their need to prove breach of duty. I have noted the recent 
development of the removal of immunity from suit for expert witnesses. This assists 
                                             
161 Jackson (n 45) at 121. See narrative verdict of Dr Shirley Radcliffe, Coroner, who expressed ‘grave 
concern’ at the Inquest of Suzanne Ballantyne, 47, who was given 800 micrograms of misoprostol at St 
George’s Hospital in Tooting to bring on delivery after her baby died in the womb. Mrs Ballantyne 
suffered multiple ruptures to her womb, causing vital organs to fail. No scientific evidence was presented 
for using 800 micrograms. Four days previously, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
had recommend doses no higher than 50 micrograms – though at the time of Mrs Ballantyne’s death there 
were no official guidelines from the Government’s drug rationing watchdog NICE. Evening Standard 3 
June 2011. 
162Brazier and Cave (n 60) at 191. See also Merry and McCall Smith (n 121) Chapter 6 for a more 
nuanced discussion of the interpretation of guidelines. 





claimants to call their expert witnesses to account where necessary. The proposed 
removal of legal aid to fund most clinical negligence cases is a retrograde step and acts 
against access to justice for claimants. 
 
My remit has been to consider these issues in the light of litigation for redress for 
iatrogenic harm occasioned within the NHS. Although throughout its history, the NHS 
has been needs-led and short of resources, there is presently an acute national financial 
crisis which means that decisions, for example regarding funding cases and resource 
allocation, have been overtly finance-led rather than principled. 
 
As noted, establishing the existence of a duty of care in the medical setting is normally 
not problematic but the question of whether hospitals have a non-delegable duty of care 
remains open and will be of increasing relevance.164 The HRA 1998, while having a 
limited impact on the way the courts deal with medical negligence, has changed the 
mindset of patients who now speak in terms of rights rather than gratitude. A remaining 
troubling issue is the level at which judicial determination of the requisite standard of 
care will rest. Will there be a point where the court does not countenance a lack of 
resources?165 The withdrawal of immunity from suit for expert witnesses is less 
troublesome than the withdrawal of legal aid for their fees which will mean that 
meretricious but uncertain clinical negligence cases will not be undertaken. The 
potential for the court to be the final arbiter of breach of duty after Bolitho is to be 
welcomed, although this power is to be used sparingly. Assuming a patient/claimant has 
fulfilled his obligation of proving he was owed a duty of care and that the doctor 
breached his duty, he must then prove that the breach caused his damage. In the next 
chapter I consider the major hurdle of proving causation. 
                                             
164 R Nayer, ‘Outsourcing Genetic and Diagnostic Services: A Consideration of the Principles for 
Establishing Delegable Duty and Why it Matters’ (2011) 2 Journal of Personal Injury Law, 61–70. 




















It is a tenet of epidemiology that association is not synonymous with causation. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between association and causation is frequently 
overlooked, and novel epidemiological findings are often referred to, particularly in the 
non-scientific press, as demonstrating a ‘link’ between an exposure and some adverse 
health outcome, inviting the erroneous conclusion that a cause-and-effect relationship 
has been established. This confusion of association with causation can have important 
ramifications for policy decisions, compensation claims and the attitude of the general 
public towards epidemiology and other statistical sciences1. 
 
Academic writers have suggested that in cases of clinical negligence, the need to prove 
causation is too restrictive of liability.2 
                                             
1 R Wakeford, ‘Association and Causation’ (December 1994) RSS News. 




The true battleground in many clinical negligence cases is not breach of duty at all but 
the vexed question of causation.3 Clinical negligence cases, unless they arise out of 
elective cosmetic surgery or family planning, involve claimants who, by definition, 
were ill or injured before the treatment was given or sought and, by the very nature of 
their complaint, are ill or injured at the end of the process. Demonstrating the causation 
of the particular injury or illness complained of to the requisite legal standard can be of 
the utmost medical and legal complexity.4 Having addressed the issues of when a duty 
of care arises and whether there has been a breach of that duty, we now come to the 
most problematic aspect of a patient’s claim. He must show that his injury, his worsened 
or unimproved condition, was caused by the doctor’s negligence. Clinical negligence 
claims have special difficulties, not only because of the vagaries inherent in illness and 
treatment but also the differences between scientific and legal approaches to the 
problem of causation. 
 
In order to put the problems in proving causation into context, I start this chapter with 
consideration of the special features of claims for clinical negligence, namely, medicine 
understood as an art, followed by a brief comparison between the scientific and legal 
approaches to evidence of causation. I will then present the legal approach to 
determining causation. Causation of primary injury at the liability stage may take a 
number of forms: classical causation; other forms of causal connection which do not 
depend on a comparison, such as ‘material contribution’; and causation in the rare 
claims where the analysis of the causation of damage departs from a strict approach 
which would leave the claimant unable to prove damage.5 These approaches address the 
question of whether the patient can convince the court that it was the relevant 
negligence which caused his injury, rather than the progress of his original disease or 
condition. Here, the court, in determining what did happen, is dealing with past fact, and 
decides on the balance of probabilities. Once a finding is made as to past fact, the 
finding is treated as certain, even though there is anything up to a 49% chance of it 
being incorrect.6 
 
                                             
3 P Balen, Clinical Negligence (Bristol, Jordans Publishing Limited, 2008) 187. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 below. 
6 Balen, (n 3) 188. 
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There is another line of cases that addresses a different question. How should courts 
proceed when the essence of a claim is not that clinical negligence caused any fresh or 
additional injury to the patient, but that negligence deprived him of a chance of full 
recovery from his original disease or condition? These cases, known as loss of chance 
cases, are about future events.7 For example, in Greg v Scott8 the question to be 
addressed was whether the delay in diagnosis reduced Mr Gregg’s chance of a ‘cure’ 
(defined as ten years in remission) from 42% to 25%.9 In each and every case the 
patient must advance evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant’s negligence caused the injury of which he complains. 
 
After I conclude the discussion of the legal approach to causation, essentially liability, I 
will address the topic of damages. 
 
II. SPECIAL FEATURES OF CLAIMS FOR CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE 
 
A. Medicine as an Art 
 
Prior to focusing on the legal issues in establishing causation in clinical negligence 
cases, it might be helpful to consider the peculiar characteristics of what John 
Harrington describes as ‘the art of medicine and the common law’.10 According to 
Harrington, the notion of clinical practice as an art has been frequently deployed by 
commentators on medicine, as well as by leaders of the profession over the last two 
centuries.11 The strategic value of the notion of clinical practice as an art has lain in its 
valorisation of an extensive zone of professional autonomy in the face of attempts to 
commercialise or bureaucratise the practice of medicine. Harrington goes on to ask the 
question: ‘What is the characteristic target of medical intervention?’ The reply is that 
‘the characteristic target of medical intervention is the individual case’.12 This has 
interesting consequences. 
 
                                             
7 M Brazier, and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011) 204. 
8 Gregg (n 2). 
9 The issue of a cure was the future event. 
10 J Harrington, ‘Elective Affinities: The Art of Medicine and The Common Law’ (2004) 55 Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 3, 259-276. 
11 For example, ibid, 260, fn 2. 
12 Ibid, 260 fn 4 quotes: ED Pellegrino and DC Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice: 
Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981) 
80 ‘...clinical medicine is guided by a telos of individuation’. 
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One of the most important attempts in recent decades to theorise the ‘object domain of 
clinical medicine’ was made by Samuel Gorovitz and Alasdair MacIntyre.13 Their 
intervention was motivated by a practical concern with the so-called malpractice crisis 
that had beset American medicine since the 1960s. They identified three sources of 
medical mishaps. Firstly, the culpable errors of practitioners; secondly, the 
underdeveloped state of scientific knowledge; and thirdly, a source of error which had 
hitherto been overlooked, namely the unique complexity of each patient. Unlike physics 
or chemistry, which aim to establish law-like generalisations about universal 
phenomena, clinical medicine is a ‘science of particulars’.14 As such, the objects of 
medicine are, to use their example, more comparable to unique phenomena such as 
hurricanes, than to chemical compounds, atoms or sub-atomic particles. ‘Particulars’ are 
not intelligible in abstracto, but only through their distinctive histories and their 
evolving relations with the environment. Given their complexity, diversity and 
contingency, they cannot be adequately comprehended in law-like generalisations. In 
fact, any prediction regarding their future development, either with or without 
therapeutic intervention, is prone to a ‘necessary fallibility’.15 Put another way, each 
patient’s case is a ‘universe of one’.16 A diagnosis may be incorrect or a therapy may 
fail regardless of the care taken by the practitioner and irrespective of all possible 
scientific knowledge. Hence, the third source of medical accidents is one which implies 
no culpability.17 The cause of the injury or damage could be said to have been 
occasioned by the pre-existing or background conditions. 
 
B. Difficulties of Proof of Causation in Medical Cases 
 
Proof of causation in medical cases is especially difficult for patients and has been a 
subject of concern voiced on numerous occasions. The Pearson Report (Royal 
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury) in 1978 noted a 
proposal to reverse the onus of proof but agreed with the fear, often expressed in 
                                             
13 S Gorovitz and A MacIntyre, ‘Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility’ (1976) 1 Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 51 as quoted in Harrington (n 10) 261. 
14 As such, clinical medicine ‘is in fact hardly commensurate with any customary notion of science’ J 
Widder, ‘The Fallibility of Medical Judgement as a Consequence of the Inexactness of Observations’ 
(1998) 1 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 119. 
15 Gorovitz and MacIntyre (n 13) 62, as quoted in Harrington (n 10) 261. 
16 DA Schön, The Reflective Practitioner. How Professionals Think in Action (London, Temple Smith, 
1983) 68. 
17 For debate and criticism see Harrington (n 10) 261. See also Professor JG Fleming, ‘Probabilistic 
Causation In Tort Law’ (1989) 68 Canadian Bar Review 661-681 at 662 regarding the difficulties with 
traditional methods of proving causation. 
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England, that it would increase claims, many of them groundless, and result in an 
increase of defensive medicine.18 It has been suggested that the traditional test for the 
burden of proof of causation in tort, namely proof on a balance of probabilities, has 
come under challenge in dealing with non-traumatic injuries such as man-made diseases 
linked to chemical products like Thalidomide, DES and Agent Orange.19 
 
In cases of clinical misadventure, medical science does not always enable us to prove 
why an injury risked occurs or does not occur during surgery. In that situation, the risk 
is called a random risk, but all that it really means is that it is beyond the control of the 
surgeon. The fact is that medical science cannot, in some cases, explain why an injury 
risk has happened. In those cases, all one has is historical evidence which shows that 
there is a statistical chance of injury in certain operations. In comparing, therefore, an 
actual operation performed on 21 November 1994 with a hypothetical one performed at 
some later date, all that is capable of proof is that the statistical chance of injury was the 
same in each case. What cannot be proved in relation to a purely hypothetical operation 
is that a statistical injury of, say, 0.9% would be more likely than not to have given rise 
to an actual injury.20 
 
Another problematic group of cases are those involving medical procedures depriving 
patients of a chance of survival or a cure. Tony Fleming points to the same problem as 
that cited by Harrington,21 namely, that it is difficult to prove medical causation by 
‘particularistic’ evidence, that is, direct, anecdotal, non-statistical evidence from the 
mouth of witnesses. In a postscript to his initial paper, Fleming emphasises that: 
 
A frequent occasion in modern litigation is the inability of medical experts to explain 
the aetiology of an injury with a degree of exactitude and confidence postulated by 
traditional formulas like ‘reasonable certitude’ or ‘reasonable probability’. The 
inherent limitations of medical knowledge, combined with a tendency of physicians 
                                             
18 Royal Commission on Civil Liability for Compensation for Personal Injury, Cmnd. 7054-1 (1978) 
paragraph 1336 (The Pearson Report) as quoted in Fleming Ibid. at 670. He cites German law which 
reverses the onus of proof against doctors guilty of gross error in treatment. He also cites the law in 
California (Evidence Code, s 646) which reverses the burden of producing evidence, though not the 
burden of proof. This rule is justified on the grounds of equity because the physician’s very fault created 
the difficulty of proof. See also A Porat and A Stein ‘Indeterminate Causation and Apportionment of 
Damages: An Essay on Allen Holtby and Fairchild’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4, 667 at 
701, whose ‘evidential damage doctrine’ would force defendants to compensate the claimant for the 
potential value of missing information of which the defendant wrongfully deprived the claimant. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See J Sher, ‘The Triumph of Logic Over Common Sense? A Commentary on Chester v Afshar’, (2002) 
70 Medico-Legal Journal 4, 188-193; Chester v Afshar [2002] EWCA Civ 724; [2003] QB 356. 
21 Harrington (n 10). 
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to express outcomes in terms of percentage, create problems of compatibility with 
legal standards, which are both linguistic and substantive.22 
 
It has been noted that proving that the negligence caused the claimant’s hurt is a 
formidable task for the claimant.23 In medical negligence cases, these difficulties are 
often amplified for two reasons. Firstly, the aetiology of disease and injury is frequently 
difficult to establish even for experts. Secondly, patients are, by definition, usually ill 
and the doctor’s negligence will usually relate to a failure to cure or alleviate their 
existing condition, requiring the court to ask the hypothetical question: ‘What would 
have happened if there had been no negligence?’24 
 
A case has been made that there are considerations specific to medical law which call 
for a treatment of causation beyond that which can be found in standard works on the 
law of torts. Causation in the context of medical law is fraught with difficulty, due both 
to the complexity of the factual circumstances themselves and to the complex nature of 
the law, when the principles come to be applied to the facts. 25 
 
The complicated and, to some extent, indeterminate nature of medical science means 
that the causal nexus between X and Y, while suspected, may be hard to demonstrate. 
Indeed, it could be said that the more medicine is portrayed as a scientific endeavour 
rather than as an art or a combination of both art and science,26 the more difficult it 
becomes to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the law a causative link between breach 
and damage. As for the latter, the law becomes ever more complex as it seeks to serve 
the twin aims of justice: fairness to the patient and the doctor.27 
 
In summary, in most non-medical tort cases proof of causal connection does not feature 
as a major problem. This is because, apart from the defendant’s fault there is no other 
                                             
22 Professor JG Fleming, ‘Probabilistic Causation In Tort Law: A Postscript’ (1991) 70 Canadian Bar 
Review 136 at 136. 
23 A Grubb, ‘Problems of Medical Law’ in S Deakin, A Johnston, and B Markesinis (eds), Markesinis and 
Deakin’s Tort Law 5th edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 244. This section is not in the 2008 
edition. The Chapter in 5th edition written by Grubb is Chapter 3 Special Forms of Negligence. The next 
edition did not have this section on medical law. 
24 For an alternative where further conduct of the defendant (or someone else) would have been necessary 
to complete the causal chain see Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1997] 39 BMLR 1 (HL). 
25 See Lord Bridge in Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] 2 All ER 909 who remarked: ‘In some cases, 
perhaps medical negligence cases, causation may be so shrouded in mystery that the courts can only 
measure statistical chances.’ 
26 Echoing Harrington (n 10). 
27 I Kennedy, A Grubb, J Laing and J McHale, Principles of Medical Law 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press; 2010) 325. 
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relevant source of risk, whether defined in terms of physical or economic damage or in 
terms of a latent condition which would certainly, probably or possibly produce such 
damage in future. The background risk (B) of that past outcome, that is the sum of other 
sources of risk operating at the same time as the defendant’s fault and which may have 
caused the outcome, was nil (B% = 0). What will be considered now are cases where 
the background risk is substantial.28 
 
In clinical negligence cases, the background risk is usually substantial. In cases that 
manifest sufficient actionable damage in circumstances where the B% is substantial, 
although an ‘outcome’ has occurred – say, for example, that the claimant has contracted 
cancer – the claimant will be met with the argument that the outcome was caused by the 
B% and not by the actionable damage. In the traditional form of the causation issue, the 
claimant must prove on a balance of probabilities an actual causal link between the 
defendant’s fault and the past damage forming the gist of his action. If the gist of the 
action is formulated in terms of outcome, this means that the claimant must show that 
the extra risk attributable to the defendant’s fault (D %) is greater than B%, so that, 
more probably than not, the outcome was due to the former (D %) and not the latter (B 
%).29 The application of the traditional balance of probability test in medical cases has 
two intrinsic drawbacks. The most obvious one is that the test does not work where 
estimates of the risks B% and D% are simply not available. The other problem is the 
‘all-or-nothing’ nature of the test.30 
 
In short, medical negligence cases involving therapeutic treatment present difficulties of 
multiple causation as a matter of routine. Two candidate conditions are automatically 
present: the patient’s condition, which represents a deviation from the standard physical 
condition of human beings, and the doctor’s breach of duty.31 
 
                                             
28 J Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence Part II’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 389. 
29 Ibid. 
30 To be discussed in regard to ‘Loss of Chance’ cases below. 
31 M Stauch, ‘Causation, Risk and Loss of Chance in Medical Negligence’ (1997) 17 Oxford J Legal 
Studies 2, 205 at 213-4. 
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C. Science and Law Compared 32 
 
The civil courts increasingly have to apply legal principles to scientific evidence in 
respect of claims concerning medical products, environmental toxins and medical 
liability. It was noted that, when determinations are made regarding standard of care and 
breach of duty, medical expert evidence is crucial.33 Difficulties arise from the very 
different traditions of reasoning between science and the law. Scientific data are 
collected and analysed by scientists in order that they can make assertions which are 
meaningful to scientists. The conflict arises when these data, analyses and assertions are 
considered as evidence by the court in order to make a legal determination. The major 
distinction between legal determinations and scientific assertions lies in the concept of 
certainty. The legal concept of causation is deterministic: it is an expression of the 
fiction of certainty, an absolute concept. The scientific concept of causation is 
probabilistic: it is an expression of the uncertainty of truth, an asymptotic concept.34 
Another way to consider the division is that science seeks truth, while the law does 
justice; science is descriptive, but law is prescriptive; science emphasises progress, 
whereas law emphasises process. These simplified characteristics restate in varying 
ways the insight that fact-finding in the law is always contingent on a particular vision 
and mechanism for delivering social justice. Scientific claims, by contrast, are thought 
to lack such contingency.35 
 
I will now turn to the causal requirements for liability: the ‘but-for’ test; the doctrine of 
material contribution to the damage; material contribution to the risk of damage; the 
loss of chance cases; and the cases where the court has departed from the generally 
accepted rules. This last category, cases decided on the basis of policy rather than 
principle because the justice of the case appeared to require it, has resulted in 
uncertainty and ‘judicial indiscipline’.36 It is for the courts to devise the rules that 
determine causation. The result of the uncertainty created is that development and 
distortion of the common law appear indistinguishable, flexibility and uncertainty 
                                             
32 The ideas discussed in this section are based upon M Powers, NH Harris and A Barton, Clinical 
Negligence 4th edn (Haywards Heath, Tottel Publishing, 2008) ch 25 on Causation. 
33 Chapter 4 Proving Liability: Duty of Care and Breach of Duty above. 
34 Powers et al (n 32) ch 25. para 25.50. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 (hereinafter Fairchild); Chester v 
Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, hereafter Chester. 
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become conflated, and policy replaces principle. The determination of legal liability is a 
judicial function based on evidence, not belief, hope, wishful thinking or policy.37 
 
III. THE CAUSATION ELEMENT 
 
In the tort of negligence, damage is the gist of the action.38 In order to succeed in a 
claim for clinical negligence, a claimant must show, on a balance of probabilities or 
‘more probable than not’, that he sustained damage as a result of the defendant’s breach 
of duty. No cause of action lies in a wrong which has not resulted in some element of 
loss, injury or damage of a kind which was reasonably foreseeable, for which the 
claimant can sue. The defendant is not liable for losses which were not wrongfully 
caused by him. So the claimant must prove that the defendant caused the loss for which 
he seeks compensation.39 If the claimant cannot show this, there is no tort and the action 
fails. In contract, a claimant who proves that the defendant was in breach of contract is 
entitled to nominal damages, but again, he will not be awarded substantial damages 
unless he establishes a causal link between the breach and his loss. A similar principle 
applies to a claim in battery, which, as an action in trespass to the person, is actionable 
per se.40 
 
Causation is concerned with the physical connection between the defendant’s 
negligence and the claimant’s damage. No matter how gross the defendant’s negligence, 
he is not liable if, as a question of fact, his conduct did not cause the damage. Thus, 
there must be a causal link between the defendant’s breach of duty and the damage 
sustained by the claimant.41 This is essentially an explanatory inquiry: how, in fact, did 
the damage occur? In medical malpractice litigation, this issue is largely a matter of 
medical and scientific evidence, for example, about the pathology of a particular disease 
and the prospects for successful treatment with proper care. The question is normally 
dealt with by the ‘but-for’ test. It is, however, important to note that the original legal 
rules relating to causation, which are based on the ‘fiction of certainty’, are now giving 
                                             
37 Ibid. 
38 M Jones, Medical Negligence 4th edn. (Andover, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2008) 375. Per Lord Scarman 
in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 
871, 883H, in ‘Loss of Chance’ cases, the question becomes whether the lost chance can become the 
‘damage’ and therefore the ‘gist’ of the tort. 
39 J Stapleton, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequence’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 388, 389.  
40 Authority for this is Jones (n 38) 558.  
41 HLA Hart and A Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959 and 2nd edn 
1985). 
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way to a more sophisticated, analytical approach as we have an increasing 
understanding of our lack of ability to be certain.42 In recent decisions such as Fairchild 
v Glenhaven Funeral Services43, Gregg v Scott44 and Chester v Afshar (each of which is 
discussed below),45 the judgments have been more explicit and open about being 
informed by policy and the language of rights rather than being bound by the strict rules 
of causal considerations.46 In Gregg v Scott47 (a loss of chance case discussed below), 
the question of whether the law demands proof of negligence on the balance of 
probabilities, that is over 50%, was discussed ‘with great learning and intellectual 
honesty’48 in the five speeches of the Law Lords. The ratio of Gregg v Scott is clear on 
one level: where a claimant has suffered a loss of chance of recovery as a result of 
medical negligence but the chance is less than even, he is not entitled to compensation 
for that lost chance. Nonetheless, there were ‘blistering dissents’ from Lords Nicholls 
and Hope, who felt that it was unfair to require that the claimant prove his case on a 
balance of probabilities when medicine is full of uncertainties.49 
 
A. The ‘But-For’ Test 
 
In the English law of tort, it is customary to analyse the question of causation in two 
stages.50 The first, referred to as ‘factual causation’, ‘cause-in-fact’, or ‘cause’, is 
essentially concerned with whether the defendant’s fault was a necessary condition of 
the loss occurring. This ‘test’ consists of posing the question: would the loss have been 
sustained but for the relevant act or omission of the defendant? If it would not, the 
defendant is normally absolved at this point. If, alternatively, the claimant is able to 
show, on the balance of probabilities, that he would not have suffered the harm in 
                                             
42 J Matthews ‘Uncertain Causation: Gregg v Scott’ Lecture notes CPIL College Clinical Negligence 
Conference 7 and 8 October 2004. 
43 Fairchild (n 36); (n 131) per Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 52. ‘The causal requirements for liability 
often vary...and since the causal requirements for liability are always a matter of law, these variations 
represent legal differences, driven by the recognition that the just solution to different kinds of cases may 
require different causation requirement rules.’ 
44 Gregg (n 2). 
45 Chester (n 36). 
46 Ibid. Lord Hope of Craighead at paragraph 80: ‘the courts have power in certain cases to override 
causal considerations in order to vindicate a plaintiff’s rights...’. 
47 Gregg (n 2). 
48 Charles Foster, ‘Last Chance for Lost Chances: Gregg v Scott in the House of Lords’ (2005 18 Feb) 
New Law Journal 248. 
49 Ibid. Also see below in IV ‘Loss of Chance’. 
50See A Honoré, ‘Causation and Remoteness of Damage’, Chapter 7 in A Tunc (ed), Int. Encl. Comp. L. 
(Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff and Tubingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1983) xi, 67, referring to the similar ‘bifurcation’ 
of analysis in the American common law and in German law. Also Deakin et al (n 23) 244 ‘Causation of 
Damage’. 
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question, the defendant may still succeed by establishing the absence of what is called a 
‘legal cause’. At this second stage, the courts make an assessment of whether the link 
between the conduct and the ensuing loss was sufficiently close. In other words, judges 
decide which of the conditions of the claimant’s harm should also be regarded in a legal 
sense to be its causes. Judges will also consider whether a particular event ‘broke the 
chain of causation’, and use such terms as ‘direct’, proximate’, ‘foreseeable’ or 
(alternatively) ‘remote’, to describe the relation between an act or omission and its 
consequences.51 
 
The separation of these two stages of inquiry, and the use of the terms ‘factual’ and 
‘legal’ cause to describe them, is by no means free of controversy. One may question, 
for example, whether the issues, which come under the rubric of ‘legal cause’, really 
have very much to do with causation in the sense of describing the relations between 
particular events in time and space.52 The courts appear to be using the language of 
cause to decide questions of policy, such as which of the parties is best placed to shift 
the loss in question (distributive justice), or which outcome will best promote loss 
prevention in that context in the future (deterrence).53 The issue of insurability is also 
never far away.54 
 
Notwithstanding that in actions for negligence, judges will consider all the elements 
discussed above,55 it is unusual for it to be argued in a medical negligence case that the 
claimant’s or some other person’s conduct amounts to a novus actus interveniens or that 
his injury is too remote.56 By contrast, factual causation is often an issue.57 
 
                                             
51 A cause which does not pass one of these tests of (legally relevant) causal proximity may be termed a 
‘mere condition’. It is, in other words, a factor ‘without which’ the loss would not have been incurred, but 
it is a factor to which the law attaches no causal responsibility in terms of liability in damages. 
52 NJ Mullany, ‘Common Sense Causation – An Australian View’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 3, 431. 
53 ‘But the issues in question (proximate cause and remoteness) are not, according to causal minimalism, 
really either causal or factual and to treat them as such is to ‘overload’ the causal issue. They are rather 
issues of legal policy in disguise, better answered by asking whether, all things considered, the defendant 
should be held liable for the harm which ensued, or, on another view, whether the harm was foreseeable, 
within the risk, or within the scope of the rule violated by the defendant’. Hart and Honoré (n 41) xxxv 
Preface 2nd edn. 
54 Mullany (n 52) 431. 
55 Duty, Breach of Duty, Cause-in-Fact, Cause-in-Law, Damage, Proximity, ‘novus actutus interveniens’ 
and Remoteness. 
56 Grubb in Deakin et al. (n 23) 257. 
57 Jones (n 38) 519. See Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428 (failure to 
diagnose) where the court held that, even with a correct diagnosis, the plaintiff’s condition was too far 
advanced for the hospital to have saved him. 
 157
A point about the ‘but-for’ test was made in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority,58 namely, that ‘[a] defendant cannot escape liability by saying that the 
damage would have occurred in any event because he would have committed some 
other breach of duty thereafter.’59 This is simply saying that the court will seek to 
establish, as best it can, what would have happened but for the negligence, both actual 
and hypothetical, of the defendant.60 Bolitho was essentially a case where causation 
depended on hypothetical human conduct. In Bolitho Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
concluded that there were two questions for the judge to decide on causation: (1) what 
would the doctor have done, or authorised to be done, if she had attended the claimant? 
and (2) if she would not have intubated, would that have been negligent? The Bolam 
test, not relevant to the first question, would be central to the second.61 At the liability 
stage in a negligence claim for personal injury where ‘but-for’ causation is invoked,62 it 
must be shown that it is more probable than not that the primary injury would have been 
avoided if the negligence had not occurred. The mere possibility of avoidance of injury 
is not enough.63 
 
Once again, when thinking about what probability means, we come to the question of 
the relationship between science and law. Neither the claimant nor the court has to 
apply scientific standards of proof (statistical validity to 95% confidence level) when 
determining causation on the balance of probabilities and, moreover, the court should 
also be conscious of the possibility that an expert witness may have difficulty in 
readjusting his focus from the 95% confidence limit approach to the balance of 
probabilities test.64 
 
                                             
58 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 discussed in Chapter 4 ‘Proving Liability: 
Breach of Duty’ above.  
59 Ibid 240 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
60 Grubb in Deakin et al (n 23) 234. 
61 Jones (n 38) 448. 
62 Where ‘material contribution’ type causation is invoked at the liability stage, it is usually because 
scientific knowledge does not permit an answer one way or another whether the negligence there would 
probably have been avoidance of the primary injury, or where a series of facts is too complex for such 
analysis. – Bailey v MOD and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 2913 (QB) J Foskett in P 
Balen (n 3) 188 (see below). 
63 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176. (Hereafter Gregg AC). 
64 For discussion of the relationship between statistics used in epidemiology and the legal tests applied to 
determine causation questions when faced with scientific uncertainty, please refer to C Miller, ‘Causation 
in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common Sense?’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 4, 544, D 
Coggan, ‘Causation and Attribution of Disease in Personal Injury Cases: A Scientific Perspective’ (2009) 
1 Journal of Personal Injury Law 12-19 and Jones (n 38) 455. 
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When considering proof of causation in an action for negligence, it is for the claimant to 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s breach of duty caused the 
damage.65 So, where there are conflicting explanations for the claimant’s condition 
neither of which is wholly satisfactory, the defendant does not have to prove that his 
explanation is the correct one, though failure to prove it may be a factor in deciding 
whether the claimant’s explanation of the cause should be accepted. In some instances, 
the precise cause of the damage may be unknown, and this tends to be a particular 
problem with some types of medical injury, where the pathology of the patient’s 
condition may be surrounded in mystery or be the subject of intense scientific dispute.66 
The ‘but-for’ test operates as a preliminary filter to exclude events which did not affect 
the outcome. It cannot, however, resolve all the problems of factual causation. 
 
In sum, the basic rule of causation in tort is the ‘but-for’ rule, which requires that the 
claimant must show that, but for the defendant’s breach of duty, he would probably not 
have suffered the injury complained of. In many cases, this rule does not give rise to 
difficulty. Problems arise, however, typically in cases where two or more factors have 
contributed to the adverse result in respect of which damages are claimed. These 
problems have led to modification of the ‘but-for’ rule in some circumstances and these 
will now be canvassed. 
 
There are cases where there may be significant problems of causal uncertainty, in 
particular where, besides the risk posed by the defendant’s faulty conduct, the claimant 
was exposed to other risks with the potential to cause the same harm. Here it may, after 
the event, be impossible for science to disentangle the different risks and say that absent 
the conduct of the defendant, the claimant would probably have avoided injury. In this 
regard, a long-standing issue is how far the doctrine of ‘material contribution’ may offer 
a legitimate alternative to the ‘but-for’ test, in permitting recovery on proof that the 
defendant’s breach ‘materially contributed to the harm’ (without the need to go further 
and show it would not otherwise have occurred).67 I will now discuss exceptions to the 
requirement to satisfy ‘but-for’ causation, namely, the alternative tests of material 
contribution to injury and material increase in risk of injury. There is an important 
caveat to bear in mind when discussing the case law. There are significant differences 
                                             
65 Note that the test for causation when considering a claim under Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights is not the same as that at common law. See Jones (n 38) 453. 
66 Ibid. 
67 M Stauch, ‘“Material Contribution” As A Response to Causal Uncertainty, Time for a Rethink’ (2009) 
68 Cambridge Law Journal 1, 27-30. 
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between industrial disease and medical negligence claims, justifying a more 
claimant-friendly approach in the former. There, typically, the claimant is exposed to 
risk factors that, even if the defendant is only at fault for one, all ultimately derive from 
the workplace environment. By contrast, in medical cases, the doctor intervenes on 
behalf of the patient to ward off natural risks (stemming from illness), and the treatment 
itself usually adds to the risks in play; furthermore (as noted by Lord Hoffman in 
Fairchild) in the case of NHS care, allowing recovery in doubtful causation cases will 
affect the resources available for other patients.68 
 
The previous section of this chapter has discussed the ‘but-for’ test used to determine 
causation of damage, a necessary ingredient of a successful tort action. In the following 
section, I will discuss cases where there are ‘evidential gaps’ which the courts have tried 
to overcome in the interests of providing justice.69 There will be a review of several 
cases where the courts have been prepared to draw inferences from the evidence to the 
claimants’ advantage70 and a medical case where they have not.71 I will start by looking 
at the way in which the courts have approached problems of uncertain causation, 
namely: material contribution to the harm, material contribution to the risk of harm, a 
case of alternative causes and finally, the Fairchild approach to causation,72 I will 
conclude with some thoughts on the significance of judicial ‘leaps over evidential gaps’ 
noting that, on the whole, these do not come into play in clinical negligence cases. The 
underlying question for present purposes remains that of what the claimant in a medical 
negligence case has to show to prove causation, in other words, evaluating how high the 
bar to liability is set and what exceptions the courts are prepared to make to ameliorate 
claimants’ inability to show certain (probable) causation. 
 
B. Uncertain Causation: Who gets the Benefit of the Doubt? 
 
As noted, there may sometimes be significant problems of causal uncertainty in medical 
cases; in particular where – besides the risk posed by the defendant’s faulty conduct – 
                                             
68 Ibid. Case comment Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 883. 
69 ‘...the reason why there were so many cases from Scotland in the 1950s and 1960s which appeared to 
be doing funny things about causation in industrial disease cases was that the judges were so aghast by 
conditions in the Scottish factories that they were determined to use tort law to get employers’ liability 
insurers to do something about those conditions.’ The Right Honourable Lord Justice Brooke, ‘Patients, 
Doctors and The Law (1963-2003): (2004) 72 Medico-Legal Journal 72 Part 1, 17-30. 
70 McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008 (hereinafter McGhee); Fairchild (n 36). 
71 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074 (hereinafter Wilsher). 
72 To be discussed below. 
 160
the claimant was exposed to other risks with the potential to cause the same harm. In 
this regard, a long-standing issue is how far the doctrine of ‘material contribution’ may 
offer a legitimate alternative to the ‘but-for’ test in permitting recovery on proof that the 
defendant’s breach ‘materially contributed to the harm’ without having to show that but 
for the defendant’s breach it would not have occurred.73 
 
In some instances, the precise cause of the damage may be unknown, and this tends to 
be a particular problem with some types of medical injury, where the pathology of the 
patient’s condition may be surrounded in mystery or be the subject of intense scientific 
dispute. The Pearson Commission reported that: ‘The Medical Research Council said 
that, while future research was likely to establish more causal relationships, it would 
also reveal increasingly complex causation in the individual case.’74 
 
Faced with this kind of factual uncertainty, the claimant may have an impossible burden 
proving causation on the balance of probabilities, although it should be remembered that 
the claimant does not have to achieve scientific standards of proof.75 Even where it is 
possible in principle to establish a connection between the type of harm suffered by the 
claimant and a specific hazard, it may be very difficult to show that the individual 
claimant’s condition was caused by exposure to that hazard rather than some other 
factor for which the defendant was not responsible.76 In such circumstances, where the 
scientific evidence is equivocal, the crucial issue from the claimant’s point of view is 
whether the court will be prepared to draw an appropriate inference that there must have 
been some causal connection, since proof of causation in the medical sphere rests 
inevitably on the drawing of an inference of fact. The burden of proof is, therefore, 
ultimately a burden of persuading the court to attribute legal responsibility for the 
claimant’s injuries to the defendant. This is patent in the case of causation in law, where 
the court must select from a number of causative factors the event or events that it 
considers to have been decisive. This is also the position, although maybe less 
obviously so, with the proof of causation in fact. The readiness of the court to draw an 
inference of fact, assisted where appropriate by principles of law, depends to some 
                                             
73 Stauch (n 67). Case comment Bailey (n 68). 
74 Royal Commission (n 18) paragraphs 1364-1449 ‘as the boundary of knowledge increases, so does the 
area of uncertainty’. 
75 Jones (n 38) ch 5 ‘Causation’, 460.  
76 Ibid. 
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extent on the court’s subjective assessment of the evidence which, in turn, may be 
influenced by the underlying policy objectives of the law.77 
 
The starting point for the discussion of the doctrine of material contribution is to note 
that difficulties arise where there are several alternative explanations of the events 
leading up to the damage, some innocent and some traceable to the defendant’s fault. 
The doctrine of material contribution evolved in the 1950s and reached its high point in 
the 1970s. The doctrine evolved around two House of Lords’ cases concerning 
occupational diseases due to industrial dusts; the earlier case concerned pneumoconiosis 
due to silica dust78 and the later one concerned dermatitis due to brick dust.79 In each 
case, there was a single aetiological factor, either silica dust or brick dust. In both cases, 
as a matter of law, the dust came from two sources, one ‘innocent’ (not in breach of 
regulation or negligence) and one ‘guilty’ (in breach of regulation or negligence). In the 
first case, the exposure to dust sources was concurrent; in the latter case, the exposure to 
the dust sources consisted of consecutive episodes. In both cases, the claimant was 
unable to establish that, had there been no breach of duty, he would not have sustained 
any injury. In short, he was unable to satisfy the ‘but-for’ test.80 It was with these cases 
that the doctrine of material contribution both to the harm and to the risk of harm 
evolved. This will be discussed below. 
 
1. Material Contribution to the Damage: A Response to Causal Uncertainty? 
 
The courts have gone some way to relieving a claimant of the rigours of the ‘but-for’ 
test where the difficulty of establishing causation has been a product of scientific 
uncertainty. In Bonnington Casting Ltd v Wardlaw,81 the House of Lords held that the 
claimant does not have to establish that the defendant’s breach of duty was the main 
cause of the damage, provided that it materially contributed to the damage. 
 
                                             
77 Ibid. Chapter 3 Standard of Care at 252. Where the issue is whether the claimant’s medical condition 
would or would not have deteriorated with appropriate treatment it is not appropriate to import the Bolam 
test. Thus, where the judge is required to make a finding of fact in a case where there is conflicting expert 
evidence, the judge is entitled to prefer one group of experts over another. Penney, Palmer and Cannon v 
East Kent Health Authority [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 41, 46, CA. 
78 Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (Hereinafter Bonnington) discussed below. 
79 McGhee (n 70) discussed below. 
80 Powers et al (n 32) ch 25 at para 25.11. 
81 Bonnington (n 78) a case of exposure to concurrent sources of harm. 
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As noted above, the claimant contracted pneumoconiosis from inhaling air which 
contained silica dust at his workplace. The main source of the dust was from pneumatic 
hammers for which the employers were not in breach of duty (‘the innocent dust’). 
Some of the dust (the ‘guilty dust’) came from swing grinders for which they were 
responsible by failing to maintain the dust extraction equipment. There was no evidence 
as to the proportions of innocent dust and guilty dust inhaled by the claimant. Indeed, 
such evidence as there was indicated that much the greater proportion came from the 
innocent source. On the evidence, the claimant could not prove ‘but-for’ causation, in 
the sense that it was more probable than not that had the dust extraction equipment 
worked efficiently he would not have contracted the disease. Nonetheless, the House of 
Lords drew an inference of fact that the guilty dust was a contributory cause, holding 
the employers liable for the full extent of the loss. The claimant thus did not have to 
prove that the guilty dust was the sole or even the most substantial cause if he could 
show, on a balance of probabilities, the burden of proof remaining with the claimant, 
that the guilty dust had materially contributed to the disease. This case, followed by 
others,82 was significant in easing the claimant’s burden of proof for two reasons. 
Firstly, they were a departure from ‘but-for’ causation – the claimant did not have to 
prove that he would not have suffered the ‘damage’ (that is, the injury or illness) but for 
the breach of duty. What had to be proved was redefined as a ‘material contribution’ to 
the injury or illness. Notwithstanding this redefinition of the ‘damage’ to which the 
claimant must establish a causal link, the claimant still recovered damages for the whole 
loss, that is, the outcome, having proved causation in respect of a part only of that loss.83 
 
The courts were willing to draw an inference84 of fact that there had been a material 
contribution when it was, in reality, impossible to say whether there had been any such 
contribution, or even to make a statistical guess. Anything which did not fall within the 
principle de minimus non curat lex would constitute a material contribution. The long-
standing issue of how far the doctrine of ‘material contribution’ may offer a legitimate 
                                             
82 Jones (n 38) ch 5, 460. 
83 J Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence: Part II’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 389, 404-405. See 
now, however, Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd. [2002] 3 All ER. 421, paragraph 5-042. The 
subject of apportionment will be discussed in the subsequent chapter on damages. See Stapleton, ‘Lords 
A Leaping Evidentiary Gaps’ (2002) 10 Tort Law Journal 276, 283 for discussion of ‘The question for 
the law in such cases (cumulative diseases) is whether there is a medical basis for apportionment of the 
cumulative condition’. 
84 Lord Wilberforce in McGhee (n 70) explicitly recognised that treating a ‘material increase in the risk’ 
as equivalent to ‘a material contribution to the damage’ involves overcoming an ‘evidential gap’ by 
drawing an inference of fact which, strictly speaking, the evidence does not support (as was done in 
Bonnington) this ‘fictional inference is drawn for policy reasons’. Jones (n 38) ch 5, 460. 
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alternative to the ‘but-for’ test, in permitting recovery on proof that the defendant’s 
breach ‘materially contributed’ to the harm, was addressed recently in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in the medical negligence case of Bailey v Ministry of Defence.85 
 
In Bailey, the claimant underwent an operation for a suspected gallstone at a hospital 
run by the Ministry of Defence.86 Complications, including extensive bleeding, 
occurred, but afterwards she was returned to the ward and received little aftercare. 
Subsequently, her condition deteriorated, due both to continued bleeding and the 
development of pancreatitis. After transfer to the intensive care unit and subsequent 
discharge from it, she became nauseous and vomited after drinking lemonade. Because 
of her weakened state she was unable to clear her air passages and choked. By the time 
she was resuscitated she had suffered brain damage. 
 
At trial, it was acknowledged that the post-operative care had been negligent. The 
problem was causation. As noted, the immediate cause of the choking was her generally 
weakened condition. Nonetheless, this was contributed to not only by the inadequate 
aftercare, but by pancreatitis – a matter for which the defendant was not at fault. At trial, 
the experts were unable to say that but for the negligent care, she would probably have 
avoided the final catastrophe. The pancreatitis alone might have resulted in the same 
outcome. In response, the Court of Appeal (upholding Foskett J) held that the claimant 
was nevertheless entitled to damages. Waller LJ, who gave the only judgment,87 
categorised the case as one of ‘cumulative risk exposure’, in which the claimant was 
exposed to two sources of risk – inadequate aftercare, and pancreatitis – which 
combined to produce the harm. His Lordship followed dicta from Lord Rodger’s speech 
in Fairchild which saw the decision in Bonnington as relaxing ‘but-for’ causation in 
favour of a test of ‘material contribution’. The latter permitted recovery where medical 
science cannot establish the probability that but for an act of negligence the injury 
would not have happened, but can establish that the contribution of the negligent cause 
was more than negligible.88 In contrast, His Lordship89 distinguished Wilsher (discussed 
below),90 where the House of Lords had required ‘but-for’ causation, on the basis that it 
involved ‘alternative’ sources of risk, operating mutually exclusively. 
                                             
85 Bailey (n 68). 
86 For details and critique of the decision see Stauch (n 67). Case comment Bailey (n 68). 
87 Sedley and L Smith JJ concurring. 
88 Fairchild (n 36) 46. 
89 Bailey (n 68) at 44. 
90 Wilsher (n 71) discussed below. 
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In the judgment, Waller LJ disclaimed any suggestion that ‘policy factors’ favoured the 
finding of liability in industrial cases, such as Bonnington and Fairchild, while denying 
it in medical ones such as Wilsher. He asserted that: ‘In my view one cannot draw a 
distinction between medical negligence cases and others’. Marc Stauch91 is critical of 
the decision in Bailey, finding it potentially too claimant-friendly at the expense of the 
NHS. He finds the distinctions between ‘cumulative’ and ‘alternative’ risks arcane 
when, in both cases, the underlying problem is identical – the impossibility of 
establishing that the defendant’s breach was necessary for the harm. He is disappointed 
that the court failed explicitly to deal with policy concerns, namely, the significant 
differences between industrial diseases and medical negligence claims, justifying a 
more claimant-friendly approach in the former. As noted earlier, whereas in industrial 
cases the claimant is exposed to risk factors that derive from the workplace, by contrast, 
in medical cases, the doctor intervenes on behalf of the patient to ward off natural risks 
occurring from the illness. This is compounded by the fact that the treatment itself adds 
to the risks in play. Stauch submits that the Court of Appeal’s approach to resolving 
Bailey is unsustainable because of what it would mean for medical resource distribution. 
This discussion then brings to the fore the very issue with which my thesis is grappling, 
namely, that allowing recovery in doubtful cases will affect the resources available for 
other patients.92 I, however, do not fear that the courts will be overgenerous to patient-
claimants. I now turn to the issue of material contribution to the risk of harm. 
 
2. Material Contribution to the Risk of Harm 
 
A benevolent principle smiles on these factual uncertainties and melts them away.93 
 
Difficulties arise where there are several cumulative explanations of the events leading 
up to the damage, some innocent and some traceable to the defendant’s fault. In 
McGhee v National Coal Board,94 the pursuer, who had contracted dermatitis after 
working in the hot and dusty ambience of the defender’s brickworks, alleged that the 
defender had materially increased the risk by not installing showering facilities. The 
defender conceded that it had breached the duty of care that it owed to the pursuer, but 
                                             
91 Stauch (n 67). Case comment Bailey (n 68). 
92 Per Lord Hoffman in Fairchild (n 36). 
93 Fitzgerald v Lane [1987] All ER 455, per Nourse LJ at 464. 
94 McGhee (n 70). 
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contended that in view of the inadequate medical knowledge about the causes of 
dermatitis, the pursuer had not proved on a balance of probabilities that he would not 
have contracted the disease, even if the washing facilities were present. The court found 
for the pursuer, invoking ‘the practical way in which the ordinary man’s mind works in 
the every-day affairs of life.’95 
 
The House of Lords allowed the appeal of the pursuer from decisions of the lower 
courts in favour of the defendant. The judgment of Lord Wilberforce appears to accept 
the possibility that, in the absence of conclusive proof of a link between fault and 
damage, liability may be imposed upon a defendant whose negligence increases the risk 
of a particular loss occurring, if that risk is subsequently realised. ‘It is a sound 
principle’, he said, ‘that where a person has, by breach of a duty of care, created a risk, 
and injury occurs within that area of risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he 
shows that it had some other cause’.96 
 
Lord Wilberforce explicitly recognised that this line of reasoning involves overcoming 
an ‘evidential gap’ by drawing an inference of fact which, strictly speaking, the 
evidence does not support (as was done in Bonnington), and moreover that this 
‘fictional’ inference is drawn for policy reasons. His Lordship went on to say: 
 
The potential in this line of reasoning for reversing the burden of proof of causation was 
enormous – the claimant does not have to show that the defendant’s breach of duty 
caused his injury, merely that it increased the risk of injury. The basis for shifting the 
burden of proof on to the defendant is the inherent difficulty facing the claimant in a 
case where medical opinion cannot establish definitively that the damage is attributable 
to one potential cause of harm rather than another. Another rationale for reversing the 
burden of proof is that the defendant’s admitted fault may be the very reason the 
claimant cannot prove his case on the balance of probabilities.97 
 
The House of Lords, when reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wilsher v 
Essex Area Health Authority,98 held that McGhee v National Coal Board99 did not have 
the effect of reversing the burden of proof. The burden of proof remains with the 
                                             
95 Per Lord Reid Ibid at 1011. See E Weinrib, ‘A Step Forward on Factual Causation’ (1973) 38 Modern 
Law Review 518 for the role of value and judicial policy in determining what legal consequences the law 
should attach to the defendant’s conduct. 
96 Lord Wilberforce referring to McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 at 16. 
97 See Fleming (n 17) 671, discussing the use of this idea in Germany. 
98 Wilsher (n 71) discussed below. 
99 McGhee v National Coal Board (n 70) 
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claimant throughout, and he must establish that the breach of duty was at least a 
material contributory cause of the harm, applying Bonnington.100 
 
Nevertheless, there is a problem in making the defendant liable for damage which, ‘on 
the normal application of the “but-for” test, it cannot be proved he personally 
caused’.101 According to Jane Stapleton ‘if no medical basis for apportionment had been 
available when Bonnington102 was argued, then, to the extent that the plaintiff recovered 
for the degree of pneumoconiosis that would not have occurred but for the inhalation of 
non-tortiously produced dust, the result in that case would represent the first in the line 
of cases leading to the material contribution to risk principle, allowing certain claimants 
to jump an evidentiary gap which emerged as the McGhee/Fairchild principle.’103 The 
mere fact that a defendant was at fault, in the sense of breaching a duty of care, is not in 
itself a good enough reason for imposing liability. To do so may be to impose a 
powerful incentive for careful behaviour on the part of defendants (deterrence). But this 
runs up against the objection that it is not the role of the tort of negligence to penalise 
careless behaviour as such. Stapleton suggests that if this is seen as desirable, it can be 
achieved by Parliament through statutory regulation. 
 
There are historical reasons for the court adopting a policy in limited circumstances of 
allowing the claimant to succeed when he was unable to demonstrate that the injury was 
avoidable. However, the courts have gone further and have equated an increased risk of 
injury with material contribution. The doctrine of material contribution is, of course, 
based not on principle but on policy. It is a fiction which enables claimants to succeed 
for policy considerations in certain circumscribed circumstances where the state of 
scientific knowledge is such that the cause and extent of their injury are unknowable.104 
 
What later became known as the McGhee/Fairchild principle specifies the 
circumstances in which a claimant can ‘leap an evidentiary gap’ and secure damages 
against a defendant who increases the ‘risk’ of an injury which then arises. The 
language of risk is employed because uncertainty in the evidence prevents an 
identification of the precise causal connection – between the negligent act or omission 
                                             
100 Bonnington (n 78). 
101 Stapleton (n 28) 404. 
102 Bonnington (n 78). 
103 This is because the claimant in Bonnington (n 78) recovered entirely at trial even though he had not 
proven that the entire injury had been the result of the defendant. Stapleton (2nd ref n 83) 276. 
104 Powers et al (n 32) ch 25, para 25.21. 
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and the eventuated injury – which the common law has traditionally required. It is 
helpful to concentrate on two of Stapleton’s six characteristics105 which point to cases 
appropriate for the Fairchild exception, namely, the (substantial) similarity of the two or 
more agents of risk and the extent to which the sources of risk are under the control of 
the defendants. In McGhee, both conditions were met. The dust encountered non-
negligently during the work shift and the dust which, through the employer’s negligent 
omission to provide showers, remained upon claimant McGhee’s skin, were identical 
and were both under the control of his employer.106 
 
The difficulty in cases such as Fairchild is that, given the current state of scientific 
knowledge about the way in which asbestos fibres cause mesothelioma, an employee 
cannot satisfy the ‘but-for’ test if he has been negligently exposed to asbestos by 
different employers at different times during his working life. While he might be able to 
prove that at each workplace each employer failed in his duty of care to protect him 
from exposure, he will not be able to identify at which workplace the crucial exposure 
took place. His claim would fail. 
 
Therefore, the proper application of traditional rules for determining causation, namely, 
the ‘but-for’ test and the doctrine of material contribution, does not entitle the claimant 
to compensation where the claimant has contracted mesothelioma as a result of 
wrongful exposure to asbestos from several previous employments. However, in 
Fairchild, after detailed review of the authorities, the court decided that the creation of a 
material risk satisfied the causal requirement for liability, or that exposure to a risk was 
equivalent to the making of a material contribution.107 The Law Lords allowed the 
claim, holding all the defendant employers liable, as each of them had materially 
increased the risk of harm to their employees. Subsequently, in Barker v Corus UK Ltd 
                                             
105 Stapleton (2nd ref n 83) 281, 300-301. The Fairchild exception should apply in cases where: (i) an 
employee was employed at different times over differing periods by employer A and employer B; and (ii) 
employer A and B were both subject to a duty to take reasonable care to prevent the employee inhaling 
asbestos dust because of the known risk that it might cause a mesothelioma; and (iii) both employers A 
and B were in breach of that duty, with the result that, during both periods, the employee inhaled 
excessive quantities of asbestos dust and (iv) the employee developed mesothelioma and (v) any cause of 
the mesothelioma other than the inhalation of asbestos dust at work could be effectively discounted; but 
(vi) the employee could not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that his mesothelioma was the result of 
his inhaling asbestos dust during his employment by one particular employer or the other, or during both 
employments taken together. Fairchild (n 36) as per Lord Bingham. 
106 C Miller, ‘Liability For Negligently Increased Risk: The Repercussions Of Barker v Corus UK (Plc)’ 
(2009) 8 Law, Probability & Risk 1, 39-54 at 53 and 54 for arguments against so narrowly limiting risk 
liability. 
107 Powers et al (n 32) ch 25, para 25.23. 
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(PLC)108 the Law Lords ruled that each defendant should be liable only to the extent of 
their relevant contribution to the claimant’s exposure to asbestos dust. In the specific 
context of claims for contracted mesothelioma, Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 
nullified that decision.109 
 
We see then, that the ‘but-for’ test is conveniently applied where the conduct 
complained of consists of a discrete, identifiable act, whereas the doctrine of material 
contribution is conveniently applied where there are repeated acts or exposures against a 
background of non-tortious acts or exposure.110 
 
The orthodox ‘material contribution’ doctrine is simple and should be uncontroversial, 
namely, ‘the fact that, in addition to the tortious conduct of the defendant, other factors 
also materially contributed to C’s111 total state at trial is not a bar to C’s claim’. There 
are two different ways in which a factor might ‘materially contribute’ to C’s total state 
at trial: one situation is where C’s state at trial is indivisible.112 For example, in 
Bonnington, the House of Lords held that the claimant could recover in full. In that case, 
no attempt was made to persuade the court that the claimant should recover only for that 
part of his injury which could be attributed to the employer’s negligence. Both sides 
went for all or nothing. No expert evidence was called to assess the contribution which 
the negligent exposure had made to the total. The injury was treated as indivisible.113 
The defendant cannot escape liability by pointing out that it was not the only agency 
responsible for the claimant’s state at trial. A separate issue is that of the extent of 
responsibility. Since each tortfeasor historically connected to an indivisible injury has 
materially contributed to all of it, the orthodox rule is that each is liable in solidium to 
the claimant for the entire injury. The other situation is where C’s state at trial is 
divisible. An example would be where D’s tortious conduct harmed C, but before trial, 
C was further harmed by the carelessness of a third party. The third party’s intervention 
is not a bar to C’s claim. The defendant cannot escape liability by pointing out that he 
was not responsible for part of the claimant’s state at trial. The extent of that 
responsibility is a separate issue. Here, D only contributed materially to a part of the 
                                             
108 Barker v Corus UK Ltd (PLC) [2006] UKHL 20. 
109 Brazier and Cave (n 7) 202. 
110 Ibid. 
111 C represents claimant. 
112 Stapleton (2nd ref n 83) 283, also Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004. In general, see 
dictum of Devlin LJ in Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] QB 162 at 188-9. 
113 J Smith, ‘Causation – The Search for Principle’ (2009) 2 Journal of Personal Injury Law, 101-113. 
According to Smith, today such an injury would be treated as divisible with apportionment of damages. 
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claimant’s state at trial, so since a medical basis for division of the total injury is 
possible, D is entitled to assert that it is only liable to the claimant for that portion of the 
total state to which he is historically connected.114 
 
To summarise, there are key features which apply to the acceptance of the ‘material 
contribution’ to harm approach to causation: first, there must be no alternative complete 
cause of the injury complained of as in Wilsher,115 where the act of negligence led to the 
provision of excess inspired oxygen, which was only one of a number of alternative 
possible causes of the child’s blindness and could not be said, necessarily, to have 
contributed to it.116 Secondly, the implicated cause must contribute to the primary 
injury. Increased risk of the injury occurring in the event of breach is not sufficient 
except in defined and limited circumstances where the court finds the defendant liable 
for materially increasing the risk of the resultant primary injury. This is in contrast to 
finding the defendant causing or materially contributing to the primary injury itself, as 
set out in Fairchild.117 
 
The courts have also had to deal with the question of the burden of proof and with 
whether the defendant may be liable, in the absence of conclusive proof under the 
‘but-for’ test, for increasing the risk of particular damage occurring. This possibility has 
been raised in order to reduce the considerable odds against certain claimants 
establishing the necessary causal link in industrial injury and medical malpractice cases. 
However, in Wilsher the House of Lords reaffirmed the centrality of the ‘but-for’ test to 
issues of causation in negligence. These cases concerned with material contribution may 
be contrasted with Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority,118 a case of alternative 
causes, to which I now turn. 
 
                                             
114 Ibid. 
115 Discussed below. 
116 See Wilsher (n 71) at 1090-1091 HL for a recent example where the claimant fell on the Wilsher side 
of the line: Temple v South Manchester Health Authority [2002] EWCA Civ 1406, paragraphs 53-55. For 
further discussion see Balen (n 3) 198. For discussion of apportionment, see Smith (n 113) 101. The key 
principles of causation and personal injury are set out. This is followed by relevant case law examples 
where the basic but-for test has been modified to deal with apportionment in the case of divisible injuries 
and circumstances where due to a lack of scientific understanding a claimant can only establish that there 
has been a material contribution to the risk of injury as opposed to the injury itself. 
117 Ibid at 199 footnote 27. 
118 Wilsher [1998] 1 All ER 871 see below for discussion of Wilsher (n 71). Wilsher has once again been 
approved in Fairchild (n 36) and is still considered good law in medical cases, see below. 
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3. A Case of Alternative Causes: Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority119 
 
In this case, there were five, dissimilar, possible causes of the claimant’s blindness; four 
stemmed from hazards inherent in premature birth and it was a failure to adequately 
regulate the air supply that constituted the (medical negligence) fifth. It was not possible 
to ascertain which of these five possible causes was actually responsible, even though 
the tort could be interpreted as increasing the risk of an injury which did indeed 
eventuate. However the ‘shape’ of this increased risk was not the shape which the 
Fairchild exception has subsequently come to recognise.120 At the trial of the claimant’s 
action for negligence, the medical evidence was inconclusive as to the cause of the 
claimant’s condition. The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, held that 
causation had not adequately been established: ‘a failure to take preventative measures 
against one out of five possible causes is not evidence as to which of those five causes 
caused the injury’.121 
 
The question in Wilsher became whether, in a case of uncertain causation, it would be 
sufficient to show increased risk of harm as in McGhee. It was not possible to ascertain 
which of the five possible causes was actually responsible for the claimant’s blindness. 
Although the tort could be interpreted as increasing the risk of the injury which did 
eventuate, the increased risk did not conform to the requirements for the 
McGhee/Fairchild exception. 
 
The claimant, Martin Wilsher, was a premature baby who, through the defendants’ 
negligence, received an excessive concentration of oxygen. It was known that excessive 
oxygen can damage the retina of a premature baby, leading to a condition called 
retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) which results in blindness.122 Martin Wilsher was born 
prematurely to a mother who, having had no inkling that she was about to give birth, 
lost any chance there may have been to arrest her premature labour. During the baby’s 
early, difficult weeks, he needed to be given a great deal of oxygen to keep him alive. 
                                             
119 I am presenting this case in detail as it is an often cited medical one and still applicable.  
120 Miller (n 106) fn 42. ‘Shape’ is the term Lord Justice Musthill used in the Court of Appeal in Wilsher 
(n 71) to denote the particular circumstances which led to increased and eventuated risk. 
121 Wilsher [1987] QB 730 at 739, 779 (Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC, approved by Lord Bridge at 
[1988] AC 1074, 1091). 
122 Retrolental fibroplasia is now known as retinopathy of prematurity. For discussion of medical 
understanding if its aetiology see AR Fielder ‘Retinopathy of Prematurity: aetiology’ (1997) 3 Clinical 
Risk 47-51. The following descriptive material is taken from Brooke (n 69) and J Badenoch QC, ‘Brushes 
with Bolam Where Will It Lead?’ Address to Medico-Legal Society (11 March 2004). Published (2004) 
72 Medico-Legal Journal 4, 127. 
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He was subsequently found to have a peculiar form of blindness, known then as 
Retrolental Fibroplasia (RLF), and now as Retinopathy of Prematurity. This was widely 
believed to be caused by the effects on the premature retina of an excess of oxygen in 
the blood (hyperoxaemia), which doctors should be at pains to avoid. The defence 
admitted that the doctors had misplaced an umbilical catheter for monitoring the blood 
oxygenation. The doctors had thought the catheter was in the umbilical artery, but in 
fact it was in the vein, so they got falsely low readings and pumped ever more oxygen 
into a child whose lung transfer capability was better than it appeared. Long periods of 
hyperoxaemia resulted, and the legal team for the claimant felt the case would be won. 
However, ‘this was in the dark ages of medical litigation, when we had no pre-trial 
exchange of expert reports, and pleaded defences were little more than denial, so we had 
no clear idea when the trial began of the precise medical grounds on which the case was 
being defended’.123 According to Lord Brooke, ‘the case was remarkable because it was 
almost the last example of trial by ambush’. The defence called four experts. The 
claimant’s legal team did not see the reports until trial. At the end of the original trial, 
Mr Justice Pain did not make any findings of fact but did find that the doctors had not 
satisfied the burden of proof.124 
 
When the case went to the Court of Appeal, it was found that there were five potential 
causes of the retrolental fibroplasias from which the boy, who was born at 26 weeks, 
suffered. RLF can occur in premature babies who have not been given additional 
oxygen and there is evidence of some correlation between RLF and several other 
conditions from which premature babies can suffer (apnoea, hypercarbia, 
intraventricular haemorrhage, patent ductus arteriosus), all of which affected the 
claimant. At the Court of Appeal, Mustill LJ put it: ‘What the defendants did was not to 
enhance the risk that the known factor would lead to injury, but to add to the list of 
factors which might do so.’125 The majority of the Court of Appeal held that McGhee 
could apply in these circumstances, recognising that this represented an extension of 
that case.126 Browne-Wilkinson V-C, dissenting, took the view that the position was 
wholly different from that in McGhee: ‘A failure to take preventative measures against 
                                             
123 Ibid Badenoch at 2. 
124 Brooke (n 69). See McGhee v National Coal Board (n 96) per Lord Wilberforce regarding shifting the 
burden of proof on to the defendant. This approach was negated by the House of Lords in Wilsher (n 71). 
Deakin et al (n 23) 251. 
125 Wilsher (n 121) 752. 
126 Deakin et al (n 23) 251. 
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one out of five possible causes is no evidence as to which of those five caused the 
injury.’127 
 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal on this issue, 
approving of the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor.128 In the end, Martin Wilsher’s case 
addressed the special problems in medical cases and how a claimant must discharge the 
burden of proof. In short, he must prove that the negligent factor was probably, or at 
least, a material cause of his injury. If the negligent factor is but one among other non-
negligent but equally possible causes of the injury, the claimant fails the causation 
hurdle.129 The House of Lords approved Wilsher v Essex AHA130 in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd131 and said that it was correctly decided on its facts.132 
What legal principle distinguishes the McGhee/Fairchild133 approach from the approach 
in Wilsher? 
 
The House of Lords judgment in Wilsher went so far as to reverse the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal and to order a retrial on the grounds that the coincidence of a breach of 
duty and injury could not, of itself, give rise to a presumption that the injury was so 
caused: ‘Whether we like it or not, the law…requires proof of fault causing damage as 
the basis of liability in tort’.134 As noted, the difficulty for the claimant in Wilsher lay in 
the fact that there were five possible causes for the condition with which he was 
afflicted. One of these was medical negligence but it could not be established that this 
possible cause actually made a material contribution to the injury. It might have done 
so, but this fact still required to be proven by the plaintiff. The House of Lords 
discarded the notion that McGhee constituted an authority for transferring the onus of 
proof to the defendant. McGhee was to be distinguished from Wilsher in that there were 
                                             
127 Wilsher (n 121) 779. 
128 Wilsher (n 71) Martin Wilsher’s case was subsequently settled. See DG Kerry, ‘Lawyer’s Comment: 
Martin Wilsher -v- Essex Area Health Authority and Causation' (1991) 2 AVMA Medical & Legal 
Journal 4, 12 ‘When Martin Wilsher got his damages in full, many years after they had been awarded, but 
without interest, which would by that time effectively have doubled his money. ….and then as the 
crowning irony, researchers announced that the oxygen theory was conclusively proved, even to the 
extent of establishing the critical level of hyperoxaemia which was the culprit, and the other Wilsher 
suspects were all but completely eliminated.’ Badenoch (n 122). 
129 Badenoch (n 122) 4. 
130 Wilsher [1986] 3 All ER 801. 
131 Fairchild [2002] 3 All ER 305. 
132 Jones (n 38) 463. Martin Wilsher’s case was subsequently settled. Also Murray v Kensington and 
Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority, unreported, 1981, CA where the claimant failed to 
establish a causal link between excess oxygen he received and RLF.  
133 For discussion of Fairchild (n 36) see below ‘The Fairchild Approach to Causation.’ 
134 Wilsher (n 71) at 1094, [1988] 1 All ER 883, per Lord Bridge. 
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several agents which could have caused the injury in the latter but only one in the 
former. This provided an exceptional inference as to cause and, as a result, McGhee 
positively affirmed that the onus of proving causation lies on the pursuer or plaintiff.135 
 
I would argue that the courts favour claimants in industrial cases over those in clinical 
negligence ones. While represented as a principle concerned with fact, it appears that 
what is involved in the strict interpretation of the ‘but-for’ test is a matter of policy and 
in clinical negligence cases this policy may defeat the claimants’ claim. A limit is 
placed on the potential liability of the defendant by demanding that a particular nexus be 
shown. There are numerous circumstances, particularly in medical law, when the 
defendant’s breach may have been part of the background leading to the claimant’s 
damage. Nevertheless, if the defendant can show that the damage would have occurred 
anyway regardless of the breach of duty, then the claimant’s action will fail.136 The 
difficulties associated with the ‘but-for’ test in medical law are at their starkest when 
there are several causal factors contributing to the claimant’s damage, or there are 
successive causes, each of which is sufficient. The intrinsic complexity of medical 
evidence means, therefore, that if the law fails to mitigate the strict application of the 
test, injustice may be done. I have made the point that in both Bonnington and McGhee 
the court took a Fairchild approach to causation,137 namely, that the defendant’s breach 
made a material contribution to the damage suffered by the claimant, or to the risk of 
damage to which the claimant was exposed. The inference was necessary because the 
lack of available evidence was such that the claimant could not meet the ‘but-for’ test. 
However, in Wilsher, the House of Lords was anxious to reassert the basic principle that 
the burden of proof always remains with the claimant, who must show either that the 
damage would not have occurred but for the defendant’s breach, or that the breach made 
a material contribution to it. The difficult question for the medical lawyer, however, is 
in knowing when a court will draw an inference of fact based on common sense or 
pragmatism.138 One plausible guide is the distinction which may be drawn between 
uncertainty created by the existence of a range of contributing factors, any or all of 
which may be judged cumulatively to have made a material contribution, and 
                                             
135 JK Mason, and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, 8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
ch 5, 157. 
136 Kennedy et al (n 27) ch 6 Causation, 328-9.  
137 The Fairchild approach refers to a situation where a claimant can ‘leap an evidentiary gap’ discussed 
below. Kennedy et al (n 27) ch 6 Causation, 333. 
138 See Chester (n 36) (failure to warn about minimal risk of surgical complications) where the court 
found for the claimant on Human Rights Policy grounds. See below. 
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uncertainty created by the existence of a number of possible contributing factors, each 
of which is separate and distinct.139 Where the factors are cumulative, the court may 
follow Bonnington but where the causes are distinct, the court would follow Wilsher, 
due to the impossibility of proving a causal nexus. 
 
Another way of analysing the evidence emphasises ‘historical involvement’.140 In this 
sense, the requirement that the claimant establish that the tortious conduct was a 
cause-in-fact of his suffering actionable damage has two related parts: first, whether the 
tort was part of the history of how the claimant got to be where he actually was at the 
time of the trial; and second, where the claimant would have been, hypothetically, had 
the tort not occurred. Stapleton is concerned that a bare reliance on undefined causal 
terms can lead courts to fail to distinguish the factual issue of historical involvement 
from the normative judgement of which consequences of the tort fall within the 
appropriate scope of liability.141 The ‘but-for’ test works well as a test for cause-in-fact 
in nearly all cases,142 but it can be supplemented with a more sophisticated approach 
which Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré correctly identified as a reliable test for historical 
involvement.143 
 
I have, up to this point, considered various approaches to proving causation in tort 
cases, namely, the ‘but-for’ test: the material ‘contribution to harm’ test; the ‘concept of 
material contribution to the risk of harm’ and finally ‘a case or cases of alternative 
causes of harm’. I now turn to the question of when the courts are prepared, in the 
interests of justice, to accept evidential limitations. I would respectfully submit that the 
courts have been more generous in employer/employee situations, particularly where 
mesothelioma is at issue, than in medical negligence cases. As we will see when 
considering Fairchild and Gregg v Scott,144 causation issues are clearly matters of legal 
policy and justice. The unfairness to claimants of requiring them to prove the impossible 
in circumstances where the defendant is in breach of duty is what usually leads the court 
to relax the normal requirements of proof. Indeed, in Fairchild, Lord Hoffmann 
                                             
139 Kennedy et al (n 27) ch 6 Causation, 334. 
140 Stapleton (n 39) 391-394. 
141 For more on this subject see Stapleton (n 39) 388 and A Honoré, ‘Causation in the Law’, The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2001 edn) E N Zalta (ed). 
142 Excepting cases of over-determination and joint determination. Stapleton Ibid and Honoré Ibid, 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/./ 
143 A Honoré points out that ‘Organic processes, such as those involved in the development of disease, 
and still more, in decision making by human beings, do not conform to settled patterns and therefore the 
NESS theory has at most a narrow range of application’. Honoré (n 141). 
144 Gregg (n 2) and Gregg [2005] 82 BMLR 52 (Loss of Chance case) considered below. 
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recognised that the distinction between a case involving a single agent and a number of 
different agents was not a principled distinction.145 
 
4. The Fairchild Approach to Causation 
 
Causation is not a strict technical matter which can be ‘solved’ by the application of 
quasi-mathematical formulas. Over many years, the courts have intervened to ease the 
frequently formidable factual difficulties of proving causation in cases of disease. This 
is well reflected in the cases I am about to discuss. In the case of Fairchild, which is a 
mesothelioma case but not a medical negligence case, the claimant had suffered 
multiple exposures to asbestos in the course of working for various employers and could 
not, strictly, demonstrate who had caused his disease. 
 
In Fairchild, the House of Lords had to deal with a similar but more acute problem to 
that raised in McGhee. The workmen had been exposed to asbestos in breach of duty in 
the course of several different employments. They had developed mesothelioma. The 
expert medical evidence showed that mesothelioma can be triggered by a single 
asbestos fibre and it was impossible to say when that trigger had occurred. All that the 
experts could say was that the risk of the single fibre causing cell mutation was related 
to the extent of the exposure. So, each employer’s negligence could be said to have 
contributed to the risk of injury but not to the injury itself. Even if the background risk 
could be dismissed, it could not be shown which employer(s) were responsible for the – 
possibly solitary – fatal fibre(s). This is by way of contrast to the lung disease 
asbestosis, which becomes incrementally more severe with increased duration of 
exposure, and to which any exposure to asbestos could, accordingly, be said to have 
contributed.146 For these reasons, the Court of Appeal concluded that the claimants were 
unable to prove which of the defendants had caused the mesothelioma, and dismissed 
their claims.147 The House of Lords, however, allowed the appeal on the basis that, in 
this exceptional case, it was sufficient for the claimants to show an increased risk of the 
disease consequent upon the defendants’ negligence, even though actual causal 
contribution was impossible to prove.148 
                                             
145 Jones (n 38) 466. 
146 See the lucid explanation of the factual difficulties by Brooke LJ in the Court of Appeal Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1052 at 1063-1064. 
147 Ibid. 
148 J Morgan, ‘Lost Causes in the House of Lords: Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services’. (2003) 66 
Modern Law Review 2, 277-284. 
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At the heart of four of the speeches was the conception of causation in law as a 
normative phenomenon.149 The House of Lords thought that it was fair and just that an 
employer who had been in breach of duty to protect from asbestos exposure should be 
held liable even though it might not have been his asbestos fibre that had triggered the 
disease.150 
 
As regards industrial disease cases, the House of Lords rejected the rationale that had 
been accepted in McGhee and also rejected Lord Bridge’s explanation of it. On the facts 
of the mesothelioma cases, there was a clear difference between making a material 
contribution to the disease and making a contribution to the risk of the disease. To say 
that the two came to the same thing or should be deemed to be the same thing was 
fiction. The House of Lords did not wish to sanction a fiction so it held that cases such 
as Fairchild were to be a recognised exception to the ‘but-for’ rule. Where the 
exception applied, it would be enough for the claimant to show that the defendant’s 
negligence had made a material contribution to the risk of injury, even though the injury 
might have been caused by the negligence of another defendant. Since Barker v Corus 
UK Ltd,151 it is established that it is enough for the claimant to show that the defendant’s 
negligence had made a material contribution to the risk of injury, even though the injury 
might in fact have been caused by some non-negligent factor, including a natural 
phenomenon, or by the claimant’s own negligence. 
 
As regards the scope of Fairchild, without caution the decision could be interpreted as 
creating a general principle that whenever the claimant has difficulty establishing 
causation but it can be shown that the defendant’s breach of duty increased the risk of 
harm to the claimant, the rules of causation should be relaxed. In order to avoid this 
problem, their Lordships sought to limit the situations in which the normal requirements 
of the ‘but-for’ test could be dispensed with.152 For present purposes, suffice it to say 
that the exemption is limited to mesothelioma cases. 
 
                                             
149 Ibid for full discussion of the speeches. I will concentrate on the issues vis-à-vis clinical negligence. 
150 As noted above, in Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572 the Law Lords ruled that each defendant 
should be liable only to the extent of their relevant contribution to the claimant’s exposure to asbestos 
dust. In the specific context of claims for contracted mesothelioma, s 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 
nullified that decision. 
151 Barker v Corus, Ibid. 
152 Jones (n 38) 466 for judicial reasoning and academic discussion. 
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In Fairchild, the judges overtly invoked policy considerations to support their modified 
approach to, and departure from, the usual strict rules of causation. In contrast, the harsh 
decision in Wilsher153stood. Lord Hoffman not only declared it to be correctly decided 
in principle, but also suggests that policy reasons to protect the NHS budgets could play 
a part in denying patient-claimants a more favourable approach to causation.154 
 
In the later decision in Gregg v Scott,155 Lord Hoffmann distinguished Wilsher and he 
observed that clinical negligence cases remain to be decided on a balance of 
probabilities. He noted that in Fairchild, their Lordships had: 
 
...accepted that the disease had a determinate cause in one fibre or other but constructed 
a special rule imposing liability for conduct which only increased the chances of the 
employee contracting the disease. That rule was restrictively defined in terms which 
make it inapplicable in this case. Everything has a determinate cause, even if we don’t 
know what it is. The blood-starved hip joint in Hotson, the blindness in Wilsher, the 
mesothelioma in Fairchild; each had its cause and it was for the plaintiff to prove that it 
was an act or omission for which the defendant was responsible. The narrow terms of 
the exception made to this principle in Fairchild only serve to emphasise the strength of 
the rule. The fact that proof is rendered difficult or impossible...because medical science 
cannot provide an answer, as in Wilsher, makes no difference. What we lack is 
knowledge and the law deals with lack of knowledge by the concept of the burden of 
proof.156 
 
Lord Hoffmann makes it clear that the exceptional rule in Fairchild should not be 
generalised to clinical negligence cases: 
 
It should first be noted that adopting such a rule would involve abandoning a good deal 
of authority. The rule which the House is asked to adopt is the very rule which it 
rejected in Wilsher’s case. Yet Wilsher’s case was expressly approved by the House in 
Fairchild and Hotson too would have to be overruled. The House would be dismantling 
all the qualifications and restrictions with which it so recently hedged the Fairchild 
exception. There seem to me to be no new arguments or change of circumstances which 
could justify such a radical departure from precedent.157 
 
The scope of the Fairchild exception has proved to be limited.158 The difficulty in both 
McGhee and Fairchild is that the evidence did not establish either cumulative or 
                                             
153 Discussed above. 
154 See below. 
155 Gregg (n 2) paragraphs 72-79. 
156 Gregg (n 2) paragraph 79. Added emphasis is mine. 
157 Ibid. at 85. 
158 See Smith (n 113) 107 for full discussion ‘The only case in which the Fairchild exception was properly 
applied was Transco Plc v Griggs’ [2003] EWCA Civ 564. 
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alternative causal mechanisms. Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlow159 was a case of 
possible cumulative causes, one tortious and one not, and McGhee160 was a case where 
there were two possible causative factors which were apparently alternative. However, 
in Wilsher,161 the question was whether McGhee could be applied to a case where there 
were up to five discrete causes of the claimant’s injury, any one of which might have 
caused the damage. 
 
Looking broadly at policy issues, McGhee/Fairchild were cases where the defendants 
were employers and the claimants were employees with serious illness deemed, despite 
an evidential gap, to have a causal nexus with their employment. Wilsher was a case 
where the defendant was the Area Health Authority and the claimant was a patient.162 
The first decision, McGhee, could be seen as an instance of corrective justice. The 
House of Lords felt that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Fairchild offends ‘our sense 
of justice’. Lord Nicholls163 said that ‘[a]ny other outcome would be deeply offensive to 
instinctive notions of what justice requires and fairness demands’. By contrast, the 
second decision, Wilsher, could be seen as an instance of distributive justice (concern 
for other patients). 
 
It could be said that the judgment in Wilsher turned upon the identity of the defendants, 
the NHS, rather than an employer sued by an employee. Surely Lord Hoffmann cannot 
be correct in asserting that ‘the massive increase in the liability of the NHS which 
would have been a consequence of the broad rule favoured by the Court of Appeal in 
Wilsher’s case’ might justify a different causation rule.164 Of course, the policy issues 
that medical negligence litigation raises are important and are the subject of much 
political debate. Whatever the practical solution to these problems, it cannot be right to 
distort legal principle simply to protect one public sector defendant. The financial 
implications for insurance companies were not mentioned in any of the speeches.165 
 
The interesting question arises as to where justice lies. The perceived unfairness of the 
lacuna in evidence did not sway the Court of Appeal in Fairchild, which set against the 
                                             
159 Bonnington (n 78). 
160 McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008. 
161 Wilsher (n 71).  
162 See Lord Hoffmann’s quote below. 
163 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.  [2002] UKHL 22 at para 36. 
164 Morgan (n 148). 
165 Ibid. 
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unpalatability of denying recovery to sympathetic claimants the injustice of requiring a 
defendant who may well have had no causal connection with the relevant injury to 
compensate the claimant’s entire loss.166 The House of Lords was content to assert that 
this injustice was ‘plainly’ outweighed by the injustice of the claimants recovering 
nothing. 
 
As regards the distinction between Wilsher and Fairchild, Lord Hoffmann relied upon 
the identity of the defendant in Wilsher, and the medical negligence context: 
 
[I]t cannot possibly be said that the duty to take reasonable care in treating patients 
would be virtually drained of content unless the creation of a material risk of injury 
were accepted as sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements for liability. And the 
political and economic arguments involved in the massive increase in the liability of the 
National Health Service which would have been the consequence of the broad rule 
favoured by the Court of Appeal in Wilsher’s case are far more complicated than the 
reasons given by Lord Wilberforce [in McGhee] for imposing liability upon an 
employer who has failed to take simple precautions.167 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s tantalising reference to the ‘political and economic arguments 
involved in the massive increase in the liability of the NHS’ raises many further 
questions: should the identity of the defendant matter? What about the point that the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 applies equally to NHS hospitals as to brothels?168 Could 
Wilsher be distinguished if the defendant in a similar case was a private hospital? 
Naturally, resource implications would have been raised by a favourable decision in 
Wilsher. Yet these have not stood in the way of other recent decisions on tort liability 
with vast socio-economic effects, notably Heil v Rankin, which effectively implemented 
the Law Commission’s recommendations on the level of awards for non-pecuniary 
loss.169 And in Fairchild itself, the sums were staggeringly high and the financial and 
insurance implications of the case were not mentioned in any of the speeches. 
 
It seems clear to me that policy factors play a role here. Thus it is perhaps no accident 
that both McGhee and Fairchild were cases of employer’s liability, a context in which 
the law has long acknowledged that policy places a strong emphasis on the maintenance 
by the employer of workplace health and safety,170 whereas Wilsher was a case of 
                                             
166 Ibid. 
167 Fairchild (n 36) and [2002] 3 WLR 89; Stapleton (2nd ref n 83) 276 and Morgan (n 148). 
168 Morgan (n 148) fn 39. 
169 Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272; Morgan (n 148) fn 40. See also Chapter 6 Damages below. 
170 Deakin et al (n 23) ch 18, 257. 
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medical negligence, an area where the courts have, on the whole, sought to avoid 
doctrinal innovations which might, as they see it, lead to excessive liabilities.171 
 
5. Clinical Negligence Cases: Does Fairchild Apply? 
 
It is not surprising that the ‘but-for’ rule, which evolved in days of litigation over cattle 
trespass, fire and flood, is too crude a tool to provide a just solution in the context of 
litigation involving the complex causation of disease. This is true both in the arena of 
medical negligence and where there have been successive employments, where there is 
no clear scientific evidence as to causation. The judgments in Fairchild acknowledge 
the limitations of the ‘but-for’ test but stop short of proposing a new test or approach 
which would produce a just solution, not only in mesothelioma cases but generally in 
complex causation cases. Lord Rodger noted in Fairchild,172 ‘it is not necessarily the 
hallmark of a civilised and sophisticated legal system that it treats cases where strict 
proof of causation is impossible in exactly the same way as cases where such proof is 
possible’. But it is also true that, according to the rule of law, a just legal system must 
enunciate the circumstances in which exceptions to general rules will be permitted. 
Potential defendants, insurers and litigants need to know what these requirements are, 
and the reasons given to support them must be convincing. 
 
The decision of their Lordships’ House in Fairchild was never realistically in doubt.173 
Faced with defendants who had acted in breach of duty and claimants who had suffered 
injury as a consequence, with all the attendant political and media interest, it seemed 
extremely unlikely that the judgment of the Court of Appeal would be upheld. As noted 
above, Lord Nicholls said: ‘any other outcome would be deeply offensive to instinctive 
notions of what justice requires and fairness demands.’ Therefore, whereas the decision 
of the House of Lords in Fairchild was predictable, the real difficulty lies in elucidating 
in sufficiently specific terms the principle being applied in reaching the conclusion. ‘To 
be acceptable, the law must be coherent. It must be principled.’174 This difficulty has not 
disappeared as a result of the judgment given. The House of Lords has indicated that ‘it 
                                             
171 Ibid. Hence the rejection of the ‘loss of a chance’ theory in Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1987] AC 
750 and Greg AC (n 63) 176, discussed below. 
172 Fairchild [2002] 3 WLR 89 at 168. 
173 C Feeney, P Laneng and D Cooper, ‘Mesothelioma, Asbestos and Causation’ (2003) 1 Journal of 
Personal Injury Law, 1. 
174Fairchild (n 36) Lord Nicholls at paragraph 36. 
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would be unrealistic to suppose that the principle here affirmed will not, over time, be 
the subject of incremental and analogical development’.175 
 
The House of Lords approached the cases on the basis that the competing potential 
causes were separate negligent exposures and it could not be shown which one was, in 
fact, causative. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, where the competing potential 
causes are successive negligent exposure of a similar type, causation will be satisfied if 
material contribution to risk is proven. 
 
However, the position is more uncertain if the competing potential causes are exposures 
which do not amount to breach of duty or are dissimilar. The House of Lords’ decision 
appears to leave open the possibility of arguing that the doctrine in McGhee does not 
apply to a situation where the other potential cause is a non-negligent cause, or where 
the competing causes render the injury more likely in different ways. Secondly, 
amendments to the test without considering the concept of indivisibility and 
apportionment may have provided justice for these claimants. However, holding 
defendants liable in full for injuries where they have only marginally increased the risk 
of the injury occurring, does not provide even-handed justice and, as it does not reflect 
the way in which the costs of such risks may be effectively distributed, may create a 
situation in which future claimants are denied compensation.176 
 
Rather than ‘incremental and analogical development’, the outcome of Fairchild may 
demand an ‘imaginative rule’177 based on changing the concept of damages in 
‘indivisible injury’ cases to render it workable for the future.178 
 
In considering the application of Fairchild to other fact situations, William Coley179 sets 
out Lord Hoffmann’s reasons for deciding that Wilsher was correctly decided. Briefly, 
the explicit reasons are to do with the fact that Wilsher did not have the ‘five 
ingredients’ necessary for declaring liability.180 However, as Coley points out, the 
implicit reasoning is a wish to limit the extension of the application of the 
                                             
175Ibid. Lord Bingham at paragraph 34. 
176 See Smith (n 113) for analysis of the principles regarding apportionment of liability. 
177 Lord Hoffmann, describing the Supreme Court of California’s judgment in Sindell v Abbott 
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) para 74. 
178 Feeney et al (n 173) 14. 
179 W Coley, ‘Fairchild: Unanswered Questions’ (2003) Journal of Personal Injury Law 15 at 21. 
180 See Stapleton (2nd ref n 83) 281, 300-301 above regarding test for material contribution. 
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McGhee/Fairchild principle, particularly in medical negligence cases. The core question 
remains, of who carries the risk of injustice, the innocent victim or the wrongdoer. 
Further, as noted, context also matters. It is worth observing again that the claimant will 
fail even if there is, on the facts, a 49% chance that it was the hospital’s negligence, as 
opposed to the other potential agents, that was the true cause of the adverse outcome 
(where the hospital has almost doubled the existing risk). The mesothelioma victim may 
possibly succeed where the defendant has only increased the existing risk by 5 to 
10%.181 In this sense, victims of clinical negligence could be seen as having lesser 
prospects of access to justice than employees. It is a sobering fact that the success rate 
for medical negligence actions is around 42% as compared with 84% for road traffic 
accidents and 79% for work place accident claims.182 I would conjecture that the 
restrictive view of causation and the real difficulty in linking breach with damage in 
clinical negligence actions in large part accounts for the low success rate. 
 
6. Modifying the Strict Rules:183 Chester v Afshar184 
 
I turn now to a failure to warn case. After presentation of the case and the House of 
Lords’ judgements, I contrast framing an action regarding negligent advice in trespass 
or negligence. I then concentrate on the issues in suing in negligence and how the 
judges have extended the concept of causation beyond its normal parameters. Turning to 
the actual judgment, I analyse the willingness of the court to modify the rules on 
causation in order to effect justice. The court achieved this by accepting a modification 
of the normal rule of causation, as in the Fairchild judgment discussed above. I follow 
with discussion of the conceptual difficulty of linking the failure to warn of a risk with 
the damage sustained during non-negligent surgery. This was achieved by accepting a 
modification of the normal rule of causation as in the Fairchild judgment discussed 
above. I briefly touch upon the question of appropriate damages for trespass or 
negligence.185 I note that there is academic opinion that modification of the rule was 
                                             
181 See Ibid regarding victims of negligent marketing of drugs, where there are a number of agents and a 
number of mechanisms and therefore the McGhee (n 70) principle to jump the evidential gap will not be 
applied, at 24. 
182 Jones (n 38) 13. Figures vary but the ratio remains similar. 
183 Brazier and Cave (n 7) 203. 
184 Chester v Afshar (n 5) and Chester (n 36). Full analysis of medical law regarding consent to treatment 
is outwith the remit of the thesis. 
185 For a fuller discussion of the symbolic and practical role of damages see Chapter 6 Damages below. 
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unnecessary186 and that, by creating another exception to the rules of causation in 
negligence, the law has been left in a state of flux.187 
 
a) Chester v Afshar: The Case 
 
In Chester v Afshar, a patient-claimant benefited from judicial willingness to modify the 
strict application of the rules of causation. The surgeon treating the patient for serious 
back pain failed to disclose a low (1-2 per cent) but serious risk of nerve damage and 
paralysis inherent in the operation. This manifested itself and the patient sued in 
negligence claiming that had she been informed of the risk she would not have gone 
ahead with the operation when she did.188 It was not established at trial, however, and 
the claimant did not argue, that she would never undergo the operation (and so never 
undergo the risk). It was, moreover, accepted that the risk in question was a constant: it 
was an integral part of the operation in question; it was irrelevant who performed it or 
when. Thereby an important issue arose as to whether it could meaningfully be said as a 
matter of law that the surgeon caused the patient’s harm. Lords Hoffmann and Bingham 
(dissenting) were adamant and emphatic in their rejection of the claimant’s case. For 
Lord Bingham, she had not met the basic requirements of the ‘but-for’ test – she had not 
shown that but for the failure to warn, she would never have undergone surgery.189 Lord 
Hoffmann stated that there was no basis in the ordinary principles of tort law for 
recovery, and he was unconvinced that a special rule was needed in this case.190 But it 
was precisely on this point that Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Walker 
of Gestingthorpe (the majority opinion) took issue with their colleagues.191 While each 
acknowledged that there could not be recovery on the ‘standard rules’, they argued, 
variously, that policy, justice, or the particular nature of decisions relating to one’s 
health and well-being called for a departure from those rules. Common to their 
                                             
186 J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’ (Jul 2006) 122 Law 
Quarterly Review 426-448 at 426 ‘the consequence of the breach would fall within the scope of liability 
for consequences of breach in the tort of negligence’. 
187 K Mason and D Brodie, ‘Bolam, Bolam-Wherefore art thou Bolam?’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 
298 at 305. 
188 The breach of the requisite standard of care requiring that the information should have been disclosed 
was not in doubt. Note the concern that ‘the House of Lords has moved from upholding the professional 
standard of disclosure to accepting that of the subjective or prudent patient’ in Mason and Brodie (n 187), 
at 302. 
189 Chester (n 36) para 8. 
190 Ibid. para 32. 
191 Support was drawn from the Australian decision in Chappel v Hart [1999] 2 LRC 341, which dealt 
with the same issue and there was also a division of opinion amongst the justices. 
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arguments was the view that these negligence actions are essentially concerned with 
protecting the patient’s right to choose – therein lies her autonomy.192 
 
i. The House of Lords’ Solution 
 
The House of Lords held by a majority that it did not matter that Ms Chester could not 
show that she would not have had the operation: in order to vindicate the claimant’s 
right of choice and to provide a remedy for the breach in respect of that particular 
operation by that particular surgeon, a modification of the traditional principles of 
causation was required. As noted above, Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffmann would have 
dismissed the appeal. However, the majority (Lords Steyn, Hope and Walker) held that 
the issue of causation was to be addressed by reference to the scope of the doctor’s duty 
to warn.193 Their judgment was that this duty was central to her right to exercise an 
informed choice. Since the injury she sustained was within the scope of that duty and 
was the result of the risk of which she was entitled to be warned, the injury was to be 
regarded as having been caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. In order to provide a 
remedy for that breach and to avoid the normal rule of causation from rendering the 
duty useless, justice required a narrow modification of that rule.194 
 
b) Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence? 
 
Failure of medical advice by a doctor can vitiate a patient’s consent to treatment, giving 
rise to battery, and it can also constitute a breach of the doctor’s duty to inform, thereby 
bringing it into the scope of an action in negligence. Thus a failure to inform pertains to 
the torts both of battery and negligence.195 The distinction between medical trespass and 
negligence, which is pertinent to my discussion of Chester, is based upon the difference 
between the types of medical advice that are not communicated. If the failure to inform 
                                             
192 Mason and Laurie (n 135) 119. 
193 The importance of the duty to warn, whatever its ideological basis or interest it protects, in practice 
then provides a basis for imposing liability for physical injury not caused by negligence. P Cane, ‘A 
Warning about Causation’ (Jan 1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review, 21-27. 
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195 Tan Keng Feng, ‘Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence?’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 2, 149-
168 at 149. See this article for full discussion of the history of trespass actions and distinctions between 
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pertains to the nature of treatment196 it relates to consent in trespass, and if it pertains to 
risks involved in treatment it is negligence.197 Trespass is concerned with protecting the 
patient’s integrity whereas negligence is concerned both with protecting the patients’ 
interests in information and with the standard of professional medical conduct.198 
Nevertheless, where failure to warn is concerned, the patient’s autonomy is curtailed as 
he loses the chance to decide which risks to undertake. (Where there has been 
carelessness in the medical treatment, the patient would normally sue in negligence.) 
 
There are, however, differences between the two torts. In battery, a patient need not 
establish any tangible injury. The actionable injury is the uninvited invasion of her body 
and it is no defence to a charge of battery that the doctor thought the operation was in 
her best interests.199 There is no requirement for the patient to prove that if she had been 
asked to consent to the relevant treatment she would have refused; nor is there need to 
show loss. The onus of proof of lack of consent lies with the claimant.200 The 
disadvantages to the doctor of liability in trespass over negligence include: the doctor in 
order to defend himself must prove that there had been consent; the measure of damages 
may be wider (direct damages instead of foreseeable damages), causation is more easily 
established in trespass than in negligence, the benefit of therapeutic privilege is not 
available in trespass, medical trespass carries more reprobation against the doctor than 
negligence, and medical insurance may be less easily available in respect of medical 
trespass than negligence.201 
 
c) Negligence, Causation and Informed Consent202 
 
i. The problem 
 
A doctor is usually under a legal duty to a patient to warn him in general terms of 
possible serious risks involved in a proposed treatment and, as noted, treatment without 
the consent of the patient is unlawful. Where the surgeon fails to give a warning of a 
                                             
196 Appleton v Garrett (1995) 34 BMLR an action in battery. Consent vitiated by fraudulent 
misrepresentation of practitioner. 
197 Feng (n 195). See footnote 19 at 153 for details. 
198 Ibid. Emphasis is the author’s. 
199Brazier and Cave (n 7) 115-116 with supporting case references. Note: If a patient is deemed to have 
capacity she can withhold consent even if decision appears to be contrary to her best interests. 
200 Freeman v Home Office [1984] 2 WLR 130.  
201 Feng (n 195) 165 also C Lewis and A Buchan, Lewis and Buchan: Clinical Negligence, 7th edn 
(Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2012) 212.  
202 A full discussion of the law regarding informed consent is outwith the scope of the thesis. 
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potential risk of complication203 and the patient consents to the operation which results 
in that very complication developing, the patient is entitled to damages in negligence 
provided that, on normal principles of causation, he can establish that had he been 
properly warned he would not have consented to the procedure.204 The patient must then 
show that the doctor’s failure caused the injury of which he complains. It was the 
narrow question of causation that directly concerned the Law Lords in Chester.205 
 
In what sense can a failure to warn of a risk which materialises be considered its 
cause?206 It can be considered a necessary condition or a feature in creating a situation 
where the injury may occur but in common usage would not be a cause. However Peter 
Cane suggests it becomes a legal cause. Cane hypothesises that the courts distinguish 
legal notions of causation from scientific ones in their desire to stress that legal 
causation has to do with responsibility (a normative concept) whereas scientific 
causation does not. 207 
 
In Chester, the doctor was under a legal duty to warn of the possible serious risks 
involved in his proposed treatment. He failed to warn her of a small but serious risk of 
cauda equine syndrome which unfortunately eventuated. Deciding on whether or not the 
claimant would have consented had she been properly informed of the risk requires a 
subjective review of what that particular claimant would have done, albeit that the 
evidential testimony is after the fact. The patient’s view may then be compared to 
notions of what a reasonable patient would have done; in other words, an objective 
test.208 If the evidence is that the claimant would have gone ahead with the operation, 
even if warned of the risk, causation is not established.209 The special feature in Chester 
is that the claimant was honest enough to say that she would not have proceeded on that 
occasion but would probably have undergone the operation subsequently. 
 
                                             
203 There are varied thresholds of risk. In Sidaway (n 38) per Lord Bridges a 10% risk, in Pearce v United 
Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1999) 48 BMLR 118, a 0.1–0.2 % per Lord Woolf while noting Sidaway 
(n 38) applied the reasonable patient’s standard of information disclosure. In Chester (n 36) the risk was 
1–2%. 
204 Aldous (n 194) 83. 
205 Brazier and Cave (n 7) 113. 
206 See Cane (n 193) 22 discussing Chappel v Hunt (1998) 72 A L J R 1344 (HC (Aus)). 
207 Ibid at 26 ‘Scientists deal in risks and probabilities, lawyers in responsibility and liability’. 
208 ‘The objective test’ Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 
285, per Hutchinson J. 
209 Smith v Salford Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 321.  
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d) Chester and Damages 
 
In terms of compensation, in negligence, a defendant is only liable for the kind of 
damage which he reasonably ought to have foreseen.210 In battery, the test is more 
stringent and the defendant may be liable for all the damage which can factually be 
shown to have flowed from the wrongdoing. As will be shown,211 judges in England 
have sought to limit the scope of battery when it overlaps with negligence. The question 
then becomes ‘for what is the patient being compensated?’ Chester became an action in 
negligence but I agree with Grahame Aldous’s212 analysis that a patient’s right to be 
duly informed of the risks of a proposed procedure would be more easily vindicated by 
an award of damages in trespass, which would then not have required any change to the 
principles of causation.213 In addition, in Chester the measure of damages was on 
conventional negligence grounds, reflecting the difference between her condition 
following surgery and the condition she would have been in without surgery. If the 
focus were rather on the claimant’s vindication of her rights, then the measure of 
damages allowed does not, in truth, reflect the loss suffered because at the end of the 
day, the loss lay in an invasion of autonomy per se, and an award of full damages can be 
said to over-compensate.214 One approach would have been to ‘offer a modest award or 
solatium’215 to acknowledge the infringement of the claimant’s autonomy by fault of the 
defendant, although it would have been difficult to fix a suitable price.216 Another 
option would be to recognise a new tort of infringement of autonomy.217 In the event, 
the judges in Chester v Afshar focused on the issue of causation in negligence and 
breach of contract accepting that, ‘once the patient is informed in broad terms of the 
nature of the procedure, her consent to it is real and her cause of action for failure to 
warn is negligence, not trespass’.218 
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e) Tort after Chester 
 
It is the concept of moral responsibility and wrongdoing which pervades the majority 
opinion in Chester. The Lords were candid in dealing with the causation issue and, 
while accepting that the claimant would fail on conventional causation rules, found a 
way for her to succeed. This leaves causation rules in flux as there is uncertainty about 
when the court will opt for policy over rules. Chester was a case in the private sector. I 
argue that liability to damages for failure to disclose a 1–2 per cent risk could be very 
costly indeed in the context of NHS settings and budgets.219 One should perhaps look at 
the potential severity of the risk as well as the likelihood of it materialising. Also, I 
believe that the judgment in Chester v Afshar was punitive to the defendant, who was 
not negligent in the performance of the surgery.220 
 
Although the Law Lords in Gregg v Scott221 discuss the difficulties in clinical 
negligence cases, there does not appear to be any commitment to extending the ‘rule’ to 
jump evidential gaps. In Chester, the policy issue concerned the new emphasis on the 
Human Rights Act 1998, but Lord Hoffmann, giving a vigorous dissenting judgment, 
said: ‘the wholesale adoption of possible rather than probable causation, the criterion of 
liability, would be so radical a change in our law as to amount to a legislative act’.222 He 
emphasised that such a change would have enormous implications for insurers and the 
NHS and, as such, it should be for Parliament rather than the judiciary to decide 
whether it should be introduced. Once again we see the tension between corrective 
justice for the individual (or class of victims) and distributive justice as to the 
distribution of funding risks. The courts at this point often suggest ‘this is a decision for 
Parliament’. While Baroness Hale seeks to contend that Chester v Afshar was a case 
confined to ‘…problems which could be remedied without altering the principles 
applicable to the great majority of personal injury cases which give rise to no real 
injustice or particular problems’,223 I agree with Emily Jackson224 that a successful 
claim in negligence for failure to disclose a material risk is, in practice, synonymous 
with strict liability for medical mishaps and therefore problematic. The requirement of 
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informed consent then becomes a route for patients to seek financial compensation for 
unfortunate but blameless medical outcomes. Doctors who exercised all reasonable care 
and skill in performing an operation would be found liable for the consequences of an 
accident which they could have done nothing to prevent, just because their pre-operative 
disclosures were inadequate.225 
 
IV. LOSS OF CHANCE 
 
Frequently, the claimant’s complaint in a medical negligence action is not that the 
doctor has inflicted ‘additional’ injury, but that, as a result of the defendant’s 
negligence, his medical condition has not been improved or has been allowed to 
deteriorate. Accordingly, the claimant has been deprived of the opportunity of making a 
full or proper recovery from the illness or injury for which he first sought treatment. 
Applying the ‘but-for’ test of causation, if, on the balance of probabilities, competent 
treatment would have prevented the deterioration which has occurred, or produced an 
improvement, the negligence is causally related to the damage and the defendant is 
responsible. 
 
Where, however, the patient’s prospects of a successful outcome to the treatment were 
estimated to be less than 5%, the patient cannot satisfy the test, because even with 
proper treatment the damage would probably (that is, more likely than not) have 
occurred in any event.226 These are the cases which provide the present challenge to the 
English courts. There is a real question whether the loss of a chance approach is 
applicable in medical negligence cases where an adverse result is suffered for which 
there was a substantial probability even without negligence, but negligence has 
materially increased that probability.227 
 
In her seminal article ‘The Gist of Negligence’,228 Jane Stapleton sets out the theoretical 
framework for formulating the gist of an action in negligence, not in terms of ‘the 
outcome’ (past fact) but in terms of the lost chance of avoiding the outcome. She argues 
that the most important impact of uncertainty about what is or could be the actionable 
                                             
225 Ibid. 
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‘damage’ in a negligence action is on the requirements for the proof of causation, since 
the causation issue is subordinate to and defined by the question of what forms the gist 
of the action.229 While the Court of Appeal in Hotson v East Berkshire Health 
Authority230 accepted that pure loss of chance, that is, one not consequential on existing 
physical or financial loss, could become a category of loss, the House of Lords’ decision 
in Hotson left open the question of whether or not loss of chance could be a successful 
negligence claim. 
 
The inherent unfairness of not recognising a ‘loss of chance’ itself as a compensable 
cause of action was stated by Justice Dore in the American case of Herskovits v Group 
Health Co-operative of Puget Sound.231 In this case, due to the negligent failure to 
diagnose the patient’s tumour, the patient’s survival rate for more than five years was 
reduced from 39% to only 2%. The court allowed the case to go to the jury on the 
question of proximate cause, although the ‘loss’ constituted the 14% reduction in the 
chance of survival, and any damages would be limited to the loss attributable to the 
premature death, not the death itself. J Dore pointed out that: ‘To decide otherwise 
would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was 
less than a 50% chance of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence’.232 This 
comment was echoed in the observations of the Court of Appeal in Hotson v East 
Berkshire Area Health Authority233 that, applying the all-or-nothing approach to a 
patient whose chances of a successful outcome to his treatment were less than 50%, 
means the patient has no action against the doctor no matter how negligent he has been. 
This creates what is, in effect, an unenforceable duty to exercise reasonable care. 
 
The way of analysing these cases was suggested by Judge Advocate Santow in the New 
South Wales case of Rufo v Hosking:234 
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The role of the court in making an assessment of damages which depends upon its view 
as to what will be and what would have been is to be contrasted with its ordinary 
function in civil actions of determining what was. In determining what did happen in the 
past a court decides on the balance of probabilities. Anything that is more probable than 
not it treats as certain. But in assessing damages which depend upon its view as to what 
will happen in the future, or would have happened in the future, if something had not 
happened in the past, the court must make an estimate as to what were the chances that 
a particular thing will or would have happened and reflect those chances, whether they 
are more or less even, in the amount of damages which it rewards. 
 
He goes on to say that the High Court in Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990)235 added an 
important refinement, namely, to include past events of a hypothetical character in the 
‘what would have been’ category where loss of chance or prospect holds sway. This 
renders those past events, being of a hypothetical character, amenable to compensation 
on a lost chance basis, though that chance be less than even, provided the duty of care 
extends so far.236 
 
A. Historical Loss of Chance Case: Hotson 
 
English courts have so far decided against loss of chance liability in medical negligence 
cases.237 The governing principles at present are those elucidated by the House of Lords 
in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority.238 In Hotson the claimant suffered an 
injury and was referred to hospital where a doctor negligently failed to diagnose a hip 
injury. Five days later the boy returned to hospital, at which time the hip injury was 
discovered. However, by this time the hip injury had also resulted in a deformity of the 
hip joint. The defendants argued that the deformity would have occurred whether or not 
a timely diagnosis had been made during the first visit at the hospital. 
 
The trial judge found that the Health Authority’s delay in diagnosis denied the claimant 
a 25% chance of avoiding the hip deformity. He thus gave the claimant 25% of the 
amount of damages he would have received had the injury been solely caused by the 
delayed diagnosis. Simon Brown J held that, where a ‘substantial chance’ of a better 
medical result had been lost, it was not necessary to prove that the adverse medical 
result was directly attributable to the breach of duty because the issue was the proper 
quantum of damage rather than causation. 
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This approach was upheld by the Court of Appeal, where Sir John Donaldson MR 
characterised the claim as the loss of benefit of timely treatment, rather than the chance 
of successful treatment. His Lordship said that the use of the word ‘chance’ was 
inaccurate because it elides the identification of the loss with the evaluation of the loss, 
which are distinct processes. Just as the categories of negligence are never closed, there 
was no reason why the categories of loss should be closed either.239 The Court of 
Appeal agreed with the Master of the Rolls, saying: ‘As a matter of common sense, it is 
unjust that there should be no liability for failure to treat a patient, simply because the 
chances of a successful cure by that treatment were less than 50%.’240 
 
The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal, however, on the basis that the 
judge’s finding that there was a high probability put at 75%, that even with the correct 
diagnosis and treatment the claimant’s disability would have occurred, amounted to a 
finding of fact that the accidental injury was the sole cause of the disability.241 In other 
words, this was not a ‘lost chance case’, it was an ‘all-or-nothing’ case – either the fall 
or the misdiagnosis caused the disability, and on the balance of probabilities it was the 
fall. The valuation of a ‘lost chance’ would only arise once causation had been 
established. As has been pointed out, however, this decision fails to address the essence 
of the claimant’s argument, which was whether a claim formulated as a loss of chance 
was acceptable.242 If the nature of the damage could be redefined as the loss of a chance 
of a successful outcome, rather than the outcome itself (the disability) then on a 
traditional causation test the defendant’s negligence clearly did cause the damage (that 
is, the lost chance). Logically, the question of whether the defendant’s negligence 
caused damage is an issue that can only be dealt with after the nature of the damage has 
been defined.243 The question of whether it would ever be possible to claim for loss of a 
chance in tort was specifically left open by their Lordships in Hotson.244 
 
The wider question remains as to whether, in a claim for personal injury, it would ever 
be appropriate to award the claimant a proportionate fraction of the full damages where 
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the cause of the injury was unascertainable and all the claimant could show was a 
statistical chance that was less than even (ie less than 50%) that, but for the defendant’s 
breach of duty, he would not have suffered the injury. Hotson v East Berkshire 
Authority,245 which left open the question of compensation for loss of chance, appears to 
stand in the way unless it is distinguishable on the basis that, as Mance LJ explained in 
the Court of Appeal,246 Hotson was dealing with a past historic fact, not one in prospect. 
It was, moreover, a case where the adverse consequence of that past fact was inevitable 
in any event, for example with the result that negligent failure to diagnose in time a 
traumatic fracture of the femur had no causal effect on the necrosis. 
 
There are unquestionably policy issues standing in the way of the courts’ acceptance of 
loss of chance as the gist of a negligence action in medical negligence cases. As has 
been seen above, Wilsher v Essex AHA247 was found to have been correctly decided by 
Lord Hoffmann in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.248 As noted earlier, 
fundamental to Lord Hoffmann’s thinking was the cost to the Health Service of 
extending liability. Stapleton249 points out that, if the claimants’ arguments succeed, the 
likelihood is that more loss of chance claims would be eligible but that the value of the 
awards across the board would decrease as damages would be awarded on a percentage 
basis.250 This issue arose directly in the case of Gregg v Scott.251 I will present the 
factual context of the case, followed by the judgments in the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords, and conclude this section with a brief discussion of loss of chance 
cases. 
 
B. Loss of Chance: Gregg v Scott 
 
The claimant had non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. His doctor negligently diagnosed a benign 
lipoma. The judge found that the negligent delay reduced the claimant’s chance of 
ten-year survival from 42% at the date of the relevant consultation to 25% at the time of 
trial. It was therefore not possible to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that 
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earlier treatment would have affected the chance of ten-year survival. The claim, 
therefore, failed. 
 
The trial judge, applying Hotson, dismissed the claim on the basis that, for a person 
with his condition, the chances of a cure were in any event less than 50%, so that as a 
matter of past fact, it was more probable than not that the claimant would have been in 
his present position even if treatment had started promptly. The Court of Appeal, by a 
majority, dismissed the claimant’s appeal. In the House of Lords, the claimant advanced 
two arguments. The first was the ‘quantification argument’ that the delay in diagnosis 
had caused physical damage. The second was the ‘loss of chance’ argument that the 
case was factually different from Hotson, so that Hotson did not preclude a claim based 
on a reduced prospect of survival; but even if Hotson did apply, the decision in 
Fairchild permitted the court to depart from it. By a 3:2 majority, the House of Lords 
rejected the claim. Unfortunately, given the significant disparities in their Lordships’ 
speeches, no clear principle has emerged. Despite the majority decision that Mr Gregg’s 
action should be dismissed, it remains arguable that in some circumstances a missed 
diagnosis could give rise to a claim based on a lost chance of a better medical 
outcome.252 
 
1. Gregg v Scott in the Court of Appeal 
 
The Court of Appeal, by a 2:1 majority, upheld the trial judge’s ruling on the basis that, 
because the chance of survival at the time of the defendant’s negligence was below 
50%, following Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority,253 the defendant could not be 
held causally responsible.254 The majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the claimant’s 
arguments, albeit on differing grounds. Mance LJ distinguished Hotson on the basis that 
in Hotson the avascular necrosis was inevitable whereas, in this case, the defendant’s 
negligence had led to the spread of the tumour. He distinguished between cases where 
the evidence was purely statistical (as in Gregg) 255and where it leads to a finding of fact 
about the claimant’s own injury (Hotson). Mance LJ took the view that Hotson left open 
the possibility of a ‘loss of chance’ claim in ‘a statistical case’ as the doctor’s duty in 
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such a case was to maximise the chances of survival. That purpose militated in favour of 
liability when the doctor’s negligence decreased the chances of the claimant surviving. 
However, Mance LJ accepted that policy considerations should lead to its rejection in 
clinical negligence cases: 
 
I think that to accept the appellant’s suggested approach in the present (very common) 
category of medical negligence case, involving failure to diagnose, would both open a 
considerable gate to claims based on percentages, and create a new category of case 
which will be difficult to distinguish in practice from other common cases of medical 
negligence.256 
 
He rejected, however, the contention that the growth of the tumour due to the 
defendant’s negligence was a tort in itself. He also rejected the argument that Fairchild 
enables a more flexible approach to determining causation. Brown LJ found nothing in 
the claimant’s case to distinguish it from Hotson and agreed that nothing in the speeches 
in the House of Lords in Fairchild supported a more relaxed approach to determining 
causation. ‘With considerable regret’,257 he dismissed the appeal. 
 
Latham LJ delivered the dissenting judgment. He agreed with Mance LJ that Hotson 
was distinguishable on the grounds that, in this case, the defendant’s negligence made 
the claimant’s position worse. In his opinion, once it had been established that the 
defendant’s negligence had allowed the spread of the tumour, liability was established 
and it was merely a function of quantum to assess the consequences of that negligence 
(the reduced prospects of successful treatment). However, Latham LJ258 saw the dangers 
of applying this approach to cases of ‘loss of chance simpliciter’ where the claimant has 
been exposed to a risk of injury but has not yet suffered any injury. Such claims would 
be ‘speculative’ being based solely on the risk of future injury. It was different, 
however, where the claimant had suffered injury that necessarily included ‘the loss of a 
chance of some benefit’. 
 
Thus, the Court of Appeal, while recognising that ‘the common man might have some 
difficulty understanding why damages were not recoverable’, stepped back from taking 
the enormous step of recognising loss of chance cases in the context of medical 
negligence claims. The decision is important because it re-affirms that the Fairchild 
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decision is a decision on its own particular facts and, while there may be other 
analogous situations where a Fairchild approach to assessing causation is appropriate, 
that category of case is to be kept within strict limits and the balance of probabilities 
remains the guiding principle to determining causation. 
 
2. Loss of Chance in the House of Lords 
 
a) The Claimant’s Arguments: The Quantification Argument259 
 
As noted above, in the House of Lords the claimant advanced two lines of argument. 
Firstly, he said, no novel question about the recoverability of damages for a loss of 
chance arose at all. It was common ground that the delay caused some spread of cancer 
cells which could and should have been avoided. That spread was physical damage in 
the conventional sense. The tort was fully consummated: there was a breach of duty, 
and that breach had caused loss. The claimant was therefore entitled to succeed. The 
only remaining question was how much the claim was worth. Once one was in the realm 
of quantification there was nothing unusual about the idea of damages for a lost chance. 
Valuing the lost chance might be practically difficult, but not conceptually demanding. 
The House referred to this as the ‘quantification argument’. 
 
The quantification argument, although found persuasive by Latham LJ in the Court of 
Appeal,260 foundered in the House of Lords.261 Lord Hoffmann said that it begged the 
question raised in the second argument, namely, whether a loss of chance was 
compensable: 
 
It is true that the delay caused an early spread of the cancer and that this reduced his 
percentage chance of survival for more than ten years. But to say that the claimant can 
therefore obtain damages for the reduction in his chances of survival assumes in his 
favour that a reduction in the chance of survival is a recoverable head of damage; an 
issue raised by the claimant’s second argument. On the other hand, if the claim is 
actually for depriving him of survival for more than ten years, the question is whether 
the spread of the cancer caused it. The judge’s finding was that it did not. It was likely 
that his life would have been shortened to less than ten years anyway (ie by the 
disease).262 
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Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale pointed out that before one gets to the stage of 
quantification, the causal connection between a tort and consequential loss of any kind 
has to be proved on the balance of probabilities – precisely what could not be done here: 
 
Consequential loss still has to be consequential upon, that is caused by, the injury that 
has been caused by the Defendant’s negligence. If I am injured in a road accident, I still 
have to prove that any earnings I have lost are caused by that injury and not by, for 
example, my decision to give up work and go round the world.263 
 
b) The Loss of Chance Argument 
 
The second argument was the undiluted loss of chance argument. This asserted that a 
lost chance was a real loss and should be recognised as such by the law.264 Charles 
Foster explains the contrast between the majority and dissenting judgments as the 
tension between justice ‘best achieved by legal certainty’ and justice demanding a 
relaxation of the old rules of causation, thereby allowing compensation in an individual 
case.265 The difference could also be described as the tension between corrective justice 
for the individual and distributive justice for the overall patients of the National Health 
Service.266 Both approaches have merit. 
 
In the House of Lords it was accepted that the cursory examination of the patient by his 
GP was negligent;267 the crux of the matter was whether this had caused a recognised 
legal harm. In the final analysis, the claimant argued that his ‘harm’ was the loss of the 
chance of survival for more than ten years or, put differently, the loss of a chance of a 
more favourable outcome to his prognosis. Statistical evidence indicated that while the 
claimant might have had a 42% chance of still being alive after ten years if there had 
been no negligence, this chance was reduced to 25% because of the negligence. There 
was, therefore, a significant drop in his statistical chances as a result of his 
misdiagnosis, but – crucially – at no point did he enjoy a more than 50% chance of 
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survival beyond ten years.268 On a strict application of Hotson and the balance of 
probabilities test, then, the GP did not cause the alleged harm: it was not ‘more probable 
than not’ that, but for the negligence, the patient would be alive after ten years. The trial 
judge found that he probably would not be. Put another way, even without the 
negligence, there would have been a 58% chance that the patient would not survive the 
decade. 
 
This outcome was unacceptable to Lords Nicholls and Hope (dissenting). Lord Nicholls, 
in particular, argued forcefully that the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to what would have 
happened but for the negligence – that is the application of the 49/51% rule from 
Hotson – was premised on a falsehood. Namely, that ‘…a patient’s prospects of 
recovery are treated as non-existent whenever they exist but fall short of 50%’.269 This 
then led to arbitrary and unjust outcomes: ‘[i]t means that, a patient with a 60% chance 
of recovery reduced to a 40% prospect by medical negligence, can obtain compensation. 
But he can obtain nothing if his prospects were reduced from 40% to nil.270 And Lord 
Hope opined that the principle on which a patient’s loss as a result of negligence is to be 
calculated – and presumably recompensed – is the same whether the prospects were 
better or worse than 50%.271 
 
The majority, however, rejected the appeal and did so largely to protect the integrity of 
legal principles. Lady Hale distinguished the House’s ruling in Fairchild and Chester as 
cases ‘dealing with particular problems which could be remedied without altering the 
principles applicable to the great majority of personal injury cases which give rise to no 
real injustice or practical problem’.272 She considered the instant case to be an invitation 
to introduce ‘liability for the loss of a chance of a more favourable outcome’. But she 
refused to do so because of the complexities involved and the consequences this would 
have. Those consequences were largely summed up by Lords Phillips and Hoffmann. In 
their view, a departure from Hotson would change the basis of causation from 
probability to possibility, that is, that some form of recovery would be due if it was 
shown that it was possible that the negligence might affect a patient’s case. Not only 
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should this be a matter for Parliament, but as Lady Hale put it: ‘it would in practice 
always be tempting to conclude that the doctor’s negligence had affected…[the 
claimant’s] chances to some extent’. Lord Hoffmann suggested that to extend the 
Fairchild principle, without identifying any control mechanisms to limit its application, 
would amount to a legislative act and have ‘enormous consequences for insurance 
companies and the National Health Service’.273 And, finally we have Lord Phillips: ‘it 
seems to me that there is a danger, if special tests of causation are developed piecemeal 
to deal with perceived injustices in particular factual situations, that the coherence of 
our common law will be destroyed’.274 
 
To conclude this section, it is important to be clear about what recoverable losses in 
respect of missed diagnosis of cancer are presently compensable. Where it is possible to 
identify something specific that a claimant has lost as a result of a diagnostic error, 
rather than a ‘mere’ statistical chance, then the claimant is entitled to compensation for 
that loss. Their Lordships in Greg v Scott accepted that if a delayed diagnosis had 
resulted in extra pain, suffering, loss of amenity and financial loss due, for example, to 
the patient having to face more drastic medical intervention than would have been the 
case, then compensation for this loss would be payable. Baroness Hale also seemed to 
accept that a modest claim for reduction of life expectancy could arise where the 
claimant’s life expectancy had been reduced compared to patients in the claimant’s 
position who had received prompt treatment, even if the patient was in the category of 
patients who, with prompt treatment, would probably have died.275 As we see below, 
this analysis appears straightforward. 
 
C. Discussion of Loss of Chance 
 
Should medical negligence cases allow a remedy to the claimant whose injury, more 
likely than not, would have occurred without any negligence on the part of the doctor, 
but where that negligence nonetheless denies the claimant a material chance of a better 
outcome? As Andrew Grubb sees it,276 the way Latham LJ277 rationalises the Gregg 
case, the claimant would succeed on conventional grounds. He had suffered a physical 
                                             
273 Gregg (n 2) Paragraph 90. 
274 Gregg (n 2) Paragraph 172. 
275 Jones (n 38) 161. 
276 Grubb in Deakin et al. (n 23) ch 3 of 5th edn, 1. Problems of Medical Law, p 261 and comment on 
p 325. 
277 Gregg EWCA (n 251). 
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injury (the enlarged tumour) which consequentially reduced the claimant’s chance of 
survival. So rationalised, it is indistinguishable in principle from a case of physical 
injury, say to the head, which creates a future risk of epilepsy. The claimant is entitled 
to recover for risk of future injury. Here, the claimant is entitled to recover for the risk 
that his life will be cut shorter than it otherwise would.278 
 
Grubb goes on to discuss the question of a ‘pure’ loss of a chance. Whether the law 
should allow recovery for a statistical chance of injury, or avoiding injury, involves 
policy arguments on both sides. Courts throughout the world have tried to grapple with 
this issue but with no unanimity of approach or outcome.279 Grubb remains rather 
sanguine about the subject, saying that ‘the volume of judicial and academic words 
devoted to this issue may be misplaced’: 
 
In reality, Brown LJ in Gregg v Scott is probably right that it is impossible to visualise 
where a claim could arise apart, that is, from the ‘loss of chance simpliciter’ cases. 
Either the claimant will suffer injury and be able to establish (or not as the case may be) 
that the defendant’s negligence caused that injury or ‘the chance’ will be conceptualised 
as a future risk/benefit which can be linked and grounded in actual physical injury 
suffered by the claimant. Latham LJ’s interpretation of the facts in Gregg v Scott has 
much to commend it.280 
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see what factors must be shown if a ‘loss of chance’ 
action materialises. 
 
It is instructive to see how Santow JA analyses the question in the recent New South 
Wales case of Rufo v Hosking.281 This is a case of medical negligence dealing with 
recoverability for loss of a less than 50% chance of avoiding spinal microfractures 
suffered in the course of heavy dosage treatment with corticosteroids against Lupus. It 
shows that while intermediate courts of appeal in Australia do not yet have the guidance 
of a High Court decision affirming ‘loss of chance’ in medical negligence, the trend of 
intermediate appellate and first instance authority in Australia favours that approach. 
 
Santow JA suggests that there is much to be said for consistency, whereby a chance 
above or below 50% obtains no more or no less in compensation than the corresponding 
                                             
278 See Grub (n 23) at 323 fn 476 (Mance LJ and Brown LJ did not accept this analysis). Also fn 477 on 
valuing a ‘diminution of life expectancy’. 
279 Grubb (n 23) 261; see Rufo v Hosking (n 227) below. 
280 Grubb (n 23) 324. 
281 Rufo v Hosking (n 227) para 52. See also discussion in Jones (n 38) 513. 
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percentage, instead of an all-or-nothing approach. That should not open the floodgates 
to loss of chance claims in the medical negligence field. The loss of chance must itself 
be established on the balance of probabilities (that it was a real chance) as also that the 
chance, if offered, would have been taken.282 Another limiting factor is that the 
question, why should there be recovery for loss of a chance when less than even, turns 
on the nature of the duty of care imposed on the medical practitioner. Doctors are not, 
and cannot be, guarantors of outcomes. What their duty encompasses is reasonable skill 
and care directed to achieving the best possible medical outcome and thus to eliminating 
or reducing so far as practicable, the risk of things going wrong. The case of Rufo was a 
case where the loss of a chance does afford a proper basis for compensation. It 
highlights the importance of considering the duty of care not in isolation, but in 
conjunction with a fair assessment of the difficult task facing a doctor having to choose 
between various options, each with their own risks. Santow JA concludes his judgment 
with a quote from Harold Luntz:283 
 
Where a medical practitioner fails to exercise reasonable care, the aim of the law 
generally is not to reposition the plaintiff as though no treatment had been given, but as 
though proper treatment had been given whether the claim lies in contract or tort. In 
many instances proper treatment could have done no more than give the plaintiff a 
chance of cure or alleviation of a pre-existing condition. This is something of value, 
something for which many people would give money. The law should treat such a chance 
as worthy of protection. 
 
It is still possible to talk about the law of causation. Many wondered, in the light of 
Fairchild and Chester v Afshar whether causation was ‘being drummed off the tortious 
stage’ by amorphous principles of fairness, principles so strident that they never stopped 
to ask whether it was fair to make someone pay for something he had not caused.284 
 
While Gregg represents an important victory for defendants and their insurers, the stark 
division of opinion amongst the Lords means that the issue will need to be revisited. 
The question is whether that will ultimately be the responsibility of the judges or the 
politicians. 
                                             
282 Ibid  (n 227) per JA Hodgson paragraphs 1-10 discussion of J Gaudron’s critique of loss of chance as 
the gist of a negligence claim in Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269, ats 277-281. J 
Gaudron suggested that this approach could disadvantage claimants in circumstances where the chance of 
successful treatment is more than 50%, as they would be paid damages for the lost chance and not the full 
amount of the lost treatment. 
283 ‘Loss of Chance’ in I Freckelton and D Mendelson (eds), Causation in Law and Medicine (Dartmouth, 
Ashgate, 2002) 197. 
284 Foster (n 48) 248. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CAUSATION 
 
There is no doubt that in academic circles there is disquiet about the current state of the 
law on causation. I have called this paper ‘Causation — The Search for Principle’ and I 
have tried to find the principles. It is not easy. Even when the principles are identified, it 
can be unclear which principle should be applied to the facts. I feel that barristers and 
advocates will continue to have difficulty with questions of causation and that the issue 
will continue to occupy the time of the Court of Appeal as often as it presently does.285 
 
What is being referred to by Janet Smith is that there are increasing numbers of cases in 
which the medical experts express their views on causation in terms of increased 
statistical risk.286 Unless and until the courts decide that the particular case falls within 
the Fairchild exception, such evidence will have to be dealt with by the application of 
the ‘but-for’ rule. Smith contends that what needs to be understood is that, if the 
defendant’s negligence has more than doubled (a twofold risk) the otherwise existing 
risk that the claimant will develop the disease, the claimant will succeed because, as a 
matter of logic, he will have shown that it is more likely that the negligence has caused 
his disease than that it has been caused by other potential causes.287 As we have seen, 
medical experts give evidence in ways not always congruent with legal requirements. 
And due to the complex nature of the human body and disease, the need to show a 
twofold risk is a high threshold to require. 
 
The point has been made that the complexity of causation creates a need for greater 
clarity and depth of analysis.288 A specific vocabulary of causal terms such as 
‘cumulative’, ‘alternative’, ‘divisible injury’, and ‘indivisible injury’ has emerged, 
providing for clearer reasoning about the relevance of decided cases. It is not helpful 
that Chester, a case regarding consent, should have been framed along causation lines. 
The Fairchild exception favours employees, while Wilsher and Gregg put patients’ 
interests behind NHS budgets. The implication of this will be considered in the 
following chapter on damages. 
 
                                             
285 Smith (n 113). Stauch (n 67). Case comment Bailey (n 68) Green (n 222). 
286 Ibid Smith at 112.  
287 Another example would be if a delay in diagnosis moves a cancer patient’s odds of recovery from a 
good chance of remission – 95% to a 30% chance of remission, the negligence would be seen to be the 
cause of the damage. 
288 G Turton, ‘A Case for Clarity in Causation?’ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 1, 140. 
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An apt summary of the nature and function of the use of the concept of causation in the 
law is to be found in Tony Honoré’s paper ‘Causation in the Law’.289 He sees causation 
as a multi-purpose tool, one function being ‘forward-looking’: specifying what will 
happen, and by what stages, if certain conditions are present together. More applicable 
to the present discussion are the following two functions: 
 
(1) backward-looking and explanatory: that of showing which earlier conditions 
best account for some later event or state of affairs and 
(2)  attributive: that of fixing the extent of responsibility of agents for the 
outcomes that follow on their agency or intervention in the world. 
 
Many legal inquiries are concerned to explain how some event or state of affairs came 
about, especially an untoward event such as death. However, in law, the third function 
of attribution is particularly salient and controversial. Whether someone is liable to 
punishment or to pay compensation, or is entitled to claim compensation, often depends 
on showing whether the person potentially liable has caused harm of a sort the law 
seeks to avoid. When considering causation and legal responsibility, it must be shown 
that the harm was done or brought about by the agency that the law treats as a potential 
basis for the existence or extent of liability. The relationship between causing harm and 
legal responsibility is complex. The complexities concern the incidence of 
responsibility, the grounds of responsibility, the items between which causal connection 
must be demonstrated, and the variety of relationships that can in some sense be 
regarded as causal. Although the question of what the law of negligence is ultimately 
trying to address deserves a chapter to itself, it is impossible to put it to one side. One 
can see the law of negligence as embodying the principle of individual responsibility for 
the consequences of one’s actions, as explained by Weinrib:290 
 
The law of negligence involves at the remedial stage a two-fold process. Not merely is 
the plaintiff compensated but this compensation is extracted from a particular 
defendant. And this particular defendant is not singled out because of some general 
moral deficiency, but because of his connection with the injury that has been inflicted. 
 
This is very persuasive as a principle, but when translated into reality one must admit 
that the concept of personal responsibility (corrective justice) gets somewhat diluted 
                                             
289 Honoré (n 141). 
290 Weinrib (n 95). 
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through the mechanisms of vicarious liability and insurance cover. As noted above,291 
the courts appear to be using the language of cause to decide questions of policy, such 
as which of the parties is best placed to shift the loss in question (distributive justice). 
The case law dealing with when the courts are prepared to adopt the McGhee/Fairchild 
principle in overcoming ‘evidential gaps’ in causation has, not unsurprisingly, been 
comprised of cases of employee/employer relationships where it is clear that policy 
decisions of fairness to employees are operating.292 Conversely, the requirements of 
proving causation in clinical negligence cases have been seen to be maladaptive. This is 
so because medicine is as much an art as a science and proving causation has been 
demonstrated to be an inexact science. Additionally, there is the issue of who pays the 
defendant’s damages, for example the National Health Service or employers.293 
Although it is not a principled idea that commercial employers are seen to be more able 
to pay damages, it is an underlying consideration that, if found liable, the National 
Health Service will be diverting money away from patient care. 
 
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a new era dawning in clinical negligence cases with 
the House of Lords decision empowering patients regarding informed consent in 
Chester v Afshar.294 The next marker for patients came with the House of Lords’ 
deliberations in Gregg v Scott,295 a ‘loss of chance’ case. The issue was whether ‘loss of 
chance’ could itself become a gist of negligence. The House of Lords in Gregg v Scott 
held, by a majority of two, that the law was, and should remain, that damages for loss of 
chance should only be forthcoming where the chance of a cure or recovery was over 
50%. There was wide-ranging discussion of the issues in the judgment: should medical 
negligence be like other forms of negligence; how should loss of chance be assessed 
statistically and could it be fairer; what is the definition of a cure? The judgments, while 
preserving the status quo, reflect disquiet in the courts that the present system is unjust. 
Mason and Laurie296 have noted that there have been significant rulings from the House of 
Lords that demonstrate well both the power and dangers of policy-driven judicial activism. 
While a hard line was taken in Gregg, it was difficult to reconcile this with the decidedly vague 
                                             
291 As noted. 
292 Lord Brooke (n 69) in discussing the Wilsher hearing (n 71) quoted Lord Fraser from Scotland, who 
told him the reason why there were so many cases from Scotland in the 1950s and 1960s which appeared 
to be doing funny things about causation in industrial disease cases was that the judges were so aghast by 
conditions in the Scottish factories that they were determined to use tort law to get employers’ liability 
insurers to do something about those conditions. Brooke (n 69) 6. 
293 Are there more favoured defendants? 
294 Chester (n 36). 
295 Gregg EWCA (n 251). 
296 Mason and Laurie (n 135) 163. 
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policy appeals of the majority in Chester. However, the trend emerging elsewhere is that the 
courts are bowing to pressure to assist the claimant over the causation hurdle in medico-legal 
cases.297 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS ON PROVING LIABILITY 
 
In these chapters, collectively, I have considered the question of the onus on the 
claimant who follows the legal route to redress for iatrogenic harm, in particular, the 
need to show that the defendant owed him a duty of care; that there was a breach of that 
duty; and finally that the breach caused the damage complained of. The duty of care 
determines, as a matter of policy, whether the type of loss suffered by the claimant in 
the particular manner in which it occurred can ever be actionable. In clinical negligence 
cases, proving a duty of care is usually not problematic, although there may be issues of 
timing as to when the duty properly arose. As regards the issue of breach of duty, this 
concerns setting the requisite standard of care required of a defendant in the 
circumstances in order to satisfy the duty of care, and whether the defendant’s conduct 
fell below that standard; whether the defendant was careless/negligent.298 The resolution 
of this issue depends greatly upon expert evidence, usually medical experts. 
 
A recurring theme throughout the entire thesis is the disparity in the conceptualisation 
of medico-legal problems between the medical and legal professions. Each profession 
comes to the problem of the need for legally recognised evidence from a different 
perspective. Historically, this was particularly tendentious, but hopefully, there is 
presently a more collaborative climate. As we have seen, these problems are nowhere 
more evident than in the quest to establish causation. In the event that the claimant is 
successful, the relief available is damages. In the next chapter, Damages, prior to 
considering the financial ramifications of the relief, I will look at the philosophical and 
symbolic meaning of financial compensation for non-pecuniary losses. 
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I suggest that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts today is not in the area 
of liability but of damages. Questions of liability have great doctrinal fascination. 
Questions of damage – and particularly their magnitude – do not lend themselves so 
easily to discourse. Professors dismiss them airily as matters of trial 
administration…1 
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The question, which our book tries to answer, is not focused on what one could 
call the ‘substantive’ part of the law of tort… – on which there is a fair amount of 
academic discussion, but on the ‘remedial’ part of tort law which has not been 
well served by academic literature. Here the questions, in their simplest form, 
are: ‘can the claimant obtain damages for this or that heading of damage?’ and, if 
so, ‘how much’?3 
 
This is the concluding chapter of the section of the thesis concerned with medical 
negligence litigation. Researching the earlier chapter on the funding of claims4 aroused 
feelings both of interest and dismay at the substantial financial hurdles prospective 
claimants now face. This chapter on damages5 is the cornerstone of a thesis concerned 
with redress for negligently inflicted personal injury in clinical negligence cases. 
Redress via the legal route will then be contrasted with the possibilities of redress 
offered through the NHS schemes, which will inform the second part of the thesis. 
 
Selective subjects have been chosen which resonate with issues pertinent to the Health 
Service. The chapter begins with a discussion of theories of compensation, 
consideration of what damages are for and what they represent. The choice of model of 
corrective or distributive justice, deterrence, or retribution determines notions of 
entitlement to financial redress. This becomes particularly challenging when looking at 
the heads of claim pertaining to non-pecuniary loss and the use of monetary 
compensation for intangible losses. I will concentrate on the theoretical and practical 
difficulties that claims for non-pecuniary loss, namely pain, suffering and loss of 
amenity, represent. I will then discuss claims for wrongful death which encompass 
bereavement payments.6 Having discussed non-pecuniary loss, I will briefly touch on 
relevant aspects of pecuniary loss. This is followed by a discussion of claims for 
psychiatric harm and/or injury which encompass both non-pecuniary and pecuniary 
losses. 
 
                                             
2 In this chapter, all italicised text is my emphasis unless otherwise explicitly mentioned otherwise. 
3 B Markesinis, M Coester, G Alpa and A Ullstein, Compensation for Personal Injury in English, German 
and Italian Law: A Comparative Outline (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 198. 
4 Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ above. 
5 Interestingly, in five years of legal studies, two hours were devoted to damages! 





I will argue that in accepting corrective justice as my preferred model, I have no quarrel 
regarding patients’ entitlement to full compensation for both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss. However, mindful that there are compelling competing calls on the NHS 
budget for treatment from other patients and members of the public, I would limit 
compensatory damages to pecuniary loss. This is because the NHS is, by its nature, a 
communal enterprise and the arguments for distributive justice which focus on the just 
distribution of goods across the population are also legitimate. In addition to this 
pragmatic argument, there is the theoretical one. Because, by its very nature, non-
pecuniary loss is unquantifiable in financial terms, after reviewing academic and 
judicial attempts to place financial value on these losses in this chapter, I will suggest 
alternative models for redress for this aspect of claims in the final part of the thesis.7 
 
The issue of redress for pecuniary loss is less theoretically challenging but of immense 
importance to claimants. In the larger picture, a serious crisis looms from the very 
challenge of tort law, exemplified by clinical negligence claims, as a suitable method of 
compensating accident victims8 in the modern welfare state.9 There have been perceived 
medical indemnity insurance crises in Australia, New Zealand, the USA and England. I 
will conclude with a brief review of their legislative responses to this. 
 
In sum, in the previous chapters, I have discussed the difficulties claimants face when 
trying to mount claims for clinical negligence. In the first chapter10 I argued that victims 
of iatrogenic harm have an entitlement to redress based on corrective justice principles. 
The second chapter11 canvassed the issue of what victims of iatrogenic harm would 
want as compensation. In the third chapter12 I discussed the difficulties of funding 
litigation, noting in particular the withdrawal of legal aid and future reliance on funding 
through CFAs. The two subsequent chapters concerned the difficulties claimants face in 
proving liability.13 If claimants successfully negotiate their claim, the redress available 
through the legal route to justice is damages (money). To the extent that money can 
provide like-for-like compensation, the redress is symmetrical and appropriate. 
                                             
7 See Part III Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress’ below. 
8 For example, patients suffering iatrogenic harm. 
9 C Sappideen and P Vines (eds) Fleming’s The Law of Torts 10th edn (Australia, Thomson Reuters 
(Professional) Ltd., 2011) 15. 
10 Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress Within the NHS’. 
11 Chapter 2 ‘What do Patients Seek from Redress?’ 
12 Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’. 





However, in the domain of redress for non-pecuniary loss, and confining this argument 
to the specific case of claims within the English NHS system, I will argue that 
alternatives to money should be available. 
 
II. SETTING THE SCENE: THEORIES AND PRACTICALITIES OF 
COMPENSATION 
 
What are damages for? Historically the entire field of tortious liability was divided 
according to its purposes into criminal, tortious, contractual and restitutionary. Each of 
these is distinguishable by the nature of the conduct or its consequences and the purpose 
for which remedies were given. Today, tort liability exists primarily to compensate the 
victim by compelling the wrongdoer to pay for the damage done. Its paradigm is the 
conflict between two individuals. The tort of negligence is now dominated by the law of 
accidents occasioned unintentionally. The law of torts is best seen as a system of 
corrective and distributive justice. Corrective justice takes the view that where a wrong 
is done by one person to another it must be corrected by compensation in order to 
equalise the moral balance between the parties. Distributive justice focuses on the just 
distribution of goods across a population and thus may cut across the pure corrective 
justice supposition that the two parties were equal. I have opted for liability and 
entitlement based on notions of corrective justice but distribution of damages (for non-
pecuniary loss) partially based on distributive justice grounds.14 
 
The remedy most successful claimants obtain is money damages. Where pecuniary loss 
is to be considered, the main issue is quantification. This is because one is replacing like 
with like and money, in this case, can go some way to restitutio in integrum. Non-
pecuniary loss poses an entirely different problem. Money may compensate for loss of 
earnings but can neither undo nor offer an equivalent for pain and suffering and 
distress.15 The principle of assessment in clinical negligence claims is to value the 
damage that arises from the negligence as opposed to the damage that the underlying 
condition which was being treated would have caused in any event without the 
negligence. This requires expert opinion as to causation and prognosis; and to deal with 
the hypothetical condition of the claimant had the negligence not occurred; and to 
expressly state extra, or new, damage resulting from the negligence. In clinical 
negligence cases the doctor never warrants a cure and is only responsible for the 
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negligence.16 I will first address the issues, theoretical and practical regarding general 
damages: these include all heads of damage incapable of precise mathematical 
calculation, including pain, suffering and loss of amenity, in other words non-pecuniary 
loss. 
 
A. Theoretical Constructs in Non-Pecuniary Loss 
 
An important question to keep in mind while reading what follows is the purpose of 
awarding compensation for intangible injuries.17 It has been suggested that there are two 
types of compensation,18 corresponding to the two fundamentally different ways in 
which one object can constitute an ‘equivalent’ for another object which the person has 
lost, as follows. 
 
In the first type of compensation, means replacing compensation is meant to provide 
people with equivalent means for pursuing the same ends (the same as before they 
suffered the loss, or as they would have pursued had they not suffered the 
disadvantage). For example, giving someone who has been blinded a sighted 
amanuensis or someone who has lost a leg an artificial limb. 
 
The second type of compensation might be called ends–displacing compensation. The 
idea here is to compensate people, not by helping them pursue the same ends in some 
other ways, but rather helping them to pursue some other ends in a way that leaves them 
subjectively as well off as they were prior to the injury. Giving someone who has 
suffered bereavement an all-expenses-paid Mediterranean cruise might be an example 
of this sort of compensation.19 
 
The first kind of compensation attempts to provide people with equivalent means to the 
same end, while the second type attempts to provide them with equivalent satisfactions 
through different ends. Both standards of compensation insist that people must be made 
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as well off as they would have been, had it not been for the loss for which they are being 
compensated. With the second type of compensation, however, they will be as well off 
as they would have been, but differently off than they would have been. To achieve the 
first type of compensation, it is not enough that they somehow or another be made as 
well off. They must be left identically situated with respect to exactly the same set of 
ends. The weight of the argument is the moral superiority of the first type of 
compensation, namely, providing equivalent means to pursue the claimant’s own pre-
accident ends.20 
 
In more familiar legal language, pecuniary compensation for pecuniary losses would 
constitute compensation of the first type, the replacement of like with like. 
Compensation of a pecuniary nature for losses which were non-pecuniary represents the 
second type of compensation, the substitution of one sort of pleasure for another.21 
Robert Goodin concludes that tort law, although notionally generous, in practice offers 
small sums in compensation for non-pecuniary losses.22 Small sums can hardly pretend 
to ‘make up’ for serious bodily harm. They are instead token payments. As with 
nominal damages in tort law, the sums involved are not ‘utterly derisory’; but pretty 
clearly, the principal value of the awards is to be symbolic.23 The aim, in Patrick 
Atiyah’s terms, is surely to provide ‘solace’ rather than ‘substitutes’.24 
 
On another view, ‘pain and suffering is essentially the prototype of a non-transferable, 
non-quantifiable injury’.25 However, if the claimant’s injury is not merely physical and 
emotional distress but the fact that his distress remains unrecognised and 
uncompensated, the cost of such an injury is in fact transferable. To the extent that pain 
and suffering and emotional distress are real injuries, denial of compensation creates the 
appearance of legal and societal indifference to the victim’s plight. An individual whose 
bodily or emotional integrity has been violated may feel a sense of continuing outrage. 
Because money is highly valued in our society, we use it to measure and recognise the 
worth of both tangible and intangible items. Compensation may restore the claimant’s 
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sense of self-value, and ease his sense of outrage.26 From the victim’s perspective, 
compensation becomes not just reimbursement, but an attempt to make amends for the 
injury done by bestowing a ‘consolation, a solatium’. Although monetary damages may 
not be equivalent to the injury experienced, damages can serve as an important symbolic 
means of preserving the entitlement of personal security and autonomy against 
infringement.27 
 
The counter-argument challenges the concept of monetary awards for non-pecuniary 
loss because money cannot provide meaningful compensation to the victim. Society 
would have acknowledged the victim’s right to bodily and emotional security by 
granting damages for the economic ramifications of his injury – his cost of coping and 
being rehabilitated. The remaining injury is arguably only that which is truly non-
quantifiable and non-transferable and, therefore, best borne by the victim. When this 
factor is combined with the unique and individualised sensitivity of individuals to 
physical and emotional pain, meaningful compensation for non-pecuniary losses simply 
may be impossible. Such damages would neither restore nor rehabilitate.28 
 
It is difficult to justify the use of financial resources taken from the NHS budget to 
make amends for disabilities or loss of faculty, pain and suffering, or death of a close 
relative. The law can only compensate in financial terms: even though the ‘loss’ has no 
measurable financial value, compensation in money can be, and is, given. As I will 
discuss below the victims of adverse events are not assuaged for these losses by money. 
I argue that the use of this money to compensate for non-commmodifiable losses 
highlights the tension between the welfare state, as represented by the NHS, and the tort 
system.29 
 
B. Conceptual Difficulties 
 
The foregoing paragraphs comprised a bald outline of the basis of a claim for general 
damages.30 Despite a ‘health warning’ that ‘attempts to deduce radical prescriptive 
solutions from exchanges conducted at high levels of abstraction must be regarded with 
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caution’,31 we should nevertheless consider the philosophical foundations of offering 
financial compensation for non-pecuniary losses. 
 
If one takes as one’s starting point that the most fundamental principle governing the 
award of damages in the law of torts is to restore the claimant to the position where he 
would have been had the tort not occurred32 – restitutio in integrum – the problem is 
obvious. By definition, non-pecuniary losses are those for which the payment of 
monetary damages does no good.33 This problem has been explained in terms of the 
non-utility of money in these circumstances34 or, more emotively, as the 
‘incommensurability’ of money with these types of losses.35 However, Bruce Chapman 
offers a slightly different account of what corrective justice requires for the payment of 
monetary damages.36 He argues that while corrective justice does require full 
compensation for the costs of future care (at least in so far as these involve pecuniary 
losses) and does require full compensation for the loss of future earnings, it does not 
require full compensation for non-pecuniary loss. He focuses upon the inherent 
correlativity of the defendant’s doing and the claimant’s suffering of harm. Chapman 
reasons that corrective justice should only correct for wrongful losses within the space 
of rights and that it should not otherwise be concerned with a victim’s welfare. 
Explaining that money damages simply cannot repair the kind of rights damage suffered 
when losses are of the non-pecuniary kind, he claims that money damages in this 
context can only serve to increase the victim’s welfare in some respect which is 
irrelevant to the wrongful act. Thus because corrective justice does not support 
compensation for such losses, he maintains that nominal damages alone are appropriate 
for this type of loss. According to Chapman the argument for very limited damages for 
non-pecuniary loss is based upon money’s lack of utility – its inability to restore the 
victim’s specific welfare loss within the ambit of the defendant’s wrongdoing – a very 
different matter from how the victim might actually choose to use a monetary award. 
Chapman distinguishes the idea that money may have no utility in restoring a victim’s 
                                             
31 H McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 620-621 and footnote 621 now H 
McGregor, McGregor on Damages 18th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) Chapter 3 ‘Non-Pecuniary Loss’. 
32 Livngstone v Rawyards Coal Co. [1880] 5 AC 25, 39 per Lord Blackburn. 
33 B Chapman, ‘Wrongdoing, Welfare and Damages’, in D Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 
(Oxford, OUP, 1995) 409-425 at 420. Also ‘Ex hypothesi, compensation on this restitutionary basis is 
impossible in the case of non-pecuniary losses Restitutio in integrim, in its ordinary sense, is impossible’. 
Ogus (n 56) 1. 
34 Chapman (n 33). 
35 M Radin, ‘Compensation and Commensurability’, (1993) 43 Duke Law Journal 56. 




loss from Margaret Radin’s notion,37 based on her theory of corrective justice as redress 
rather than rectification, that money may be incommensurate with the victim’s loss. 
Chapman’s conclusion, with which I agree, is that the concept of the limited utility of 
money precludes awarding anything but nominal damages for non-pecuniary loss.38 
 
The question then becomes whether or not money can have symbolic value. In place of 
corrective justice as rectification, corrective justice may be seen as redress.39 Redress 
means showing the victim that his rights are taken seriously: 
 
Redress is accomplished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize 
public respect for the existence of certain rights and public recognition of the 
transgressor’s fault in disrespecting those rights. In this conception of 
compensation, neither the harm to the victim, nor the victim’s right not to be 
harmed, is commensurate with money. They are not conceptually equated with 
fungible commodities.40 
 
On this view, corrective justice as redress provides a way to restore the moral balance 
between the parties other than by putting the parties back to the status quo ante, which 
may be unachievable, given the fact of incommensurability.41 Rather, compensation as 
redress restores moral balance between the parties by simultaneously symbolising, in a 
non-commodifiable space, a respect for the claimant’s rights and a denunciation of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.42 
 
Overall, there are limitations to monetary recompense, particularly in the area of non-
pecuniary loss. One can imagine a range of responses to the need for public recognition 
of wrongdoing which are quite different from the more conventional payment of 
monetary damages as compensation in tort law. There is a Kantian analysis43 which 
suggests that money, while possibly useful to the plaintiff for rectifying the loss, might 
not have much significance for the defendant. In such circumstances, a tort regime 
which focused more on the defendant’s characteristics than on the claimant’s loss, and 
in particular concerned itself with a denunciation of the wrong which was meaningful to 
                                             
37 Ibid. 
38 D Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, OUP, 1995) 21-22. 
39 Radin (n 35). 
40 Ibid 61. 
41 Ibid 69. 
42 Chapman (n 33) at 422. See Apologies below in Conclusions. 




the defendant, might not pay much in monetary damages to the plaintiff.44 This issue 
was at the forefront of a conference regarding the draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill.45 
Victims of negligently incurred workplace accidents were as concerned with corporate 
punishment as with redress. The inclusion in the new Compensation Act 200646 of the 
statement that ‘…An apology, an offer of treatment or other redress, shall not of itself 
amount to an admission of negligence or breach of statutory duty’ might offer succour 
for patients in clinical negligence cases where what is most wished for is an apology 
from the medical team concerned. 
 
In the final chapter to my thesis I will be discussing recent initiatives in Australia 
regarding apologies in the sphere of clinical negligence.47 The next question to be 
addressed is the approach to quantifying damages for non-pecuniary losses. 
 
C. Putting a Price on Pain and Suffering: Theoretical Issues of Quantification 
 
There is evidence that since biblical times, sages have grappled with the issue of 
quantification of damages for non-pecuniary losses: 
 
Loss of time: the injured person is considered as if he were a watchman of 
cucumber beds. You might say that the requirements of justice suffer thereby, 
since when he was well he would surely not necessarily have worked as a 
watchman of cucumbers48. But in truth the requirements of justice do not suffer, 
for he has already been paid for the value of his hand or the value of his leg…49 
 
A timely article reviewing the current situation has pointed out that there is still much 
work to do:50 
 
                                             
44 Chapman (n 33) at 424. 
45 Corporate Manslaughter Conference, London, 13 June 2006. Now the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
46 Compensation Act 2006 s.2: Apologies, Offers of Treatment or Redress. 
47 Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress’ below. 
48 meaning he might have commanded higher wages. 
49Babylonian Talmud: Baba Kamma 85 Discussion continues regarding payment for ‘Pain and 
Degradation’. 
50 R Avraham, ‘Putting a Price on Pain-And-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches 
and a Preliminary Proposal for Change’ 2006, 100 Northwestern University Law Review 87. This article 
has extensive references, including: RR Bovbjerg, F Sloan & JF Blumstein, ‘Valuing Life and Limb in 
Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering’, (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law Review 908 [Referred to as 
BSB, Valuing Life and Limb]. Cited in 147 law reviews, 15 other journals and 4 legal news articles, as 




Seventeen volumes and seventeen years ago, the editors of the Northwestern 
University Law Review made a wise decision. They accepted for publication an 
article – Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain-and-Suffering – which 
has become one of the most important pieces concerning pain-and-suffering 
damages in the legal literature. In what was considered a seminal paper 
concerning ‘putting a price on pain-and-suffering damages’ the authors took 
upon themselves a daunting task: analysing various ways to put a price on the 
unpriceable, a person’s pain and suffering. Nothing much has changed since the 
BSB paper. Juries, judges, lawyers and academics still struggle with the same 
dilemma BSB tackled: what is the best way to adequately compensate tort 
victims for the non-economic harms they incur? In many ways, the BSB paper is 
as relevant today as it was ‘seventeen volumes ago’.51 
 
Looking at the picture in England, the levels of awards for pain, suffering and loss of 
amenity have become an increasingly important issue over the past 20 years.52 What 
follows is a concise look at different conceptualisations which inform the approach to 
quantification; the ideas put forward by the Law Commission in several reports,53 the 
judgments in Heil v Rankin,54 and how the final calculations are made.55 It has been 
suggested that there are three theoretical approaches to the problem.56 
 
First there is the conceptual approach57 (‘so much for a foot’) which is objective and has 
its analogy in the law of property. Each asset, be it physical or the enjoyment of an 
amenity, bears an objective ‘value’ which is fully recoverable in the case of loss. This 
approach requires, in effect, that resort be had to a tariff system which would prescribe a 
certain ‘sum’ for each part of the body and for the extent of injury to each part. This 
method of compensation was in force over 1,000 years ago in the laws of King Alfred.58 
This theoretical approach may be summarised by saying that the award is measured by 
the extent of the physical injury. In support of the suggestion that English law is most 
                                             
51 The Court of Appeal in Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273 at 299-300 ruled that juries should no longer be 
used for the assessment of damages save in exceptional cases. See Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 69(3). For 
historical overview of juries in personal injury actions see Markesinis et al (n 3), 8-10. 
52 Markesinis et al (n 3), 48. 
53 ‘Damages for Personal Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss’ (1995) Law Com No 140. ‘Damages for Personal 
Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss’ (1999) Law Com No 257 especially paragraphs 2.19 and 2.24. ‘Personal 
Injury Compensation: How Much Is Enough?’ (1994) Law Com No 225. 
54 Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272 
55 McGregor (1997) (n 31), H McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) now 
McGregor (2010) (n 31) 35-287. 
56 AI Ogus, ‘Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, A Feeling or a Function? (1972) 35 Modern Law 
Review 1 at 2 (‘so much for a foot’). 
57 See Sellers LJ in Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 Q.B. 638, 644-654 and Lord Morris in West v Shepherd [1964] 
AC 326, 344-353. The English law on the assessment for loss of amenities is not perfectly consistent with 
any of these approaches, but it has a strong leaning towards the conceptual approach. Ibid at 3. 
58B Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, (London: George E. Eyre and Andrew Spottiswoode, 
1840. Reprinted 2004 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.) pp 93-101. Specimen examples of the ‘bot’ 
payable: broken arm above the elbow, 15 s: loss of thumb, 30 s: loss of arm below the elbow, 80 s. In 




closely aligned to this conceptualisation, it should be noted that judges in personal 
injury cases consult Kemp & Kemp for the figures appropriate to the physical damage.59 
The second, personal, approach rejects the premise that human life can be ‘valued’ 
independently of an individual’s feelings.60 It suggests measurement can only be made 
in terms of human happiness; therefore, the award would be measured by the extent of 
the loss of happiness seen subjectively. The third, functional, approach61 adopts the 
premise of the personal approach, that the sole concern of the court is with the 
claimant’s pleasure or happiness, but it prescribes a different standard of compensation. 
In this approach the award is measured by the extent to which money can provide the 
claimant with reasonable solace. 
 
The principles behind awarding damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity, and the 
issue of quantification have been thoroughly canvassed by the Law Commission.62 
 
The Law Commission63 contrasted the ‘diminution of value’ approach64 to the 
‘functional approach’65 assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss. In brief, the 
conclusion of the Law Commission66 was to favour the ‘diminution of value’ approach. 
The reason suggested is that the ‘functional approach’ would seem to transform the non-
pecuniary consequences of injury into a form of pecuniary loss. Damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity would be measurable in terms of the financial cost of 
providing reasonable substitute pleasures to comfort the claimant. Additionally, and 
more tellingly, it is unrealistic to assume that substitute pleasures can provide full solace 
to a claimant.67 
 
                                             
59 Ogus (n 56) at 3. Also see W Norris, C Cory-Wright and P Andrews (eds) Kemp & Kemp: Quantum of 
Damages Looseleaf 4th edn Annual Subscription ISBN 9780421216808 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, latest 
release August 22, 2011). 
60 See Ogus (n 56) at 3 for references. 
61 Ibid at 3 footnote 12 for references especially the Australian High Court Judge Windeyer J. Skelton v 
Collins [1966] CLR 94, 130-133 (‘so much for a function’). Law Comm 140 (n 53) suggests that ‘the 
experience in Canada has not been a happy one’. In particular, most judges have continued to apply a 
tariff approach to assessment; there is therefore an inconsistency between the rationale for the award of 
damages for non-pecuniary loss, as authentically laid down by the Supreme Court, and the continued 
practice of many courts.’ Para 4.9 (v) at 85. 
62 Law Com 140 (n 53), Law Com 257 (n 53), especially paras 2.19 and 2.24. 
63 (The conceptual approach) Law Com 140 (n 53) at 8 para 2.3, which quotes from Ogus (n 56) 1 above. 
Law Com 257 (n 53) especially paras 2.19 and 2.24. 
64 The approach used in the English courts. 
65 Used in Canada Law Com 140 (n 53) at 83 para 4.8. 
66 Ibid and in the final recommendation in Law Com 257 (n 53) 5.2. 




In the English approach, the purpose of an award of damages is to put a value on what 
the plaintiff has lost, irrespective of the use to which the damages may be put.68 English 
law regards both subjective loss (loss which is dependent on the claimant’s awareness 
of it) and objective loss (loss which is not dependent on the claimant’s awareness of it) 
as compensable.69 
 
Although I will be arguing against financial redress for non-pecuniary loss within the 
context of iatrogenic harm within the NHS, I am sympathetic to the diminution of value 
approach taken by the Law Commission.70 The main reason for taking this stance is that 
I believe that non-pecuniary losses are uncommodifiable;71 additionally, substitute 
pleasures do not make up for all the non-pecuniary effects of personal injury. Having 
discussed the theoretical issues of quantification of non-pecuniary losses, I now turn to 
the difficult but practical issue of quantification of non-pecuniary loss and how the 
courts have approached this.72 I will also note the approach to redress for non-pecuniary 
loss taken by other jurisdictions.73 
 
D. Practical Issues of Quantification of Redress for Non-Pecuniary Loss 
 
The difficulties inherent in this head of claim are immediately apparent. In the forward 
to the first edition of the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines, Lord Donaldson stated that 
the assessment of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity is ‘one of the 
most difficult tasks’ a judge in a civil court has to perform.74 There is no process of 
calculation for this head of damage. How is the level of damages assessed for someone 
who, for instance, loses a finger, or is blinded as a result of an accident? The courts have 
                                             
68 Ibid at 8 footnote 9. 
69 Ibid at 8 at paragraph 2.3. 
70 Law Com 257 (n 53) para 2.4.  
71 See Radin (n 35). 
72 Section D immediately below. 
73 I will return to this subject in the final Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress’. 
74 Great Britain Judicial Studies Board, Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal 
Injury Cases (Oxford, Blackstone Press, 1992) (Now 10th edn, 2010). The need for consistency and 
comparability in awards, previously found wanting in jury trials, led the Court of Appeal in Ward v James 
(n 51) to rule that juries should no longer be used for the assessment of damages save in very exceptional 
cases. S 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which grants a prima facie right to a jury trial in cases of 
fraud, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation. However, s 69(3) has been seen as 




looked for a pragmatic solution75 and have sought to arrive at a ‘conventional figure’ 
derived from experience and from awards in comparable cases.76 
 
1. Principles of Assessment: Pain and Suffering77 
 
The effects of an accident on a claimant are extremely unlikely to be only financial. 
Impairment, disfigurement, loss of function and pain are just some of the potential non-
pecuniary consequences, none of which can be measured in purely financial terms. 
Restitutio in integrum cannot be effected by money if the claimant has lost an arm, or is 
unconscious. Nevertheless, the courts have never doubted the appropriateness of making 
awards for the non-pecuniary losses suffered by the claimant; they are, after all the 
essential losses, the most immediate consequences of the accident.78 The two main 
aspects of non-pecuniary loss are pain and suffering (viewed subjectively) and loss of 
amenity (viewed objectively). 
 
Pain and suffering are combined into a single head and it is inappropriate to separate 
them in making an award. Damages are awarded for pain which the claimant feels 
consequent to an injury, both in the past and into the future. The level of damages will 
depend upon the duration and intensity of the pain and suffering.79 
 
In Hicks and another v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police80 on the question 
of finding whether the deceased suffered compensatable pain and suffering before a 
fatal injury: 
 
The trial judge dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that the deceased had suffered any recoverable damage from pre-death 
pain and suffering. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld 
the judge’s finding that no physical injury had been caused before the fatal 
crushing, on the ground that, since the unconsciousness and death had occurred 
in such a very short space of time after the onset of asphyxia, the asphyxia and 
                                             
75 Diplock LJ in Every v Miles [1964] unreported, Court of Appeal. 
76 Lord Diplock in Wright v British Railways Board [1983] 2 AC 773 as quoted in S Allen, I Bowley and 
H Davies, APIL Guide to Damages (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2004) at 1. 
77 S Allen, I Bowley and H Davies, APIL Guide to Damages (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2004) at 
1-3. See also McGregor (2010) (n 31). ‘“Pain and suffering” is now a term of art, so constantly has it been 
used by the courts and there appears to be no exact difference between pain on the one hand and suffering 
on the other…’ Chapter 3 at 3-003. 
78 D Allen, Damages in Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 244. 
79 Allen, Bowley and Davies (n 76). 




death were in reality part of the death itself, with the result that no damages were 
recoverable for that pain and suffering.81 
 
If the claimant is unconscious82 or killed instantly as a result of an accident, there will 
be no damages under this head, although they may be recoverable for loss of amenity (ie 
for persistent vegetative state).83 
 
The assessment is subjective and it is for the claimant to give evidence of the effects of 
the injuries. This assessment is made at the date of the trial in order to provide the court 
with as full a picture as possible resulting in an award of damages in the money of the 
day.84 
 
Suffering is treated as distinct from pain. But the term ‘suffering’ is meant to cover the 
mental element of the injury, including the claimant’s anxiety, fear, worry, distress and 
embarrassment caused by the injuries suffered in the accident. 
 
2. Loss of Amenity 
 
Damages are awarded for the reduction in the ability of the claimant to perform every-
day tasks and enjoy life, and it does not matter whether the claimant is conscious of the 
effect upon his life. It can include interference with hobbies and pastimes, loss of a skill 
or craft, a reduction in marriage prospects85 and loss of enjoyment of a holiday,86 or 
interference with the claimant’s sex life.87 
 
One problem which has caused much trouble is that of assessing the damages awardable 
to a claimant who has been reduced to a ‘persistent vegetative state’. Medical science 
can now keep people with the most devastating injuries alive in a state of complete 
coma for many months, or even years, with no hope of recovery. In a case of this nature 
it is hard to see what purpose there can be in awarding lump sum damages for 
                                             
81 Ibid. Upheld by the House of Lords, Lord Bridge gave the leading judgement. Reading the full case, 
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82 ‘…however caused, whether by the injury itself or produced by drugs or anaesthetics…’per Lord 
Devlin in H. West & Sons Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326 at 354. 
83 A great deal depends on the current state of medical knowledge. See new information regarding the 
consciousness of patients in persistent vegetative states: The Guardian 3 February 10 2010. 
84 Allen, Bowley and Davies (n 76). 
85 Moriaty v McCarthy [1978] 1 WLR 155. 
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disabilities or loss of amenities, or even for loss of earnings if there are no dependants. 
There is no question of providing substitute pleasures for those foregone, because the 
injured party is unable to enjoy any pleasures; nor is there any question of providing 
solace for pain, suffering or mental distress, because the victim feels none.88 
Nevertheless, the courts have held that although damages for pain and suffering cannot 
be awarded, nonetheless, damages for loss of ‘amenities’ or ‘faculties’ must be 
awarded; and these damages run into many thousands of pounds.89 
 
In H West & Sons Ltd v Shephard90 the majority of the House of Lords confirmed the 
majority decision of the Court of Appeal in Wise v Kaye 91 and held that an unconscious 
claimant was able to be awarded damages for loss of amenity despite his unawareness 
of the loss. The essential rationale for this view can be found in the words of Lord 
Morris: 
 
The fact of unconsciousness does not, however, eliminate the actuality of the 
deprivations of the ordinary experiences and amenities of life which may be the 
inevitable result of some physical injury.92 
 
This majority view of the House of Lords in H West & Sons Ltd v Shephard93 was 
reaffirmed in Lim Poh v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority,94 where Lord 
Scarman said that the cases draw a clear distinction between the damages for pain and 
suffering and damages for loss of amenity. The former depend upon the claimant’s 
personal awareness of pain, her capacity for suffering. But the latter are awarded for the 
fact of deprivation – a substantial loss, whether the claimant is aware of it or not.95 
 
The Law Commission, in its Consultation Paper on non-pecuniary loss,96 suggested that 
non-pecuniary losses should be assessed subjectively, contrary to the view of the House 
of Lords in H West & Sons Ltd v Shephard.97 A significant majority of consultees, 
however, preferred the status quo, on the basis that failure to recognise the loss of 
                                             
88 Cane (n 24), Chapter 6.  
89 Ibid at 141. 
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Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174. 
91 Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638. 
92 H West & Sons Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326 at 349. 
93 Ibid. 
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amenity would be to undervalue victims and to trivialise their experience, that it would 
be unjust to award lower compensation for major injuries than for lesser ones, and that 
there might be problems in determining the degree of awareness of deprivation.98 In the 
light of this, the Law Commission did not recommend any change in the law on this 
point.99 
 
In both cases, awards for pain and suffering and awards for loss of amenity, the 
calculation of damages is, to a very large extent, arbitrary. Something which cannot be 
measured in money is ‘lost’, and the award of damages requires some monetary value to 
be placed on it. There appears to be no way of working out any relationship between the 
value of money – what it will buy – and damages awarded for pain, suffering and loss of 
amenity. All such awards could be multiplied or divided by two overnight and they 




As with all heads of damages, but perhaps more importantly with damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity, it is imperative that the claimant’s statement describes life 
before the accident or injury and life afterwards. The contrast between his capability and 
enjoyment of life before and the limitations and restrictions endured and which he may 
continue to endure following the accident or injury is critical in providing the judge with 
a true picture of the impact of the injuries on the claimant.101 
 
E. Non-Pecuniary Loss: The View from Abroad 
 
As I have shown, non-pecuniary loss poses an entirely different problem from pecuniary 
loss. Money may compensate for loss of earnings but can neither undo nor offer an 
equivalent for pain and distress. For the victim, the most money can offer is solace, by 
providing the victim with the means of distraction and substitute activities, and bringing 
about some satisfaction in the face of having been wronged.102 The scale of non-
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pecuniary damages should not be underestimated, since in many countries they account 
for more than half of the total amount paid out under the present tort system. I would 
not be alone in advocating non-financial payment of non-pecuniary loss, particularly in 
cases of iatrogenic harm within the NHS. In the absence of any logical process for 
assessing damages for ‘pain and suffering and loss of amenity’ jurisdictions have 
adopted different approaches. As long ago as 1978, the British Pearson Committee 
advocated limiting awards for non-pecuniary loss.103 Courts, and sometimes 
legislatures, have taken steps both to contain and to standardise non-pecuniary loss 
awards while also attempting to respond to what is ‘fair and equitable’.104 More 
recently, statutory schemes have been adopted to address this problem: restrictions 
include thresholds, caps and schedules.105 I will return to initiatives of other 
jurisdictions in the final chapter addressing effective redress.106 The desire to restrict the 
award of non-pecuniary damages is driven in part by concern that insurers and corporate 
defendants, and in this case the NHS, may find it increasingly difficult to shoulder 
catastrophic losses involving multiple victims which occur more frequently with 
growing technology. One solution is to impose a maximum monetary limit on liability 
for any one disaster such as products (pharmaceutical) liability. In the last resort, 
extraordinary intervention by government is required to settle peculiarly costly 
catastrophes.107 
 
I have argued for a modified model of corrective justice when addressing redress for 
iatrogenic harm, namely that victims have an entitlement to redress against the 
wrongdoer, in this case the NHS. However, because the NHS is a communal enterprise, 
I have argued that damages should be limited to redress for pecuniary loss. In order to 
explain my stance on non-pecuniary loss, I then considered the theoretical and practical 
difficulties inherent in the quantification of such loss. I now turn to examples of actions 
which have a major component of non-pecuniary loss: first wrongful death actions and 
then claims for psychiatric harm. 
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106 Chapter 9 below. 
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Pecuniary Loss’ (2011) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Law 6-9 “In the current economic climate there may 




III. DAMAGES IN RESPECT OF DEATH 
 
In wrongful death actions, there is a complex interaction between claims by the estate of 
the deceased (for example, for pre-death pain and suffering) and those of dependants 
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The bereavement award discussed below108 is a 
one-off payment to a narrowly defined class of claimant. Although it is admittedly for a 
non-pecuniary loss, I would allow this payment because it is a conventional sum which 
has historically been paid and by now has a strong symbolic value.109 I will note how 
other jurisdictions110 have grappled with the issue of damages for bereavement. 
 
There are two separate and distinct claims which may be brought in respect of the death 
of a person as a result of some tortious act of the defendant: 
 
(a) The claim on behalf of the deceased’s estate (Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1934) and 
 
(b) The claim brought by the deceased’s dependents in respect of their own loss 
(Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (as amended)).111 
 
A. The Survival Action 
 
Historically, at common law there could be no claim for damages in cases of death. This 
was, in part, a consequence of the maxim: action personalis mortur cum persona,112 and 
in part a result of the rule expressed in Baker v Bolton113 that death does not comprise 
an injury for the purposes of a civil action. Statute subsequently ameliorated the 
position. As regards the former maxim, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1934 enables the right of action of an injured person to survive his death, it being passed 
on to his personal representatives.114 A deceased’s claim survives for the benefit of the 
estate regardless of whether the death was caused by the defendants’ breach of 
duty/negligence.115 Heads of damage usually include: 
                                             
108 Section B (2) below. 
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(i) non-pecuniary loss: pain and suffering; and 
 
(ii) pecuniary loss: past loss of earnings; past care and services; miscellaneous 
losses including medical expenses, travel and probate. 
 
 
Claims may include damages in respect of funeral expenses.116 A claimant may have 
suffered an injury that reduces his life expectancy, resulting in a loss of potential 
earnings or pension he would otherwise have received in the lost years. A living 
claimant may recover damages for these losses but this head of damages does not 
survive for the benefit of the estate. A claim for pain and suffering, as has been noted,117 
is calculated in accordance with conventional principles and is therefore dependent 
upon the claimant’s personal awareness of pain and suffering.118 
 
The practical significance of the rule in Baker v Bolton119 that death does not comprise 
an injury for the purposes of a civil suit has diminished significantly in recent years and 
the most important piece of legislation is the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, a consolidation 
of earlier legislation originating in the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 and amended by the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982. 
 
B. The Dependency Action 
 
Under the Fatal Accidents Act claim, a right of action is conferred on the dependants of 
the deceased, reflecting their loss, not his. This action is primarily designed to provide 
compensation for the lost income of a person who was formerly maintaining members 
of their family, normally a spouse or cohabiting partner and children. The action 
provides compensation not only for an actual dependant but also for a prospective 
dependant, so long as the claimant falls within the list of persons entitled to sue under 
                                             
116 Funeral expenses usually form part of the Fatal Accidents Act claim if the dependants have incurred 
the expense. However, in Bateman v Hydro Agri (UK) LTD. [1995] unreported, the judge held that the 
claimant, who was suffering from mesothelioma and was expected to die within 3 months, could recover 
the prospective costs of his funeral. Allen, Bowley and Davies (n 76) at 82. For the scope of what may 
properly be included as funeral expenses see McGregor (2003) (n 55), 540 now McGregor (2010) (n 31). 
117Above: Principles of Assessment (p 219) Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 All ER 
65, HL ‘an attempt by the estates of the victims to recover damages on this basis failed on the facts: it 
being found that no actionable pre-death pain and suffering had occurred.’ McGregor (2003) (n 55), 520 
now McGregor (2010) (n 31). 
118 Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 183 and Hicks and another 
(n 80) 




the Act. Thus a parent may be able to sue in respect of the death (say) of a child of 16 
who has not yet contributed anything to the parent’s support but who might have been 
expected to in the future. The crucial matter of note is that although this claim is that of 
dependants, not the deceased, they can only claim if he would have been able to, had he 
survived.120 
 
In claims on behalf of dependants, the heads of damage usually include: 121 
 
1. Damages in respect of bereavement 
2. Damages for loss of dependency and 
3. Funeral expenses.122 
 
The question of who can claim as a dependant is one involving issues of law and fact. 
Any claim under the Act has to be brought by the executor or administrator of the 
deceased; but may be brought by the dependants themselves six months after the death, 
if no action has been brought by then. It is noteworthy that only one action can be 
brought123 and full particulars of the persons for whose benefit the action is brought 
must be given.124 However, although only one Fatal Accidents Act action can be 
brought in respect of the death, each dependant is nevertheless individually entitled to 
his own damages.125 
 
The Act contains a detailed definition of persons whose relationship with the deceased 
was such as to enable them, as a matter of law, to qualify as dependants but they must, 
in addition, satisfy the factual test of establishing whether they had, in the words of one 
of the leading authorities,126 ‘a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right 
or otherwise, from the continuance of the life’.127 In its 1999 Report: ‘Claims for 
Wrongful Death’,128 the Law Commission recommended retention of the present list of 
                                             
120 Allen (n 78) at 259 for case law. 
121 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s 2(1). 
122 Allen, Bowley and Davies (n 76) at 83. 
123 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s 2(3). 
124 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s 2(4). 
125 See McGregor (2003) (55), ch 26 for details of calculation and apportionment of the dependency. 
126 Franklin v South Eastern Railway Co. [1858] 3 H & N 211 at 214 quoted in Allen (n 78) at 261. 
127 Ibid at 261 for the list of who can be a dependant as a matter of law. See Fatal Accidents Act 1976 s.1 
for the original list; now expanded in Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s.1 (3)(b). 




those able to claim, but regarded it as too restrictive.129 It is important to note that, 
subject to the statutory award for bereavement to be considered below, damages under 
the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 are restricted to pecuniary losses.130 
 
An apposite clinical negligence case illustrates how these two Acts work together: 
 
In Batt v Highgate Private Hospital131 the claimant was the widower of Lorraine 
Alison Batt who died on 30 January 1999 following an abdominoplasty. This is a 
cosmetic operation, more commonly referred to as a “tummy tuck”. There were 
devastating post-operative complications. As a result, her life was taken away 
from her at the age of 36. She left behind her husband, two teenage children of a 
previous marriage and a daughter of 7 from this one. Judgment was entered 
against the surgeon who performed the operation on 21 November 2003. The 
matter came before the court for the assessment of damages. 
 
The widower Batt sought damages for the death of his wife. Two unusual heads of 
damage were claimed. Under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1934, Batt 
sought repayment of the £5,635 cost of the operation, arguing that the expense was 
rendered futile by his wife’s death and she received no benefit from it. He also claimed 
£116,000 under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, for the loss of an appreciating asset in the 
form of a house which he and his wife were in the process of buying before she died. 
 
Assessing damages, Darlow J held that Batt could not claim for either loss because the 
first, the cost of the operation, did not flow from the negligence of the surgeon and 
expenses rendered futile by a tort did not have the same importance in tort as they had 
in contract. The second, under section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, Batt could 
only recover for a loss of a pecuniary benefit arising from the relationship which would 
be derived from the continuance of life. This meant that the dependency claim was 
limited to what had been lost as a result of the wife’s ceasing to contribute to the family 
finances, plus the loss of her gratuitous care of the couple’s daughter.132 Batt was 
attempting to claim for the loss of a speculative gain arising from the use of family 
                                             
129 Allen (n 78) at 262 for fuller discussion and case law. See also K Norrie, ‘Rushed Law and Wrongful 
Death’, 51 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 4, 24 for adjustment of s 35 Damages (Scotland Act) 
1976 changing and expanding the list of those with ‘title to sue for Non-Patrimonial Loss’. 
130 Blake v Midland Railway Co. [1852] 18 QB 93. 
131 Batt v Highgate Private Hospital [2004] EWHC 707, CH D (Patents). S King, Case Commentary: 
‘Personal Injury; Clinical Negligence; Damages; Fatal Accidents Act’ (2004) 4 Journal of Personal 
Injury Law C169-173. 
132 Ibid for full discussion of the case. Refer also to D Kemp, ‘Substitute Services and the Fatal Accidents 
Act’ 1993 (APR) Law Quarterly Review 109, 173-175 regarding calculations of ‘substitute services’ and 




funds to acquire a capital asset. Furthermore, the increase in the house’s value from 
£94,000 to £210,000, its value as at January 2004, was not a result of her death. In other 
respects, damages were awarded on the usual basis. 
 
1. Calculating the Dependency 
 
As has been seen, the claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is restricted to recovery 
of pecuniary losses only. The principle is that if the patient has died, damages awarded 
to his family will reflect the loss to them of the moneys he regularly expended on them. 
They recover for their loss of dependency.133 The precise method of calculation for 
pecuniary losses is outwith the remit of this thesis134 but a few comments might be 
helpful. The calculation of awards of damages for personal injury is notoriously 
imprecise, particularly when attempting to place a value on future losses. In cases where 
the claim comprises a specific loss, such as the contribution to wedding expenses in 
Betney,135 the calculation is a simple one. Where the dependency is a continuing one, 
the matter is more complex.136 As with personal injury cases, a multiplier/multiplicand 
method is employed, the multiplicand being the present annual value of the dependency, 
the multiplier being the likely duration of the dependency, subject to being discounted 
to take account of the fact that the dependant is receiving an immediate lump sum rather 
than periodical payments over a period of years, as would have been the case had the 
deceased lived.137 In addition, the contingencies of life will be taken into account in 
determining the multiplier.138 
 
                                             
133Fatal Accidents Act 1976 as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982. M Brazier, and E 
Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011) at 233. 
134 Allen (n 78) ch 10; Allen, Bowley and Davies (n 76), ch 13 and McGregor (2003) (n 55) ch 26 for 
calculations of damages. 
135 Betney v Rowland and Mallard [1955] 2 All ER 166. 
136 Death statutes in the United States list elements of loss for which a defendant must make 
compensatory payment. The element that economists as expert witnesses are called upon to calculate is 
net income interpreted as the money required for survivors to attain the same standard of living as before. 
Equivalence scales traditionally used for these calculations are flawed. The author proposes a new method 
of calculation. A Lewbel, ‘Calculating Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Death’ (March 2003) 113 
Journal of Econometrics 1, 115-128. 
137 Since the decision of the House of Lords in Wells v Wells [1998] 3 All ER 481 actuarial tables provide 
the basis for the selection of multipliers in Fatal Accident Act cases just as they do in personal injury 
cases. See McGregor (2003) (n 55), 528 paragraph 26.20 footnote 2 now McGregor (2010) (n 31). 
See also below ‘Methods of Payment: Periodical Payments.’  
138 Allen (n 78) ch 10 at 264 and McGregor (2003) (n 55) ch 26 for examples of contingencies taken into 




2. Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in Respect of Bereavement: Who Can Claim 
and in what Amount? – Judicial and Legislative Initiatives 
 
Although admittedly, damages in respect of bereavement represent payment for non-
pecuniary loss, I would not disallow this. As the award is a conventional sum, it 
represents an acknowledgement of loss and by now has a symbolic significance. It does 
not represent a large sum, as the standard award is small, and removing it would cause 
offence beyond what the saving would merit. That said, it is acknowledged that ‘non-
pecuniary damages are essentially arbitrary in nature, lacking the objectivity found in 
the case of pecuniary losses’.139 I will set out the law in England and then briefly note 
the position of several jurisdictions regarding bereavement awards. Although there is 
unease in all the jurisdictions about this payment, expressed partly by limitations on the 
class of claimants, none have removed it completely. 
 
It was established as long ago as 1852140 that the claim under the Fatal Accidents Act is 
restricted to recovery of pecuniary losses only, subject only to the introduction in 
1982141 of a statutory claim for damages for bereavement in a limited class of cases. 
Those entitled to claim are the wife or the husband of the deceased and, where the 
deceased was a minor who never married, his parents, if he was legitimate, and his 
mother, if he was illegitimate. The bereavement award is a fixed sum. The specified 
amount recoverable was initially £3,500 but was raised to £7,500 in respect of deaths 
occurring on or after 1 April, 1991.142 In respect of deaths on or after 1 April 2002, the 
amount was £10,000143 and in respect of deaths on or after 1 January 2008, it is now 
£11,800.144 As can be seen, the range of claimants is very much narrower than that for 
claimants for loss of dependency under section 1 of the Act. In its 1999 Report ‘Claims 
for Wrongful Death’,145 the Law Commission recommended a significant extension to 
the statutory list.146 
 
                                             
139Markesinis et al (n 3), 223. 
140 In Blake v Midland Railway Co. [1852] 18 Q.B. 93. 
141 S 1A of the ‘Fatal Accidents Act 1976’, as inserted by s 3(1) of the ‘Administration of Justice Act 
1982’. 
142 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s 1(1A). 
143 Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 2002, SI2002/644. 
144 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice announced in a ministerial statement on 12 
December 2007 that it was the government’s intention to increase this level every three years to reflect 
inflation as measured in the Retail Price Index. Tettenborn (n 100) at 869. 
145 Law Com. 263 paragraph 6.3. The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury Cmnd 7054-1 (1978) at 96-98 paragraphs 418-431, would have preferred an even more 
inclusive list than that favoured by the Law Commission. These proposals were not implemented. 




Looking abroad at other jurisdictions, one finds that while a ‘parsimonious approach’ in 
respect of the range of claimants has been adopted in England,147 the list of ‘immediate 
family’ in Scotland is far more generous.148 French law, most generous in its definition 
of dependants liable to obtain compensation for the death of a third person, makes 
awards which are similar to the amounts in English law and are seen as awards for 
dommage morale, retributory damages.149 In Australia, Lord Campbell’s Act150 has been 
read down to allow recovery for loss only of economic or material advantages to the 
survivors. Damages in the nature of solatium for grief or bereavement (unless 
amounting to psychiatric illness), for loss of consortium or allowance for the gravity of 
the injury preceding death are rigorously excluded except where provided by statute. 
Not all jurisdictions have been content with the construction against recovery for all 
non-economic loss. However, legislative reform in South Australia151 and the Northern 
Territory152 has followed England153 and has been cautious, limiting awards to spouses 
and parents of minors and usually setting a low monetary limit or fixed sum; the latter 
mode dispenses with any embarrassing inquiry into the bereavement. 
 
In introducing the concept of damages for bereavement, statutory effect154 was given to 
a recommendation of the Law Commission,155 that ‘an award of damages, albeit small, 
can have some slight consoling effect where parents lose an infant child or where a 
spouse loses a husband or wife’. The Commission considered that ‘if money can, even 
minimally, compensate for such bereavement …it should be recoverable.’156 Where an 
infant dies after attaining the age of 18, his parents will be unable to claim bereavement 
damages even if the injuries which led to his death were suffered before he was 18.157 
There is now provision for a fixed sum of £11,800 for bereavement damages which the 
                                             
147 Draft provisions of the Civil Law Reform Bill have sought to extend the list of relatives who may 
claim but the Bill has not materialised. G Dalyell, ‘A Comparison of Fatal Accidents Claims in England 
and Scotland’ (2011) Journal of Personal Injury Law 1, 10-18 at 12. 
148 Ibid at 11. Definition of ‘immediate family’ set out in s.1 (4) of the Damages (Scotland Act) 1976. 
149 Markesinis et al (n 3), 222. 
150 Now Fatal Accidents Act 1976, as amended by Administration of Justice Act 1982. 
151 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 28-30. 
152 Compensation (Fatal Injuries Act (NT), s 10(f): without financial limits. 
153 Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (ENG), s 1A (bereavement). See Sappideen, and Vines (n 9), 759. 
154 S 1A of the ‘Fatal Accidents Act 1976’, as inserted by s 3(1) of the ‘Administration of Justice Act 
1982’. 
155 See ‘Personal Injury Litigation-Assessment of Damages’ Law Com No. 56 (1973) paragraphs 172-180. 
For the Law Commission’s views on bereavement damages see ‘Claims for Wrongful Death’ (1997) 
Consultation Paper No. 148, paragraphs 6.1-6.65 (Part VI). 
156 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 148, paragraph 174. See discussion below ‘money as redress 
with symbolic value’. 




court cannot vary, and which is subject only to alteration by statutory instrument.158 The 
1982 Act is intended to ensure that, in the words of the Law Commission,159 there will 
‘be no judicial enquiry at all into the consequences of bereavement’.160 The fact that the 
new head of damage takes effect under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, however, 
necessarily means that the award will only be recoverable if the deceased would have 
had a cause of action for negligence had he lived and also that the sum will, in fact, fall 
to be reduced if the deceased had been contributorily negligent.161 
 
Finally, the Law Commission recommended162 that the explanatory notes to their 
replacement clause on bereavement damages should clarify that the function of 
bereavement damages is to compensate, in so far as a standardised sum of money can, 
for grief and sorrow and the loss of the non-pecuniary benefits of the deceased’s care, 
guidance and society. Such clarification is meant to be helpful, in particular as it would 
serve to preclude the idea that there is a punitive element to the award, or any reflection 
of the value of the life of the deceased. In that regard, as the Law Commission note,163 
‘no sum of money will be regarded as enough’.164 
 
In conclusion, as has been seen, in wrongful death claims, two different types of actions 
may be brought, the ‘survival action’ and the ‘dependency action’. After extensive 
consideration of claims for wrongful death, the Law Commission165 essentially accepted 
the continuation of the two actions. It suggested extending the list of persons eligible to 
qualify for claims and made recommendations regarding levels of damages. It 
recommended that bereavement damages continue to be made available and clarified 
the function of bereavement damages as seen above. Although bereavement damages 
                                             
158 Ibid. 
159 Law Commission Report No. 56, paragraph 175. See McGregor (2003) (n 55), 540 para 26.44. 
160 Proof of mental distress is not required; an award of bereavement damages is not taken into account 
when assessing damages for psychiatric illness resulting from a death of another. Allen (n 78) at 271. 
161 Law Commission Report No. 56, paragraph 175. 
162 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s 1 (1A). 
163 Law Commission ‘Claims for Wrongful Death’ (1977) Consultation Paper No 148. 
164 Interestingly, the Scottish Law Commission was mandated ‘to consider the law relating to damages 
recoverable in respect of deaths caused by personal injury and damages recoverable by relatives of an 
injured person; and to make appropriate recommendations for reform.’ This gave rise to the introduction 
of the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Bill in the Scottish Parliament. The Bill 
seeks to allow sufferers of mesothelioma to settle claims for damages during their lifetime without, as 
would occur under the present law, automatically precluding a subsequent claim for non-patrimonial loss 
(grief, distress, sorrow and other intangible losses) by their immediate family. 




are statutorily fixed at £11,800,166 and therefore are not a major cost in these types of 
actions, it is a moot question whether or not they achieve the redress function hoped for. 
 
There are additional anomalies regarding damages payable for intangible losses. 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss may be awarded to victims of personal injury, but 
otherwise they will only be awarded for the death of a spouse or unmarried minor child 
under the Fatal Accidents Act. In other circumstances, no damages can be awarded for 
non-pecuniary loss. This rules out, for instance, any damages for the distress and 
anguish of parents whose child suffers crippling brain damage and whose life may 
thereby be shattered. Similarly, nothing is recoverable for the death of someone other 
than under the Fatal Accidents Act. So no damages will be awarded for the death of an 
adult child or of a non-marital partner; and a husband or wife cannot recover anything 
for the effects on themselves of a serious accident to their spouse. It was not suggested 
by Cane that there should be payment of damages for non-pecuniary loss in these 
situations, but the difficulty of justifying such damages in the cases where they are 
presently awarded was stressed.167 For the reasons outlined above, primarily the 
symbolic value of these awards, I would continue the payment of damages for 
bereavement even though the loss is incommensurate with money. 
 
IV. PECUNIARY LOSS ASPECT OF CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
 
Viewed through the prism of the theory of corrective justice,168 full compensation for 
the injury that the defendant caused to the claimant is required. A useful distinction can 
be drawn between what we might call ‘equivalent compensation’, on the one hand, and 
‘substitute/solace compensation’, on the other. This distinction is based on the fact that 
the compensation provided by the tort system is in the form of monetary payments, but 
that not all of the adverse changes for which the tort law compensates are financial in 
nature. When tort law gives monetary compensation for adverse financial changes in a 
                                             
166 Currently, in 2011, the award for bereavement damages is £11,800. See P Balen, Clinical Negligence 
(Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2008) at 510 for discussion of the (DCA – Department of 
Constitutional Affairs) Consultation paper ‘The Law on Damages’ (2007) available online at: 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/damages/cp0907.htm. 
167 Cane (n 24), 144, and ch 17 ‘The Functions of Compensation Systems’. 
168 See Chapman (n 33) for a full discussion of theoretical positions. Additionally, see Chapter 1 
‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress Within the NHS’ above for a full discussion of the 
concepts of corrective and distributive justice. ‘Corrective justice means to make required changes in an 
unjustified state of affairs between an injurer and a victim, when the injurer’s activity has caused the 
injustice, so that changes bring about a just state of affairs between them, and one that is related in a 




person’s life, we can say that the compensation is equivalent to that which is 
compensated for; but this is not the case when those changes are not financial.169 For 
present purposes, I have concentrated my discussion on the difficulties, theoretical and 
practical, of providing substitute/solace compensation. This is not to deny the enormous 
interest claimants have in receiving damages. Equivalent compensation does not present 
the same theoretical challenge as compensation for intangibles and I argue that despite 
the exigencies of the NHS, these should be paid to victims of iatrogenic harm along tort 
law principles. The detail of computation of pecuniary loss is beyond the remit of the 
thesis.170 However, because the change in the method of payment of damages may have 
an impact on NHS finances, I will note the change in how damages are paid, lump sum 
or periodical payment, and consider the issue of claims for private medical expenses. 
 
A. Lump Sum or Periodical Payment?171 
 
Until 1 April 2005, the principle of full compensation was achieved by empowering the 
courts to award a lump sum, which once awarded was final. It could not be reopened 
and the claimant could spend it as he chose. This enabled finality and a sense of closure 
for both parties, but it was seen to be flawed, particularly in terms of the risk of over- or 
undercompensating due to the uncertainty of life expectancy.172 
 
Parliament has reviewed the lump sum principle in two ways: first by providing for the 
possibility of provisional damages and latterly by providing for periodical payments in 
place of lump sums.173 The courts now have the power to make a number of different 
types of personal injury award. They may (and in the majority of cases do) award a 
single once-and-for-all lump sum at trial. Alternatively, the judgment may be for a lump 
sum, but provisional, allowing the opportunity to one or other party to return to court in 
certain defined circumstances. In addition, since the early 1990s, in the case of larger 
awards, the courts have often made part of an award in an alternative form; namely, as a 
‘structured settlement’, by which an annual payment is made indexed to provide 
protection against inflation. Until 2005, such awards were consensual only and could 
not be imposed on an unwilling claimant or defendant. Since 2005, the courts have been 
                                             
169 Cane (n 24), 412. 
170 See Tettenborn (n 100) and McGregor (2010) (n 31) for details of computation of damages. 
171 Brazier and Cave (n 133) at 233. 
172 Ibid at 234 and Balen (n 166) at 484. 




able to impose a periodical payments order (PPO).174 This system of payment addresses 
some of the uncertainties generated by having to assess compensation as a lump sum 
because payment stops when the claimant dies. Periodical payments, paid for through 
self-financing, may therefore save the NHS some money and be fairer and more 
efficient.175 There is, however, a mandatory requirement for the court to be satisfied as 
to the continuity of the future periodical payments by the defendant.176 Where the 
source of the payment is a Government Health Service body,177 problems have arisen 
because an NHS Trust is not technically such a body178 and, in particular, because 
Foundation Trust Hospitals have financial autonomy and therefore can, in theory, be put 
into liquidation. These problems have now been resolved by the decision in YM v 
Gloucester Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and the Secretary of State for Health179 on 
the basis of agreements made between the NHS Litigation Authority and the Secretary 
of State for Health.180 
 
B. Potential Problems in the Calculation of Pecuniary Loss: Medical Costs181 
 
The most important item of expenditure usually concerns hospital, medical and nursing 
expenses, past and future. These are recoverable if reasonably necessary and in England 
one can claim for private provision: ‘the test is not whether other care or treatment is 
reasonable but whether the care and treatment chosen and claimed for is 
reasonable…the test is whether the claimant has made a reasonable choice’.182 
However, in Australia and many other countries, the value of publicly funded medical 
and hospital services cannot be claimed because the victim will incur no expense. This 
is not the rule in the United States, however, where no comprehensive National Health 
                                             
174 See Damages Act 1996, ss 2-2B (as substituted by the (Courts Act 2003) and the Damages (Variation 
of Periodical Payments) Order 2005, SI 2005/841. See Brazier and Cave (n 133) at 236 for discussion and 
detail of PPOs. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Section 2 of the Damages Act 1996 and Part 41 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
177 Defined in Damages (Government and Health Service Bodies) order 2005, SI 2005/474. Ibid at 722. 
178 Contrary to the decision of Sir Michael Turner in Begum v Barnett and Chase Farm Hospital Trust 
[2005] EWHC 3383 (QB).  
179 YM v Gloucester Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and the Secretary of State for Health [2006] 
EWHC 820, [2006] PIQR P27. 
180 Tettenborn (n 100) at 722. 
181Brazier and Cave (n 133) at 233. 
182Peters v East Midlands SHA [2009] 3 WLR 737 at para 80. See Aldous (n 16), 227. If the claimant is 
reasonable in electing private funding over state funding then he is free to do so and need not give credit 
for future publicly funded provision. See Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’ above at 5. 




Service exists.183 A major problem of the tort system under which clinical negligence 
actions are pursued is that the system is inordinately expensive, with little more than 
half the insurance premium reaching the victim.184 These high transaction costs are 
inherent in the system itself, the primary cause being the adversary relation between the 
claimant and the compensation source. Both liability and damages require investigation 
by expensive professionals and are frequently contested. The system is geared to 
individual processing and does not favour economies of scale.185 Attempts at 
standardising compensation plans have not met with success.186 
 
C. Conclusion: Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Loss 
 
In England and Australia there has been fear that an increasing culture of blame has led 
to a compensation culture. However, research in both countries has not borne out the 
idea of ever increasing rates of litigation.187 The rate of claiming has increased in the 
United Kingdom in the thirty years since the Pearson Report188 largely because of an 
increase in knowledge that such claiming is possible; however, there is little or no 
evidence of a litigation ‘explosion’.189 There was an increase in litigation rates in the 
thirty years to the 1990s, but little increase per capita after that. However, the cost of 
claims, particularly the biggest damages awards for catastrophic injury, has increased 
dramatically, partly because of wage rises for nursing and similar professions and 
because of increased life expectancy.190 I argue that victims of iatrogenic harm as a 
result of treatment in the NHS have an entitlement, based upon corrective justice 
principles, to compensation for their pecuniary loss. However, while not denying an 
entitlement to redress for their non-pecuniary loss, I would advocate searching for non-
                                             
183See Sappideen, and Vines (n 9), Chapter 10, at 268 for details of this and payments for care provided 
by family.  
184 Royal Commission (n 145). The Pearson Report at 83 estimated operating costs at 85% of the value of 
tort compensation payments. By comparison, the administrative cost of the New Zealand accident scheme 
is under 8%. See Sappideen, and Vines (n 8), 17. But the tort system fits the corrective justice model 
better. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid at 18. 
187 See Sappideen, and Vines (n 9), 15, footnotes 63 and 64 for details of research articles. 
188 And the Harris Report ‘Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (1984). 
189 R Lewis, A Morris and K Oliphant, ‘Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: is there a Compensation 
Culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158. 
190In 2010/11, 8,655 claims of clinical negligence and 4,346 claims of non-clinical negligence against 
NHS bodies were received by the NHSLA, up from 6,652 claims of clinical negligence and 4,074 claims 
of non-clinical negligence in 2009/10.£863 million was paid in connection with clinical negligence claims 




pecuniary means of recompense. This is both because these losses are, by their nature, 
non-commodifiable and the nature of a welfare health system, based on distributive 
justice principles, means that the population’s claims for treatment rather than redress 
must also be respected. I now turn to the complicated issue of redress for psychiatric 
harm. 
 
The issue of redress for intangible, psychiatric rather than physical harm merits 
discussion because the restrictions placed on recovery for psychiatric harm in the 
Hillsborough accident cases191 have left a legacy of concepts, language and analysis ill-
suited to clinical negligence cases.192 The courts have had difficulty with claims for 
‘pure psychiatric damage’, where the claimant has not suffered any physical injury. 
Although most of the problematic cases have involved claims for psychiatric harm 
sustained by third parties as a result of witnessing traumatic events to others, some have 
involved claims by individuals arising out of events in which they were participants. In 
the medical context, this could include, for example, psychiatric damage resulting from 
medical treatment where the patient has not yet sustained any physical injury or upon 
the negligently conveyed communication of distressing news. In addition, there are 
secondary claims for psychiatric injury from close relatives arising from negligently 
harmed primary patients. The issues that such cases raise are so closely linked to the 
broader question of how the courts react to claims for psychiatric damage generally, that 
these cases are discussed along with those involving claims for psychiatric damage by 
third parties.193 After the discussion, ideas of potential reform of this area of law will be 
canvassed. 
 
                                             
191 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (hereafter Alcock) White v 
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V. PSYCHIATRIC HARM IN THE CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE SPHERE 
 
One area where I argue that the present law is unsatisfactory is in its dealing with claims 
for psychiatric injury not attendant upon physical injury. Discussion of psychiatric harm 
is conventionally to be found under problems of duty of care, as the focus of litigation 
has been in setting boundaries limiting the class of potential claimants.194 In the context 
of this chapter on damages, claims for psychiatric harm offer examples of both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. In the following analysis, I will discuss the problem 
of the medical and legal classification of psychiatric harm,195 the issue of liability for 
psychiatric harm and note proposals for reform.196 In conclusion, for comparison, I 
consider recent court decisions and legislative initiatives in Australia.197 
 
A. Mental and Emotional Harm: Problems of Classification 
 
Initially, there are difficulties with the definition and classification of what counts as 
harm for the purposes of legal redress. The medical and legal definitions are not co-
terminous. The courts have been consistently uneasy about compensating claimants for 
pure psychiatric harm because of a widespread mistrust of intangible harm. The most 
high profile cases in recent times have concerned the Hillsborough football stadium 
disaster. A common thread running through the House of Lords decisions198 is the 
spectre of proliferating claims and ‘virtually limitless liability’ should the controls be 
abandoned. It will be argued that the concerns about proliferating claims and the 
perceived difficulty in diagnosing psychiatric illness have been overstated. Meanwhile, 
manifestly deserving claimants are thwarted by rules that have long been a blot on the 
legal system, perpetuating a mismatch of law and medicine. After a discussion of these 
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House of Lords decisions, I will focus on the issue of claims for psychiatric harm in the 
medical, rather than accident scenario, ending with thoughts about the way forward.199 
 
The history of ethereal torts displays a consistent and repeated pattern: the devaluation, 
diminishment and dismissal of injuries to the psyche despite evidence that it is precisely 
those sorts of injuries that harm people profoundly – injuries that matter the most: 
 
The initial division of deserving and undeserving plaintiffs is the separation of 
those suffering physical injuries from those suffering mental injuries. Those 
incurring physical harms are readily compensated. Those incurring psychic 
harms face scepticism, heightened burdens of proof and a history of precedents 
that treat the interest in emotional equilibrium as unworthy. In infliction of 
emotional distress cases, the injuries complained of are often presumptively 
treated as pre-existing flaws in the individual’s psychological make-up.200 
 
It is widely accepted that the current state of the law governing psychiatric injury is 
unsatisfactory. The traditional approach to the duty of care in ‘nervous shock cases’ 
requires more hurdles to be met than in cases of ordinary physical injury. The rules are 
generally considered to be overly complex, inconsistent and lead to the drawing of 
arbitrary distinctions. This dissatisfaction is shared by members of the senior 
judiciary.201 The medical and legal systems address the issue of mental and emotional 
harm from understandably different perspectives. I am including a detailed discussion of 
the tensions between the legal and medical understanding of the terms because they are 
beneath the surface in almost all aspects of the thesis, from causation to redress. The 
problem for present purposes is that modern law regarding psychiatric injury is 
predominantly carved from litigation concerning accidents, in particular, the 
Hillsborough litigation.202 The most important requirements apposite to accident 
scenarios include the presence of a ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’, usually Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder,203 caused by a particular traumatic event. The courts have 
restricted liability to claimants who are considered proximate to the accident scene. As 
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will be addressed, these concepts of sudden shock and ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
victims, when superimposed on clinical negligence cases, are a poor fit.204 
 
B. Medical Classification 
 
Although ‘personal harm’, as generally understood, extends well beyond bodily injury, 
no single term fully captures the sheer range of suffering which is not manifestly 
physical. The field of inquiry regarding legal redress for ‘mental and emotional harm’ 
immediately raises formidable and unresolved difficulties of appropriate terminology. 
When viewed from the medical perspective, emotional reactions to traumatic stimuli are 
often more nuanced than the effects of physical injury. To an extent not always open to 
the law, medicine can allow for levels of uncertainty and gradation when categorising a 
patient’s mental condition. A basic distinction can, nevertheless, be drawn between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ reactions to trauma. Primary reactions are immediate, 
automatic and instinctive. They are transient, subjective sensations such as fear, anger 
or shock which have various physiological repercussions that affect the nervous system. 
Though very common, such symptoms are normally offset by a defence mechanism 
which allows the sufferer to cope. In a small minority of cases, however, longer-lasting 
secondary reactions develop, often in the form of traumatic neuroses. A person’s 
emotional make-up is a key predictor of such consequences, but there will be other 
variables, such as the intensity of the stimulus, the degree of preparedness for it and, 
crucially when injury to another is the trigger, the intensity of the relationship between 
the individuals concerned.205 
 
The main neurotic reactions to trauma are now commonly divided into PTSD and 
certain other conditions, such as depressive illnesses, adjustment disorders and anxiety 
disorders.206 All of these conditions can be induced by shock, but PTSD is distinctive in 
that the diagnosis depends on exposure to an external and severely traumatic event 
outside the range of normal human experience. PTSD is also characterised by re-
experiencing’ the traumatising event and by the emergence of persistent ‘avoidance’ 
and ‘arousal symptoms’. It is widely acknowledged within psychiatry that the 
boundaries of mental disorder are not exact. Although there is no definitive 
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classificatory system of mental disorders, the most widely accepted works of this kind 
are those of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV) and the World Health 
Organisation (ICD-10). As works of reference which set out diagnostic criteria, these 
manuals constitute a valuable resource for the psychiatric profession. In the context of 
litigation, their criteria also routinely feature in the written opinions and evidence of 
expert witnesses.207 
 
It is clear, however, that DSM-IV and ICD-10 are not designed to satisfy legal criteria 
for remediable harm. There is no universal agreement within psychiatry on what 
constitutes a ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’, nor, if there were, is it obvious that it 
should be the legal recovery threshold for negligently inflicted ‘pure’ mental harm. 
There is no reason why one should expect the particular classificatory system in a 
medical treatise to be totally congruent with the requirements of a liability regime that 
are inevitably shaped by the development of legal doctrine, as influenced by notions of 
culpability and various social and economic considerations. In the court setting, then, 
DSM-IV and ICD-10 serve as valuable guidance to be considered in the light of other 
relevant factors, which include clinical judgement. Such works cannot be dispositive of 
legal decisions, and some medical experts maintain that their categories ‘do not reflect 
the complexities of the psychological impact of trauma’, given that conditions not 
‘officially’ classified may prove more disabling, depending on the particular facts.208 
Nonetheless, the influence of these diagnostic systems in the legal context is undeniable, 
as is apparent from how soon PTSD became a prominent basis of claims once it had 
been accepted as a distinct diagnostic category. What remains unfortunate is the extent 
to which certain legal criteria of liability fly in the face of generally accepted scientific 
understanding. 
 
C. Legal Classification 
 
If medical opinions differ on how to define and label particular mental conditions, so 
too the law is far from uniform in classifying and providing remedies for mental and 
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emotional harm. The chequered history of the term ‘nervous shock’ is a case in point.209 
The question, for our purposes, is to what extent can a doctor, who negligently treats a 
patient, be liable for psychiatric injury to the patient or his relatives where that 
psychiatric injury is the only injury suffered by the patient or relative?210 The answer, as 
previously noted, is to be found in four House of Lords decisions.211 
 
The distinction between primary and secondary victims is important. Where the patient 
has been exposed to a risk or danger, the patient is entitled to claim for pure psychiatric 
injury as a primary victim. A relative would be classified as a secondary victim whose 
ability to recover compensation is subject to the test laid out by the House of Lords, 
namely, that the claimant has to prove that: (1) there was a recognised psychiatric injury 
and not merely grief, (2) this resulted from shock, ie the sudden and direct appreciation 
by sight or sound of a horrifying event or events, (3) there was propinquity in time or 
space from the causative event or its immediate aftermath, (4) the injury was reasonably 
foreseeable and (5) that the relationship between the claimant and defendant was 
sufficiently proximate. 
 
In the leading clinical negligence case of Sion v Hampstead HA212 P Gibson LJ made 
clear that a claim of this sort would not fail simply on the basis that there is no 
‘unexpected’ or ‘shocking’ event. What is crucial is the unexpected or shocking nature 
of the discovery by the claimant. There remains, however, the distinction between a 
gradual onset of psychiatric harm and a psychiatric injury which flows from a sudden 
‘shock.’ A more flexible approach to this criterion is illustrated by the case of Walters v 
North Glamorgan NHS Trust,213 where a baby was negligently misdiagnosed leading to 
his death from acute hepatitis and his mother recovered compensation for the 
psychiatric harm she suffered in circumstances where the baby died 36 hours after the 
mother’s initial appreciation that her son was seriously ill. Thomas J held that the period 
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of 36 hours from when the mother first saw her son having an epileptic fit through to the 
time of the baby’s death was a horrifying event. The initial witnessing of the fit was not 
such an event in its own right, but the court should look realistically at all the events 
which happened over the period until death. Also, the psychiatric evidence meant that it 
was not possible to isolate the causative effect of each incident within the 36-hour 
period. The accumulation of all events had contributed to the injury. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling, stating that the court should take a realistic 
view of the word ‘event’ and should not be overly restrictive in its interpretation, so that 
a series of events may satisfy the test, depending upon the individual circumstances of 
the case.214 
 
D. Liability for Psychiatric Harm: 
‘Beyond the Mainstream’ – The Current Position 
 
The liability rules for negligently caused mental harm were essentially crafted with 
accident-based claims in mind. Whether one thinks of the rail or road crashes which 
shaped the early law or mass disasters at particular venues, the paradigm is an untoward 
physical event causing shock-induced psychiatric illness.215 Throughout the twentieth 
century, presence in the ‘zone of danger’ and instant fright were stock features of the 
case. The primary/secondary divide is but the latest construct to confirm the law’s 
preoccupation with physical proximity to a particular physical incident. 
 
Yet there are numerous types of situation in which the accident-driven rule structure has 
little or no meaningful purchase. Often the negligent conduct complained of is not 
‘accident-based’ as described above, so that there is no-one who fits the narrow 
Page/White formula for primary victims, or who could satisfy the range of legal criteria 
for secondary victims.216 When negligent delivery of services or of bad news causes 
psychiatric harm, there is no ‘accident scene’ and only in exceptional circumstances 
would the recipient have been physically endangered. This is also so when the harm 
results from a prolonged hospital vigil for negligently treated dying family members.217 
                                             
214 Balen (n 166) at 176. 
215 Teff (n 191), Chapter 1, 2-3. 
216 For example, Farrell v Avon Health Authority [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458, and Walters (n 213). 




In many contexts, to insist that the claimant fit within the accident-driven format either 
rules out liability arbitrarily or prompts yet more artificial analysis. 
 
In the fraught environment of the hospital, the natural anxieties of patients and people 
intimately connected with them are often heightened by inadequate information or 
mixed messages. The traumatic experience of a long drawn-out vigil, with intermittent 
crises and hopes raised only to be dashed, or an extended process of dawning realisation 
culminating in the trauma of attendance at the mortuary, can provide ample evidence of 
‘causal proximity’.218 Yet under Alcock, whatever the surrounding circumstances, 
secondary claims would appear to require a specific traumatic incident. A review of the 
recent case law shows a mixed picture of a declining insistence on ‘sudden shock’ and a 
lingering potential for restrictive analysis in the hospital setting.219 
 
The ‘shock, horror’ model of how psychiatric harm is induced, with its enduring hold on 
the popular imagination, has long been mirrored in the legal setting.220 If deprecated of 
late in the case law, it still has undue capacity to determine legal outcomes.221 The 
inclination towards more liberal interpretation in the hospital cases seems, in part, 
attributable to judicial empathy, a tacit recognition of the narrowness and rigidity of the 
liability rules. It also reflects the fact that, in this setting, the case for restricting 
‘secondary’ claims for want of ‘sufficient proximity’ looks distinctly thin. There is 
commonly a nexus between the hospital and those closest to the patient, whose 
‘presence’, when not actually known about as a fact, is readily foreseeable, even if they 
seldom perceive a shocking event. Abandonment of the shock requirement would be 
both an important symbolic and practical demonstration of the progressive 
understanding of psychiatric harm which the House of Lords has asserted in recent 
years. These hospital cases are clearly distinguishable from the accident cases because 
of the prior link between the claimant and the defendant and this link has been invoked 
to justify strained interpretations of the doctrinal barriers to recovery. Some judges have 
been emboldened either to disregard a particular restrictive device or to dispense with 
all the special controls in favour of broader negligence criteria.222 An argument put 
forward by Harvey Teff for broadening the scope of mental harm to include instances 
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which fall short of a ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ is supported by judgments in the 
Australian courts. 
 
E. The View from Afar: Australia 
Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd223 
 
In these two cases224 the court largely repudiated the use of limiting devices as 
preconditions of liability in favour of a more principled and rational approach grounded 
in reasonable foreseeability.225 Direct perception, sudden shock and reasonably 
foreseeable harm in a person of ‘normal fortitude’ were all downgraded to mere features 
helping to establish foreseeability.226 This decisive departure from prevailing English 
law on psychiatric harm was sadly short-lived. There was a sea change in the law and 
the fruits of Tame and Annetts were swiftly abandoned in hastily drawn up legislation. 
At the turn of the century, Australia saw a dramatic rise in the cost of personal liability 
insurance and corresponding reductions in risk coverage. What was perceived as an 
‘insurance crisis’,227 symbolised by the collapse of a major general insurer, HIH, 
generated political and media-driven debate about litigation rates, the breadth of 
negligence liability and the level of awards, concerns endorsed by some members of the 
judiciary.228 Tort law reform was already on the agenda in several States when, in 2002, 
the Federal Government instituted a major review of negligence law, chaired by Justice 
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Rumble (n 195). 
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David Ipp.229 As a direct consequence of the Ipp Report’s recommendations, substantial 
wide-ranging reforms were implemented, mainly between 2002 and 2004, in all 
Australian jurisdictions.230 Tame and Annetts were immediately partially overturned by 
legislative amendment in New South Wales. There, and in several other States, a test 
based on a claimant of ‘normal fortitude’ has been designated a precondition of 
foreseeability of psychiatric harm in psychiatric injury cases231 and some new statutory 
provisions are more restrictive than those recommended in the Ipp Report. In particular, 
as regards secondary victims, several States have confined recovery to claimants who 
are either present or at the scene of an accident and see another person being killed, 
injured, or imperilled232 or who are in a ‘close relationship’ with such a person.233 
 
In conclusion, I would agree with Teff and Vines that the present restrictive English law 
regarding liability for psychiatric harm absent physical injury needs revision. However, 
while I would be the first to acknowledge the reality of the pain and suffering inherent 
in psychiatric harm, I nonetheless would eschew damages for the non-pecuniary loss 
aspect of psychiatric harm occasioned in the NHS sphere for the reasons rehearsed 
above. I now turn to the legislative reforms in Australia, looking more broadly at 
personal injury claims. 
 
VI. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE: 
PECUNIARY AND NON-PECUNIARY LOSS 
 
England is not alone in struggling to find affordable means of redress for personal 
injury. The Australian reforms of 2002–2004 were enacted against a ‘catchcry’ or 
slogan of personal responsibility234 and the notion of a compensation culture which 
galvanised governments into passing legislation constraining the common law of 
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torts.235 An important catalyst for these changes was the medical profession. The 
increases in medical indemnity insurance in Australia made the doctors a potent lobby 
in the tort reform process. Similar problems arose in the NHS which gave rise to the 
NHS Redress Act 2006.236 In the United States, a perceived crisis in medical indemnity 
insurance occurred in the 1970s and led to some tort reforms. This was followed by 
further crises in the 1980s and in the late 1990s.237 The anxiety of medical practitioners 
went unassuaged and legislatures responded not only to constrain the law of torts but 
also to reduce litigation by other means such as taking certain medical adverse events 
out of the litigation process238 and protection of apologies in civil liability, especially in 
relation to medical malpractice.239 As regards non-pecuniary loss, there are limiting 
thresholds in several jurisdictions.240 In Queensland, there are caps on damages, 
restrictions on compensation to family and friends for free care and limits on legal fees 
refundable for smaller claims.241 In Victoria, there are restrictions on medical 
negligence claims, particularly the requirement that medical experts must determine that 
a patient has suffered impairment of at least 6 per cent due to a physical injury and at 
least 11 per cent in the case of psychiatric problems before a claimant can sue.242 
 
One possible response to the restrictive legislative scheme243 would be for judges to 
enhance justice by highlighting the hardships and iniquities this legislation creates for 
injured claimants. However, while Thomas Faunce244 hopes for and anticipates a no-
fault compensation system in Australia, Prue Vines245 notes that in the last decades, 
social welfarism has lost its earlier appeal due to financial stringency. Public policy has 
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veered from expanding to reducing public expenditure for social welfare and 
‘privatising’ formerly governmental responsibilities. Notions of individual 
responsibility and private choice are gaining at the expense of social welfare. She 
anticipates that this will be reflected increasingly in a preference for voluntary first-
party insurance over no-fault compensation, and even over tort liability with its satellite 
of third-party insurance.246 
 
The landscape in England appears much as Vines describes it247 and it is clear that the 
no-fault option has been eschewed by the British Government.248 It has been instructive 
to consider how other jurisdictions grapple with issues arising from iatrogenic harm.249 
Whereas in England the question of whether or not compensation should be paid for the 
maintenance of a healthy child who was born as a result of negligent advice following a 
sterilisation operation was decided in the negative by the House of Lords,250 in 
Australia, after Cataract,251 recovery is allowed. One reason for this is that Australia did 
not follow the principle of Caper as to whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose 
liability and instead held that ‘to deny such recovery is to provide a zone of legal 
immunity to medical practitioners…that is unprincipled and inconsistent with 
established legal doctrine’.252 Kirby J suggested that to deny recovery would be an 
arbitrary departure from the principle of corrective justice.253 However, in a concession 
to the House of Lords, Justice Kirby acknowledged that concern to protect the economic 
viability of the NHS might help to explain its resort to ‘distributive justice; such 
concerns could, however, find no place in Australian public policy.’254 
 
The present overwhelming worldwide financial challenges for governments has resulted 
in retrenchment of welfare payments, and theoretical models currently take second place 
to strictly financial burdens. Nonetheless, I continue to argue that victims of iatrogenic 
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harm occasioned within the NHS should receive their financial redress for pecuniary 




DAMAGES AS REDRESS FOR IATROGENIC HARM: 
PECUNIARY AND NON-PECUNIARY LOSS 
 
Damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity is a secondary form of 
compensation, incapable of precise assessment and less able than pecuniary damages 
to provide an equivalent to what has been lost. A ‘correction’ cannot be made. It is 
compensation deserving a lower priority than that awarded for financial loss.256 
 
 
It is important to note that for a claimant who chooses the legal route to redress, the 
remedy in a clinical negligence action is damages and that the claimant’s wish for ‘a 
guarantee that this will never happen to anyone else’ (or similar forms of redress) is not 
achievable within a court’s judgment.257 
 
I shall make a brief remark regarding compensation for pecuniary loss due to negligence 
in the NHS sphere. Although in practical terms, the calculations for pecuniary loss give 
rise to actuarial complexities, in philosophical terms, monetary damages are seen as 
satisfying the equivalence test by replacing like with like and are therefore 
unproblematic. While admittedly, the emphasis in this chapter on damages has been 
more focused on the philosophy, practicalities of quantification and methods of payment 
regarding damages for non-pecuniary loss, I have also discussed damages in respect of 
death and bereavement; calculations and payment for pecuniary loss; redress for 
psychiatric harm, and have noted how these issues are tackled in other jurisdictions, 
most notably Australia. The fact that there are concerns regarding the unequal 
distribution of compensation, payments between those people who qualify because of 
tort and those who have not been negligently damaged but are ill or disabled, is outside 
the remit of this thesis.258 
 
I have argued that, from a corrective justice vantage point, victims of iatrogenic harm 
occasioned within the NHS have an entitlement to full redress for both pecuniary and 
                                             
255 Chapter 9 ‘Effective Redress’ below. 
256 Cane (n 24). 
257 For these remedies see Part III ‘Redress within the NHS’ below. 
258 Ibid Introduction. Also J Stapleton, ‘Compensating Victims of Disease’ (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of 




non-pecuniary loss. However, this entitlement is constrained by the competing 
responsibility a universal healthcare service has to deliver treatment to society at large. 
 
There is a tension between funding redress and funding treatment. I argue that the 
pecuniary losses should be reimbursed because the NHS should be held to the requisite 
standard of a competent health service. However, because non-pecuniary loss is 
incommensurate with money, more appropriate redress might be found.259 I am limiting 
this argument to the specific instance of a universal health service under the assumption 
that money not spent on damages would go directly to patient care. As regards redress 
for wrongful death, I have argued in favour of retaining the bereavement payment. 
Although this is inconsistent with my overall stance regarding non-pecuniary loss, I 
would keep this payment because it is an expected, conventional sum with symbolic 
meaning and its removal would cause unacceptable hurt. 
 
Turning to the question of liability for psychiatric harm, particularly in the absence of 
physical harm, I have discussed the unsatisfactory state of the law at present. In clinical 
negligence cases, the victims may well be relatives as well as patients and would fall 
foul of the artificial constructs for primary and secondary victims. I have noted the extra 
burdens placed on claimants for psychiatric harm. I would argue that diagnosis is not as 
problematic as the courts infer; the percentage of the population who might succumb to 
PTSD is not more than 1 in 3,260 and the floodgates argument is invalid. That said, the 
question of compensation for pure psychiatric harm remains challenging in England and 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. I argue that psychiatric harm should be treated on an 
equal footing with physical harm and therefore damages are due for pecuniary loss and 
bereavement payment but not for the non-pecuniary loss. 
 
In the closing section of the chapter, I have looked at judicial and legislative initiatives 
around this aspect of tort law in Australia. After some enlightened judicial decisions in 
the area of psychiatric harm, legislative responses to a perceived but inaccurate notion 
of a compensation culture restricted liability and redress for injured patients. While 
there is some scope for judicial interpretation to counterbalance the legislation, the 
                                             
259 See Part III ‘Redress within the NHS’ below. 





present financial crisis finds governments retrenching on all aspects of welfare rights, 
from treatment itself to withdrawal of legal aid and limits on redress. 
 
This chapter concludes Part II Medical Negligence Litigation and I now turn to Part III 
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In a perfect world, no doubt things would never go wrong in hospitals: no one 
would ever complain or have cause to do so…This is a trite observation, but it 
leads to the point which we want to make. This is absurd and leads to 
dissatisfaction, inefficiency or worse – to pretend or persuade oneself that things 
never do go wrong.1 
 
The best place for a lawyer in the NHS is on the operating table.2 
                                             
1 Sir Michael Davies, Chairman Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints Procedure, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (1973) page 4. 






This thesis focuses on redress for iatrogenic harm incurred through clinical negligence 
in the English NHS. In a sense this is where both philosophical and practical issues are 
at their most acute. The tortfeasor’s intent, leaving to one side instances of gross 
negligence and aberrant behaviour, is to provide a positive good. The human cost of a 
doctor’s error can be great, and monetary compensation is inadequate when the mistake 
results in disability or death of the patient.3 The money used to pay compensation comes 
out of a limited budget in which there are competing claims for healthcare. 
 
The preceding section of this thesis4 was concerned with claimants obtaining financial 
recompense through litigation. This section concerns redress within the NHS and 
focuses on non-litigious and non-financial remedies for alleged clinical negligence, in 
particular, the increasingly important NHS complaints procedures. Where financial 
compensation is barred by virtue of limitations on legal aid and civil law reform,5 more 
pressure will be placed upon the complaints system and professional regulation to 
deliver appropriate sanctions, communication and correction.6 I argue that a complaints 
system that functions well would offer a significant alternative route of access to justice 
for iatrogenically harmed patients. 
 
According to the Health Ombudsman,7 complaints can be complex, covering extended 
periods of time and multiple issues of maladministration or service failure. Clinical care 
and treatment form the largest subject category, followed by the attitude of the NHS 
staff. The type of harm being discussed is often the result of poor communication and 
insensitive handling after the original event and there are also instances where a doctor 
may not have done anything technically wrong but may have generated enough ill-
feeling to provoke a complaint.8 As previously discussed, claimants are motivated not 
only by a desire for an explanation, a wish for retribution, and the need for 
compensation, but also by concerns about standards of care. Both patients and relatives 
                                             
3 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011) 6. 
4 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation above. 
5 Ibid. 
6 E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) 27 Professional Negligence 3, 138-157 at 157. 
7 Listening and Learning: the Ombudsman’s Review of Complaint Handling by the NHS in England 
2010-11 at 26-28 has complaint handling subject keywords and percentages. I will discuss these below. 
8 L Mulcahy, ‘Threatening Behaviour?  The Challenge Posed by Medical Negligence Claims’ in Freeman 




want to prevent similar accidents happening in the future and believe that staff or the 
organisation should have to account for their actions.9 
 
Patients who are dissatisfied with their medical treatment will not necessarily either 
choose, or be eligible to pursue, an action in negligence. Such patients may nevertheless 
want to complain about the care they received.10 A number of procedures exist to ensure 
that medical practitioners and healthcare providers can be held accountable for their 
actions. If a doctor’s11 conduct gives rise to concern it can lead to: 
 
 (a) a patient complaint to the health service provider 
 (b) litigation by a patient 
 (c) disciplinary action by the employing body 
 (d) after exhaustion of the complaints procedure, an investigation by the Health 
Service Commissioner (the Ombudsman) 
 (e) investigation by the General Medical Council (GMC) or 
 (f) in extreme cases, investigation by the police or, where death results, an inquiry 
by the Coroner and 
 (g) in exceptional circumstances there could also be a public inquiry. 
 
After preliminary discussion of the context within which medical errors occur, I will 
briefly touch upon the regulatory processes and investigative recourse available to 
aggrieved patients and/or their relatives. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the 
history and working of the NHS complaints processes and the role of the Health 
Ombudsman.12 In the Ombudsman’s report of 2005,13 Ann Abraham listed what she 
thought the essential elements for a new system for complaints should be. It would be 
essential, inter alia, to offer coherent and comprehensive coverage; to be customer 
focused which included issues of accessibility, flexibility and transparency; to offer a 
quality service including the NHS being open and transparent about mistakes; to offer 
effective complaint handling with links to clinical governance; and finally to offer a 
                                             
9 Ibid. See page 98 footnotes 45 and 46 therein; and C Vincent, M Young and A Phillips, ‘Why do People 
Sue Their Doctors?  A Study of Patients and Relatives taking Legal Action’ (1994) 343 Lancet 1609-13. 
Also Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’, above. 
10 E Jackson, Medical Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 141. 
11 This discussion also includes members of the healthcare team. 
12 Hereafter ‘the Ombudsman’. 
13 Ann Abraham, The Health Service Ombudsman for England, ‘Making Things Better? A Report on 
Reform of the NHS Complaints Procedure in England’ HC 413 (London, The Stationery Office, 9 March 




system of just redress. Redress should include provision for a full range of remedies for 
justified complaints, including explanations, apologies, specific actions or treatment for 
the patient, changes to prevent recurrence, and, where appropriate, financial 
compensation. The Ombudsman concluded that a just redress should be designed to put 
the complainant back in the position they would have been in had the service failure or 
maladministration not occurred; or if that were not possible, to compensate them 
appropriately. 
 
I will show that in its present form and operation the complaints system falls far short of 
these aspirations. Ideally, the NHS complaints system was envisaged not as a fall-back 
when litigation was not possible but as an avenue to address different problems such as 
explanations of the adverse event and plans to avoid recurrence. Whereas litigation 
offers damages for specific losses,14 I have argued that damages cannot appropriately 
address issues of intangible loss such as pain, suffering, loss of amenity and other loss 
associated with iatrogenic harm. The complaints system in its present structure is not 
designed to offer significant financial redress. Although the Ombudsman can 
recommend that financial recompense be made to cover expenses that the patient has 
incurred as a result of the faults found, she does not award financial compensation.15 
 
The complaints system as it operates at present is failing in its core role of offering open 
disclosure and learning from mistakes.16 I will measure the current complaints system 
against the Ombudsman’s essential elements for a just system of redress. After analysis 
of the history and current form of the NHS complaints process, I will conclude with a 
discussion of the recommendations of the House of Commons Health Committee17 for 
the future shape of the complaints process and the redress for iatrogenic harm it may 
offer complainants. On the positive side is the Ombudsman’s and Health Committee’s 
commitment to a well-functioning complaints process. The unfinished work is to 
translate this into reality. 
 
                                             
14 Chapter 6 ‘Damages’, above. Where patients have suffered significant financial loss, ie, loss of 
earnings and/or future care, the proper route would be litigation. When patients state a preference for 
explanations and apologies over compensation, I suggest they are referring to intangible loss. 
15 G Aldous (ed), Clinical Negligence Claims: A Practical Guide 2nd edition (London, Chambers of G 
Aldous QC, 9 Gough Square, 2011) 46. 
16 House of Commons Health Committee (Hereafter: Health Committee), ‘Complaints and Litigation’ 
Sixth Report of Session 2010-12 Printed 22 June 2011. Avoiding recurrence of the adverse event for other 
patients was the most mentioned motive for complaints by injured patients. See Chapter 2 ‘What Patients 





A. Medical Error in Context 
 
Few professionals still stand so high in the public esteem as doctors and nurses18 but 
this comes at a stiff price. Though their triumphs garner great praise, few individuals 
attract greater public condemnation than the doctor or nurse who errs. The price of the 
power wielded by medical professionals is that those who exercise it must expect to be 
subjected to constant scrutiny from patients, their families and the public at large.19 
 
1. Historical Backdrop: ‘The Times They Are a-Changin’ 
 
The Ancient Greek model of clinical autonomy was that of a doctor as a beneficent 
paternalist, in sole possession of specialist skills and knowledge. The only constraints 
on the individual doctor’s freedom of action were those imposed by the medical 
profession itself, in line with its perception of the best interests of the patient.20 
 
A wonderful description of the exalted position of consultants in 1930s England, before 
the founding of the National Health Service, is that of Nicholas Timmins:21 
 
The British Medical Association was meeting in the Great Hall of BMA House in 
Tavistock Square, a massive neo-classical, red-brick building originally designed by Sir 
Edwin Lutyens for the Theosophical Society with the Great Hall as its temple. The 
Society had been unable to afford the mighty edifice which came to symbolise all the 
self-important solidity the medical profession felt was its right – a building where, as 
late as the 1930s, the clerical staff were under instruction not to share the lift with the 
great London consultants who arrived to do their business in top hats and frock coats.22 
 
Although this model was largely unchallenged for millennia, legislative and judicial 
developments during the second half of the twentieth century have introduced greater 
concern for the autonomy of the patient and, as will be seen below, the most recent 
trends threaten to circumscribe the doctor’s traditional and jealously guarded freedom to 
practise with the minimum of external intervention. The first major change to the 
doctor-patient power relationship in England came with the advent of the NHS. 
                                             
18 R Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: Medicine and Its Discontents Great Britain, (London, Atlantic Books, 
2004), 102. 
19 Paraphrased from Brazier and Cave (n 3), 4-7 and discussed therein at length. 
20 ED Pellegrino and DC Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good: The Restoration of Beneficence in Health 
Care (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987) 3. 
21 N Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State (London, Harper Collins, 2001) 103. 
22 E Grey-Turner and FM Sutherland, History of the British Medical Association Volume II 1932-1981 





The NHS opened for business on 5 July 1948. Prior to this, access to healthcare for 
most of the population was patchy and limited. However, the most important thing the 
NHS did was to take away fear. Before it, millions at the bottom of the pile had suffered 
untreated hernias, cancers, toothache, ulcers, and all kinds of illnesses rather than face 
the humiliation and worry of being unable to afford treatment. There are many moving 
accounts of the queues of unwell, impoverished people surging for treatment in the early 
days of the NHS, arriving in hospitals and doctors’ waiting rooms for the first time ‘not 
as beggars but as citizens with a sense of right.’23 
 
The next quantum leap for patient empowerment was ‘The Citizen’s Charter’,24 an 
initiative by the Government to improve the quality of public services and make them 
responsive to their users. Principles of public service such as the maintenance of proper 
standards were made express goals, and the citizen could legitimately expect service of 
a certain quality, with legal consequences for failure to honour statements of policy or 
intention.25 Of particular note is that one aspect of this initiative was the establishment 
of adequate internal complaints procedures. Such procedures were expected to be well-
publicised, open and accessible and were to provide clear information on how to 
complain and, if dissatisfied with the internal response, to give patients recourse to the 
Parliamentary or National Health Services Commissioners.26 The most recent legislation 
underpinning patients’ rights is, of course, the Human Rights Act 1998.27 It is telling 
that the influential organisation Action for Victims of Medical Accidents (now known 
as Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA), using the language of rights, has 
emphasised that patients have ‘The Right to Know - a Fundamental Right,’ and the 
‘Right to Redress’ embodied in its charter.28 
 
                                             
23 A Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London, Macmillan, 2007) 67. 
24 The Citizen’s Charter: Raising the Standard CM 1991. The Patients Charter 1991, revised 1995, was 
abolished as part of the ten-year plan for reform: Department of Health, The NHS Plan: a plan for 
investment, a plan for reform, CM 4818 (Crown Copyright, 1 July 2000). See also The Citizen’s Charter-
Five Years On (HMSO 1996) setting out new NHS Commitments. 
25 Ibid, 370. 
26 Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 as amended by the Health Service Commissioners Act 
(Amendment) Act 1996, 107. 
27 See CJ Lewis, Clinical Negligence 6th edn (Haywards Heath, Tottel Publishing Ltd, 2006), ch 27, 445-
463. Relevant articles of the HRA 1998 will be discussed below as appropriate. 
28 P Walsh, ‘Medical Error, the Law and Alternative Approaches’ (2007) 75 Medico-Legal Journal Pt 2, 
40, 44. Also see Lord Irvine, ‘The Patient, The Doctor, Their Lawyers and The Judge: Rights and Duties’ 
(1999) 7 Medical Law Review 3, 255-268 anticipating the focus on patients’ rights with the advent of the 




In addition to legislation, the attitude of the judiciary towards the medical profession has 
also changed. Recently, there has been a marked increase in the number of cases coming 
before the civil courts involving the medical profession.29 This development must be 
seen against a background of a more consumerist, and arguably more litigation-prone 
population and the rapid progress that has been made in medical technology. Claims for 
medical negligence have given rise to increasingly complex factual issues for the courts 
to resolve. Most striking of all has been the development of an almost new medical 
jurisprudence involving complex and emotive issues but issues which have often been 
as much about ethics as the law.30 Attitudes are changing within and without both the 
legal and medical professions. Although historically the courts have been reluctant to 
appear to trespass on the expertise of another senior profession, the courts are being 
more proactive in recognising circumstances in which practices considered appropriate 
by a body of doctors may not always be the benchmark by which a doctor’s actions 
must be judged. 
 
With this very brief history, one can see that, during the lifetime of the NHS, the climate 
within which medical error is now viewed has changed from one of excessive deference 
to medical opinion to one of critical analysis and regulation. Vocabulary has also 
changed and it is time to define medical error. 
 
2. Medical Error Defined31 
 
To be clear from the outset, I am here looking at iatrogenic harm,32 which is 
unintentional and due to medical error. Error is an essentially contested concept, 
particularly in complex and uncertain fields such as medicine. Much lies between the 
two extremes of blame-free accident and deliberate harm, and this is reflected in the 
                                             
29 In 2009/10, the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) received 6,652 claims for 
clinical negligence – over 500 more than the previous year. NHSLA Reports and Accounts 2010 HC 52 
(London, 2010). See Cave (n 6), Mulcahy (n 8), and O Quick, ‘Prosecuting “Gross” Medical Negligence: 
Manslaughter, Discretion and the Crown Prosecution Service’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 3, 
421-50 at 426. 
30 Lord Irvine (n 28), Lord Woolf, ‘Are The Courts Excessively Deferential To The Medical 
Profession?’(2001) Medical Law Review 1-16. See also Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 
(1957) 1 WLR 582 and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority (1993) 4 Med LR 381 Lord Irvine’s 
comments about the tension between Bolam and the needs of pioneering doctors, at 267 and Chapter 4 
‘Proving Clinical Negligence: Duty and Breach’ above. 
31 This is based on O Quick, ‘Outing Medical Errors: Questions of Trust and Responsibility’ (2006) 14 
Medical Law Review 1, 22. 
32 A Merry and A McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine and The Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University 





myriad of terms competing to describe the phenomenon of error in medicine: 
‘accidents’, ‘mishaps’, ‘errors’, ‘negligence’, ‘failures’, ‘incompetence’, ‘misconduct’, 
‘malpractice’, ‘deficient or substandard care’, ‘adverse or untoward events’ and the concept of 
‘iatrogenic harm’. In addition, particularly serious incidents may warrant the label 
‘disaster’.33 Semantics matter. The different meanings and connotations of these terms 
are not without significance. ‘Accident’ conveys a neutral, blame-free meaning 
unattached to notions of responsibility and liability.34 Accidents are regarded as matters 
of fate which excuse participants from censure. With greater knowledge about the 
history of such events, the notion of an innocent unpredictable ‘accident’ is increasingly 
being rejected. Reflecting this, the term has been abandoned in other settings, such as 
traffic safety,35 and the British Medical Journal has banned it from its pages.36 ‘Adverse 
events’ are described as injuries arising from medical intervention, not the underlying 
condition of the patient. According to this definition, they are unexpected yet avoidable. 
The terms ‘mistake’ and ‘error’ imply a wrong act and convey a negative judgemental 
meaning. Similarly, ‘negligence’ carries with it ‘at least an innuendo of moral blame’.37 
The term ‘mishap’ falls somewhere between ‘blame-free accidents’ and ‘blameworthy 
errors’. Neither innocuous nor inflammatory, this term might be the most appealing to 
both public and profession. In this chapter ‘error’ is a generic term encompassing all 
failures to achieve intended outcomes that cannot be explained by chance.38 
 
There has been a paradigm shift in terms of thinking about errors.39 In the aftermath of 
the disasters, the lens of responsibility is being refocused away from people and towards 
(work) places. Institutions, not individuals, processes rather than persons are becoming 
the focus of investigation. This is reflected in the formal responses to these events, such 
as public inquiries, which now routinely focus on system responsibility. While systems 
analysis has obvious merits, it also raises important and unresolved questions. In 
particular, what are the implications for individual professional responsibility? And 
what does this mean in terms of the search for justice?40 
                                             
33 BA Turner and NF Pidgeon, Man Made Disasters 2nd edn (Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997) 19. 
34 The traditional concept of a pure accident is an unmotivated, unforeseen event, distant from wilful 
damage and neglect. For fuller explanation: Quick (n 31) 22. 
35 L Evans, ‘Medical Accidents: No Such Thing?’ 307 British Medical Journal (1993) 1438. 
36 R Davis and B Pless, ‘BMJ Bans Accidents’ (2001) 322 British Medical Journal 1320. 
37 P Devlin, Samples of Lawmaking Oxford University Press (1962) 100. Certain errors may be classified 
as negligent: Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER Lord Edmund-Davies 267 at 276. 
38 See Quick (n 31) 22 and K Oliphant, ‘Defining ‘Medical Misadventure’: Lessons from New Zealand’ 
(1996) 4 Medical Law Review 1, 1. 
39 Quick (n 31) 14. 





In the interpretation of adverse events, the stakes are high for both patients and doctors. 
What is emerging is an eroding of the, perhaps misplaced, unconditional trust that the 
general public and patients appeared to have invested in their doctors. Although patients 
are thereby empowered, citizens rather than supplicants, this loss of trust is not an 
unalloyed good and comes at a price that merits consideration. 
 
Negligence claims have the potential to threaten the medical profession in a number of 
ways. They can expose doctors to external scrutiny by colleagues, solicitors, barristers, 
and the judiciary and increasingly to managers within the Health Service with 
responsibility for overseeing claims and risk management. It is clear that public 
knowledge about medical errors has increased markedly in recent times. Errors are no 
longer closeted in the private professional domain.41 Whether or not a claim has actually 
been received by a doctor, the fear of litigation may encourage him to adopt risk-
aversive strategies such as defensive medicine42 or the avoidance of high-risk 
specialities. Additionally, the high costs of some claims and the fact that these are now 
met from local budgets may expose doctors to pressure from managers to manage the 
claims in a way not acceptable to them. Where they see the allegations as justified, 
doctors may have to come to terms with their own incompetence. At the very least they 
will have to come to terms with a breakdown in the relationship with a patient.43 
 
The making of a claim can also prompt a personal crisis for the doctor because it 
challenges the core assumption that healthcare professionals heal or alleviate pain.44 
Research suggests that doctors are not well supported in their plight by medical 
colleagues or by the normative frameworks of the profession into which they are 
socialised in medical school. Many suffer severe reactions to having a claim made 
against them and in coming to terms with medical mishap. Authors of recent large-scale 
studies of error in medicine suggest that the incidence of mishap is high and that intense 
reactions to these events have to be understood within the concept of the ‘perfectibility 
model’ to which doctors are taught to aspire in the course of their education. They are 
                                             
41 See Quick (n 31) 22 for a detailed discussion regarding the ‘outing’ of medical error and the need for 
further systematic research. 
42 ‘Defensive medicine’ includes excessive investigations. 
43 Walsh (n 28) 43 suggests that the breakdown of doctor-patient relationships in these situations is 
avoidable but it is submitted that that proposition takes insufficient note of human nature. 




socialised in medical schools to strive for error-free practice.45 Although discussion of 
this phenomenon is outwith the remit of this thesis, understanding the psychological 
sequelae of litigation to doctor and claimant is crucial to any evaluation of redress for 
alleged clinical negligence. 
 
‘Passion is never far away from every-day relationships between doctor and patient.’46 
One reason for this could be that the patient looks to the physician as a healer, an 
archetype, someone who has the knowledge and magic that will bring relief from fear 
and pain.47 Concerns about errors and public safety fall within the broader themes of 
risk and trust in experts and expert systems. Exposure of errors to a critical public 
audience presents problems for the professional, in particular, the risk of diminishing 
trust. Heightened awareness of errors potentially undermines trust in medicine.48 Given 
that the practice of medicine depends upon a collaborative effort between doctor and 
patient, loss of trust would greatly undermine the efficacy of treatment. Patients need to 
have confidence in the larger system by which doctors are held to account. 
 
Research on the incidence of medical mishap has demonstrated that medical error and 
mistakes are common49 and this has provided an incentive for the introduction of more 
stringent risk management and clinical audit protocols.50 
 
B. Regulation and Investigation 
 
The NHS complaints system does not operate in a vacuum. It functions within the 
context of regulatory and investigative processes. Although my thesis focuses on the 
NHS complaints system, for completeness I briefly refer to these systems and what they 
can offer harmed patients. 
 
                                             
45 Ibid. 
46 Brazier and Cave (n 3), 6. 
47 Lewis (n 27) 1. 
48 Quick (n 31), O O’Neill, A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) and O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
49 Mulcahy (n 8) 100 fn 52. Tallis (n 18) 102 and Quick (n 29). 
50 V Harpwood, ‘The Manipulation of Medical Practice’ in Freeman and Lewis (eds) (n 8), 50 and more 




1. Regulation: Doctors and Hospitals 
 
a) The General Medical Council:51 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? 
 
Professional regulation is of paramount concern for those claimants seeking sanctions 
against their doctor.52 Reforms (and reform proposals) of the GMC introducing licences 
to practise53 and, by 2012, revalidation54 and reforming fitness to practise proceedings,55 
have been well received.56 The powers of the GMC, in ascending order of seriousness, 
are: to give a formal warning that will last for five years; to impose conditions on the 
practitioner’s registration; to suspend the practitioner for a maximum of twelve months; 
and to erase the practitioner’s name from the register.57 The primary objective in 
imposing sanctions concerns the wider public interest and the impact on the practitioner, 
while relevant to proportionality, is not a primary consideration.58 In conclusion, 
although patients do not receive financial compensation or full disclosure in relation to 
events by the mechanism of a referral to the GMC, they have a measure of reassurance 
knowing that the public is being protected from impaired doctors.59 
 
b) Clinical Governance 
 
Whereas the issues mentioned above regarding the GMC refer to the regulation of 
individual doctors, the question of clinical governance is equally concerned with the 
                                             
51 Hereafter ‘GMC’. By virtue of the Medical Act 1983, the regulation of the medical profession is 
currently entrusted to the profession itself, acting through the GMC. 
52 Refer to Chapter 2 ‘What Patient Seek from Redress’ above. 
53 The General Medical Council (License to Practise) Regulations Order of Council 2009, SI 2009/2739. 
54 GMC, CMOs and Medical Director of NHS, Revalidation: A Statement of Intent (2010), now 
streamlined and ‘watered down’ in Ministerial Statement, HC Deb, 26 July 2010 c65-6WS. 
55 GMC (Fitness to Practise) (Amendment in relation to standard of proof) Rules Order of Council 2008, 
SI 2008/1256; GMC (Fitness to Practise) (Amendment) Rules Order of Council 2009, SI 2009/1913. 
Quoted in Cave (n 6) at 147. But see also P Case, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Dishonest Doctor: The 
General Medical Council and the “Redemption Model” of Fitness to Practice’ (2011) Legal Studies 31 
591-614. 
56 Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE), Fitness to Practise Audit Report (2010), p 27, 
which labels the GMCs fitness to practise procedures robust and effective. Quoted in Cave (n 6) at 147. 
But see also Case (n 55). 
57 Aldous (n 15) 13. Note practitioner’s right of appeal. 
58 Robert Alan Odes v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 552 (Admin.).  
59 M Timms, ‘Referring a Doctor to the General Medical Council’ (2006) Journal of Personal Injury Law 
36-39, 36. Note: Where there has been a systems failure which may be sufficient to warrant a finding of 
negligence against an NHS Trust or hospital, when the role of an individual doctor in the systems failure 
is analysed, it may not be sufficient to warrant a finding of impairment. See I Kennedy, A Grubb, J Laing, 
and J McHale, Principles of Medical Law 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press; 2010) ch 2 




regulation of NHS organisations. As a person now outside the regulatory system,60 it 
appears to me that the regulatory system is failing profoundly. There are daily news 
reports of significant harm to vulnerable patients such as the elderly.61 The Care Quality 
Commission (CQC)62 which has been charged with responsibility for public 
accountability63 has ‘not so far achieved value for money in regulating the quality and 
safety of health and adult social care in England’ according to the National Audit 
Office.64 This is a matter of concern for all of us involved in a universal welfare system. 
 
NHS governance has been profoundly affected by Professor Sir Ian Kennedy’s ‘Bristol 
Report’ Learning from Bristol65 which recommended that clinical audit should be at the 
core of a system of local monitoring of performance. Since that time there has been a 
bewildering array of reforms designed to enhance and monitor quality in the NHS.66 
The CQC is now the independent regulator of all healthcare and adult social care in 
England. It registers providers of health and social care, monitors compliance with 
standards, investigates areas of concern, has enforcement powers if services drop below 
essential standards, including the power to close a service down, acts to protect patients 
whose rights are restricted under the Mental Health Act 2007, and gives the public 
information about the work done.67 The CQC does not have a role in resolving 
complaints68 but does liaise with the Ombudsman.69 The National Audit Office report 
referred to above70 noted that there is a gap between what the public and providers 
expect of the CQC and what it can achieve as regulator. Additionally, proposals to 
extend the Commission’s role risk distracting the Commission from its core work of 
regulating health and social care.71 Discussion of the CQC is outwith my remit; 
                                             
60 I was Chair of Independent Review Panels from 1996 until their cessation. 
61 Care and Compassion: Report of the Health Service Ombudsman on Ten Investigations into NHS Care 
of Older People February 2011. 
62 Hereinafter ‘CQC’. 
63 Cave (n 6) at 146. 
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however, its shortcomings matter because it is the body with powers to enforce rather 
than simply recommend.72 
 
In conclusion, the foregoing has been a consideration, first of medical error and then of 
the current regulation of the medical and healthcare systems. The next question to be 
addressed is from the perspective of the aggrieved patient and/or their family who are 




What do patients or bereaved relatives want when things go wrong? What the vast 
majority want is firstly an apology or an explanation; additionally they usually want to 
find out what has happened, so as to understand and, if possible, come to terms with it; 
and finally, they may want an inquiry into what has gone wrong so as to prevent others 
in future suffering the same sequence of events or procedural errors which led to their 
harm.73 To this end, there are two major avenues which offer investigative processes; 
namely, an inquest in the coroner’s court,74 confined to post-death investigations, and 
public inquiries. Both topics are complex and require careful study. As they are beyond 
my remit, I confine myself to noting these mechanisms in place for dealing with deaths 




Inquests, as the word suggests, are inquisitorial in nature and are not adversarial 
proceedings. Their purpose is to establish the facts and provide an explanation of a 
death. The proceedings and evidence at an inquest are directed solely at ascertaining 
who the deceased was; how, when and where he/she came by his/her death; and the 
particulars required by relevant legislation to be registered concerning the death.75 The 
coroner and jury are prohibited from expressing any opinion on any other matters.76 An 
inquest does not seek to establish criminal or civil liability. Indeed rule 4277 specifically 
prevents a verdict being framed in such a way as to appear to determine any question of 
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criminal or civil liability. Nevertheless, if an inquest is held, relatives of the deceased 
should find out what the hospital/health provider says about the circumstances 
surrounding the death. While an inquest is not a trial and cannot apportion guilt to any 
individual,78 it relies upon the discretion of the coroner as to what questions may be 
asked, or witnesses approached; nevertheless, with the possibility of a narrative verdict, 
the inquest is a major resource in the armoury of the family seeking answers. The 
outcome of an inquest may provide an indication of whether to proceed to a civil action. 
If the circumstances of the death mean that the procedural requirements of ECHR 
Article 2 are engaged, funding may be provided for legal representation for the family 
to effectively and actively pursue such answers as it seeks.79 
 
b) Public Inquiries 
 
When things go wrong in the NHS, an inquiry is often set up to find out what happened 
and what can be learnt. In the past few years, the NHS has been subject to several major 
inquiries. Such inquiries have been established to investigate poor clinical performance, 
major service failure and criminal misconduct. They have become an increasingly 
common political and managerial response to any major problem in the NHS.80 A 
comprehensive discussion of inquiries is outwith the present remit; however, I am 
highlighting relevant details of inquiries because of their significance in the landscape 
of health investigations. In recent years, medical disasters81 have increasingly been 
followed by public inquiries which have both investigated the causes of these tragedies 
and made recommendations as to how similar adverse events might be avoided in the 
future. An NHS inquiry may be established under section 2 of the National Health 
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Service Act 2006.82 However, NHS inquiries tend to be informal and lack coercive 
powers.83 
 
Public inquiries pursue important goals which cannot be achieved by other means, 
Parliamentary or judicial. Increased recourse to the public inquiry can be understood in 
the context of a decline in trust in previously revered institutions. Trust is a ‘notoriously 
vulnerable good, easily wounded and not at all easily healed’.84 The medical setting is 
full of potential for trust to be eroded, and the Shipman and Bristol disasters are graphic 
illustrations of this. There is, however, a parallel rise of faith in public inquiry as 
somehow being the only mechanism for dealing with tragedy. In the medical arena, 
despite a multi-layered system for responding to serious mishaps and misconduct, the 
call for a public inquiry sits at the top of the agenda. Its perception as the only forum for 
discovering the truth is unsurprising, given the frustration with the outcomes of 
disciplinary hearings of self-regulatory bodies. Clamour for public inquiries also fits 
with the gradual shift from secrecy to openness.85 There are many advantages associated 
with public inquiries. Thoroughness in gathering facts and pursuit of the truth 
distinguishes the public inquiry from the narrow scope of legal proceedings. The 
openness and transparency of such inquiries offer the best way of restoring trust in the 
NHS. Public inquiries enable the exploration of broader issues, paving the way for 
regulatory and policy changes. An example of the effect of previous medical inquiries is 
the cessation of heart transplant operations and the request to the Healthcare 
Commission for an external review after a sudden rise in unexplained deaths in 
Papworth Hospital.86 
 
Nonetheless, there are caveats regarding public inquiries, not least the vast expense and 
time involved in holding inquiries. The primary output of most inquiries is a report, 
usually lengthy and with many recommendations. In view of the fact that governments 
are not compelled to implement inquiry recommendations, such efforts may be 
frustratingly futile. In relation to due process, although individual reputations and public 
safety may be affected, inquiries do not give rights in relation to such matters as legal 
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representation, cross-examination or appeal.87 The adversarial model of procedural 
fairness depends, amongst other things, on notice, disclosure, confrontation, cross-
examination and a reasoned decision. Witnesses are not always provided with prior 
disclosure of the criticism that they will face. Despite assurances that inquiries are not 
courts of law, it is claimed that for those giving evidence, it feels like a court without 
the procedural safeguards.88 The fact that evidence is now publicly available on inquiry 
websites increases witness vulnerability and anxiety. Judicial review challenges might 
address this problem.89 
 
For the injured and bereaved relatives, public inquiries can provide necessary evidential 
information. Investigation into the causation of damage in complex medical negligence 
cases can be a formidable burden for an injured person or bereaved relatives to have to 
arrange, let alone finance, as in cases of medical mishap publicly funded assistance is 
unlikely to be available.90 However, although the findings of public inquiries can 
profoundly affect the course of subsequent negotiations, they can also be a source of 
frustration and delay, especially if a number of different inquiries take place: public 
inquiry, police inquiry and inquests.91 As the increased scrutiny of medical work 
inevitably exposes further mishaps and misconduct to the public gaze, calls for inquiries 
are unlikely to abate. However, as inquiries become increasingly commonplace, it will 
be legitimate to question their effectiveness as a mechanism for enabling lessons to be 
learnt. 
 
c) Conclusion: Regulation and Investigation 
 
As has been seen above, when injury results from medical treatment, patients or their 
relatives seek accountability. This can take a number of forms. Some may wish the 
responsible health professionals to be disciplined, and this has been examined in the 
section on medical regulation. Some seek financial compensation and bring a medical 
negligence claim following the legal route to redress.92 In particularly serious cases of 
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repeated error or bad practice, patients often demand an inquest and/or a public inquiry. 
However, the starting point for all these matters is that an explanation is sought and it 
was for this that the NHS complaints procedure was originally devised. 
 




Sir Michael Davies, in his 1973 Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints Procedure 
writes: 
 
Complaint need not and ought never to be regarded as a dirty word93…Few 
have any serious grievances, but those who do have the legitimate right, no less, 
to have their dissatisfaction fully and fairly investigated. Furthermore, valid 
complaints which, at the present time, may remain unexpressed because of lack 
of knowledge of procedure, inadequacy of intellect or drive, fear of 
victimisation or for any other reasons, are much better brought out and dealt 
with than left to fester… 
 
There is ample and convincing evidence that more complaints involve ‘medical 
treatment and care’ than anything else…There is equally strong evidence that 
these complaints are the most difficult of all to deal with and resolve 
satisfactorily, particularly those which, theoretically at least, could result in 
court proceedings. In former days the attitude to such complaints was too often 
‘Sue or shut up’. This attitude is by no means as prevalent as it was…but it still 
does exist in some quarters. There are, of course, cases in this category in which 
it is right and proper for a complaint to be resolved by legal proceedings, but we 
are convinced that there are many more cases where a complainant does not 
wish to take legal proceedings but still does want his complaint to be fully and 
fairly investigated. The evidence convinces us that the complainant is not often 
motivated by a desire for revenge or punitive damages. Almost always the 
complaint is made in terms of ‘It shouldn’t happen again to someone else’.94 
 
These opening remarks of a report into hospital complaints procedures made over a 
quarter of a century ago, and as apt today as they were then, show how elusive the 
resolution of complaints remains. As discussed previously, a tangle of motives lies 
behind a patient’s or family’s decision to take legal action following medical injury, and 
money is only one of them.95 
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These motives, which can be considered to represent a demand for some form of 
‘accountability’, can be classified into four themes:96 restoration including financial 
compensation or some other intervention to ‘make the patient whole again’; correction, 
such as a system change or competence review to protect future patients; 
communication, which may include an explanation, expression of responsibility; 
apology and sanction including professional discipline or some other form of punitive 
action. In the United Kingdom, one study97 surveyed 227 patients and relatives who 
were taking legal action through firms of complainant medical negligence solicitors. In 
open-ended responses to a question asking what the provider could have done after the 
incident that would have prevented the claim, explanation and apology were mentioned 
more than twice as often as compensation and ten times as often as disciplinary action. 
 
Yet medical malpractice litigation essentially offers injured patients and their families 
only one form of redress: financial compensation. Thus the legal system is used for a 
variety of reasons, most of which it is not intended to serve. This remedial narrowness 
may constrain efforts to achieve meaningful malpractice reform and improve patient 
safety.98 As will be discussed below, the NHS complaints procedures, in ever evolving 
forms, have had as their goal a non-financial means of making amends. Complainants 
should receive at least investigation and explanation, and where appropriate, an 
undertaking to repair. Nevertheless the literature is replete with examples of how the 
NHS complaints procedure has been failing patients, especially in terms of providing 
explanations for mistakes.99 Apologies are not forthcoming and doctors are 
understandably reluctant to admit errors because of fear that the complaints process 
might lead to patients seeking compensation in the courts.100 It is submitted that a thread 
running through the whole field of dissatisfaction with redress for personal injury is the 
asymmetry between the damage and the redress. The patient cannot be made whole 
again. As has been shown above, recourse for investigation and explanation of adverse 
incidents in the NHS may be had through requests for inquests and public inquiries. 
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I will address the question of the complaints processes for redress within the NHS in 
terms of time-frames: the history, the present and the future.101 I will begin with a brief 
overview of the history of the NHS complaints procedures followed by a description of 
the extant system. I will then consider the most recent Parliamentary recommendations 
for the future shape of an effective complaints procedure.102 I will conclude with the 
Ombudsman’s recommendations for an effective and just complaints system103 and 
using these as a yardstick, analyse how far or otherwise we have come towards 
achieving this end. 
 
B. Complaints Procedures: A Troubled History 
 
A formal NHS complaints system was introduced in 1966. There were three separate 
schemes, relating to primary care, clinical care and non-clinical care respectively.104 As 
early as 1973, the report of the Davies Committee105 on hospital complaints criticised 
the complaints mechanisms for being too internal and based on general principles which 
were inconsistently applied. The Davies report, published some 30 years ago, was 
‘quietly interred…’.106 The climate within which the NHS functioned changed. The 
particular focus given to consumers in the new, market-oriented, public services and the 
Citizen’s Charter107 initiative increased expectations. Spiralling complaints and 
overwhelming criticism that the NHS complaints system was fragmented, confusing, 
cumbersome and slow, and evidently unsuited to the reformed pro-competitive NHS, 
led to further review in 1994. The Wilson Committee was entrusted with the remit to 
review the current complaints procedures and to ensure that a new complaints process 
was effective from the perspective of both users and providers of health services. The 
review was wide-ranging108 but the terms of reference excluded consideration of 
litigation or professional disciplinary matters. Nevertheless, the Wilson report 
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commented on the importance of the relationship between complaints and the latter two 
areas.109 
 
In 1996, the Government accepted the principal recommendation made by the Wilson 
Committee and issued the final guidance along with statutory directions which set out 
the ground rules for the new system:110 
 
(1) One single complaints procedure became applicable throughout the NHS. Hospital 
doctors, GPs and other community-based health professionals were dealt with 
within a unified complaints system. 
(2) A three-step process was established so that complaints were first subject to ‘local 
resolution’ which could be followed by an ‘independent review’ of the case, with an 
ultimate right to resort to the Health Service Commissioner (known as the NHS 
Ombudsman). 
(3) The NHS Ombudsman was finally empowered to investigate complaints about 
clinical judgment and his jurisdiction was extended to cover GPs.111 
 
Although the revised NHS complaints system had laudable objectives, putting principle 
into action proved a harder task and dissatisfaction with the NHS complaints system 
endured.112 Patients complained that the second stage was not truly independent and that 
the process was complex, time-consuming and inefficient. Doctors were perceived as 
defensive and mistakes were repeated. The complaints system was reformed in 1996, 
and again in 2003 and 2006.113 
 
The single complaints system introduced in April 1996 was a radical improvement on a 
previously fragmented and partial system.114 For the first time, the same complaints 
system covered hospital, community and primary care services, and could handle 
concerns about both administrative and clinical treatment. Complaints were first 
considered and responded to by the service provider, this first stage being known as 
local resolution. If complainants remained dissatisfied they could ask a convenor 
(usually a non-executive member of the organisation complained about) to arrange a 
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review by a panel of lay people, with access to any necessary clinical advice.115 This 
was known as the second, or independent, review stage. However there was no 
automatic right to such a review. Where complainants remained dissatisfied, or had 
been refused an independent review, they could complain to the Healthcare 
Ombudsman. In the evaluation of the effectiveness of the new system, the Department 
of Health116 found that there was a high degree of dissatisfaction with both the local 
resolution and independent review stages. The main causes noted were unhelpful, 
aggressive or arrogant attitudes of staff, poor communication and a lack of information 
and support. The most important structural failure was the ‘perceived lack of 
independence in the convening decision’ and in the review process generally.117 
 
C. The Extant Complaints Procedure118 
 
1. From Three Stages to Two 
 
Revisions were made in the National Health Service (Complaints) Regulations 2004,119 
which entrusted independent review to the Healthcare Commission. A number of major 
inquiries necessitated further reform. The Shipman Inquiry120 and two private inquiries, 
the Neale and the Ayling Inquiries, considered the adequacy of the NHS complaints 
process. The fifth report of the Shipman Inquiry made recommendations for 
improvements to the system, especially in relation to general practitioners. The National 
Health Service (Complaints) Amendment Regulations 2006121 were duly enacted to 
improve local resolution and to align the NHS and social care complaints systems. 
Problems persisted.122 There were at least seven different routes for complaints about 
health services and many were poorly signposted.123 Only 27 per cent of people making 
a complaint were satisfied in the way it had been handled. Further reforms were 
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announced in 2009124 to make the process faster and more effective and to introduce a 
single complaints system across health and social care. Applicants now have the right to 
local resolution while simultaneously pursuing a legal claim.125 The second stage of a 
three-tier complaints system was abandoned. Where previously a complainant would 
start with local resolution and potentially progress to the independent Healthcare 
Commission (replaced in 2009 by the CQC) and finally the Health Service 
Ombudsman, those dissatisfied with local resolution now go straight to the 
Ombudsman.126 
 
2. Access to Justice via the Complaints Process 
 
At a time when the Ministry of Justice is seeking to save £17 million by taking clinical 
negligence out of scope for legal aid127 it is particularly important that patients worried 
about the possibility of iatrogenic harm have the ability to request information and 
explanation.128 Although the complaints process is meant to be ‘responsive to 
complainants’ the mechanisms in place for access seem overly cumbersome. There is a 
distinction made between concerns and complaints.129 To raise a concern the patient is 
directed towards the NHS Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) which sees itself 
as an early warning system for NHS organisations and regulatory bodies by identifying 
problems or gaps in the services and reporting them.130 However, the Health Committee 
found that in practice PALS offices are not always visible or signposted and that the 
staff were not at a sufficiently senior level within the organisation to influence clinicians 
and managers.131 From PALS, a patient can then be referred to the Independent 
Complaints Advisory Service (ICAS),132 which is a free and independent, confidential 
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service designed to help patients and relatives make a complaint. ICAS can support 
patients with the practicalities of complaining and provide support to vulnerable 
complainants. There are, however, artificial boundaries that can impede this work. For 
example, ICAS cannot currently support patients to make complaints to the GMC or 
other professional regulators. The National Audit Office has suggested that awareness 
of ICAS services is very low. Their report into complaints handling in the NHS states 
that: ‘…84 per cent of dissatisfied NHS service users who did not complain were 
unaware of the ICAS service’.133 ICAS services cost the taxpayer over £10 million per 
year134 and the Health Committee recommends that greater emphasis must be placed on 
effective marketing and public information strategies.135 My question is: why is the 
complaints process perceived as so convoluted that it requires both a sifting process 
and then an independent advocate to aid troubled patients? 
 
I now turn to the role of the Health Ombudsman but will return to this issue 
thereafter.136 
 
D. The Health Service Ombudsman 
 
1. The Remit 
 
The second and final stage of the NHS complaints system (complaining to the Health 
Service Ombudsman) is normally instigated only when the local resolution stage has 
been completed.137 The Ombudsman undertakes independent investigations into 
complaints about NHS funded care and treatment brought to that office by complainants 
or their relatives. According to the Health Service Commissioners Act 1993, complaints 
may be made to the Ombudsman on the grounds of maladministration and/or poor 
service.138 This being the case, a further two tests are applied before the Ombudsman 
accepts a complaint for formal investigation or intervention. Firstly, a person must have 
suffered injustice or hardship as a result of the poor service or maladministration and 
secondly, there must be a prospect of a ‘worthwhile outcome’.139 It is not usually 
possible to obtain damages, although in some rare circumstances, where the person 
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involved can prove that they have suffered financial loss, the Ombudsman can order 
some financial payment.140 
 
The Ombudsman does not investigate cases where the complainant could bring an 
action for negligence unless it would not be reasonable to expect him to pursue a legal 
remedy. While this provision seeks to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ it can lead to 
injustice where the complainant is unable to get legal aid and cannot afford legal 
action.141 However, in some circumstances, the Ombudsman will take on complaints 
about negligent treatment, provided that the complainant undertakes not to start legal 
proceedings.142 Such an undertaking is not legally binding and there is nothing to stop a 
complainant assuring the Commissioner he will not sue and then launching proceedings 
on the basis of the evidence uncovered by the Ombudsman.143 
 
The Ombudsman has noted a significant increase in complaints proceeding to stage two 
of the complaints system. In 2009–10 complaints to the Ombudsman more than doubled 
on the previous year – a total of 15,579 complaints were closed in that particular year. 
Just over a half of these complaints (9,011) were closed because they had not completed 
the local resolution stage.144 In essence then, the Ombudsman may carry out a formal 
investigation resulting in a detailed report about the case. Following this investigation 
the said detailed report will be sent to the complainant, the NHS organisation concerned 
and the Secretary of State for Health. There is no appeal against the Ombudsman’s 
findings.145 
 
2. The Challenges 
 
Although the Health Committee accepted that 90 per cent of people were satisfied with 
the investigation carried out by the office of the Ombudsman, there were concerns at the 
small number of cases accepted for investigation.146 The right to take one’s complaint to 
the Ombudsman, if not satisfied by the NHS’s local resolution,147 rings hollow if the 
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case is not then taken up. More importantly, the Committee found that patients and the 
public perceive the Ombudsman as offering a general appeals process to the local stage 
of the complaints system, whereas the role is in fact much narrower than that. The 
Committee recommended that a complainant whose complaint is rejected by the service 
provider should be able to seek independent review. This is what was lost with the 
abolition of the second stage of review. The Committee also recommended that the 
operational and legislative framework within which the Ombudsman operates should be 
reviewed to make it effective for this wider purpose. The Ombudsman herself is 
dissatisfied with the quality of local resolution and poor complaint handling at local 
level.148 Poor communication and staff attitude were mentioned both by the 
Ombudsman and the Health Committee Report and, most significantly, there are still 
insufficient mechanisms in place for learning from adverse events. The right to 
complain about NHS services and have one’s complaint dealt with effectively is derived 
from legislation.149 This shows a commitment to getting things right for patients but, as 
I discuss below, the commitment still awaits an effective process. 
 
E. Nobody Knows the Trouble I’ve Seen: How to Fix It 
 
1. The Problems 
 
The NHS complaints procedure should provide redress in the forms of communication, 
correction, and potentially, sanction. These are the most noted requests for non-financial 
redress from patients and their families.150 However, despite the aforementioned 
reforms, as Emma Cave reports, ‘patients still found the complaints process inflexible, 
the system complex and slow and the healthcare professionals defensive and closed.’151 
The failure of the regulatory system to react quickly and effectively to appalling 
standards of care at Mid-Staffordshire152 has led to further questions about the adequacy 
of the complaints process. There are evidently global problems with the complaints 
process.153 However, for present purposes, I will highlight difficulties with access to the 
                                             
148 Ibid. and Listening and Learning (n 7) 2010-11, Foreword. 
149 Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009. 
150 Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’, above. 
151 Cave (n 6), 147. 
152 Final Report of the Independent Inquiry into Care Provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust (2010). 




system, problems with open and full disclosure, and a persisting lack of systematic 
learning from adverse events. 
 
2. Access to the Complaints Process 
 
I argue that the amorphous nature of what could be called a complaint is what prompted 
the establishment of the sifting mechanisms behind PALS and ICAS. The Health 
Committee acknowledged that ‘it is always difficult for a single complaints system to 
manage complaints about the great diversity of issues that occur on a daily basis’. The 
Committee recommended that the Government consider carefully the development of 
separate systems for investigation and resolution of customer care complaints and more 
serious complaints about clinical issues. There should also be a stratified set of 
standards relating to each part of the system.154 I think these proposals would go a long 
way to clarifying the nature of a complaint, thereby making resolution that much 
clearer. If the nature of the problem and redress available were clear from the outset, my 
argument is that it would then not be necessary for the PALS and ICAS155 systems to be 
employed for access to the complaints system. This would free resources for Trusts and 




Although, in the 2003 report of the Chief Medical Officer,156 a formal duty of candour 
was proposed, it was clear to the Health Committee that the NHS does not always admit 
when things go wrong, nor does it always offer an explanation.157 I have discussed the 
complex issue of disclosure and the nuanced way in which communication between 
doctor and patient can be distorted.158 The Health Committee has placed great store in 
the role of the new commissioning agents as having the potential to drive improvement 
in the complaints system. Supportive of patients’ expectation of full disclosure, the 
Committee suggests a contractual duty of disclosure between providers and 
commissioners. The Committee acknowledges that a culture change is also required but 
I think a contractual duty is a good first step. My reasoning is that a contractual duty is 
                                             
154 Ibid. Conclusions and Recommendations at para 7. 
155 There might still be a need for advocacy. 
156 Chief Medical Officer Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for Reforming the 
Approach to Clinical Negligence in the NHS (Crown Copyright, Department of Health, 2003). 
157 Health Committee (n 16) 2 The NHS Complaints System at 77 and Cave (n 6) 148.  




the art of the possible whereas legislative reform has not been forthcoming. Even the 
NHS Redress Act 2006,159 not yet implemented, did not include a statutory duty of 
candour.160 
 
4. Learning from Adverse Events 
 
The most-mentioned motive for both complainants and claimants is the desire ‘that the 
adverse event’ not be repeated.161 And yet the Ombudsman reported in 2010 that the 
complaints process is still poorly signposted and mistakes are being repeated.162 The 
Health Committee has made recommendations for a follow-up to complaints action 
plans, namely that the providers of NHS care and treatment be put under a contractual 
duty to report their complaints action plans and progress in implementing them to their 
commissioners and to the complainant. It is in the lack of follow-up that the learning 
system fails. Progress updates are then to be given to their local Healthwatch and 
Healthwatch England.163 It is hoped that the reforms of 2009 will improve the sharing of 
information between complaints handlers and regulators. The Health Committee 
expressed support for the new two-stage process but was clear that there needed to be 
clear national standards for complaint handling and that one organisation (Healthwatch 
England) should be responsible for maintaining an overview of complaints handling in 
the NHS.164 
 
F. History of the NHS Complaints Processes: A Curate’s Egg? 
 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the Ombudsman’s report of 2005165 listed 
the essential elements for a new just system for complaints. These included 
accessibility; flexibility and transparency; the NHS being open and transparent about 
mistakes; offering effective complaint handling with links to clinical governance and 
finally a system offering just remedies. These just remedies would include provision for 
a full range of remedies for justified complaints, in particular; explanations, apologies, 
specific actions or treatment for the patient, changes to prevent recurrence and, where 
                                             
159 See Chapter 8 ‘NHS Redress Act 2006-A Lost Opportunity?’ below.  
160 See Cave (n 6) at 146 for other options regarding duty of candour. 
161See Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’ above. 
162 Cave (n 6) at 148. 
163 The Health and Social Care Bill 2011, cl 170, proposes to insert a new s 223A into the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. 
164 Cave (n 6) at 148 and Health Committee (n 16) 97.  




appropriate, financial compensation. The NHS complaints system has a specific role to 
play in the panoply of redress for iatrogenic harm. Its remit is wider than that which is 
available through litigation. As we have seen, presently it is failing to deliver on the 
very tasks it was set up to address. I have discussed the difficulties of access which 
necessitate a patient first going through the PALS system and then, if required, ICAS. 
Open disclosure remains a hope rather than a statutory requirement. If there is no open 
disclosure there is no reason to offer explanations or apologies and at best, patients 
receive a letter from a Chief Executive of a Trust to the effect that ‘we are sorry this 
happened to you’. So many years after the Bristol Inquiry there is as yet no credible 
system for learning from adverse events – the main priority for all patients embarking 
on the complaints system or litigation. In the present uncertain climate, Trusts are not in 
a position to promise future care. Apart from reimbursement of expenses, the 
complaints system does not offer significant compensation. This means that there is as 
yet no ‘joined-up’ redress offering explanation, apology, undertaking to repair and 
financial compensation. In the next chapter, I will discuss the NHS Redress Act 2006 
which attempts to join up aspects of complaints and compensation to a certain limit. 
 
Given that the right to complain about NHS services is written into the NHS 
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the NHS to have an effective and just complaints 
process. Many of the elements required are on the Government’s agenda but have yet to 
be translated into action. In this chapter about the history of the NHS complaints 
processes, I first discussed the definition of medical error and the toll that complaints 
and litigation make on the medical profession. I then briefly reviewed the systems in 
place for regulation of the medical profession by the GMC; regulation of hospitals by 
the failing CQC, and investigative recourse for patients and their families namely, 
inquests and inquiries. I then considered the NHS complaints process past, present and 
future.166 I think something valuable was lost by the eradication of the second stage of 
the complaints system. Arguably, the Independent Review Panels had their faults, but 
these were remediable. Complaints now go from local resolution, if unsuccessful, 
directly to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman’s office, which offers a very good service 
to those whose cases it investigates, is overstretched so that fewer cases can be 
reviewed. The Independent Panels were a way for patients to receive valuable 
independent clinical advice and to ‘have their day in court’. The Health Committee’s 
and the Ombudsman’s reports give comprehensive recommendations on how to 
                                             




improve the present system in order to make it more responsive, accessible and 
effective. With the Government’s intention to end legal aid for clinical negligence cases, 
settlements for the most seriously injured claimants could be eroded and access to 
justice for many will be undermined. The route for information, explanation and some 
just redress will increasingly fall upon the complaints process. The system at present is 
failing its constituents. 
 
In the next two chapters I will discuss other avenues for just redress. First, I will 
consider the NHS Redress Act 2006167 to see what remedies it was intended to offer and 
then finally I will consider what a comprehensive redress scheme for iatrogenic harm 
would offer, including apologies and financial redress for financial loss.168
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Redress: reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss 
resulting from this…Correction, amendment or reformation of something wrong…A 
means or way of redress, an act or arrangement whereby a person or thing is redressed. 
 





Redress: n. relief, remedy, compensation paid to one who has been injured. 
 




The NHS Redress Act 20061 (hereinafter ‘NHSRA' 2006) is the only statute entirely 
concerned with clinical negligence.2 The statute represents an attempt to address the 
problems of clinical negligence litigation and is important because it potentially affects 
NHS hospital patients, with the intention of extending its operation to primary care. The 
underlying policy of the NHSRA 2006 was to provide a genuine alternative to litigation 
for low-value claims.3 The Act, wholly concerned with the process of compensation, 
proposes a redress package where there has been clinical negligence in hospital. 
Applicants would need to show a ‘qualifying liability in tort’.4 The redress package 
must include: an offer of compensation; explanation; apology; and report of action to 
prevent similar occurrences.5 The redress package may include care or treatment. The 
package can be accepted with waiver of the right to sue, or rejected. The redress scheme 
would be run by the National Health Service Litigation Authority (hereinafter 
NHSLA).6 In addition, the Act was to provide a more integrated system of complaints 
and compensation.7 
 
The NHS Redress Act 2006 received Royal Assent in November 2006 and was to have 
been implemented in April 2008.8 Implementation was initially on hold pending further 
consultation and likely reform of the NHS complaints procedure.9 Despite its successful 
passage through Parliament in 2006, the regulations to enact the NHS Redress Scheme 
have not been brought into effect in England.10 In his review of legal costs,11 Lord 
Justice Jackson has lent his support to implementation of the NHSRA 2006, stating that 
the scheme would be a sensible one which would facilitate the early and economic 
                                             
1 The NHS Redress Act will hereafter be called NHSRA 2006. 
2 M Powers, N Harris and A Barton, Clinical Negligence, 4th edn (Haywards Heath, Tottel Publishing, 
2008), ‘The NHS redress Act 2006’. 
3 AM Farrell and S Devaney, ‘Making Amends or Making Things Worse? Clinical Negligence Reform 
and Patient Redress in England’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 4, 630-648. It is in the low cost claims that the 
costs are most disproportionate to the damages awarded. 
4 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 1(14). 
5 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 3(2). 
6 Powers et al (n 2). 
7See A Simanowitz and S Burn, ‘Clinical Disputes Forum: Litigation and Complaints – an Integrated 
System?’ Consultation paper – (London, Clinical Disputes Forum, September 2001). 
8 M Brazier, and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2011), 
270. 
9 This is due to the widely held belief that the principles of the Act are closely related to the live 
consultation paper entitled Making Experiences Count regarding NHS Complaints Procedure Reform. 
10 House of Commons Health Committee, ‘Complaints and Litigation’ Sixth Report of Session 2010-12 
Printed 22 June 2011. 
11 Right Honourable Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs; Final Report, December 
2009. (Hereinafter: Jackson Report). 
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resolution of lower value clinical negligence claims in respect of hospital treatment.12 
Lord Justice Jackson also stressed that the proposed scheme was one that would 
promote access to justice at proportionate cost.13 As Emma Cave suggests, ‘The 
Government may yet follow Lord Justice Jackson’s advice and implement an NHS 
Redress Scheme. However, an alternative has been suggested: to implement a voluntary 
fast-track personal injury system for clinical negligence claims under the Road Traffic 
Act PI Scheme.’14 
 
The NHSRA 2006 is an enabling Act and the detail of its operation is yet to be set out in 
secondary legislation. Notwithstanding, I will discuss the anticipated provisions, noting 
how these have changed between the original statement of intent15 and the final Act.16 I 
will highlight: the constraints on access to justice occasioned by the fact that it is a tort-
based scheme; the issue of real and perceived independence if it is managed by the 
NHSLA; the failure to legislate for a duty of candour; the impossibility of ensuring 
NHS future treatment and the vexed question of the cost of the scheme. I will conclude 
this chapter by making a brief comparison with similar schemes in Wales and Scotland. 
 
The lost opportunity regarding the Act is twofold: the failure to draft regulations, 
leaving in doubt whether the NHS Redress Scheme would be developed in England at 
all: and the actual proposed provisions, which ‘failed by a large margin to live up to the 
aspirations for a radically different way of compensating patients’.17 As regards the 
failure to enact the scheme, the previous Government18 did not capitalise on the fact that 
there had been a unique consensus in all of the Parliamentary debates that an alternative 
to litigation had to be found. The NHSRA 2006 provided for by the legislation did at 
least offer some alternative, though modest, improvement. However flawed the 
scheme’s process, there was more chance that lower value cases would have been 
                                             
12 ‘Complaints and Litigation’ (n 10), 45. 
13 Jackson Report (n 11).  
14 See E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) 27 Professional Negligence 3, 138-157, 154 for details. 
15 CMO, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting Out Proposals for Reforming the Approach to 
Clinical Negligence in the NHS (Crown Copyright, Department of Health, 2003) (hereinafter CMO, 
Making Amends). 
16 There has been extensive academic criticism of the envisioned Act. See 16 Brazier and Cave (n 8), 270; 
Farrell and Devaney (n 3); P Gooderham, ‘Proposed Further Tort Reform After the NHS Redress Act: a 
Trojan Horse from Making Amends’ (2007) 13 The AvMA Medical & Legal Journal 1, 25. Note that 
AvMA stands for Action against Medical Accidents; D Marsden and L Aderogba, ‘The Impact of the 
NHS Bill on Clinical Negligence Litigation’, (2007) 13 Clinical Risk 3, 96; P Walsh, ‘Clinical 
Negligence Reforms Finally on the Way’ (2005) 3 Journal of Personal Injury Law 267. 
17 P Walsh, ‘Editorial’ (2008) 14 The AvMA Medical and Legal Journal 4. 
18 Labour Government 1997-2010. 
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compensated more speedily and with less cost and stress.19 Most significantly, for 
present purposes, it would have offered a preferable procedural route when compared 
with litigation, and could potentially combine compensation with apologies, 
explanations and system change.20 As noted in the previous chapter,21 all these features 
are necessary elements of just redress. As regards the limitations of the anticipated 
provisions, the present Government22 has already acknowledged that the NHSRA 2006 
‘missed an opportunity to improve fundamentally the way clinical negligence claims are 
handled. It should have focused on improving the fact-finding phase prior to pursuit of a 
claim in order to facilitate faster resolution of claims, leaving it to the parties concerned, 
or ultimately the courts, to determine cases not resolved by fact-finding’.23 
 
A. The Historical Context: The Dreams 
 
In 2003, Sir Liam Donaldson, the then current Chief Medical Officer24 (hereinafter 
‘CMO’) published the Making Amends report which examined options for reform of the 
clinical negligence litigation system in England.25 The political impetus for the report 
had its origins in earlier reports, including the Pearson Report,26 ‘Access to Justice’, 
Lord Justice Woolf’s wide-ranging investigation into the operation of the system of civil 
justice,27 the National Audit Office’s report Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in 
England28 and, finally, the ground-breaking report: ‘Learning from Bristol’.29 
 
‘Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England’ concluded that the current system 
was too complex, slow and costly.30 The recommendation of ‘The Bristol Report’ was 
that the current system should be abolished entirely to be replaced by ‘an alternative 
                                             
19 Walsh, ‘Editorial’ (n 17). 
20 Brazier and Cave (n 8), 270. 
21 Chapter 7 ‘History of the NHS Complaints Process: A Curates Egg?’ above. 
22 Coalition Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government 2010-present. 
23 ‘Complaints and Litigation’ (n 10), 45. 
24 Hereafter ‘CMO’. 
25 CMO, Making Amends (n 15). 
26 The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (1978) (The Pearson 
Commission), Cmnd 7054-1 (The Pearson Report). 
27 Woolf H, (1996) Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales, (London, Lord Chancellor’s Department, July 1996), 15.2. 
28 National Audit Office, Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England, Report by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General, Session 2000-2001, HC 403, 3 May 2001 page 1. 
29 Learning From Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary 1984-95, Cmnd. 5207 (2001) (The Bristol Inquiry) Final report, Summary, paragraph 86, 
page 16; Recommendation 37, page 442. See also the prior reports of The Pearson Commission (n 26) 
and Lord Justice Woolf’s report (n 27). 
30 National Audit Office (n 28). 
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administrative system’ on the grounds that it fostered a ‘culture of blame’, which 
prevented the identification and analysis of errors.31 Additionally, it is a salutary 
reminder that Lord Justice Woolf’s investigation into the operation of the system of 
civil justice highlighted medical negligence as an area for special consideration on the 
grounds that it was in respect of these claims that civil justice was ‘failing most 
conspicuously’. Lord Justice Woolf was also concerned to establish ‘a climate of 
change marked by greater openness. He suggested that the GMC might explore ways of 
clarifying the responsibilities of the doctor in terms of candour,32 and he also favoured 
the wider use of mediation schemes. 
 
The CMO’s report Making Amends contained a number of recommendations, one of the 
key ones being that a redress scheme should be established in relation to low-value 
claims in order to address long-standing patient concerns over the handling of adverse 
events arising out of medical treatment in the NHS.33 In seeking to ‘make amends’ for 
harm suffered by patients as a result of adverse events in medical treatment within the 
NHS, the CMO rejected the introduction of a no-fault medical injury scheme.34 Instead, 
the report recommended a redress scheme incorporating investigations of adverse 
events, provision of explanations and apologies, remedial treatment and rehabilitation 
where needed, and financial compensation where appropriate. These functions would be 
carried out in an efficient and non-adversarial manner reducing cost, delay and 
complexity from the scheme. The Government subsequently adopted the concept of a 
redress scheme, although its final form and substance differ significantly from that 
originally envisioned by the CMO. 
 
In Making Amends, the CMO proposed reform of the existing negligence system, 
incorporating four main elements: 
                                             
31 Learning From Bristol (n 29) Final report, summary, paragraph 86, 16; recommendation 37, 442. See 
also the prior reports of The Pearson Commission (n 26) and Lord Justice Woolf’s report (n 27). 
32 See L Beecham ‘GMC approves new Ethical Guidelines’ (1998) 316 British Medical Journal 1556. 
The ‘duty of candour’ theme will be addressed below. 
33 C Vincent, M Young and A Phillips ‘Why do people sue doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives 
Taking Legal Action’ (1994) 343 The Lancet 1609. An ‘adverse event’ is defined as ‘an event or 
omission arising during clinical care and causing physical or psychological injury to a patient’. See 
Department of Health An Organisation with a Memory: Report of an Expert Group on Learning from 
Adverse Events in the NHS Chaired by the Chief Medical Officer (London, TSO, 2000), xii.  
34 For a variety of reasons, predominantly those of cost. See JK Mason and GT Laurie, Law and Medical 
Ethics 8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), ch 5, 127 and CMO, Making Amends (n 15), 
Chapter 6. Extensive discussion of a no-fault scheme is outwith the remit of this paper but on this subject 
see Mason and Laurie, just cited, ch 5, 127 and CMO, Making Amends (n 15), Appendix B. 
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(1) an investigation of the incident which is alleged to have caused harm and of the 
harm that has resulted. 
(2) provision of an explanation to the patient and of the action proposed to prevent 
repetition. 
(3) development and delivery of a package of care providing remedial treatment, 
therapy and arrangements for continuing care where needed.35 
(4) payments for pain and suffering, out-of-pocket expenses and care or treatment 
which the NHS could provide.36 
 
Making Amends is a thorough, aspirational report. However, as will be shown, the 
CMO’s expansive concept of a redress scheme has been severely undermined by the 
Government’s overriding political commitment to ensuring institutional control and cost 
containment in the operation of the scheme. I will now discuss the difficulties inherent 
in a tort-based scheme, including: the lack of independent legal advice; the lack of an 
independent body to run the redress scheme;37 the failure to legislate for a duty of 
candour; the impossibility of ensuring NHS future treatment and note the vexed 
question of the cost of the scheme. And finally, I will note that there are four significant 
departures from the CMO’s recommendations that have been lost between Making 
Amends and the final NHSRA 2006.38 
 
II. ANTICIPATED PROVISIONS: THE REALITIES 
 
A. Tort-Based Eligibility Scheme: Access to Justice 
 
As and when the NHS Redress Act 2006 scheme is implemented, and assuming that 
such implementation would be as it has been conceived and approved by Parliament in 
2008, the scheme will be tort-based and will primarily cover cases of clinical 
negligence.39 Initially the scheme will apply only to cases involving liability in tort 
arising from hospital services provided as part of the NHS in England, whether provided 
for in England, in another part of the UK or abroad.40 The scheme is not restricted to 
claims by patients; it may cover claims that could be brought following the death of a 
                                             
35 See Marsden and Aderogba (n 16), 96 and Walsh (n 16) for critique of remedial care packages. 
36 Ibid and CMO, Making Amends (n 15), page 16. 
37 ‘While I welcome the Act, I nevertheless believe that an opportunity was missed to make the fact-
finding stage of investigation of disputes truly independent. The danger is that local NHS trusts will act as 
judge and jury in their own cause. I question whether this will ensure a thorough investigation of the facts 
and command the confidence of patients.’ Powers et al (n 2). 
38 For detailed analysis of the NHS Redress Act 2006 see Farrell and Devaney (n 3) and Brazier and Cave 
(n 8), 270. 
39 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 1. 
40 Ibid. 
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patient by virtue of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 or claims 
brought by the dependants of a deceased patient under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.41 
The scheme would exist in parallel with the common law. 
 
I have argued that the moral basis for redress for iatrogenic harm rests on the concept of 
corrective justice. In order to ‘restore patients to as near as possible to the position they 
would have been in but for the negligent act which caused them to suffer harm,’42 the 
parameters of a just redress scheme within the NHS in England must include, inter alia: 
facilitating access to justice; access to justice to be generously defined to include 
expansive eligibility criteria and the capacity to pursue redress against all relevant 
parties. The problem of tort-based eligibility criteria is that, because the Act confines 
redress to cases of personal injury arising from breach of duty, the need to prove both 
breach and causation remains intact. Both pose considerable difficulties for claimants.43 
In Making Amends, the CMO had suggested that a ‘lower qualifying threshold’ might be 
appropriate but suggestions for alternative approaches to determining eligibility under 
the scheme which are not as onerous for patients to establish have not been followed 
through by the Government. The patients’ charity, Action against Medical Accidents44 
suggested that a further alternative – the ‘avoidability test’ – should be used to 
determine eligibility for financial compensation under the redress scheme. Under this 
test an adverse event would be compensable ‘except where it is the result of an 
unavoidable complication regardless of treatment or non-treatment’.45 I argue that 
because the test for eligibility under the scheme is identical to that used by the courts, 
all of the difficulties claimants face in establishing liability in negligence will be 
reproduced under the NHS Redress Scheme. As I have not advocated replacing tort 
criteria with a no-fault system, I am not arguing for a more expansive eligibility route to 
the redress scheme. However, there is a problem about equality of arms for would-be 
claimants as concerns proving eligibility for the scheme. 
 
In the current clinical negligence system, tort law principles are applied where patients 
have the benefit of independence in terms of legal representation, investigation of the 
facts and adjudication. This level of independence is designed to ensure procedural and 
                                             
41 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 1 (4) (a).  
42 Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 187 per Lord Scarman. 
43 See Farrell and Devaney (n 3); E Jackson, Medical Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010), 163 and Part II Medical Negligence Litigation, above. 
44 Action against Medical Accidents is hereinafter referred to as ‘AvMA’. 
45 Jackson (n 43), 163. 
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substantive fairness between the parties and is of particular importance to patients, 
given the imbalance between the parties.46 It is mooted that in the details of the Act47 
patients will not have access to independent legal and expert advice at crucial points. 
Legal assistance would only be provided for advice relating to the offer and any 
settlement agreement,48 and the provision of the services of jointly instructed medical 
experts.49 This would leave patients unable to have a clear idea of their eligibility under 
the redress scheme and the strength of their claim.50 In the present climate, with legal 
aid about to be removed for clinical negligence actions, access to this other significant 
route to just redress will in fact be curtailed. This is unacceptable. I now turn to the 
question of the perceived and real independence of the scheme. 
 
B. Independence: Perception and Reality 
 
One of the most contentious aspects of the legislation is the perceived and actual 
independence of the scheme. The Redress Act 2006 stipulates that a specified Special 
Health Authority must be provided to have such functions in connection with the 
scheme as the Secretary of State thinks fit. The appointed authority will deal with 
questions of liability and quantum and will oversee the scheme generally and monitor 
consistency. Although the Act does not specify who the Scheme Authority will be, the 
Department of Health has stated in numerous papers that the National Health Service 
Litigation Authority is the intended authority.51 
 
The NHSLA currently handles all clinical negligence claims made against the NHS and 
is presently the body which determines whether to admit or deny liability for an incident 
on behalf of the NHS. This body has thus far played a very one-sided role in clinical 
negligence litigation. There is obviously a very real concern that the NHSLA will lack 
independence, either perceived or actual. This could undermine public confidence in the 
                                             
46 M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 
9 Law and Society Review 1, 95-160. 
47 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 8. 
48 NHSRA 2006, (n 1), s 8 (2). 
49 NHSRA 2006, (n 1), s 8 (1) (b). See Aldous, G (ed) (2011) Clinical Negligence Claims: A Practical 
Guide 2nd edition (London, Chambers of G Aldous QC, 9 Gough Square), 50 for details. 
50 This is due to the curtailment of access to independent medico-legal advice. Farrell and Devaney (n 3), 
635 and Brazier and Cave (n 8), 270...‘it seems unlikely that the applicant will receive free and 
independent legal advice as to whether a complaint, an application for redress under the scheme or a 
clinical negligence claim is suitable. Additionally, would lawyers and doctors be willing to work for the 
flat fee to be offered? 
51 Aldous (n 49), 48. 
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scheme or at worst lead to insufficient offers of compensation being offered or failure to 
accept liability.52 
 
Those opposed to the appointment of the NHSLA as Scheme Authority argued that it 
was inappropriate for the NHSLA to perform what is, in effect, a judicial function: 
assessing and valuing claims deemed eligible for the scheme in line with relevant tort 
law principles.53 Moreover, such appointment facilitates a situation whereby the NHS is 
able to act as ‘judge and jury’ of its own mistakes.54 The appointment of the NHSLA as 
Scheme Authority represents a clear conflict of interest for the body under the current 
system and may prove fatal to any trust patients may have in the scheme. The inequality 
of arms as regards legal representation at the eligibility/liability stage of the scheme is a 
glaring injustice to would-be claimants. I think that this clear case of conflict of interest 




A just redress scheme should have provision for an independent appeals mechanism in 
cases where the initial determination is disputed. This element is, however, missing 
from the remit of the NHS Redress Scheme. Patients, who are dissatisfied with the 
outcome of their claim, have two options under the scheme: first, to accept the decision 
reluctantly or, second, to pursue the case, again under the existing litigation system.56 




Redress under the scheme will comprise of a number of elements, namely: financial 
compensation where appropriate, explanations and apologies (which it is envisaged will 
cover explanations of how the harm or loss came about) and, in appropriate cases, 
                                             
52 Ibid. 
53 E Howe, NHS Redress Bill, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 21 November 2005, cols GC327 and 
360. 
54 This is what the Government’s comments supporting improved fact-finding rather than adjudication 
refer to. See Introduction, above. 
55 The second stage of the 1996 Complaints Procedure, the Independent Review Panel, was eliminated in 
major part because of a perceived conflict of interest for the ‘gate-keepers’ the convenors who decided 
whether or not they were held. Chapter 7 ‘History of the NHS Complaints Process- A Curate’s Egg?’ 
above. 
56 Farrell and Devaney (n 3), 638. 
57 NHSRA 2006 (n 1) s 14; Aldous (n 49), 51. 
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offers, including contracts for future remedial care, may be made as well as financial 
compensation.58 
 
1. Financial Compensation 
 
The scheme will be targeted at lower value claims of a straightforward nature, which are 
currently dealt with by way of litigation. The threshold amount is £20,000.59 These are 
the types of claim where the costs of pursuit of the claim by the traditional route outstrip 
the amount of compensation ultimately recovered. The mechanism for assessment of 
that compensation, by way of general damages and special damages, should be in line 
with the general law on damages, so that offers of financial compensation will be 
broadly equivalent to the level of compensation that would be provided in a successful 
claim before a court. In the event that an offer of redress is accepted by the patient, he 
will be required to enter into a settlement agreement which will include a ‘waiver of the 
right to bring civil proceedings in respect of the liability to which the settlement 
relates’.60 The Clinical Disputes Forum61 proposed that, if a claimant accepted 
compensation awarded by the tribunal (redress scheme) he should waive the right to 
seek further compensation in the courts. However, the Forum foresaw that this clause 
could be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Act 1998, especially Article 6(1) – the right to a fair trial before an independent and 
impartial tribunal.62 Although not provided for by the Redress Act, it is envisioned by 
the Department of Health that all offers of settlement under the scheme would be made 
without prejudice and will not be capable of being considered an admission of liability 
in a later court case.63 
 
                                             
58 D Dow and J Lill, Personal Injury and Clinical Negligence Litigation (Guildford, College of Law 
Publishing, 2007), 140. 
59 P Balen, Clinical Negligence (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2008), 46. 
60 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 3(5) (b). Any offers of redress by the scheme authority will be made on a 
‘without prejudice’ basis, as neither offers nor settlements are to be regarded as an admission of liability 
for the purposes of subsequent litigation. Department of Health NHS Redress: Statement of Policy (Crown 
Copyright, 14 November 2005), 4. See NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 6(5) and Farrell and Devaney, (n 3), 638. 
61 Simanowitz and Burn (n 7). 
62 Ibid. ‘…The waiver could amount to a deprivation of his right to a fair hearing in the courts unless he 
took legal advice in advance and opted out of the court process on a truly informed basis.’ 




The Act provides for explanations to be given concerning harm suffered in incidents 
giving rise to applications under the scheme.64 The need for a full and adequate 
explanation, as well as an apology, has been described as a high priority for patients in 
these circumstances.65 A reading of the Act does not reveal what is meant by 
‘explanations’, or in what circumstances explanations will be excluded from the 
scheme.66 For present purposes it is sufficient to highlight the need for meaningful 
explanations and apologies in the context of clinical negligence disputes.67 The starting 
point for full explanations rests with the obligation of a duty of candour; however the 
Act does not impose one. At the time of writing, the Government has defeated a 
proposed amendment to the Health and Social Care Bill 2011 which would have 
required the creation of a statutory ‘duty of candour’ with patients when things go 
wrong in healthcare and cause harm.68 Instead, the Government will rely upon 
contractual duty of candour clauses between NHS Commissioning Boards and 
providers. This should be extended to contractual duty of candour to their populations as 
well.69 
 
3. Future Remedial Care 
 
In appropriate cases, contracts for future remedial care may be made in addition to any 
offer of financial compensation. This aspect of the scheme is a particularly contentious 
issue amongst those advising the victims of clinical negligence.70 There are long-
standing concerns over whether the NHS is capable of providing rehabilitative services 
of the appropriate quality and suitably tailored to the needs of individual patients, given 
that this area has long suffered from a chronic lack of funding as well as a lack of 
                                             
64 NHSRA 2006 (n 1), s 10. 
65 See M Bismark and EA Dauer, ‘Motivations for Medico-Legal Action – Lessons from New Zealand’ 
(2006) 27 The Journal of Legal Medicine 55. 
66 See Farrell and Devaney (n 3), 639. 
67 ‘Apologies and Civil Liability in England, Wales and Scotland: The View from Elsewhere’ (2007) 
University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series Paper 61 (online at bepress Legal 
Repository) and P Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness Or Corrective Justice In The Civil 
Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 1, 1-50. 
68 Press Release AvMA 14.02.12. 
69 Note Chapter 7 History of Complaints Process: A Curate’s Egg? and ‘Complaints and Litigation’ 
(n 10), Conclusions and Recommendations (Para 82). 
70 Marsden and Aderogba (n 16), 97 and Farrell and Devaney, (n 3), 641. 
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appropriate resourcing in terms of equipment and personnel.71 There is a question as to 
whether the claimant would wish to receive remedial treatment from the perpetrator of 
the harm. The practicalities become an ethical dilemma. Should this group of patients 
receive preferential treatment by being moved up waiting lists to the disadvantage of 
others? A final concern for the claimant: under the current system, claimants who are 
successful in clinical negligence claims are able to claim the cost of care and treatment 
in the private sector, including rehabilitation services, regardless of whether it could be 
provided by the NHS.72 This pre-existing entitlement may have been removed under the 
Act in relation to claims within the remit of the scheme. This needs clarification prior to 
the implementation of the Act. 
 
D. Lost in Transit 
 
There are several significant departures from the CMO’s recommendations in Making 
Amends. First, the CMO recommended a separate, no-fault NHS Redress Scheme for 
Severely Neurologically Impaired Babies,73 where it could be shown that the injury was 
birth-related. Currently, only around one third of cerebral palsy births result in a claim 
in clinical negligence. Of these, only one third receive damages, averaging since 1995 at 
around £650,000. The claims are costly in terms of both the emotional effects on parents 
and health professionals, and the financial effects on the NHS. The CMO was impressed 
by no-fault schemes for birth-related neurological injuries run in Virginia and Florida, 
USA. Although the Government has not ruled out such a scheme, it forms no part of the 
NHS Redress Act 2006.74 Second, the CMO recommended a ‘duty of candour’ to 
encourage openness in the reporting of adverse events.75 As noted, the Act does not 
include a duty of candour. The third major departure from Making Amends was the 
CMO’s thirteenth recommendation that ‘documents and information collected for 
identifying adverse events should be protected from disclosure at court’. The aim was to 
limit disincentives to reporting of adverse events. This too was rejected by the 
                                             
71 Department of Health National Service Framework for Children, Young People and Maternity 
Services: Disabled Children and Young people and those with Complex Health Needs (Crown Copyright, 
2004). 
72 S 2(4) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. 
73 CMO, Making Amends (n 15), recommendation 2. 
74 Brazier and Cave (n 8), 270. 
75 CMO, Making Amends (n 15), recommendation 12. One can look to New Zealand, where patients are 
compensated without proving fault through the Accident Compensation Corporation, doctors have a legal 
duty of candour and adverse events are usually admitted. P Davis et al, ‘Acknowledgement of “No-Fault” 
Medical Injury: Review of Patients’ Hospital Records in New Zealand’, (2003) 326 British Medical 
Journal 79. 
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Government. The balance between the public interest in encouraging reporting and the 
individual interest in access to information was, it felt, not properly reflected in a 
protection from disclosure. The NHS is patient-focused; such defensiveness was 
contrary to public policy.76 
 
The final major departure from Making Amends has been, as noted above, the lack of 
provision for an independent body to oversee the redress scheme. Significant measures 
proposed in Making Amends designed to increase openness and reduce the blame 
culture have been excluded. What started as an ambitious and compassionate next step 
in the Government’s oft-stated commitment to improve the handling of complaints 
within the NHS77 has, by some mysterious alchemy, turned into a redress scheme 
‘designed primarily to suit the institutional and financial preferences of the NHS, that 
will not operate as a just redress scheme sensitive to patients’ concerns where they have 




The final biggest drawback of the scheme is its cost. The Act did not satisfy economists 
because although it would reduce delay, it would be costly to set up and would most 
likely bring in new claims.79 It was estimated that the scheme would cost £42 million 
per year.80 There are at present two proposals for fast-track low-value clinical 
negligence schemes: Lord Justice Jackson’s proposal that the abandoned NHS Redress 
Act 2006 be resurrected81 and Lord Young’s proposal that the Road Traffic Act fast-
track scheme be extended to clinical negligence claims.82 Whether the latter can be 
adapted for the more complicated issues in clinical negligence claims is an open 
question. Neither satisfies the elements for a ‘just redress’ set down by the CMO, but I 
                                             
76 Ibid. 
77 See An Organisation with a Memory (n 33) and CMO, Making Amends (n 15), both excellent reports 
by the CMO and MA Mansell, ‘NHS Redress-Progress and Problems’, (2005) 73 Medico-Legal Journal 
(2005) 4, 121. 
78 See Farrell and Devaney, (n 3) and academic articles cited above. 
79 Brazier and Cave (n 8), 270. 
80 P Fenn, A Gray and N Rickman, ‘The Economies of Clinical Negligence Reform in England’ (2004), 
114 The Economic Journal 262 at 289, C. 
81 Jackson Report (n 11), Chapter 23, paras 7 and 8. 
82 HM Government, Lord Young, Common Sense, Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of 
Graffham to the Prime Minister following a Whitehall‑wide review of the operation of health and safety 
laws and the growth of the compensation culture (October, 2010), 23 See Cave (n 14), for fuller picture of 
both schemes and what they might offer. 
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would welcome an initiative that would show that the financial and other aspects of 
redress can be addressed in one scheme. 
 
III. OVER THE RAINBOW: WALES and SCOTLAND 
 
Whereas the political will to enact the NHSRA 2006 appears to be missing in England, 
it is of note that the Welsh Assembly has forged ahead with a redress scheme.83 The 
NHS (Concerns, Complaints and Redress Arrangement) (Wales) Regulations 2011 form 
part of the Welsh Assembly Government’s ‘Putting Things Right’ project and is 
designed to align complaints and redress. Most of the regulations came into force on 1 
April 2011 and the rest came into force in October 2011. Wales has been operating a 
successful84 optional Speedy Resolution Scheme for low-value claims85 since 2005. 
However, The NHS Redress (Wales) Measure 2008 is designed to align complaints and 
redress. This legislation introduces a single portal for ‘concerns’ which include ‘an 
expression of dissatisfaction, a complaint, a claim for compensation and any issue 
arising from a patient safety incident.’86 When a concern is raised, a responsible body 
would have thirty days to investigate the issue and provide a written response. This 
might incorporate an apology or action taken, and include a right to take the case to the 
NHS Ombudsman or request further information. Under regulation 21 there is a 
requirement on the responsible body to consider whether there is a ‘qualifying liability 
in tort’, in which the redress process would be activated. Albeit that the scheme shares a 
number of the potential flaws with the proposed English scheme discussed above, it is a 
real attempt to bring together a fragmented system of redress. The scheme represents a 
positive attempt to offer a just and unified approach to redress and is a welcome 
initiative.87 Initially, the Welsh Redress Scheme and the Speedy Resolution Scheme, 
both for lower value clinical negligence claims in Wales, will be operating side by side. 
 
In Scotland, the language of patients’ rights has been to the fore. The Patients Rights 
(Scotland) Act 2011 sets out the basic rights that NHS Scotland should uphold for 
patents,88 while its schedule sets out healthcare principles.89 
                                             
83 NHSRA 2006 (n 1) s 17 gave the National Assembly for Wales the power to introduce an NHS redress 
scheme. Brazier and Cave (n 8), 271. 
84 M Rosser, ‘The Changing Face of Clinical Negligence in Wales’ (2010) 3 Journal of Personal Injury 
Law 162 at 169 and Brazier and Cave (n 8), 271. 
85 Low value claims are claims between £5,000 and £15,000. 
86 Brazier and Cave (n 8), 271. 
87 Ibid. 
88 The Patients Rights (Scotland) Act 2011, s 3. 
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In these times of financial constraints it is understandable, though regrettable, that the 
Government’s commitment to redress for iatrogenic harm has been eclipsed by more 
pressing NHS reforms. With the pending withdrawal of legal aid from clinical 
negligence suits, other avenues where ‘joined-up’ redress for the variety of losses 
iatrogenic harm occasions must be sought. The Welsh and Scottish attempts to address 
this issue will be worth watching. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NHS REDRESS ACT 2006 
 
The analysis of the redress scheme offered above has been hampered by the lack of 
clarity offered by the enabling Act without the secondary legislation. When the 
Government embarked upon the process of clinical negligence reform, there was 
widespread stakeholder and political support for the concept of a redress scheme in 
relation to low-value claims.90 This support has diminished over time as the parameters 
of the scheme became clearer. I have discussed the limitation on access to justice when 
eligibility for the scheme remains tort-based. The restriction on independent legal and 
medical advice at the liability stage is problematic. There are serious questions of real 
and perceived independence if the scheme is run by the NHSLA. The failure to legislate 
for a duty of candour shows a lack of commitment by the Government to this issue. I am 
in agreement with the Health Committee that, pragmatically, a contractual duty might 
work better and am not sure that legislation would change the culture of lack of 
candour. A more serious problem is the inability to ensure NHS future treatment and the 
vexed question of the cost of the scheme. I have noted that the way forward may be a 
resurrection of the NHSRA 2006 or a fast-track system. The lost opportunity was the 
failure to enact the Act at the time when there was a political will for it to succeed. It 
was flawed but offered a chance for ‘joined-up’ redress. 
 
I turn now to the concluding chapter where I will consider the necessary elements for 
effective redress for iatrogenic harm. I will be discussing effective and just redress, 
including financial compensation for pecuniary loss, but I will concentrate on redress 
for non-pecuniary loss with an emphasis on the role of apologies in their broadest sense. 
                                                                                                                                  
89 Further detail is outwith the remit of the thesis. 



























Apologies have many roles: the psychological, sociological, philosophical and anthropological 
literature shows that apologies can have a healing and re-balancing function for both 
victim and relationship, and often for the offender as well. They may also have a moral, 
meaning-creating and educative function of reinforcing the sense of the norms of right, 
wrong and responsibility in the community and between victim and offender, and 
possibly an underlying function of reducing aggression which has 
biological/evolutionary roots. Most of these functions require an apology to 
acknowledge fault rather than merely to express regret if they are to be effective – that 
is, in order to elicit the next stage in a reconciliation process.1 
                                             
1 P Vines, ‘Apologising for Personal Injury: the Effectiveness of New Legislation in Medical Malpractice 





This concluding chapter is concerned with what an effective redress system would 
contain. I have already addressed this issue when considering the complaints 
procedure,2 and in this chapter I look more broadly at the problem of redress for the 
more intangible aspects, focusing on redress for non-pecuniary loss. The chapter starts, 
in Section II, with a review of the central problems in the current system(s). I then turn, 
in Section III, to consider what an effective redress system would look like. In this 
regard, because knowledge and acknowledgement of the adverse event is crucial both to 
litigation and complaints, I have chosen to focus on the role of apologies in facilitating 
effective redress. I conclude that without a system for full apologies, as defined in the 
chapter, there cannot be effective redress. However, to achieve the aims of corrective 
justice, redress would have to include forms of reparation and compensation. The 
nearest model for effective redress for iatrogenic harm in the UK is in its embryonic 
form in Wales3 and will be watched attentively. 
 
II. TAKING STOCK: REDRESS FOR IATROGENIC HARM 
 
In this, my concluding chapter, I will discuss the requirements for an effective redress 
scheme for iatrogenic harm. I begin, however, with a review of my arguments regarding 
redress and briefly summarise the deficiencies of the existing legal and complaints 
systems. 
 
A. Redress: The Moral Imperative 
Claimants and Defendants 
 
I have premised the obligation for victims of iatrogenic harm to be compensated upon 
corrective justice principles,4 constrained by notions of distributive justice5 when it 
comes to paying damages from an overstretched NHS budget.6 Corrective justice theory 
                                             
2 Chapter 7 History of NHS Complaints Processes – ‘A Curate’s Egg?’ Introduction section and Ann 
Abraham, The Health Service Ombudsman for England, ‘Making Things Better? A Report on Reform of 
the NHS Complaints Procedure in England’ HC 413 (London, The Stationery Office, 9 March 2005) 
Chapter 3 ‘Key Elements of a New System’. 
3 Chapter 8 ‘The Redress Act 2006 - A Lost Opportunity’ Section III above. 
4 Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress within the NHS’ above. 
5 See McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. 
6 Note: all my arguments are confined to issues in the context of the NHS, a universal, welfare health 
system. ‘The real cost of clinical negligence is much greater than the £16 billion paid out by the NHSLA’ 
in D Brahams, ’The Rise of Dodgy Insurance Claims and the Huge Price of Negligent Medical Treatment 
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focuses strongly on the connection between law and morality by arguing that there is a 
specific obligation against the individual who causes harm to correct that harm in some 
way.7 This is an obligation-based ethical position and is not negated by the fact that the 
patient has been harmed within the confines of the NHS. There is no reason why the 
NHS, a welfare-model universal service, should not be held to account for adverse 
events, and the best way of reducing claims is to improve the standard of medical care 
and treatment that is provided by doctors and the NHS generally.8 I have opted for a tort 
model of redress9 which seeks to restore the patient to his pre-tortious state. This 
presents a serious challenge when the damage is iatrogenic harm. The aim then becomes 
to restore the patient to the best approximation of his pre-injured state, which may in 
fact have been a health-compromised one. Therefore, in the discussion of redress, one is 
thinking of a compensatory system which can at best only provide partial relief. Within 
the confines of actions for clinical negligence, I do not see the tort system operating as 
an effective deterrence because human error is by definition unintentional, and 
therefore not easily deterred.10 In addition, I argue that while larger awards are being 
paid out – the result of higher annual payments to claimants who are living longer 
because of medical developments11 – there is no evidence of a compensation culture. 
The concept of a compensation culture is, in fact, one of ‘perception rather than 
reality.’12 In fact, such evidence as there is strongly suggests that the actual numbers of 
claims has been falling over the last few years.13 
 
                                                                                                                                  
to the National Health Service” (2012) 80 Medico-Legal Journal 1 and see National Health Service 
Litigation Authority (2011) Reports and Accounts.  
7 E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1995), 57. See Vines, 
P, ‘Apologising to Avoid Liability: Cynical Civility or Practical Morality?’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 
5, 483-505, 502. 
8 Brahams (n 6) 2. 
9 “[t]ort law is a set of rules and principles of personal responsibility...Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort 
Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997), 15. 
10 Merry, A, and McCall Smith, A, Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 2. Because negligence is not intentional is it morally as well as legally wrong? It is regarded 
as morally culpable in some situations; and lies between the two situations of intention to create harm and 
pure coincidental accident. Vines, P, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in 
the Civil Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 1, 1-50, 13. 
11 Brahams (n 6), 2. 
12 HM Government, Lord Young, ‘Common Sense, Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of 
Graffham to the Prime Minister following a Whitehall‑wide review of the operation of health and safety 
laws and the growth of the compensation culture’ (October, 2010), 19. For critique of the Young Report 
see J Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: an Australian Perspective on the latest Response to Britain’s 
‘Compensation Culture’ (2012) 1 Professional Negligence 4-26.  
13 C Lewis and A Buchan, Lewis and Buchan: Clinical Negligence, 7th edn (Haywards Heath, 
Bloomsbury Professional, 2012), 4. Due in part to decline in the availability of legal aid. 
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The main conceptual difficulty in a fault-based liability system of corrective justice is 
that the defendant tortfeasor does not pay the damages himself.14 The system depends 
upon the availability of liability insurance. Nonetheless, the fact that the tortfeasor has 
taken out third-party insurance can be seen as a willingness on his part to make amends 
should the situation arise. In my discussion of apologies below, the significance of the 
negligent doctor personally relating to the victim of iatrogenic harm has great currency. 
Rehearsal of a no-fault system is outwith the remit of the thesis, but I note that a no-
fault system would fail to address patients’ desires for apologies and explanations, and 
would not necessarily promote learning from mistakes.15 In basing my argument on 
corrective justice principles, I would reject no-fault schemes on the basis that they 
neglect the necessary moral recognition of responsibility. However, this is a moot point 
at present as it is unlikely that a no-fault scheme would be introduced in England as the 
Chief Medical Officer estimated that a no-fault scheme would be unaffordable for the 
NHS.16 
 
I now turn to the question of what patients seek from redress and how far any scheme 
can realistically meet their needs.17 The starting point is that patients are motivated to 
take medico-legal action in the desire for: restoration, including financial compensation 
or some other intervention to make the patient whole again; correction, such as a system 
change or competence review to protect future patients; communication, which may 
include an explanation, expression of responsibility, or apology; and sanction, including 
professional discipline or some other form of punitive action.18 I have discussed what 
patients seek in my earlier chapter,19 but here I want to consider the extent to which 
these needs can be met. 
 
Patients suffering from iatrogenic harm within the context of the NHS are both patients 
with rights to safe healthcare and citizens with responsibilities to the whole 
                                             
14 As P Vines, I assume that the paradigm of negligence concerns a dyadic interaction between two 
private individuals. That the NHS may be a party doesn’t negate the theoretical point. Vines (n 10), 15. 
15 Jackson, E, Medical Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), 161. 
16 Chief Medical Officer, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for Reforming the 
Approach to Clinical Negligence in the NHS (Crown Copyright, Department of Health, 2003) at 112 as 
discussed in Jackson (n 15), 161. 
17 Chapter 2 ‘Iatrogenic Harm: What Patients Seek from Redress’ above. 
18 M Bismark, E Dauer, ‘Motivations for Medico-Legal Action – Lessons from New Zealand’ (2006) 27 
The Journal of Legal Medicine 55. 
19 Chapter 2 ‘Iatrogenic Harm: What Patients Seek from Redress’ above.  
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community.20 Starting with the notion of restoration, as noted above, in clinical 
negligence actions this can at best be partial. The need for financial compensation for 
pecuniary loss such as loss of earnings and future care does not present a theoretical 
challenge and pecuniary loss contingent upon negligence should be paid in full. The 
ethical challenge lies in the tension between what is owed to the harmed patient related 
to negligent past care and what is then left for the care of future patients. I address this 
problem of distributive justice by arguing that non-pecuniary loss should be 
compensated by means other than money.21 My reasoning is both pragmatic and 
philosophical: pragmatic because of the financial constraints on the NHS budget, but 
more importantly, philosophical, because these losses, being non-commodifiable, 
cannot in any meaningful way be assuaged by money. 
 
Medical negligence litigation for damages for pecuniary loss is conceptually simpler but 
in practice difficult to achieve.22 Nevertheless, it is a like-for-like, calculation. Although 
studies of patients’ motivations for medico-legal action often note that financial 
compensation is not necessarily the prime motivator, where there are major financial 
losses, undoubtedly financial compensation becomes important.23 
 
In this chapter, I concentrate on extending redress for intangible non-pecuniary loss. In 
particular, I consider the role that full apologies might play in facilitating resolution of 
this aspect of clinical negligence disputes. I have modest expectations of what apologies 
can achieve. I do not see apologies as a panacea in addressing non-pecuniary loss. 
Unfortunately, patients put a high premium on apologies and have what I consider 
unrealistic expectations of how emotionally remedial an apology would be.24 Apologies 
might well not bring closure; the iatrogenic harm, bereavement and longing may persist. 
Nonetheless, full apologies can offer explanations, without which patients cannot make 
informed decisions about whether or not, and which avenues, to pursue for redress. 
Apologies can offer acknowledgement that an adverse event has occurred and that the 
                                             
20 M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm–Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 
397. Actions taken to satisfy a retributive instinct are unhelpful. I have sat on Independent Review Panels 
where nothing short of annihilation of the doctor would suffice. S Ehrenzweig, ‘A Psychoanalysis of 
Negligence’ (1953) 40 Northwestern University Law Review 855. 
21 I have allowed awards for bereavement under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 because of their historic 
symbolic value. 
22 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation: Chapter 3 Funding Litigation; Chapters 4 and 5 Proving 
Liability; Chapter 6 Damages, above. 
23Chapter 2 ‘Iatrogenic Harm: What Patients Seek from Redress’ above.  
24 In England, to date, there have not been programmes offering full apologies so the question of how 
illusory the relief might be is a speculative one. 
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tortfeasor takes responsibility for the injury. They can offer space to consider remedial 
opportunities. I will discuss the Australian,25 Canadian26 and American27 literature 
regarding disclosure and the relationship between apologies and litigation but for 
present purposes I am not championing apologies as a means of reducing the NHS 
litigation bill. Prior to considering apologies, I will briefly review the central problems 
in the current systems offering redress to iatrogenically harmed patients. 
 
B. Litigation and Complaints 
Claimant or Complainant? 
 
1. An Integrated System? 
 
As long ago as 1997, the Clinical Disputes Forum was set up by Lord Woolf to consider 
the interface between litigation and complaints, in the hope of integrating the systems 
dealing with clinical negligence cases.28 At present, ‘despite progress in improving 
various aspects of NHS redress, the clinical negligence system litigation perpetuates 
injustice for both patients and healthcare professionals.’ 29 The key requirement, ‘a 
joined-up system,’30 is still missing. The Redress Act 2006,31 still a lost opportunity 
would, despite its failings,32 have been a united mechanism by which different forms of 
redress might have been delivered. It may be that the recommendations of the Young 
Report33 to extend to medical negligence claims the simplified procedure applicable to 
road traffic accidents34 will be pursued by the present Government. Whether the more 
complex nature of clinical negligence cases can successfully be accommodated in this 
manner is open to question.35 Presently, we might look to Wales,36 which has been 
                                             
25 P Vines, ‘Apologies and Civil Liability in England, Wales and Scotland: The View from Elsewhere’ 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 2, 200. and Vines (n 1). 
26 Canadian Patient Safety Institute, Canadian Disclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and 
Families 2011 at www.patientssafetyinstitute.ca and W Levinson and T Gallagher, ‘Disclosing Medical 
Errors to Patients: A Status Report in 2007’ (2007) 177 Canadian medical Association Journal 3, 265. 
27 GH Teninbaum, ‘How Medical Apology Programs Harm Patients’ (2011) Suffolk University Law 
School Legal Studies Research Papers Series Research Papers 11-30 1-41. 
28 S Dewar, B Finlayson and S Williams, Building Effective Interfaces: Systems for Complaints, 
Litigation, Discipline, Regulation and Clinical Governance (London, Clinical Disputes Forum, 2003). 
http://www.clinical-disputes-forum.org.uk/files/publications/ProjectBMainText.pdf 
29 E Cave, ‘Redress in the NHS’ (2011) 27 Professional Negligence 3, 138-157, 139. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Chapter 8 NHS Redress Act 2006 –A Lost Opportunity 
32 Ibid. 
33 Young (n 12). 
34 With an increased ceiling of £50,000. 
35 Young, (n 12), 25. For critique of the Young Report see Goudkamp (n 12), 23.  
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operating a successful optional Speedy Resolution Scheme for low-value claims37 since 
2005 and The NHS Redress (Wales) Measure 2008 which is designed to align 
complaints and redress.’38 Initially, the Welsh Redress Scheme and the Speedy 
Resolution Scheme, both for lower value clinical negligence claims in Wales, will be 
operating side by side and it will be instructive to see how they work. 
 
2. Medical Negligence Litigation: Access to Justice? 
 
If a claimant is seeking damages for pecuniary loss the only avenue to pursue is an 
action for clinical negligence. The first stumbling block in the way of access to justice is 
the curtailment of the availability of legal aid for funding a suit.39 It is replaced with no-
win-no-fee agreements.40 Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2010-2012 takes forward Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals in his Civil 
Litigation Costs Review.41 
 
Restriction of funding is a particular disadvantage in clinical negligence cases because 
these cases can be very expensive to investigate and pursue in the process of finding out 
what and why things went wrong and whether negligent treatment was the cause of any 
injury claimed and the extent of the injury.42 As discussed in the chapter on funding,43 
once these cases are primarily funded by no-win-no-fee provision, only obviously 
winnable cases will be considered. 
 
The legal route to redress through an adversarial system is quintessentially about 
obtaining damages.44 It is fraught with particular difficulties and has a lower success 
rate than general personal injury claims. The claimant has great challenges in proving 
                                                                                                                                  
36 M Rosser, ‘The Changing Face of Clinical Negligence in Wales’ (2010) 3 Journal of Personal Injury 
Law 162 at 169 and M Brazier, E, and Cave, Medicine, Patients and The Law, 5th edn Penguin, 2011) at 
271. 
37 Between £5,000 and £15,000. 
38 Brazier and Cave (n 36), 271. 
39 In Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010-2012 legal aid is 
eliminated for a wide range of cases, including most clinical negligence cases. 
40Contravention of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights is avoided by setting up an 
‘exceptional funding scheme’, allowing exceptional funding for out of scope cases that will ensure that 
individual cases of this type continue to receive legal aid. Cave (n 29), 142. 
41 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Final Report, (London: 
The Stationary Office, December 2009) Downloadable from www.judiciary.gov.uk. See details of 
restrictions on success fees uplifts and costs. 
42 Brahams (n 6), 1. 
43 Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ above. 
44 Although claimants may indicate other motives, the redress available at the end of the day is financial. 
See Chapter 6 ‘Damages’. 
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the elements of liability. While proving the existence of a duty of care may not be 
difficult, the question of proving that the requisite standard of care was breached,45 and 
then that the alleged breach caused the damage, is difficult.46 With one notable 
exception,47 the courts have been shown to be protective of the NHS budget48 and not 
inclined to accept novel ‘gist of the action’ arguments such as ‘loss of chance’. There is 
also the knotty question of who should pay. This was addressed above when I 
considered notions of corrective justice.49 Suffice it to note here that there are times 
when claims can only be put right by the harm-doer, as when an apology is claimed. 
There are other circumstances, such as where the claim is for money, where this can 
then be satisfied by someone else, such as the insurer. I have briefly touched upon the 
way damages are calculated and paid. There has been a major change wrought with 
periodical payments in specific situations which makes damages payment less of a 
windfall or lottery. As always, there are winners and losers.50 
 
The litigation route to redress, therefore, remains a first option only for claimants who 
can fund it, who have a good evidential basis for their claim,51 can prove the liability 
elements and are seeking damages. A sum for non-pecuniary loss (pain, suffering and 
loss of amenity) will be an element of the damages received. My focus in this chapter is 
to consider alternatives to redress non-pecuniary losses. 
 
3. Redress Within the NHS: Just Redress as it Stands? 
 
We are a long way from providing the essential elements for a new just system for 
redress as rehearsed by the Ombudsman.52 To summarise: this included timely provision 
for a full range of remedies for justified complaints, in particular: explanations, 
apologies, specific actions or treatment for the patient, changes to prevent recurrence 
                                             
45 The role and cost of expert witnesses was discussed in Chapter 4 ‘Proving Liability: Duty of Care and 
Breach of Duty’. 
46 Chapter 5 ‘Causation’. Particularly difficult in medical cases where there is a background risk factor 
already operating. 
47 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 where judicial concern focused on the patient’s human rights. 
48 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074 remains good law. 
49 Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress within the NHS’ above. 
50 See R A Buckley, Buckley Law of Negligence & Nuisance 5th edn (Part of the Butterworths Common 
Law Series) (London, Lexis Nexis UK, 2011), 674 regarding the arbitrariness of the current legal system 
for compensating tort victims. 
51 Particularly if funded through a conditional fee agreement. Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation.’ 
52 Abraham (n 2), Chapter 3 ‘Key Elements of a New System’. 
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and, where appropriate, financial compensation.53 In an ideal world, these elements 
would be addressed within one system. 
 
I have discussed, inter alia: the failings of the regulatory system;54 the difficulties 
aggrieved patients and their families may have in accessing NHS complaints processes; 
the failure to provide a coherent system for learning from complaints; and the myriad of 
complications arising from the lack of true dialogue between aggrieved patient and 
doctor. While there is good practice in parts of the NHS, the picture is not uniform and 
the status of complaint processes varies greatly amongst hospital Trusts. Curtailment of 
resources within the NHS will negatively affect attention to redress for past failings. 
 
C. The Role of Apology in Addressing Non-Pecuniary Loss 
 
Liability in negligence results in damages. Damages operate as compensation, as a 
marker of wrongdoing and as acknowledgment that redress is needed. Damages also 
address needs and many people regard this as the most significant aspect of damages. 
Damages are often seen as the central vehicle of corrective justice in the sense that they 
operate to redress the balance between the parties by correcting the loss suffered by one 
party at the expense of the other who caused it. If damages are only about need then a 
no-fault scheme could be a way to deal with loss.55 Apologies, while doing some of this 
work, marking wrongdoing and offering acknowledgment, do not address need in the 
same way. Apologies can be part of the corrective justice mix if one considers 
compensation as practical reparation and apology as reparation for the emotional and 
moral pain suffered by the victim. I will argue that full apologies would redress some of 
the intangible aspects of loss following iatrogenic harm.56 
 
                                             
53 See Chapter 7 History of the NHS Complaints Processes: ‘A Curate’s Egg?’ above for full discussion. 
54 The Care Quality Commission. 
55 H Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Wrong Questions – Wrong Answers’ (2002) 8 UNSWLJ 
Forum: Reform of the Law of Negligence: Balancing Costs and Community Expectations 2, 18. 
56 Vines (n 10), 15. 
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III. FACILITATING EFFECTIVE REDRESS 
APOLOGIES AND NON-PECUNIARY LOSS 
 
A. Setting the Scene: Trust 
 
Trust is at the heart of all medical decisions.57 
 
The purpose of healthcare law and policy must be to establish an environment in which 
trust thrives. Trust is the primary value for the relationship between patient and 
healthcare professional to work. .58 
 
I am considering the issue of apologies in the context of private law59 in the sphere of 
clinical negligence. There are special elements in the medico-legal field that merit 
mention. Trust is crucial in the medical setting yet involves the patient in deciding 
whether or not to take the inherent risk. Some will trust because they have dealt with the 
doctor before; others will trust because of the reputation of the doctor; still others will 
trust because they believe the healthcare system they are entering is one that can be 
trusted, in this case the NHS. At present, trust, as the basis for the relationship between 
healthcare professional and patient, is being replaced by the rules, practices and 
processes of systems. Yet those rules, practices and processes cannot do the thinking 
and problem-solving necessary to diagnose and treat a particular patient.60 The 
judgement involved is an art, a human skill which the patient has to trust. Mistakes are a 
reality of the complexity of the healthcare world and the possibility of mistakes must be 
part of the expectations discussed in the patient-doctor relationship. Healthcare 
professionals need to be open about their mistakes and share those with other 
professionals and patients to avoid their repetition.61 
 
What militates against good communication and wholehearted openness regarding 
adverse events? One key to understanding communication difficulties is to appreciate 
the inherent power imbalance between the patient and the doctor. At the fraught time of 
                                             
57 M Henaghan, Health Professionals and Trust: The Cure for Healthcare Law and Policy (London, 
Routledge, 2012), 2. 
58 Ibid at 12.I use the phrase ‘healthcare professional’ and ‘doctor’ interchangeably. 
59 In contrast with apologies in the public sphere of governments. See M Nobles, The Politics of Official 
Apologies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) and N Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of 
Apologies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
60 See Henaghan (n 57), 6 for discussion of the undermining of trust by audit: compliance for compliance 
sake. 
61 Ibid at 20. 
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the realisation of iatrogenic harm, families want understanding and to be heard. What 
they need most is knowledge – they need full disclosure of the mistake made and an 
apology for it with the offer of fair compensation.62 Although it is a fundamental ethical 
requirement63 that a physician should at all times deal openly and honestly with patients, 
the physician may perceive himself as all-knowing and prefer to see what has happened 
as a ‘complication’ rather than confront his own limitations. The combination of an all-
knowing doctor, whose identity is synonymous with his/her status, and the patient and 
the family who want to know what really happened, creates a major trust gap between 
the two groups.64 Another crucial factor which colours all these transactions is the 
difficulty of real communication. In my discussion of ‘open disclosure’ I highlighted the 
complexity of imparting65 and hearing information.66 One of the major goals of full 
apology is the restoration of the relationship between doctor and patient.67 
 
It is against this contextual background of the issue of trust that I will discuss the role 
apology might play in providing some redress for the pain and suffering of ‘not 
knowing’ and the need for acknowledgement of wrong and undertakings to repair. I will 
discuss and analyse the definition of apologies, their function and limitations, apology-
protection legislation, and the supposed effect apologies might have on litigation. I 
conclude with arguments for their place as a compensatory aspect68 of offering effective 
redress for the non-pecuniary aspects of iatrogenic harm in the NHS. 
 
B. Apologies: Timing and Definition 
 
Reconciliation means the healing of the relationship - an apology (and possible 
reparation) on the one side and forgiveness on the other creating the healing. 
Thus, an apology may not be an end in itself, but part of a larger sequence.69 
 
                                             
62 N Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness, (Baltimore, Hopkins University 
Press, 2005), 38-39. 
63 American Medical Association, ‘Opinion 8.12 –Patient Information’ Code of Medical Ethics, March 
1981. 
64 Berlinger (n 62), 41. 
65 Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’ above: ie what and how much information is imparted 
and how is it understood? 
66 See NC Manson and O O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) for analysis of the limits of informed consent and the nuances of communication 
transactions. 
67 Vines (n 10), 5.  
68 Vines (n 7), 499. 




Justice delayed is justice denied.70 Starting from a premise of doing no harm, then harm 
being done, creates an obligation to rectify that harm. The first way to do that is to be 
honest with the patient as to why and how the harm has occurred. I see the full apology 
as the beginning of the process of redress, therefore to be given before any clinical 
negligence litigation. It is only when the patient is fully apprised that he can make an 
informed choice of how to proceed: whether through the complaints procedure, 
litigation or no further action.71 This goes some way towards equalising the power 
differential between the parties. Delaying the giving of an apology involves costs to the 
patient. 
 
The longer the process goes on, the more deeply the grievance sets in. There is also the 
psychological cost to the patient and/or family of living with the possibility of no 
resolution. While the matter is unresolved, the anxiety caused by it means that people, 
patient as well as doctor, do not function at the levels they are capable of. These are, 
inter alia, the costs in not addressing the problem so that it can be dealt with in a way 
that makes it less likely to happen again.72 
 
2. Full Apologies, Partial Apologies and Forgiveness: What Do We Mean? 
 
Defining apologies is crucial to determining their function. Apologies have 
multiple functions, one of which is corrective justice.73 
 
There is such a thing as a true apology, called a full apology, and whether public or 
private, an apology is not real unless it includes an acknowledgement of fault. What is 
apologised for is a wrong rather than a loss because the moral question to which 
apology responds is whether there has been a wrong.74 A full apology does not exist 
unless the person who is expressing regret is also taking responsibility for a wrong 
which they have committed. This definition applies whether considering an apology 
from a moral theory point of view or from a psychological point of view.75 Partial 
apologies are known as ‘safe’ apologies because where there is no acknowledgment of 
                                             
70 Henaghan (n 57), 75. 
71 Teninbaum (n 27), 34: a prompt apology gives patients an opportunity to consider their options. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Vines (n 10), 1. 
74 Apologies in the civil liability area are to be viewed as a form of corrective justice. Ibid at 8-13. 
75 Ibid at 5 fn 21 and 22.  
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fault, there is no risk of legal liability. Saying ‘I am sorry’ is defined as a mere 
expression of regret or a partial apology. This might operate as a soothing device for 
small hurts or where the person speaking has no responsibility.76 As discussed below, 
much of the legislation which protects apologies only protects this type. Forgiveness by 
the victim is the other side of the sequence leading to reconciliation. Forgiveness 
involves the suspension of hostile feelings towards the wrongdoer. It fosters 
reconciliation and the restoration of relationships. Finally, forgiveness involves the 
removal of the guilt created by the wrong – in other words completes the sequence of 
wiping the slate clean. Realistically, I think this is an outcome which can only be 
partially achieved.77 
 
As Prue Vines points out in her writings, the concept of apologies in this sphere was 
born out of apologies in the public arena in relation to governmental actions relating to 
war or treatment of indigenous people or other matters. One reason for hesitancy by 
governments is that an apology may require compensation. However, in Australia, the 
argument for apologising to indigenous people is seen as part of reconciliation.78 In the 
civil arena apologies are seen as a norm with specific functions.79 The positive side of 
full apologies offers doctor and patient face-to-face communication essential for 
corrective justice. It is a chance for a full explanation of the adverse event, the 
acknowledgement of fault and the acceptance of responsibility. Apologies can also 
create meaning for people out of events which can otherwise seem utterly meaningless. 
Finally, apologies may dissipate anger in a way which is related to the severity of the 
harm, and reduce aggression.80 
 
3. The Consequences of Offering Partial or Insincere Apologies 
 
There are consequences attendant upon offering less than full apologies. As noted in my 
discussion of the communication difficulties in imparting information, apologies, since 
they are mediated by language, entail an extremely complex, highly nuanced process. 
Literature from Canada concurs that ‘disclosing medical errors to patients may sound 
                                             
76 A mere expression of regret is a partial apology. Ibid at 5. 
77 Ibid. 
78Ibid at 4.  
79 N Tauchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1991), 39. 
80 Vines (n 10), 10. 
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straightforward; however, it is actually a very challenging communication task’.81 The 
conceptual and moral problem with an apology is whether or not it is sincere. There are 
significant risks in giving apologies which are perceived as insincere. Such apologies 
may actually release further aggression.82 In addition, relationships between patients and 
doctors are not healed by such an apology; if anything they are made worse and further 
compromise trust.83 
 
I have defined the requisite ingredients and potential reparative work that full apologies 
can offer. Yet these apologies are rarely forthcoming. Despite the fact that in the UK a 
number of high profile cases have highlighted the problem of non-disclosure to patients 
of adverse events in medical care, the push for a mandatory disclosure law has not yet 
materialised.84 I now turn to the question of the effect on apologies of apology-
protecting legislation.85 
 
C. Apology-Protecting Legislation: 
Apologies, Insurance and Liability 
 
1. Why Sorry is the Hardest Word 
 
Hindering the practice of offering full apology has been the interpretation of the frequent 
clauses in insurance contracts which void the contract if any admission of liability is 
made.86 These clauses, known as admissions and compromise clauses, are the driving 
force behind organisations advising clients not to apologise because an apology may be 
taken as an admission of liability. In order to facilitate apologies and address the fear of 
litigation, apology-protection legislation has been passed in some US jurisdictions since 
1986, in Australian jurisdictions since 2002 and Canada87 and the UK since 2006.88 
 
                                             
81 Levinson and Gallagher (n 26), 266. 
82 Vines (n 1). 
83 Henaghan (n 57), 72-73. 
84 Vines (n 1). 
85Where appropriate I will analyse reforms in Australia and the United States (US). 
86 See Vines (n 7), 487 for full discussion and examples of how the courts have dealt with the problem. 
87 British Colombia Apology Act RSBC 2006, Bill 16 makes an apology for an adverse event inadmissible 
for the purposes of proving liability. Levinson and Gallagher (n 26), 266. 
88 Massachusetts General Laws TiT II Ch 333, s 23D; Civil Liability Act 2002 s 68 (NSW); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); British Colombia Apology Act (n 87) and UK Compensation Act 2006 s 2 
‘An apology, an offer of treatment or other redress, shall not of itself amount to an admission of 
negligence or breach of statutory duty’. The UK legislation is unsatisfactory as there is no definition of 
apology. Vines (n 1). 
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The vast majority of legislation in the US is legislation specifically directed at medical 
negligence litigation; elsewhere the legislation is directed at civil liability in general, or 
in relation to personal injury in general. The concern that an apology may amount to an 
admission and therefore directly or indirectly create liability is a legitimate one. In the 
UK, the explanatory note to the Compensation Act 2006 asserts that the answer to the 
question of whether an apology is an admission of liability is no. However, it is not 
simply the case that any kind of apologetic utterance will not amount to an admission of 
liability creating or going to liability. It appears in England, Wales and Scotland that the 
law states that an apology ‘of itself will not amount to an admission of liability, 
particularly in relation to negligence law. This is because liability is a legal conclusion 
which courts will always have to draw themselves. However, as the case law is 
equivocal, there cannot be complete confidence about the position.89 
 
In Australia there have been cases that have made it clear that the fact that someone has 
said it is his or her fault does not mean s/he is automatically liable for an injury. All 
Australian jurisdictions since 2002 have passed legislation which prevents an apology 
from being deemed an admission, from being admitted into court and from determining 
liability. The aim of the legislation was to reduce litigation by protecting apologies. It is 
clear that the courts regard it as their prerogative to determine liability. If an apology 
does not determine liability then it should not void an insurance policy. Nonetheless, 
there are difficulties, at present, for Australian medical practitioners and for the open 
disclosure process.90 The Acts in different jurisdictions do not define apology in the 
same way. New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland define 
apology as including an acknowledgment of fault (full apology). The other States and 
the NT define the apology that is protected by law as merely an expression of regret 
(partial apology). This creates a serious problem for three reasons. 
 
One, as noted above, is that research shows that most people regard an apology as real 
only if it includes acknowledgement of fault. Partial apologies can elicit increased anger. 
The second reason is that in a country where businesses, including insurance companies 
and projects such as open disclosure91 are national, the fact that there are differences 
                                             
89 Space precludes case discussion and evidential considerations. See P Vines ‘Apologies and Civil 
Liability in England, Wales and Scotland: The View from Elsewhere’ (2007) University of New South 
Wales Faculty of Law Research Series Paper 61 (online at bepress Legal Repository) at 15. 
90 P Vines, ‘Sorry Saga of Apologies’ December 2011 at www.mjainsight.com.au/view?  
91RAM Iedema et al, ‘The National Open Disclosure Pilot: Evaluation of a Policy Implementation 
Initiative’ (2008) 188 Medical Journal of Australia 7, 397- 400. 
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across the States and Territories causes unnecessary confusion. And, unfortunately, in 
most cases, for the sake of uniformity, advice will be based on the lowest common 
denominator, namely the partial apology. Therefore, even when a doctor is working in 
NSW, a jurisdiction where full apology is protected, he is likely to be told by open 
disclosure trainers to give only a partial one. The third problem for practitioners is that 
they are told there are strict parameters about how to apologise which make apologies 
even harder to make sincerely.92 Vines finds this disappointing because there are, as I 
will discuss below, several hospitals in the US and Australia that have moved to a 
system of full disclosure – including acknowledgement of responsibility for harm – 
which have found their litigation bills declining. Vines’ recommendations for facilitating 
protected apologies are: education of lawyers, medical practitioners and insurers;93 a 
change to the definition of apology to include acknowledgement of fault in all 
jurisdictions; and finally the creation of uniform legislation.94 I agree that there is much 
of value in legislative protection of apologies and it helps to avoid the ‘chill factor’ of 
lawyers and insurance companies advising doctors not to apologise. The main impetus 
for creating apology-protecting legislation was the assumption that litigation would be 
reduced, thereby saving costs to both defendants (for present purposes the NHS) and 
insurers. 
 
Concern about whether disclosing medical errors increases malpractice claims has been 
one of the main barriers to disclosure. However, the relative effects of disclosure versus 
compensation on the outcome of litigation is not possible to assess and the research is 
not definitive; there is emerging evidence that the number of malpractice claims may 
either stay the same or decrease after implementation of open disclosure policies 
accompanied by financial compensation in appropriate cases.95 Overall, however, the 
evidence to date is inconclusive.96 
 
2. The Effect of Apologies on Litigation 
 
As I have argued, full apologies have much to offer, but this does not mean that nobody 
sues. In many cases, particularly in the US and other countries including the UK, where 
                                             
92 P Vines (n 90). 
93 The need for training programmes to facilitate high-quality disclosure is echoed in the Canadian 
literature. Levinson and Gallagher (n 26), 266. 
94 Vines (n 1). 
95 Levinson and Gallagher (n 26), 266.  
96 Vines (n 90). 
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social security payments are low, a badly injured person may need to sue in order to get 
sufficient money for his or her consequent treatment and care. Nevertheless, it may be 
that patients who have been subject to adverse events and subsequently receive a full 
apology are more likely either not to sue or to settle their cases before trial.97 In settling 
a case, costs are reduced.98 
 
My argument is that it would be helpful to consider initiatives in the US, Canada and 
Australia offering open disclosure and full apologies.99 That said, open disclosure and 
full apologies (which depend upon open disclosure) are not easy options. 
 
D. The Other Side of the Coin: 
How Medical Apology Programs Harm Patients 
 
I have included the following material because in the concerns expressed about the lack 
of independent advice to claimants there are echoes of the NHS Redress Act 2006100 
provisions, eschewing independent legal advice to patients. The Welsh program also 
compromises independent review of the adverse event.101 
 
When a lawyer suspects that he has committed legal malpractice, he must disclose it to 
the client and recommend that the client seek outside counsel to get objective legal 
advice on how to proceed. By contrast, when a doctor suspects that he has committed 
medical malpractice, at many facilities he is expected to employ a set of protocols that 
discourage the injured patient from considering the need for compensation. Yet, while a 
lawyer could be disbarred for this sort of behaviour, medical apology programmes 
receive praise.102 In an interesting and detailed paper, Gabriel Teninbaum does not 
reject full apologies per se but is critical of the way in which they are used in medical 
apology programmes. His contention is that their design subverts the goals of fully 
compensating patients under the principles of tort law. Injured patients are manipulated 
as a means to persuade them not to pursue monetary damages. He argues that modern 
                                             
97 Space has precluded discussion regarding resolution by mediation but no doubt a full apology would 
assist that process also. 
98 Vines (n 10), 15. 
99 Iedema (n 91), 397- 400 and Vines (n 10), 1. 
100 Chapter 8 ‘NHS Redress Act 2006 – A Lost Opportunity’ above. See NHS Redress Act 2006 s 8 
‘independent advice only offered in relation to offer and any settlement agreement’. 
101 Lewis and Buchan (n 13), 560. 
102 Teninbaum (n 27), 2.  
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apology programmes appear to cool their marks.103 In other words a person in power 
uses persuasive methods to control the emotional state of the mark (ie the patient); the 
intended effect diffuses the mark’s righteous anger to the benefit of the perpetrator. 
These programmes104 appear to cool their marks out105 as a means of preventing them 
from speaking to a lawyer and becoming educated about their rights.106 
 
For present purposes, what is significant about the contrasted studies of medical 
apology programmes are their provisions for the patient’s access to independent legal 
advice. The Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Centre107 model was the last publicised 
programme in the US that included the need to advise unrepresented patients who are 
malpractice victims108 to bring an attorney to negotiate on their behalf. Surprisingly, in a 
subsequent study, data indicated that disclosing errors in specific ways may not result in 
an increase in malpractice claims or in the amount paid per claim.109 
 
However, further studies supported the idea that many patients were willing to accept a 
fraction of the amount of money they would get in a malpractice suit if the doctor 
simply apologised.110 The rules pertaining to COPIC, (a primary insurer for Colorado’s 
3 Rs programme: Recognise, Respond, Resolve)111 range from not allowing attorney 
involvement to refusing to allow a patient who has written a letter from participating. In 
addition, this compromises practitioner accountability and potentially harms future 
patients.112 The University of Michigan Healthcare Model113 created a system designed 
to address the issue patients want resolved: explanation and holding the doctor to 
account. Unlike COPIC, UMHM allows patients to seek legal advice but does not do so 
routinely. The criticism of this programme is that there is no protection for patients 
against the conflict of interest which arises, as UMHM is a self-insured facility. The 
                                             
103 Erving Goffman, ‘On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure’, (1952) 15 
Psychiatry 451, 455. 
104 The Lexington VA Medical Center (hereinafter Lexington), COPIC (a primary insurer for Colorado’s 
3 Rs program: Recognise, Respond, Resolve) which works with monetary caps (hereinafter COPIC) and 
the University of Michigan Healthcare model (hereinafter UMHM) in Teninbaum (n 27), 12. 
105 Confidence men use a tried-and-true set of techniques to convince (or cool out) their victim (or mark) 
not to complain after he has been swindled. Teninbaum (n 27), 3.  
106 Teninbaum (n 27), 3. 
107 Lexington (n 104). 
108 Teninbaum (n 27), 8 fn 21. 
109 Ibid, 8. 
110 Ibid Part IV at 26 fn 127. ‘If Everyone is Happy, What’s Wrong?’ See also RE Quinn & MC Eichler, 
‘The  
3Rs Program: The Colorado Experience’ (2008) 51 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 709, 710. 
111 COPIC (n 104). 
112 Teninbaum (n 27), 15. 
113 UMHM (n 104). 
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author concludes with a plea for empowering patients to know their rights in order to 
make informed decisions about seeking redress. 
 
IV. EFFECTIVE REDRESS 
 
A. Can Complaints Programmes Become a Way to Build Trust? 
The New Zealand Experience 
 
In New Zealand, compensation is paid through the Accident Compensation Act 2001, 
whereby the loss is spread across all employers by way of a levy.114 A hospital could 
show its repentance by acting quickly to minimise the damage. Compensation is 
financial, but repentance also requires actions by those involved: it may be by providing 
extra care; helping with chores in the house; listening to the injured person and working 
with them to put into place processes which will avoid a repetition of the adverse event. 
Disclosure of what happened to them and a timely apology would go some way to 
beginning resolution. I appreciate that New Zealand operates a no-fault system115 to 
deal with medical accidents, but the necessary ingredients for a humane and efficient 
redress system remain constant. 
 
In the New Zealand context, fair compensation would be covered by the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001 and could include rehabilitation costs, income compensation, 
lump sum compensation, funeral costs, survivors’ grants and spousal compensation. 
Mark Henaghan argues against large sum payments for loss of life barring those cases 
where there was dependency. He argues that the existence of the threat of large financial 
compensation for non-pecuniary loss and Draconian professional penalties act as a 
deterrent, making disclosure and apology less likely. I have alluded to the pitfalls of 
delay and the psychological toll on both parties. A key feature for fairness to all 
concerned is the crucial availability of an independent third party to investigate and 
assess the complaint straight away. If it is found that there is no basis to the complaint, 
it should be dismissed immediately, thereby leaving no opportunity for uncertainty and 
stress to fester. Tact, confidentiality for both sides, and careful use of language are 
essential. As noted above, the lack of independent review bedevilled the proposed 
Redress Act 2008 and the Welsh project. As in the UK, complaints may be referred to 
                                             
114 See Henaghan (n 57), 74-75 for full exposition of these ideas. 
115 This looks more like distributive justice as more victims are paid smaller sums. I am concentrating on 
the content and joined-up aspect of the compensation process. 
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the Health and Disability Ombudsman, who has similar powers to our Ombudsman. In 
New Zealand, as here, the Ombudsman’s office is overstretched.116 
 
I believe that, excepting the necessary compensation, the most important trust-building 
and useful outcome from a medical redress system is the undertaking to repair. I have 
noted how important to all victims it is that something should be learnt from the adverse 
event to ensure that others do not suffer the same fate. Examples of good practice would 
be the repackaging of the chemotherapy drug Vincristine117 and the new World Health 
Organisation surgical checklist.118 
 
I have listed herein the requirements for a just redress system for iatrogenic harm. How 
this is to be delivered in the UK remains a challenge. On the present horizon is the 





In this final chapter I have reviewed the legal and NHS systems in place for redress for 
iatrogenic harm in England. Relying on corrective justice principles which place the 
relationship between victim and tortfeasor foremost, I have analysed and advocated as a 
first step – before an action for clinical negligence – the timely giving of full apologies 
where appropriate. I have noted the importance of trust for the patient, doctor and the 
NHS system. I then introduced the topic of apologies, their definition, function and 
limitations when used inappropriately. I then analysed the apology-protection legislation 
and the presumed though inconclusive effect apologies may have on litigation. I have 
argued that, despite potential pitfalls, full apologies have a significant role in addressing 
redress for the non-pecuniary aspects of iatrogenic harm. 
                                             
116 Henaghan (n 57), 76. 
117 After the negligent death of Wayne Jowett (2001). See The Guardian 20 April 2001 and 16 August 
2011 for follow-up. 
118 See Henaghan (n 57), 79-81 for full exposition of making hospital environments safer. 
119 ‘RTA portal struggles with claim numbers as clinical negligence pilot is set for April’ (28 July 2011) 
Legal Futures contains the following quotation: ‘On clinical negligence, Justice Minister Jonathan 
Djanogly told Parliament recently (2011) that the Ministry of Justice is working with the NHS Litigation 
Authority and claimant lawyer representatives to devise a pilot for dealing with cases valued between 













Cynics beware, I am romantic about the National Health Service; I love it. All I need to 
do to rediscover the romance is to look at the healthcare in my own country.120 
 
The Government have announced that they intend to establish a comprehensive health 
service for everybody in this country. They want to ensure that every man, woman and 
child can rely on getting all the advice and treatment care which they may need in 
matters of personal health.121 
                                             
120 DM Berwick (President, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Cambridge Mass. USA) ‘A 
Transatlantic Review of the NHS’ (2008) British Medical Journal 2008; 337; a838. Paper given at the 
NHS Live conference celebrating 60 years of the NHS, July 2008. 
121 Ministry of Health, Department of Health for Scotland. A National Health Service (Cmd 6502). 
(London, HMSO, 1944) in T Delamothe, ‘NHS at 60: A Comprehensive Service’ (2008) British Medical 




The thesis has addressed how effectively or otherwise the civil justice system – through 
litigation and/or the NHS complaints procedures – provides redress for patients 
suffering iatrogenic harm in the course of treatment received under the aegis of the 
NHS. In the case of iatrogenic harm, sadly, the victim often cannot be put back into his 
pre-tortious state. It nevertheless must be possible to have more meaningful redress than 
is presently on offer. 
 
I have assumed that the NHS is a public good that should be supported. The competing 
tensions in my argument are around doing justice to iatrogenically harmed patients 
while at the same time protecting a limited budget devoted to treatment of the 
population at large. The best solution would be a reduction of adverse events but, for 
present purposes, I concentrate on effective redress for past adverse events.122 
 
I have premised the obligation for victims of iatrogenic harm to be compensated upon 
corrective justice principles,123 constrained by notions of distributive justice when it 
comes to paying damages from an overstretched NHS budget. Patients’ wishes for 
restoration, correction, communication, sanction and financial support, where 
appropriate, should be attended to.124 There is a place for financial compensation for 
pecuniary loss and this is achievable through litigation.125 I have noted that the route to 
damages has many practical difficulties, including the funding of litigation126 and 
proving liability,127 but although payment of money as compensation for pecuniary 
loss128 can never be a like-for-like substitution, it can be said to be a congruent redress. I 
remain of the opinion that non-pecuniary loss should be compensated by means other 
than damages, not solely because of NHS budgetary constraints but because other 
redress would more effectively address these needs. 
 
                                             
122 I have delineated the details both in the body of the thesis and in the final Chapter 9: ‘Effective 
Redress and the Role of Apologies.’ Here I summarise only. 
123 Chapter 1 ‘Corrective Justice and Entitlement to Redress within the NHS’ above. 
124 Chapter 2 ‘What Patients Seek from Redress’ above. 
125 Part II Medical Negligence Litigation, above. 
126 Chapter 3 ‘Funding Litigation’ above. 
127 Chapters 4 ‘Proving Clinical Negligence: Duty and Breach’; Chapter 5 ‘Causation’ above.  
128 Chapter 5 ‘Damages’ above. 
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I have considered redress for non-pecuniary loss within the NHS, namely, the 
complaints procedure129 and the Redress Act 2006.130 The former was found wanting in 
all aspects: not timely, explanations not forthcoming, no system for learning from 
mistakes. The latter Act has never been fully enacted. A major stumbling block for 
patients and their families who suspect iatrogenic harm is lack of information. This 
difficulty affects both the civil justice system and the NHS complaints processes. 
Information is power and the withholding of that information reinforces the power 
differential between the doctor/healthcare provider and the patient. Access to just 
redress depends upon the patient making an informed decision about how to proceed to 
claim his need for and/or right to redress. The innovative work on full apologies with 
apology-protecting legislation in common law countries offers a way forward which 





                                             
129 Part III Redress within the NHS; Chapter 7 ‘History of the NHS Complaints Process – A Curate’s 
Egg?’ above. 
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